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AFGHANISTAN IN 1919

LECTURE BY MR. IKBAL ALI SHAH, M.R.A.S., F.R.G.S.

At the monthly meeting of the members and friends of the Central Asian Society, held on the afternoon of Wednesday, October 22, 1919, a lecture on Afghanistan was delivered by Mr. Ikbal Ali Shah. The chair was occupied by Sir Frederic Fryer.

The CHAIRMAN, in introducing the lecturer, expressed regret that Lord Carnock, Chairman of Council, was unable to attend owing to an attack of bronchitis. His Lordship, he added, very much regretted his absence, as he was very anxious to say a few words on the subject of the lecture. Before introducing the lecturer, he wished to express the deep sorrow which the Members of the Council and of the Society felt at the death of their late Chairman, Sir Henry Trotter. Sir Henry was a most excellent Chairman of the Society, and took the greatest interest in all its affairs. He was exceedingly well qualified for the position because of his wide and comprehensive knowledge of Central Asia. They would all miss him very much, and desired to express their sympathy with Lady Trotter in her great loss. Mr. Ikbal Ali Shah, who was to give them a lecture on the most interesting subject of Afghanistan, was himself a native of the country, and was at that time studying at the University of Edinburgh. Mr. Shah had written several interesting articles for the *Edinburgh Review*, and had a very wide knowledge of Afghanistan.

Mr. Ikbal Ali Shah then read his paper, which was in the following terms:

History repeats itself in Afghanistan as elsewhere. Two decades ago, when the great Abdur Rahman Khan, father of Habibullah Khan and Nasrullah Khan, and grandsire of the present Amir, sat on the throne at Kabul, there was trouble, similar to the recent trouble on the north-western frontier of India. Afridis and Afghan regulars had closed the Khyber Pass, a Jehád having been proclaimed, and the Amir had to upbraid his subjects for taking up arms. In a proclamation he said: "Why do you call these disturbances Jehád? . . . Do not be led to think like Shir Ali (against whom Britain waged war in 1878) I am such a fool as to annoy and offend others for your sake. Your real object is to make me

fight with the British Government." He also reminded the tribes that "the first condition of a Jehád is the co-operation of the King of Islam"—that is, himself. He ordered the Governor of Jelalabad to turn back tribal deputations, seeking to visit Kabul, and directed his officials to disperse gatherings of tribesmen. It was realized in London, when full information was received regarding the risings, that they were wholly due to the actions of certain recalcitrant sections of the Amir's subjects, who were influenced by the agitation in favour of a religious uprising. Afghanistan was not then, nor is it now, a country like England, with railways and telegraph systems. It takes time to suppress disturbances and specially those which break out as a result of religious agitations and the plotting of influential men who are as hostile to the Amir as to the Power whom he desires to retain friendly relations with.

To understand the Afghan situation, it must be realized that the attitude of the people as a whole, ever since the days of Amir Dost Mahomed, has been one of distrustfulness towards foreigners. The unity of the country was not achieved until Amir Abdur Rahman, grandfather of the present Amir, ascended the throne. He did everything in his power to convince his people that the British were their friends, and that the Russians were their real enemies. In this regard he was not wholly successful, so deep-rooted was the anti-foreign prejudice in all parts of Afghanistan. He, however, did much to influence large sections of his subjects to regard the British with a degree of favour. Many Afghans are warmly pro-British.

Amir Abdur Rahman was both ambitious and patriotic. Two predominating considerations dominated his policy. In the first place, he wished to win back all the lost provinces of his grandfather and consolidate a kingdom for his descendants which would be permeated by strong national feelings, and in the second place he desired to have his kingdom entirely independent of foreign control and left to develop itself on such lines as the people approved. He favoured foreign assistance, but within limits; such assistance, he held, must not involve interference with purely Afghan affairs. He employed British, French, and Indian subjects, who were taken to Kabul so as to train his subjects as artisans and traders. Strict watch was kept on them so that they might not interfere with Afghan politics. This precaution was a needful one. An Indian Moslem medical man, for instance, was found to be taking a great interest in a political movement, and was ultimately implicated in a plot. He was consigned to prison and, I believe, is still there. It did not matter to the Afghans that the political offender was their co-religionist. It was sufficient for them that he was the subject of a foreign Government and had interfered with Afghan politics.

The actions of this invidious Indian doctor did much to confirm

the suspicious of many people in Kabul that all foreigners are dangerous, and that they must be on their guard against them. This anti-foreign feeling has naturally been directed towards their nearest neighbours—namely, the Russians and the British. In consequence, many Afghans are obsessed by the idea that if they are to retain their liberty they must keep the Russian and the British subjects out of their country.

It is not difficult to account for this prevalent and, in places, violent anti-foreign prejudice. The Afghans followed with anxiety the gradual absorption by Russia of Central Asia. They were also aware of the Russian scheme to invade India by violating their country. Although they were informed, time and again, that the Russians had given repeated assurances to the British Government that they would respect the boundary line between Turkestan and Afghanistan, there were frequent clashings between Russian and Afghan outposts at Panjdeh, on the Murghab, and on the Pamirs. They could not trust the northern foreigners. Had the Russians not formed a secret alliance with Amir Shir Ali which resulted in the second Afghan War? Had the Russians not incited Persia to claim Herat, and had not Herat been attacked by the Persians with Russian co-operation and assistance? It was clear to the Afghans that Russia desired to add their country to its Turkestan Province, so that it might become the cockpit of the struggle for the possession of India. It is not to be wondered at that Afghanistan dreaded and hated Russia.

On the other hand, many Afghans were suspicious of the good intentions of Great Britain also, because it had waged wars against their country. They also feared that Britain, even although it inclined to friendliness, was dangerous because it appeared to be less powerful than Russia during the Kaufmann military occupation of Turkestan. When the two Powers set themselves to arrange an agreement regarding Afghan territory, the Russian diplomatists appeared to be invariably astute and influential enough to "make the best of the deal." The Provinces of Panjdeh, Shighnan, Roshan, and Darwaz were secured by the Russians by force. The Afghans believed that they would have held their own if the British Government had not controlled their policy. They held, and still hold, that it was through British influence and Russian misunderstanding of geographical conditions and racial questions that Afghanistan lost such large areas of their country.

Anti-British feeling was also fostered in consequence of the fact that the British Government had deposed their Amirs and kept the deposed men in India, and, for some reason not understood by the people, pensioned them as if to hold them in reserve for future contingencies. Afghan statesmen might approve of the action of the British Government—the best informed of them decidedly do—but the average Afghan regarded the British policy as one directed to

interfere with the freedom and independence of their country. It is difficult to make the Amir's subjects realize that Great Britain was checkmating Russian movements in Central Asia and endeavouring to strengthen Afghanistan so that it might ever be a buffer state between Russia and India.

My concern here is not to excuse the anti-British feeling that prevails among sections of the people of Afghanistan, but to inquire into its origin. The British and the Russians were hated because Afghan freedom was in danger. It is important to bear in mind that the sole cause of anti-foreign feeling is the dread of the loss of Afghan independence. Amir Abdur Rahman Khan was well aware of Afghan sentiments in this connection. When he ascended the throne he did everything in his power to have himself recognized as an independent monarch. Great Britain gave him due recognition, but within limits. He was denied the privilege of dealing directly with the British Government. The arrangement was that all negotiations should be conducted through the Government of India. His wish to have an ambassador in London was refused. He contended that as an independent monarch an ambassador was the proper intermediary. It is undoubted that he was deeply disappointed by the refusal of the British Government to negotiate with him through their Foreign Office, which has ever enjoyed so excellent a reputation for international dealing. He sent his son Nasrullah to England so as to prevail upon the British statesmen to reconsider their decision, which pained and surprised him. He could not understand why his independent State should be denied the privilege accorded to other independent States. The mystery surrounding the British refusal has never been cleared up. It has been stated time and again that Nasrullah's mission failed because he was "too arrogant," "too proud," and "really impossible." But, granting that Nasrullah was haughty and firm—he was expected at home to be firm—his attitude, even although it may have involved want of tact, did not alter the principle which he did his utmost to urge and from which he refused to depart. It seemed quite clear, at the time, to those who recognized that the Afghan claim was a perfectly fair one, that for some reason best known to itself the then statesmen were opposed to Afghanistan coming into direct touch with London. The desire was, evidently, to keep Afghanistan under the control of the Viceroy of India; just as India, prior to the Mutiny, was kept under the control of the East India Company. Afghanistan was thus denied the privilege enjoyed by Persia of having a representative in London, and its people could not help being made to feel that it was virtually a semi-dependency although nominally independent.

At the time when Nasrullah's mission was widely discussed, it was urged in excuse for the attitude adopted that as India was in such

close proximity to Afghanistan the Indian Government was in a position to understand local conditions much better than the Foreign Office or India Office in London. The same argument applies to Persia and even to China. It carries with it a slight on the British Foreign Office and the India Office in London, which I believe to be the most perfect in the world. If these offices are able to deal with Siam, China, and Japan, surely they are not incapable of dealing with Afghanistan. It will be hard to convince the Afghan statesmen that the British Government cannot be safely guided by its Foreign Office and that its relations with the Indian Government could not be safely supplemented by direct relations with the India Office in London. My own view, which is shared by the majority of the responsible statesmen at Kabul, is that an Afghan ambassador in London would strengthen those ties which already exist between Afghanistan and Great Britain. It is not forgotten that Great Britain solemnly declared during Lord Dufferin's Viceroyalty that it desired a "friendly, strong, and independent Afghanistan." That this is still Great Britain's policy no British subject can doubt. But, at Kabul, those who are undoubtedly pro-British find it difficult to defend the attitude of the past British statesmen who opposed the policy of direct representation by having an Afghan representative in London. If this privilege is granted, my critics urge, there would have to be a British ambassador at Kabul. I agree; and it would be found that the Amir would willingly consent to such an agreement. Those who are familiar with the political "cross-currents" at Kabul have no hesitation in stating that if it were brought into direct contact with London a new and happy era would be inaugurated. Afghanistan would come to know and understand Great Britain, and Great Britain would come to know and understand Afghanistan and not have to depend upon information gathered from a complicated system.

To a large extent the trouble which has broken out of late is due to misunderstandings. Habibullah, the late Amir, who was the friend of Great Britain and the real friend of his own countrymen, had much to contend with during 1914 and later, as the result of the misunderstandings, due to the lack of knowledge, prevalent in Afghanistan. He was a wise and prudent man. His tactfulness made him strong. The people learned to believe in him, as was emphasized by his dramatic appearance at Kabul Bridge in 1914,* when he prevented his country being plunged into war to serve the purposes of Germany. But although his pro-British attitude was approved by many, it involved at the time what appeared to be a pro-Russian attitude also,

* This incident is well told in Mr. Ikbal Ali Shah's article in the *Edinburgh Review* for July, 1918, entitled "Afghanistan and the German Threat." That article, and "The Claims of Afghanistan" in the same *Review* for January, 1919, should be read in conjunction with this lecture.—A. C. Y.

for the Russians were fighting with the Allies. He had consequently to strive against fearful influences, and when it was realized that the war involved the collapse of Turkey, to the Afghans it appeared then that the Islamic cause was in peril. Agitators were busy, and they made the best of this. Habibullah had checked the movement in the interests of his country by the sheer force of his personality, and to him Great Britain owed a debt of gratitude. He made possible the withdrawal from India of considerable forces which reached Europe at a time when the military situation was extremely critical. Resentment at the restraint which he imposed upon his countrymen continued, however, to smoulder in Afghanistan. It was believed that Turkey was really the only Power which could act in the real interest of Afghan Moslems, and that, if it collapsed, Russia would renew her policy of eating her way into Afghanistan. In Afghanistan this belief has long been widespread that Russia is the greatest and most dangerous enemy of Islam.

Nasrullah, who is deeply respected by the clergy of Afghanistan, took advantage of the religious agitation which was current since 1914. He succeeded ultimately in making Habibullah unpopular, especially amongst the so-called fanatical tribes. The Bolsheviks helped also to cast suspicion on Habibullah. As has been indicated by many reports published in the daily press from time to time, they had hopes of creating trouble in India. They regarded Habibullah as an obstacle to their scheme, chiefly because he prevented his people rising with the purpose of invading India. Nasrullah's influence among the religious leaders was strengthened, both directly and indirectly, by Bolshevik gold, which was freely distributed. The murder of the late Amir was a direct result of the continued efforts of Nasrullah's supporters and Bolshevik agents.

Another aspect of the situation remains to be dealt with. It was generally well known in Central Asia during the later period of the war that Habibullah favoured a grand Central Asian Alliance, and that Kabul would be its centre of influence. The scheme involved Russian loss of control over the Khanates and the substitution of Afghan influence, coupled to a certain degree with that of Great Britain. The Bolsheviks were opposed to the Amir's scheme, and increased their efforts to dispose of Habibullah. They spread their propaganda with great activity, and are still a force to be reckoned with. It must be recognized in this connection that, although Russia is at present in a state of suspended animation, the Russian menace to British policy is not yet dead, and not incapable of a vigorous revival. All Russian vested interests are likely to support in Central Asia the Bolshevik plan to keep Afghanistan in a state of unrest, so that Russian commercial and political ascendancy might be maintained. A weak Afghanistan, or an Afghanistan bound hand and foot

by a compromising alliance, is necessary for Russian success in the future.

When the strong and the far-seeing Habibullah was murdered, the Bolshevic cause was undoubtedly well served. Nasrullah's attitude was what it had always been; for he wanted the throne. Although he was in Jelalabad at the time, he had himself declared Amir. Subsequent developments revealed the fact that he was not unconcerned with the murder of his brother, and he was tried in an open Durbar and imprisoned.

Two rival claimants had to be considered when Nasrullah made his bold bid for the throne. These were Habibullah's sons Inayatullah, the heir-apparent, and Amanullah, the present Amir.

Inayatullah had been nominated by his father as Habibullah had been. This point is worthy of note, for it throws some light on a puzzling situation. An Amir has a right to nominate a successor, and when Amir Abdur Rahman was dying he called to his bedside his two sons Habibullah and Nasrullah. Having addressed them regarding the future, he asked which of the two brothers was the most competent. Neither made reply. Then the dying father said that Habibullah was to be his successor. This settled the matter. In the case of Inayatullah, the decision was made as soon as he was born. Habibullah made it known that the child was the heir-apparent, and he was brought up from infancy as the "Moin-us-Sultanat" ("the pillar of the kingdom" or "Crown Prince"). As the question of the succession had thus been long settled, Nasrullah had, from the Afghan point of view, no excuse for proclaiming himself Amir at Jelalabad. This action showed clearly that he had not, in his secret heart, been loyal to his brother Habibullah.

Inayatullah is a man of retiring disposition, and either offered or was forced to renounce his legal claim to the Amirship. His younger brother, Amanullah, was then proclaimed Amir at Kabul. According to the information I have received, the majority of the nobles favoured Amanullah's claim in preference to that of Nasrullah, who reluctantly consented to do homage to his nephew.

Now Amanullah had, on ascending the throne, the same personal desire as his father to maintain friendship with Great Britain. One of his first acts was to address a letter to the Viceroy of India in this connection. He then caused an inquiry to be held regarding the murder of his father, and ordered the imprisonment of Nasrullah.

The fall of Nasrullah was the occasion of a storm of protests. On the borderland and in the Jelalabad district the turbulent Mullahs (priests) remonstrated that the head of the Church had been subjected to unjust martyrdom, being innocent of the charge proved against him. They threatened to depose Amanullah, declaring that, like his father, he was an ally of the infidels. I am informed that they even went the

length of accusing the British Government of having been instrumental in bringing about the imprisonment of Nasrullah, their religious leader, and that, therefore, the British were the worst enemies of Afghanistan and Islam. They did not wait for a declaration from Kabul in this connection, but declared a holy war and raided British territory. Their action brought about a situation similar to that referred to at the beginning of this article. A war zone was created between Peshawar and Kabul which intercepted all communications. When the Indian Government found that not only the border people but regular Afghan troops took part in the invasion, they concluded that the sudden war was being waged with the knowledge and authority of the new Amir. The letters sent to Simla were, I am assured, quite unauthorized. What happened in Kabul remains, and is likely to remain, a mystery. No doubt the Amir was deceived and threatened, and he found himself involved in a war caused partly by misunderstandings and partly by intrigue.

Although the great majority of the Afghan people are anti-foreign in principle, they are not necessarily anti-British, and they do not wish to wage war against Great Britain. The case is different with the misguided fanatics who have implicated their country in a war which cannot be defended. Their motives were to avenge the fall of Nasrullah and to obtain booty from "Golden Hindustan." The Nasrullah party were anxious to involve Amanullah in war so that he might not have British sympathy and support, as he was assured of getting by following in the footsteps of his father. Their hope was that by plunging the country into a war a condition of affairs would be created which would favour their cause. Peace might be arranged on condition that Nasrullah supplanted his nephew as Amir. Whatever the upshot would be of the situation created, they were at least assured of revenge.

Now that Afghanistan is again becoming settled, and the old relations between it and the Indo-British Government are being renewed, it would be well to give consideration to the future political situation in the Mid-East. I am of opinion that it would be in the interests of Great Britain to consummate Habibullah's scheme of having a strong Central Asian alliance with Kabul as the centre of control. Russia is sure, in time, to become a menace once again, and against the intrigues of Russia and Germany it would be well to have India securely buffered by a group of federated states.

The pressing needs of Afghanistan are railways and telegraph systems. These should be worked and controlled by the Afghans after a period of training. If India were connected by railway with Kabul, the Central Asian markets would be magnificent "feeders" of British commerce. Afghanistan would benefit greatly by drawing customs duties, and its future tranquillity would be assured by the wealth

obtained in this connection and by the facilities railways would afford for the transport of troops and the effective policing of the whole country. Such incidents as recently occurred on the frontier would become impossible of realization. There are great possibilities of development in Afghanistan itself, and its development should be left in Afghan hands. British and Indian engineers and traders who may be employed should ever be correct in their behaviour and refuse to be implicated in political movement, lest their own countries' interests should be seriously compromised.

One thing is now quite certain. Afghanistan cannot remain a veiled land like Tibet. Aeroplanes and airships have neutralized the barriers hitherto formed by mountains and trackless plains. If railway development is postponed indefinitely, Afghanistan will suffer from economic starvation. At present it has railways on its northern borders, and there is a railway from Seistan in the west of Baluchistan to Karachi which, if not connected with Afghanistan, will draw away trade that would otherwise pass through it.

The important thing to do, before railway development in Afghanistan can be advanced even in its initial stages, is to guarantee that the Amir's country will always remain strictly independent. All causes for suspicion or misunderstanding should be removed. Let there be an Afghan ambassador in London and a British ambassador at Kabul, and let there be restored to Afghanistan the provinces of Panjdeh, Darwaz, Shighnan, and Roshan, of which it was deprived by Russia with the consent of Great Britain—a consent due entirely to a misunderstanding of the geographical conditions. A generous and far-sighted policy would ensure good relations between Britain and Afghanistan in the future. Indeed, it is quite certain that if Great Britain championed the cause of Afghanistan, it would earn the enduring gratitude of the masses of the Afghan people. The possibilities of intrigue against a Great Power which has no desire to interfere with the integrity of Afghanistan would be removed for all time by the adoption of the policy here advocated. Of this I am as confident as that the sun will shine on the morrow.

Meanwhile, it should be understood that the Afghan situation at present is centred in deep-laid domestic trouble which has been fostered by Bolshevist intrigue. It would be unfair to brand the whole Afghan nation as the enemies of Great Britain.

The CHAIRMAN, in opening the discussion, said they were all very much obliged to Mr. Ikbāl Ali Shah for his lecture and for the slides illustrative of the country. He had given them a very accurate account of the internal politics of Afghanistan. He thought the objection which the Afghans entertained of railways being introduced arose from their being convinced that, once they were laid, the

seclusion of their country would be broken through, and that people and merchandise being constantly carried to and fro would certainly result in the abandonment of the exclusive policy they at present pursued. He had no doubt the Afghans were intensely jealous of any interference with their country either by Russia or by Great Britain, and had made up their minds that, the more communication was opened up between other countries and their own, the more their independence as a people would be endangered. He remembered, years ago, Amir Abdul Rahman coming down to attend a durbar at Rawalpindi. He was placed in charge of the Amir's residence, and had constant conversations with him. He always told him that when once his frontier line was passed by railways, he felt that the independence of his country would disappear. He also often mentioned to him that he thought the government of the Afghans involved a very difficult problem even for himself, and that, although he was constantly being accused of being a tyrannical and cruel Governor, it was impossible to rule or lead the Afghans with a silken thread. The Amir said that the people required a very severe government, and that it was only by very strict and very severe measures that he was able to maintain his power at all in that country. If they had much knowledge of the Afghans, they would easily understand that they were not an easy people to govern. He himself had had some experience of them, and had always thought they required a very strong hand over them. In fact, he remembered on one occasion a number of Afghans penetrated as far as Burma, and, going out shopping, had a discussion with some of the Burmese shopkeepers on the price they were charged for the articles they wished to purchase. It ended in their severely beating the shopkeepers and looting the whole of their merchandise. The Afghans were all arrested and taken off to the lock-up. Subsequently, they sent a deputation to him to say that the whole of the trouble arose from the fact that the Burmese did not understand their language, that all they really did was to expostulate with them on the high prices they were charging, and that the shopkeepers desired to take advantage of them from the fact that they were strangers and that they were very much annoyed at this. He had them put on board a steamer and sent back to their own country. He certainly thought the lecturer had not exaggerated the ideas of his countrymen on the subject of our interference with them. No doubt the Amir, Abdul Rahman Khan, was very much vexed because he was not allowed to have an ambassador in London, but at the same time there was a great deal to be said on the subject from both sides. Personally, he should not have been overjoyed if he had been sent as ambassador to Kabul, because Kabul was not a very safe place to live in. Although under such Governors as Abdur Rahman and Habibulla order was maintained, the internal uncertainty which would prevail

in times like the present would make the situation of the British ambassador in that country a most unenviable one, and rather different from what it might have been under their government. They were very much obliged to Mr. Ikbāl Ali Shah for his lecture and for his pictures. It was always very interesting to have an account of the country from a native who had lived in it all his life. The Chairman then invited observations on the lecture or questions to Mr. Ikbāl Ali Shah from members.

Mr. A. L. P. TUCKER, C.I.E., remarked that one feature which Mr. Ikbāl Ali Shah made manifest in the course of his lecture was his intense patriotism, and that he greatly respected. On the other hand, it was to be remembered that we had only very lately been at war with Afghanistan, and that that war was provoked and brought about by what the Viceroy of India in public described as an outrage. In the course of the lecture he had in no part detected any expression of regret for that outrage, as we regard it. He had not quite gathered to what the lecturer had ascribed the origin of the trouble, but he inferred from what he said that a great deal of it was due to the Bolshevik agitation. What he would particularly like to hear from the lecturer was what sympathy there was between a Mahomedan Government and Bolshevism. He would also like to know what the attitude of the Afghan people was to Bolshevism, or to the popular view of what is meant by Bolshevism—the division of property and all the rest of it. The lecturer might throw much light on the question of how Bolshevism appeals to a Mahomedan and fanatical people.

Mr. IKBAL ALI SHAH, in reply to Mr. Tucker, expressed regret that time had not permitted the reading of the whole of his paper, owing to his having written it too lengthily. The chief and most important point he desired to emphasize was not that he justified the war of the Afghans against the British, but that he, like Mr. Tucker and others, wanted to know how it arose and why. Therefore, the question raised by that gentleman was precisely the one which he in the course of his lecture actually raised. He tried to indicate the course by the word "misunderstanding," and was thereby endeavouring to qualify by inference his reference to the different political things which had happened and were still happening in Afghanistan and on the borders of India. On the question raised as to whether there was any degree of sympathy existing between the fanatical or over-faithful Mohmands and the Bolsheviks, he had to say that by the sacred laws of Islam there was no affinity between Bolshevism and Islam. They had learnt to understand that the religion of Islam was one thing and politics quite another. Nor was there any real affinity between the people of Afghanistan and the Bolsheviks. The trouble appeared to have arisen from the Russians having come forward and offered probably some political advantage denied to them by the British

Government, and the high and exaggerated promise of certain political things must have exercised conviction in the minds of many of the Afghans.

Colonel C. E. YATE, C.S.I., C.M.G., M.P., said he really thought that the explanation given by the lecturer could hardly be accepted as satisfactory. He did not think any of them could agree that the Afghan War was due to any misunderstanding so far as this country was concerned. There was no misunderstanding that he knew of on the part of the Afghans, or on the part of the Government of India or of England. The lecturer had given them a very feeling appeal for the independence of Afghanistan, but he appeared to have overlooked one very important fact. He was speaking to those who were already converted to his view. Nobody in England objected to the independence of Afghanistan; there was no Englishman who did not want to see a prosperous, contented, and independent Afghanistan. The people of England had done their best in every way they could to help Afghanistan to maintain its independence. The lecturer, in his opinion, had laid too much stress on the supposed effects of the Agreement by which the foreign relations of Afghanistan were to be conducted by the Government of India. When they came to think of the date, the time, and the circumstances under which that Agreement was made with the Amir, they could realize that it was a great step forward for the British Government to take for securing the independence of Afghanistan and defending it against the threatened aggression of another country. Russia was the threatening power in those days, but England checked the Russian ambitions, and secured for Afghanistan the independence of which she might otherwise have been deprived by showing to the world that she had England behind her. Therefore, although the British Government did not consider it advisable at the time of the Deputation of Nasrullah Khan to this country to grant to Afghanistan the appointment of a minister in London, he regarded the Agreement referred to as right and wise, for it insured for Afghanistan protection against any advance into it by Russia, and gave it the knowledge that in resisting any such encroachment it would receive the support of England. The lecturer had also dealt at some length with the Turcomans, and gave details of certain intense cruelties which he alleged were meted out to them by the Russians. When he (Colonel Yate) was at Merv he found the Turcomans to be flourishing, and he could not see that there were any differences between them and their neighbours. After Geok Tepe had been captured and the country settled down, he did not remember any particular cruelties having been reported. It was stated by the lecturer that a hundred miles of avenues of mulberry-trees had been destroyed by the Russians, but he never heard of any such avenues, nor had he ever heard of mulberry-trees having been deliberately cut

down by the Russians to put a stop to the silk industry of the country. There was, of course, an increase in the growing of cotton, and from this the Turcomans reaped the advantage the same as everybody else. Reference had been made in the lecture to the need for railways in Afghanistan, and the pertinent question had been put: "Why don't the Afghans make the railways themselves if they want them?" That question summed up the whole matter. The Afghans had all along prevented railways being made in their country, but the day would come, some time or another, when this resistance to railways would come to an end. It was inevitable in the ordinary course of things that the time would be reached when railways would be made through the country, and when, by such means, communication would be opened up between Afghanistan and other parts of the world. With reference to the war with the Afghans, he did not know really whether it had stopped or whether it had not, and none of them appeared to know anything definite as to its actual cause. There appeared to him to have been acts of the most wanton aggression on the part of Afghans which had been utterly uncalled for and entirely unprovoked. The attack they made had been without justification, and their presence at Spin Baldak on the frontier of Baluchistan was a menace to the railway terminus at Chaman. Indeed, their withdrawal from this post of theirs on the frontier of Baluchistan ought to have been insisted upon in the settlement. After the aggressions to which he had referred, made without any apparent cause or justification, he regarded the Treaty made by the Government of India as indicating the greatest weakness, and of a character which, he was afraid, would be regretted ere long. What the full terms of the Treaty were he did not know; so far he had only seen a summary of them. He hoped, however, to see the Treaty published in full very shortly, when they would have an opportunity of having a discussion of all the points which it involved. Judging from the summary he had read, he could only say that he was of the opinion that the Treaty made by the Indian Government—no doubt on instructions received from the Home Government, particularly with reference to the influence it would have in dividing the allegiance to this country of the Mohmands—showed the greatest weakness just at a time when the greatest possible show of strength was necessary. While we were going on for two months talking about the Armistice, we allowed the Afghans to incite the Frontier tribes to cause trouble and to set the whole Frontier in a furore. The whole of the circumstances which the Treaty involved, together with those which led up to the trouble, should be fully discussed, and he hoped the details surrounding the difficulties which had arisen would be made public before very long.

A VISITOR stated that he was in Kabul last year (1918), previous

to the visit of his friend Sir Alexander McRobert. At that time representatives of Bolshevism were in the country and stayed at Kabul. They did succeed in spreading a certain amount of discontent throughout the country; but from the intimate knowledge he had of Afghanistan and of its people, he attributed the recent trouble to the influence of the Germans rather than to that of the Bolsheviks. He had been singularly interested in the subject of the lecture, and particularly so in some of the pictures displayed. The projection showing the interior of an Afghan boot factory with the native operatives at work appealed to him in a very practical way, for the reason that he was closely identified with the particular industry which it illustrated.* It was quite true that the Afghans very readily took to boot-making, and manufactured footwear of quite as good a quality as any made elsewhere, and a great deal cheaper. There were immense opportunities for the development of industry in the country, but he was afraid the murder of the late Amir had thrown things back very considerably. There was room for tanneries and boot factories, and these, if brought up to date, would have a great tendency to develop industry. He ventured to give some advice relative to the making of boots in Afghanistan. As they were all aware, the great drawback was the want of coal and wood. He suggested to the late Amir the planting of trees along the river banks. This would serve three purposes: first, the provision of excellent fuel; second, of good hard wood suitable for manufacturing purposes; and third, of suitable material necessary for the tanning of leather. This, with the training of the natives in the industry, would stimulate enterprise and help to develop the country's resources. He was extremely obliged to the lecturer for having brought facts relating to the development of the country to the notice of the meeting. His own opinion was that the Germans did more to bring about the late war than did the Bolsheviks.

A MEMBER remarked that the Afghans did not wear boots.

The CHAIRMAN replied that those made were for the regular army. Many of the Afghans, however, did wear boots occasionally.

Mr. ABDUL QAYUM MALIK, B.A. (Lecturer, School of Oriental Studies, Finsbury Circus, London, E.C.), remarked that he was not familiar with, nor was he privileged to witness, the events which had been associated with the recent outbreak in Afghanistan, but he thought that regrettable incident must not be put down to one or more events which might have recently taken place. The causes were not few, but many and diverse. The Afghans had been charac-

* The speaker, as it was afterwards ascertained, had been sent to Kabul by Cooper, Allen and Co., of Cawnpore, to construct and establish a boot factory for the Afghan Government. Sir Alexander McRobert, who attended the lecture, started the next day for India. The Kabul boot factory could, it was stated, turn out seven hundred pairs of boots a day.—A. C. Y.

terized as an unruly race, but they could only be so regarded because of their patriotism and their love of freedom. Patriotism, however, was not the root cause of, or initiative for, many of them going the extreme lengths they recently did. They had come across numerous evidences of disaffection amongst the Afghans, but he thought that one of these in particular appeared to have precipitated the struggle. It was the failure of the Muslim appeals to England during the past three or four years to befriend Muslim Turkey against what amounted to the complete extinction of the Turkish Empire. Afghans were very patriotic, but they were above anything else ardent Muslims, and the peculiar fear they had of the final overthrow of Islam did, to a great extent, explain the position which arose, and which, unfortunately, resulted in the war. To Afghans, the utter destruction of Turkey meant the disappearance of the only substantially independent Muslim power that now remained. They, as a people, did not entertain any kind of bitter feeling or hostility towards the British, and it was only the more unruly and ignorant of their number who, for the cause mentioned, resorted to extreme measures. It must be confessed, by those who knew them best, that they were as amenable to reason as any if properly approached and led, and it was rather unfortunate that, in the course of events which had been brought about, no real attempt had been made to bring about a *rapprochement* of the two peoples, to whom friendly relations were of vital importance. Amir Amanullah was certainly on the throne of Afghanistan to-day, but he was by no means the man who could be regarded as the absolute master of the situation. There was a real, living, public opinion throughout the country which was asserting itself, and it would not be in the best interests of peace and harmony to hold one Afghan or the Government of Afghanistan as the only party to have been in the wrong. The sentiments of extreme jealousy with which the Afghans regarded any foreign interference with their internal affairs was as old as the mountains on which they lived, and it was absolutely impossible to think of governing them on principles which they regarded as entirely opposed to those of absolute freedom and independence. Evidence of this was afforded in the sufferings of the army of Alexander during their march towards India. Alexander encountered little opposition in the regions between Asia Minor and Persia, but when he invaded the southern regions of Afghanistan, the fierce mountaineers inflicted great losses on some of the seasoned regiments of his Macedonians. After he retired from India, he avoided the defiles of Afghanistan, and ordered his Admiral Nearchus to bring back the bulk of his army by sea. The Pathan and Mughul Emperors of India likewise found it extremely difficult to maintain their dominion over this north-western province of the Empire. With the first evidence of the weakening of the Mughul Empire, Afghans threw

over the remaining vestige of the Imperial control that was exercised from Delhi. With experiences like these behind them, it was sheer waste of time, energy, and resources to adopt any measures against these unruly people in order to impose on them any sort of foreign control. He appealed to the faculty of the sanest British statesmanship to make good friends of a people who had shown ample evidences of their friendliness when properly led. Let the British and the Indian Governments approach the whole question in a spirit of sympathy, and with a certain measure of imagination. Sympathy, and a desire for co-operation on the part of England, would do far more good than assuming an attitude of dictation towards the Afghans. Actuated by motives of that amicable character, England would not be long in bringing about the day when a state of real tranquillity would reign in that part of the world. Such a condition of things could only be realized by mutual feelings of respect, sympathy, and co-operation on the part of the two peoples. Afghan envoys had a great reception at Moscow, but he was confident that the Afghans had no sympathy with, even if they had knowledge of, the principles of Bolshevism, Socialism, and such like things. The appearance of the envoys at Moscow was only a sort of passing phase. Their real sentiments were those of an independent people, and it would be a pity if the records of a long Anglo-Afghan friendship should be obliterated by the comparatively small affair that had recently, but most unfortunately for all concerned, broken out.

The proceedings were then concluded by the Chairman conveying to Mr. Ikbāl Ali Shah the thanks of the meeting.

THE NEW LEVANT COMPANY

At the monthly meeting of the Central Asian Society, held on the afternoon of Wednesday, November 19, 1919, under the chairmanship of the Right Honourable Lord Carnock, P.C., G.C.B., the President, the Right Honourable Sir Maurice de Bunsen, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.V.O., delivered a lecture on "The New Levant Company."

The CHAIRMAN at the outset of the proceedings announced that the next lecture of the session would be delivered at the rooms of the Royal Society, Burlington House, as, unfortunately, the Central Asian Society have to leave the premises which they now occupy. Continuing, he said that it was his pleasant duty to introduce to the meeting his old friend Sir Maurice de Bunsen, who had kindly undertaken to address them on the Levant Company. Sir Maurice desired him to explain that owing to his recent absence from England, and his numerous occupations since his return, he had been unable to prepare a formal lecture. He therefore hoped the meeting would be content with the conversational summary which he intended to give of the subject with which he proposed to deal. He was sure that in whatever form Sir Maurice de Bunsen presented his observations, they would only be too delighted to hear them. It was a great pleasure to them all to have an address from so distinguished a diplomatist who had had such lengthy and varied experience in many countries of the world.

Sir Maurice de Bunsen's address was in substance as follows:

The life of the old Levant Company extended from 1581 to 1825. Since the beginning of the sixteenth century British merchants had already made many voyages to the countries bordering the Eastern Mediterranean, and some of these are recorded in the publications of the Hakluyt Society. As early as 1513 there was a British Consul in the Island of Chios. These voyages were undertaken by individual merchants, each on his own venture, and without as yet any serious attempt to form themselves into companies. But the age of chartered companies was dawning. The horizons of trade enterprise had been enormously extended by the discoveries of new worlds and new trade routes which marked those spacious times. Individual effort no longer sufficed. Trading charters were first granted in England to branches of the Hanseatic League. Then followed the Merchant Adventurers,

later called the Hamburg Company, trading with the Netherlands and Germany. The Russia Company received its charter in 1554. Most of the North American colonies in their inception were chartered companies. The East India Company dates from 1600, and there were many more. But we are specially concerned to-day with charters granted to traders with the Levant. A footing had already been taken at Aleppo by Antony Jenkinson, a venturesome British merchant, sea captain, and traveller, the first Englishman, it is said, who penetrated into Central Asia. Before doing so he had secured valuable trading privileges at Aleppo in 1553. He was later Captain-General of the Fleet of the Moscovy Company. Trade, however, with the Levant had been largely conducted in Venetian vessels, which came to our ports laden with currants and wine. A notable step in naval architecture was taken by the building at Ragusa of "Ragusans," corrupted into "Argosies," vessels of greater carrying capacity than had hitherto been seen on the seas. Their size and dignity as compared with smaller craft are noted in the opening scene of "The Merchant of Venice," when Salarino accounts for Antonio's sadness by suggesting that

"Your mind is tossing on the ocean,
There where your argosies with portly sail,—
Like signiors and rich burghers on the flood.
Or, as it were, the pageants of the sea.—
Do over-peer the petty traffickers
That curtsey to them, do them reverence,
As they fly by them with their woven wings."

In 1575 one of these argosies was lost off the Isle of Wight, and it is said that Venice for a time held back her ships from such perilous voyages. There was a further cause for the interruption. The Republic had imposed a heavy export duty on currants and oil carried in other than Venetian bottoms. England retaliated by an equal duty on any but English vessels bringing cargoes from Venetian ports. The trade was choked off for a time, and something had to be done to revive it. There was also a strong political reason for opening relations with the mighty Turkish nation, now at the zenith of its power. Spain was evidently meditating an attack on heretical England. England might well follow the example of France, who in 1536 had concluded important "capitulations" with Solyman the Magnificent, and thus secured a powerful ally against the House of Habsburg. In 1579 three British merchants proceeded to Constantinople as an embryo Turkey Company to see what could be done, Sir William Harborne at their head. A treaty with Murad III. having been secured for a period of five years, Letters Patent were issued (1581) to a small company of "Merchants to the Levant," led by Sir Wm. Osborne, "because they had found out and opened a trade in Turkey

not known in the memory of any man now living to be frequented by our progenitors." The Levant Company dates from this time. In the following year (1582) they despatched their first ship, the *Great Susan*, with Sir William Harborne on board. Soon after (1587) the Venice Trading Company was amalgamated with the Levant Company, the latter's charter having been extended the year before to embrace a company of fifty-three merchants, whose rights and privileges were to be renewed every five years. A more detailed charter, not limited in duration, was issued to the Company by James I. in 1606, giving them the absolute monopoly of all the trade with the Levant, and imposing on them the obligation to admit as members all merchants desiring to join them and willing to pay £50 towards their expenses, which included salaries of Ambassadors and Consuls, periodical presents to the Sultans, and many other charges. The Company was entitled "The Governor and Company of the Merchants of England trading to the Levant seas." Its arms were a three-masted ship under full sail between two rocks; the crest a sea-horse; motto, *Deo Republicæ et Amicis*.

In 1643 their privileges were confirmed and extended by an ordinance of both Houses of Parliament, renewing their full and exclusive right to appoint officers and to levy moneys on members or strangers shipping merchandise in English bottoms.

After a period of great prosperity there were some lean years about the middle of the eighteenth century, and in 1753 Parliament, on petition, again renewed and extended the rights and powers of the Company, which continued to prosper, until at last, in the year 1825, it was intimated to them, in a letter from Canning couched in considerate terms, and assuring them that the action of the Government implied no blame or reproach, that on grounds of public expediency their charter and privileges must be ended. It had become clear that, in a new age, hostile to the idea of monopoly and privilege, with an enlarged Eastern Question looming on the horizon and Free Trade principles beginning to demand attention, there was no place at Constantinople for a Company invested with special rights and attributions.

The privilege enjoyed throughout (until 1803) by the Company of selecting the Ambassadors, and through them the Consuls, of this country in the Turkish dominions involved the corresponding duty of paying these important officials. In 1623 the salary of the Ambassador alone was £1,800 a year. By the year 1800, when the Company consisted of some 800 "Turkey merchants," the total of the salaries paid by them, including those paid to the Consuls at Aleppo, Smyrna, Alexandria, and other places, amounted to about £15,000 a year.

Of the seventeen Ambassadors who resided at Constantinople between 1582 and 1700, Sir William Harborne was the first. He had

already been in Turkey five years before receiving his commission, and he then procured the first so-called "heroical letters" from the Grand Signior inviting the friendship of the Queen of England. The Turkey Company was established in 1579, after Murad III. had granted by treaty to English merchants the same freedom of traffic as was then already enjoyed by the French, Venetians, Poles, and others. During Harborne's embassy (1582 to 1588), a great extension of trade facilities was obtained, as well as the redemption of many English captives. Nash quaintly writes of him in 1598: "Who since, in the hottest days of Leo, hath echoing noised the name of our Island and of Yarmouth (his birthplace) so tritonly that not an infant of the curtailed, skin-clipping Pagans but talk of London as frequently as of their Prophet's tomb at Mecca."

On proceeding to his post, he took out with him a letter from Queen Elizabeth to the Sultan in which she described herself as "the unconquered and most puissant defender of the true faith against the idolaters who falsely profess the name of Christ." This was an appeal to Mussulman prejudice against image worship, which it was hoped would induce the Sultan to throw in his lot with the Queen in her conflict with Philip II. of Spain, and the same policy was again pressed upon him in 1587, on the eve of the attack of the Spanish Armada.

Sir Edward Barton, Ambassador from 1588 to 1597, took out with him valuable presents, paid for by the Levant Company, but sent in the name of Queen Elizabeth, consisting of pieces of plate, cloth of gold, etc., for the Sultan, and the Queen's portrait set in rubies and diamonds for his Venetian Sultana Safiye. The present was acknowledged by the Sultana in a letter (1594) containing the following passage: "I send Your Majesty so honourable and sweet a salutation of peace, that all the flocke of nightingales with their melody cannot attain to the like, much lesse this simple letter of mine. The singular love which we have conceived one toward the other is like to a garden of pleasant birds."

After the death of Murad (or Amurath) III. in 1595, Sir Edward Barton employed all his powers of persuasion to induce the Company to send another set of presents in recognition of the accession of Sultan Mohammed III. Like the last it came in the Queen's name, but arrived only in the autumn of 1599, two years after Barton's death, when Sir Henry Lello was Ambassador. Barton died at his post and was buried on the Island of Halki, in the Sea of Marmora.

Sir Henry Lello was received in solemn audience for the presentation. This time the principal gift took the form of an ingenious mechanical organ, built by Thomas Dallam, the founder of a great firm of organ-builders which supplied King's College, Cambridge, and many of the English cathedrals with organs in the seventeenth

century. Dallam himself accompanied the present and helped to show it off to the Sultan. There was again a present, a gilded carriage, for the Sultana.

Of the later Ambassadors two or three may be mentioned. In 1661 the Earl of Winchilsea filled the post, "a jovial Lord," as he was described, extremely favoured by Vizier Kiuprili. Two Viziers of that name (1658 to 1676) restored for a time by their statesmanship and victories the waning fortunes of the Sublime Porte. Lord Winchilsea obtained a renewal of the Capitulations, as also did his successor Sir J. Finch in 1676. Sir Dudley North, son of the Lord North of those days, after a highly successful career as a moneylender and trader in the Levant, became Ambassador towards the end of the seventeenth century. A hundred years later Lord Elgin received this important appointment, and rendered to the cause of archæology the eminent services with which his name is associated.

Our knowledge of the history, policy, and government of Turkey is largely indebted to a series of eminent writers employed by the Levant Company in their official posts. An interesting volume of the publications of the Hakluyt Society, "Early Voyagers and Travels in the Levant," contains the diary of Master Thomas Dallam (mentioned above), and extracts from the diaries of Dr. John Covel, later Master of Christ's College, Cambridge, covering the years 1670-1679. Mr. J. Theodore Bent, author of the Introduction to these works, states that the Company doctors used to make a special study of the plague, and that "Russell on the Plague" was quite the standard work of its time.

There was sometimes considerable friction with the Sublime Porte. In 1685 the latter advanced the demand that foreigners marrying Turkish subjects must assume Turkish nationality. The obnoxious decree was enforced during one hundred years. Its effect was to create a special class of Levantines, persons of British origin but increasingly infiltrated with Levantine blood, and forbidden to leave the country of their unwilling adoption.

A few particulars concerning the vessels used by the Levant Company and their freights may be of interest. From an account of their shipping sent to Sir Robert Cecil in the early years of the Company's existence, the following list of ships is taken:

<i>Jewel</i> , 180 tons	}	From Alexandretta with silks, spices, cottons, etc.
<i>Centurion</i> , 200 tons		
<i>Riall Exchang</i> , 250 tons		
<i>Great Susan</i> , 260 tons		
<i>Midgett and Elizabeth</i> , 60 tons		
900 tons in all, at £10 a ton. Total, £9,000.		

Seven more ships, totalling 1,180 tons, at £7 a ton, "to owners and maryners," cost the Company £7,910.

From all the foregoing it was anticipated that the customs duties would amount to £5,300.

In calling Sir Robert Cecil's attention to these figures, the Company remark on the generosity of the King of France, who paid his Ambassador at the Porte 10,000 crowns, and always supplied the necessary present at a cost of £3,000.

Among the many houses which they built may be mentioned the English Embassy House at Constantinople (£10,000), for which the ground was given by the Sublime Porte in gratitude for the expulsion of the French from Egypt after the Battle of the Nile.

The far-reaching influence of the Levant Company in promoting British commerce, and making the name of England respected throughout the East, has probably been under-rated, and the history of its various activities in a connected form still awaits the attentions of a qualified historian.

The writer in the volume of the Hakluyt publications already referred to goes so far, in the last paragraph of his Introduction, as to declare his opinion that, without this influence, "Greece would probably have never succeeded in establishing her independence, and the Mussulmans would have effectually eradicated the Christian populations of the East."

Though the old Levant Company died in 1825, it had thrown out roots which have continued to the present time to supply abundant sap to the tree of British commerce with the Near East. Before its demise Charlton Whittall had settled in Smyrna. In 1811 the company formed by him was incorporated in the Levant Company. Together with its Constantinople relation, it has triumphantly survived the disappearance of the old chartered company. A veritable dynasty of Whittalls, well known to all who have been brought into contact with Turkey during the last one hundred years, has passed on the goodwill of the name, and developed its activities ever since. Great services to the homeland have indeed been rendered by this highly respected, patriotic, and enterprising band of brothers.

When the new Levant Company was formed, towards the end of 1918, the first thing it did was to establish the closest relations with J. Whittall and Company, Limited, who possess some forty-eight branches and agencies throughout Turkey-in-Europe and Asia Minor.

The new Company may be described as an offshoot of the British Trade Corporation. This powerful body was formed, it will be remembered, in the early period of the war, and under the special auspices of Lord Faringdon, in order that something might be done to remove from British banking the reproach—to which it has been often, whether fairly or unfairly, exposed—of withholding from British industry the support and encouragement said to be much more freely

accorded to German producers and manufacturers by the banks of that country.

The present Levant Company is surrounded by none of the glamour and romance of its historic prototype. It enjoys none of the ancient privileges, and pretends to no monopoly or special protection. It is just an ordinary trading company. This is not the place for an account of its constitution, financial position or prospects. Its object is to keep alive and develop British trade with the Levant. The sense in which the latter term is employed will be seen from an enumeration of the Company's principal agencies and branches as already established within only a few months of its birth. In Turkey and Asia Minor it works exclusively through Messrs. Whittall's, in which firm it possesses a very large interest. In Greece there is the Levant Company (Greece), Limited, with headquarters at Athens, and branches at Salonica and other important centres. This Company was represented at the recent Athens Exhibition with promising results. At Salonica it has purchased the old-established firm of Whittall, Saltiel and Company, Limited.

There are branches in Serbia, with headquarters at Belgrade; likewise in Roumania, with promise of an early establishment in Bulgaria. In South Russia its branches centre in Odessa, Novorossisk, and Rostoff on the Don; in the Caucasus at Batoum; in Mesopotamia at Bagdad; in Egypt at Alexandria; in Syria and Palestine at Beyrout and Jaffa. The Levant Company (Sudan), Limited, has been set up at Khartoum. Early extension is hoped for to Persia. Already imports from these regions have begun to arrive in considerable quantities, in the form of lambskins, chrome ore, canary-seed, copper, opium, wool, bristles, and other merchandise. All this, to some small extent, helps to set off the much larger volume of our Levant Company exports to those countries. The head office is, of course, in London.

Many difficulties have stood in the way, arising largely out of the uncertainty which still prevails as to the ultimate ownership of the countries concerned. Who is to be the controller or mandatory for Constantinople, Southern Russia, the Caucasus, Armenia, etc.? Till this question is disposed of, it is difficult to make definite arrangements in those areas. There is further the obstacle of the enormous depreciation of the local currencies. Everywhere the conditions are roughly similar—countries swept clean of everything by the war, and incapable as yet of exporting anything to speak of; together with an abundance of worthless paper, inconvertible into sterling. Under such conditions the trader's lot is not a happy one. He is compelled to fall back largely on a system of barter, if he is not to lock up his local currency in the hope that it will some day recover its exchange value, or invest it locally.

Notwithstanding these drawbacks, the new Levant Company believes that it has made as good a start as could have been expected; its name is already well known throughout the Levant, and it is animated with the hope that in a large measure it will succeed in perpetuating the spirit of patriotism and enterprise which so greatly distinguished the old association whose name it has taken the liberty to adopt.

The CHAIRMAN said that after listening to the very admirable and interesting address which Sir Maurice de Bunsen had given them, he was sure he was echoing the feelings of all present in wishing all possible good-fortune to the activities of the New Levant Company. He himself had spent some years in Constantinople and in the Near East, and he used to watch, sometimes with anxiety, the somewhat fluctuating fortunes of British commerce: and he had always thought it was owing to the sturdy determination and pertinacity of British merchants that we had been able, in very great measure, to retain our position and to meet the most strenuous and active competition that we had encountered. Of course, since the war, he dared say this competition, in some quarters, would disappear for the present, or at any rate be very greatly weakened; but he was sure that an institution and a body like the New Levant Company was most essential if we wished to develop our commerce and enterprise generally in the East. He agreed with Sir Maurice de Bunsen, and he quite appreciated, that there is very great difficulty in not knowing who are to be the future masters or administrators of many of the regions in which the Levant Company conducts its operations. But he did hope that there would be no question of allowing any of these countries which might have what was called "mandates" to establish preferential tariffs or any exceptional privileges for their own nationals. The Levant Company would have to keep a careful and watchful eye to see that there was complete freedom of trade, and absolute equality of commercial treatment; otherwise we might find that undue, and perhaps unjust, competition might seriously hamper our future. He was glad to hear that the Company was not going to restrict its activities to its present area, but to look far into the future, and that it hoped to extend them still farther eastwards. There was vast scope for its activities, and he was quite sure the Levant Company could confer immense benefit in the direction of fostering and promoting British trade. From what he knew of the composition of the Board of the Company, he thought we might be quite confident that British interests would be amply and fully safeguarded.

Colonel A. C. YATE remarked that he did not intend to be for one moment regarded as an authority on the Levant Company, but to explain that as soon as he knew that Sir Maurice de Bunsen was to

give the Society an address on the subject, he communicated with Sir William Mitchell Ramsay. Doubtless there were many in that room who would remember that Sir William some time ago lectured to them on "The Past History of Anatolia: a Mirror of the Future." He was well known as one of the first authorities of the day on Asia Minor. It had occurred to him that a man like Sir William Ramsay would, in all probability, be an authority also on the history of the old Levant Company, and he therefore wrote asking him to be present on the occasion of the lecture by Sir Maurice de Bunsen. In reply Sir William M. Ramsay had written him the following letter:

"I have yours of the first November. Since then I have been in London for a week and have just returned. It is, therefore, in the last degree probable that I can be in London on the 19th, otherwise I should have been extremely glad to hear Sir Maurice de Bunsen speak about the New Levant Company.

"The Old Levant Company is a very interesting episode in history, and it is quite extraordinary that no account of it has ever been compiled. The qualifications for the historian of the Levant Company are rather difficult to fulfil, as many of the documents on which the history must be based are in Turkish.*

"It is remarkable that so few of the families which settled in Smyrna and Constantinople as members of the Levant Company survive. The Whittalls are an astonishing exception, as their number is very great and their ability goes on, if possible, increasing; also their attachment to their homeland grows as the opportunities for home education and home visits are multiplied. The Barkers, also, I think belong to the Old Levant Company, and they still survive, influential but far from so numerous as the Whittalls. The Charnauds and the La Fontaines settled in Turkey as French subjects, obtained the British citizenship by Special Act of Parliament, and still survive, influential and very active; but I am not quite sure that they were actually members of the Levant Company.

"Some of the greatest families, such as the Lees in Smyrna, once

* *The Quarterly Review* of July, 1918, in its article on "The Levant Company," quotes authorities, including a work by a M. Epstein; and a paragraph which I will quote from Sir Edwin Pears's "Forty Years in Constantinople" (p. 240) traces "English love of justice" from the "Waring Guard" (mostly English) of Anna Comnena's day to the era of the Levant Company. "Their reputation for a love of justice greatly impressed the Princess (Anna Comnena) and has been maintained ever since. The valuable works of Paul Rycart in the latter half of the seventeenth century, of Sir James Porter a century later, and many other writers, might be quoted to show that both the members of the British community and the Levant Company, which lasted from 1608 into the nineteenth century, steadily and successfully sought to live up to the ancient reputation of our race."—A. C. Y.

extremely wealthy, degenerated and died out. An old resident in Constantinople told me that he had examined carefully the cemetery at Constantinople in which the earliest of the Levant Company were buried, and that he found not a single name which was known to him among the residents of Constantinople at the present time.

That, said Colonel Yate, was Sir William M. Ramsay's letter, which he thought would interest the meeting. They would observe that it confirmed what Sir Maurice de Bunsen had said. One thing struck him as not having been alluded to by the lecturer, and that was the power that the French Representative at Constantinople possessed in the sixteenth century. He based the little knowledge he had of this on an article which appeared in the *Quarterly Review* for July, 1918, in which the writer pointed out that the Venetians and the French were in that century paramount in Constantinople, and how great were the difficulties which awaited our Queen Elizabeth's first Envoy, Sir William Harborne, and his successors in supplanting that power. The article mentioned that the Venetian Envoy safeguarded Venetian interests solely, while the French Representative used to protect under his flag any other foreigners who came there. It was with this established prerogative of the French Representative that Sir William Harborne had to contend.

He had been thinking that morning how advantageous might have been the presence on that occasion of the Official Representative of some one of the countries with which the New Levant Company would establish commercial relations. Those of them who were members of the Geographical Society knew that it was frequently the custom of that Society to invite the presence of the Minister or Diplomatic Representative of the country which formed the subject of lecture at its meetings. It occurred to him, when Sir Maurice de Bunsen mentioned the valuable service which the Old Levant Company had rendered to Greece, at the time of its emancipation ninety years ago from the Turkish rule, that the presence at the time of the Greek Minister would have been opportune. He had just one other subject to allude to in connection with the lecture. He could not but refer to a letter which appeared in *The Times* of that morning, written by Sir Francis Younghusband. The lecturer had laid considerable emphasis on the same point—viz., the uncertainty of the future of the Middle East. Recalling the part that had been played for a century by the so-called Buffer States of the Middle East, he had come to the conclusion that the Buffer State System might now be looked upon as a thing of the past. That was a subject that could not be considered in detail at that meeting.

Mr. ROLAND L. MICHELL (C.M.G., ex-Commissioner of Limassol) expressed the opinion that all who had heard the lecture and had seen

the map by which it was illustrated must have been rather struck by the fact that Cyprus had not been once mentioned. This, he thought, was not surprising, in view of the fact that wherever they went they found that very small interest was taken in the island or in its future. And yet, if they looked at the map they could not help being impressed with the importance of its geographical position in its relation to the great interests involved in the Levantine seas. In the earlier history of the Near East, that geographical position was duly recognized, and great interest was centred in the island as well as in all matters connected with its resources and commerce. In the controversy which would inevitably arise as to the Powers or Power to which the administration of the countries referred to by the lecturer ought to be entrusted, he thought it was of paramount importance to this country and to the people of Cyprus that that geographical position should not be overlooked. At present a dense fog of doubt and uncertainty appeared to be hanging over all the countries referred to by Sir Maurice de Bunsen. Whilst, in the opinion of some, it was natural that less interest should be taken in Cyprus than in the other countries, he personally thought that its geographical position and its future possibilities should not be disregarded by the New Levant Company, or by those in Great Britain to whom the settlement of these problems was entrusted. The possibilities of Cyprus were very considerable, and the fact that its commerce and resources had not been developed in recent as they had been in former years was no reason why the importance of the island should be disregarded in the future. Sir William Ramsay had said that our tenure of Cyprus had been a tenure of incapacity. Responsibility for this, he had no doubt, would be placed on the right shoulders, but in the present state of uncertainty it would not be wise that the attention of diplomacy should be so fully occupied as to permit of the exclusion of all consideration of the interests of Cyprus. As soon as that uncertainty was dispelled, he hoped that British interests there would not be disregarded or ignored. At present there did not appear to be any interest taken in the island; but if they asked any of their friends who were intimately concerned with its future they would find that, generally speaking, their opinion was overwhelmingly opposed to its abandonment by this country. In 1915 it was practically thrown at Greece, and was as practically refused by that Power. In the present circumstances he did not think it would be of any interest to say any more about Cyprus, but he could not help expressing the hope that those who take an interest in the island and in its prosperity would use their interest and their influence in opposing its cession to Greece. He could not help thinking that such a cession would be most unwise.

Colonel Sir FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., said he was sure they had listened with extraordinary interest to the fascinat-

ing lecture or address which had been given by Sir Maurice de Bunsen. The romantic history of the Levant Company must, he was sure, have stirred their blood as they listened to the story of those adventurers who went out in such tiny little ships and established our trade in the East. Like all the traders who went out to the Levant, to India and to Russia, in those early Queen Elizabethan days, they did something more than merely trade, and, he had no doubt, they succeeded in making themselves very rich as a result. What was so remarkable was that they paid attention to other things besides trade, and he really thought that it was the spirit of adventure which was at the back of it all. In addition to increasing the trade of this country, they increased its prestige in the lands they visited. They looked after the culture, took an interest in the archæology, attended to the welfare and health, and combated disease amongst the people of the countries with which they had trading relations. Obviously, then, they had many more interests than those of trade; and, very successful as they were in this, they had added enormously to the prestige of their own country. As he listened to the address of Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the thought struck him to contrast the past with the present. The Old Levant Company, like the Old East India Company, went out in times when ours was really a tiny little country, and when we had no possessions. He thought he was right in saying that then beyond these islands our Empire had not yet commenced. Through the activities of the Levant Company we came in contact with the great Turkish Empire, and through those of the East India Company we came in contact with the Great Moguls when they were at the very zenith of their power—when the Turks, as Sir Maurice de Bunsen had reminded them, were expanding not only over the greater part of Asia, but right into Europe, to the very gates of Vienna itself; and when the Moguls were increasing their power in India and establishing at Delhi the greatest empire India had ever known. At that time we were a very small Power, and our traders then became our ambassadors in a very humble capacity before the great potentates the Sultan of Turkey and the Great Mogul at Delhi. But they seemed to have comported themselves with great dignity, and to have carried on their trading and diplomatic service with very conspicuous success. It was largely as the result of their ability and of their boldness in enterprise that the British Empire as we know it to-day had been founded. He thought, therefore, that we ought to have a very special appreciation of the great work they had done, and he was sure the Society were very grateful indeed to Sir Maurice de Bunsen for having shown to them how these adventurers opened up the gates of Central Asia. It was the hope of them all that the Levant Company would expand not only in the Levantine seas, but would extend its operations into Mesopotamia and into Persia. Indeed, he

very much hoped that some of the Company's agencies would open up in Central Asia, in order that we might get in London some of the beautiful carpets and various other works of art which he had seen there.

The CHAIRMAN thought that before the meeting separated those who attended would join with him in expressing to Sir Maurice de Bunsen their most cordial thanks for the very instructive, interesting, and—as Sir Francis Younghusband had so well expressed it—fascinating lecture with which he had favoured them. Sir Maurice was a very busy man, and his time was very fully occupied. He was sure they all felt most grateful to him for having spared an hour and so enabled them to spend so pleasant and instructive an evening.

Mr. E. R. P. Moon asked permission, if it was not irregular, to second the proposition so as to raise a point which, he thought, would be of interest to the gathering. He said that the original Levant Company clearly was a chartered company, like so many other companies of the period. When it was started, the Virginia Association was knocked on the head by James I. The East India Company, as Sir Francis Younghusband had said, went on, and he supposed that what terminated the history of it and the Levant Company was the fact that they were privileged and held monopolies. They had had chartered companies in later days—the Nigeria Company and the British South Africa Companies were examples. So far as he had gathered, Sir Maurice de Bunsen had not made this point as absolutely clear as he had many others: Whether the New Levant Company was an ordinary company without any monopoly, without any privileges, just the same as the P. and O. Company or any other company which extended British influence and trade over large and important areas. It seemed to him exceedingly interesting that the New Levant Company was extending its operations beyond “the Levant seas” which suggested its name, just in the same way that the fact that their Society, by extending its sphere of lectures beyond Central Asia properly so called, had enabled itself to have the benefit of a lecture such as the one they had listened to.

Sir MAURICE DE BUNSEN, in acknowledging the vote of thanks, replied to Mr. Moon's question by saying that the Levant Company was like any other British Company—without any privileges at all. They had to carry on under the same terms as any other trading company—without privileges.

The proceedings then terminated.

OBITUARY

LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR HENRY TROTTER, R.E. (Retired),
K.C.M.G., C.B.

LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR HENRY TROTTER, who died at Lucas Green Manor, Chobham, on September 25, 1919, after a prolonged illness which, keenly as it was felt, was as patiently borne, served his country in many capacities, military and civil, for a period of forty-six years—from 1860 to 1906; and, during the last twelve years of his active life (1907 to 1918) was a steadfast supporter of and worker for the Central Asian Society. For some ten years he was a Member of Council, and well merited the chairmanship which he held from 1917 to 1918, and which fittingly crowned his services to the Society.

Lieutenant H. Trotter (R.E., Bengal) left Addiscombe in 1860 for India, and in 1863 joined the Trigonometrical Survey of that Empire. With it he continued to serve till 1875, his two last years being put in with Sir Douglas Forsyth in his mission to Yarkand and Kashgar (*vide* "Autobiography and Reminiscences of Sir Douglas Forsyth," by his daughter. Richard Bentley, 1887). It was while on this mission that Sir Henry shot the first *Ovis Poli* known to have been shot by a European, and acquired the knowledge which enabled him to inaugurate his chairmanship of this Society with a lecture entitled, "The Amir Yakub Khan and Eastern Turkistan in Mid-Nineteenth Century." Yakub Khan is now almost forgotten, but in the seventies of the last century he was a notable figure, and our Indian Government thought it politic to send a special mission to Kashgar to, if possible, gain Yakub Khan's ear before our dangerous Muscovite rivals in Central Asia had done so. From that employ Captain Trotter passed in 1876 to special service in China, and thence to act as Assistant Military Attaché at Constantinople during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. In that capacity he accompanied the Turkish armies throughout the campaign in Asia Minor, and, among other things, witnessed the capture by the Russians and return by them to the Turks in 1878 of Erzeroum, a town which the Russians captured for the third time during the late war, and which again has slipped through their fingers. Many members of the Society will remember Sir Henry's confident prediction that Erzeroum could not be taken in winter, and his good-humoured admission a few weeks later that he would have done better to resist the temptation to prophesy.

The years of 1878 to 1894 saw him employed, first for four years in Kurdistan—which recently has acquired a sickening notoriety for the murder of British officers—then at Scio, then for seven years as Military Attaché at Constantinople, and finally (1890-94) as Consul-General in Syria. During his last twelve years of official work (1894-1906) he was British Delegate on the European Commission of the Danube and H.B.M. Consul-General for Roumania. During that period he frequently acted as H.B.M. Chargé d’Affaires at Bucharest. He was in his earlier days a keen sportsman and one of the few who, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, had shot a lion in Gujerat. It is to be regretted that the railway strike prevented the corps of Royal Engineers from paying to him those honours at his funeral which it was their wish to pay.

I cannot do better than conclude this with a quotation from the tribute paid to Sir Henry in *The Times* of October 4 last by the Rev. H. P. Cronshaw, Rector of St. James’, Piccadilly:

“Settling in London after his retirement, he served on numerous councils, including those of the Royal Geographical, Central Asian, and Royal Asiatic Societies, the Palestine Exploration Fund, and the S.P.G., while his experience and help were at the disposal of many charities. In spite of advancing years, he took an active interest in many war organizations, and was consulted by the Government on questions of Eastern policy; and having been spared to witness the triumph in the late war of the country he had served so well, he passed away very peacefully. He is mourned, not only as a soldier, diplomatist, and scientific explorer, but as the embodiment of all that is typical and best in the English character, and as a pattern of valiant and true knighthood. Courteous and sympathetic, with a delightful sense of humour, he was universally loved and respected by numerous colleagues and friends, and for them his simple, upright character will remain an inspiration and an ideal.”

A. C. YATE.

A LONG ARM THROUGH THE WILDERNESS*

A LECTURE full of interest was read on February 12 at the Central Asian Society by Lieutenant-Colonel Webb Ware, C.I.E., F.R.G.S., F.S.A., on "The Nushki Railway and Some of the Problems with which it Deals." The lecturer, a distinguished officer of the Indian Political Service, has had the advantage of constant employment for twenty years in the peculiar tract of country with which his lecture deals. In or about 1896 Colonel (then Lieutenant) Webb Ware was placed on special duty for the exploration and development of the ancient trade route between South-Eastern Persia and Northern India, which is now generally known as the Seistan trade route. The route dates from prehistoric times when Seistan, as its buried remains show, was a fertile tract supporting a large population. The old route, traces of which still exist, with buildings, beacon towers, and other accessories of ancient travel, was used by Alexander the Great for the transport from India of one of his armies, while others were withdrawn by the Persian Gulf and by its coast-line. Colonel Webb Ware, in dealing with the country traversed by the route, possesses an experience and authority which, in the days of rapid transfers of officers in the Indian services from one sphere of duty and locality to another, are as welcome as they are rare.

For the proper understanding of the problems of the lecture a study of the published maps of Northern India, Southern Persia, and Afghanistan is essential. We are dealing with great distances; and distance, coupled with the unusual features, climatic and physical, of the regions under notice, is the main factor in the problems of the future. If we take, as we conveniently may, the Arabian sea coast-line and the eastern coast of the Persian Gulf as the basis of our examination, we can readily arrive at some measure of grasp of the problems involved. It was from the Mesopotamian region and the head of the Persian Gulf that the Baluch tribes, now settled in Northern India, had their first known origin. Thence they were driven out and passed over the Persian coast littoral and hinterlands to the tracts which they inhabit at the present time.

The Nushki Railway, the subject of the lecture, is a branch line.

* By kind permission of the Editor of the *Spectator*, March 22, 1919.

It takes off from the main line of the North-Western State Railway in India which connects Karachi Harbour with the great military depôt at Quetta. This it leaves at a point a little south of Quetta. The Nushki branch is a short one, sixty miles or thereabouts. It descends the hills between the Quetta uplands and the plain below, the fall exceeding two thousand feet. Nushki, which lies to the south-west of Quetta, is the Indian gate of the trade route which runs thence, due west, for upwards of four hundred miles within British limits until the Persian border is reached. Nushki is thus in close rail connection with Quetta, and easy, though distant (Quetta to Karachi, *circa* four hundred and fifty miles), rail communication with Karachi and the sea. With the rest of India rail communication lies over the Indus bridges. The Nushki branch was constructed in 1903-4 in the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon. Its commercial object was the further development of the trade route. Goods carried over this passed, camel borne, up the hills to Quetta. The road was exceedingly steep and difficult, and the rigour of the climate very injurious to the animals. The removal of these obstacles was essential if a land trade between South-Eastern Persia, South-West Afghanistan, and Northern India was to be seriously encouraged.

At Nushki, then, the lecturer's trade route now begins. It is satisfactory to note that the value of the trade carried over it has risen since the opening of the railway from six lakhs of rupees to sixty lakhs (roundly, half a million sterling). Rates are low, and special facilities are given to merchants who use the route. From 1904 to 1916 the extension of the railway line beyond Nushki remained in abeyance. The country from Nushki westwards towards the Persian border is an immense desolate tract with little to commend it save a fairly flat surface. It is without trees, towns, villages, and even wholesome water. It is exposed to burning heat in summer, swept by hot winds and dense sand-storms. The winter storms are cold and bitter, and apt to render travel by road impossible. On the northern side the Afghan border flanks the route throughout its length. Little is known of the country within it. To the south lies Baluchistan country, largely desert and quite undeveloped. At Robat, four hundred miles from Nushki, the point is reached where the British, Afghan, and Persian borders join hands. One hundred miles to the north-west of Robat lies Nasratabad, the chief town and headquarters of Persian Seistan and the seat of a British Consulate.

In the course of the war the extension of the railway from Nushki to Robat became a question of prime importance. German agents, as well as Turkish forces in the north, entered Persia and penetrated to the regions with which we are dealing. As many as seven of the branches of the Imperial Bank of Persia were closed, as the towns were seized by forces under German agents, by whom a heavy cam-

paign of propaganda was opened and carried into Afghanistan. The history of this period has yet to be published. A British force, however, was sent into South-Eastern Persia from the Persian Gulf, and cleared the country of German agents as far as Kerman, and probably beyond it. In 1916 the extension of the railway from Nushki to Robat was commenced. It was completed in 1918. The despatch of troops to that point was thus immensely facilitated. Robat has since formed an important railhead whence Indian forces can be despatched north to distant Meshed (six hundred and fifty miles), and to places beyond it which are outside the scope of this article.


Thus the lecturer has had the satisfaction of seeing the attainment of the object for which he has laboured so long and undergone so much. The physical difficulties of the Seistan trade route have been conquered. The days of long weary marches are done. The whistle and smoke of the engine have succeeded the camel bells and dust of the caravans. The statesmanship that projected the Nushki extension is justified by results. Grave dangers have been averted, and a valuable strategical point effectively occupied at Robat. An immense tract of border country has been brought into touch with the civilizing influence of the railway. The achievement is a great one, and the lecturer's share in it evokes our unstinted admiration.

What are the problems of the Nushki Railway at present? One would say rather of the Robat Railway, for Robat is now the outer railway gate. They may be simply stated. Should the line remain as it is, with Robat for the terminal? Should it be extended? If so, in what directions and to what points? As to the first of these questions, it may be said at once that, as a commercial project, the line has yet to prove its value. The trade of the desolate country through which it passes is growing, it is true; but it is still insignificant. The earnings of the line can bear no relation to the cost of construction and of maintenance. There are possibilities of the discovery of minerals, salt in particular, in the country which the line serves or approaches. But while the line remains as it is no considerable growth of commercial traffic appears likely for some time to come.

Should the line from Robat be extended? Here two courses are open. The first is a continuation of the line to the south to a point on the Persian Gulf coast, probably Charbar: the second an extension to the north in the Meshed direction. In both cases the line would lie in Persian territory, and the Persian Government would have to be taken into partnership. Afghan territory might be touched or approached in the latter case, and Afghan hostility to any railway has hitherto proved invincible. But, apart from delicate international questions, it may be pointed out that a southern extension to a petty roadstead on a barren coast has little to commend it. The country to be traversed is rough, hilly, and unproductive; the distance (probably four hundred and fifty

miles) immense; and the climate similar to that of the long stretch between Robat and Nushki. Moreover, such an extension would necessarily deflect traffic from the costly line which has been already built. Sea transport from a gulf roadstead would be far cheaper for goods sent to or coming from Europe and Western India than the long land journey via Robat, Nushki, and Karachi. A southern extension from Robat can well wait.

As to a northern extension, the political advantages of rail connection between Robat and Meshed are obvious: the distance, however, is immense (six hundred and fifty miles). The first section would lie between Robat and Nasratabad in Seistan. There is much to be said for this portion of the project: the capacity for development by scientific irrigation of the great lacustrine basin of Seistan is undoubted. The multiplied production of grain in this one large oasis in a barren and dry land would prove an untold blessing to its people and their Governments. Of this extension we are strongly in favour, and would express the hope that any difficulties which may delay its progress will not be insurmountable. An object-lesson, in the shape of a personal visit to one or more of the great canal colonies of Northern India by representatives of the Persian and Afghan Governments, is a method which should, we think, remove doubts and misunderstandings, and tend to restore Seistan to a condition which it once enjoyed, and may yet enjoy again. As to a further northward extension, it may be noted that, until Meshed is approached, the country traversed is far from fertile, and only two towns of any importance, Kain and Tarbat-i-Haidari, are to be met with on the way.



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CORRECTION

CANCEL on the cover of Vol. VII., Part I., the name
Lieut.-Colonel Webb Ware, C.I.E., F.R.G.S., F.S.A.,
as author of "A Long Arm through the Wilderness."
Colonel Webb Ware had no connection with this
article.

A. C. YATE, Hon. Sec.

CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

THE Council of the Central Asian Society desires to call the attention of the readers of its Journal to the importance of Eastern affairs in the world's settlement. The Society affords its Members a unique opportunity, not only for hearing and reading the opinions of experts, but also for a free discussion of the various problems at its meetings. Those readers of the Journal who are not already Members of the Society are cordially invited to join, while all Members are asked to induce their friends who are either interested in Eastern affairs or have particular expert knowledge to become Members.

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A. C. YATE, Hon. Sec.

BOLSHEVISM AS I SAW IT AT TASHKENT IN 1918

By SIR GEORGE MACARTNEY, K.C.I.E.

N.B.—This lecture was delivered on June 11, 1919, at 22, Albemarle Street, the chair being taken by the Right Hon. Lord Carnock, P.C., G.C.B. Until it was known that Lieutenant-Colonel F. M. Bailey was out of reach of Bolshevik animosity, it was not deemed wise or right to publish this lecture.—A. C. Y.

RUSSIAN Bolshevism is a subject on which the Press of this country has kept the public so well posted that I need make no attempt here to deal with its general aspect, or with what may be called euphemistically its intellectual side.

But it may be of interest if I relate a few personal experiences I had, first in Chinese Turkistan in 1917-18, and later on at Tashkent in the autumn of 1918, when I came into more or less close quarters with Bolshevik activities.

I was at my post at Kashgar when the Tsar abdicated in March, 1917, and well do I remember the effect the news produced on the native Mahammadan population—mutual congratulations, a sense of exultation that the war in which Turkey played so important a part should have resulted in the downfall of the Autocrat of all the Russias. "Mahammadans were free once more," it was said in the bazaars; "Islam had come into its own." Everyone then thought that Russian Turkistan would turn into an independent Mahammadan State, or at least would unite with the Tartar Government of Kazan. During the short-lived Kerensky régime there was the same feeling of hope and triumph. Then strange rumours reached Kashgar that General Kuropatkin, Governor-General at Tashkent, had been arrested by his soldiers, despite the fact that he had given his adherence to the new Socialistic régime under Kerensky. The Kashgarians were puzzled as to the meaning of this event; nor were they less so when it became known that the soldiers who had laid hands on the Governor-General were men styling themselves Red Guards. It was only after some little time that we at Kashgar realized that the Kerensky Government had no sooner come into existence at Tashkent than it was upset and replaced by a number of local men, clerks and railway employees, giving themselves out as Bolsheviks. Still, without knowing precisely what the Bolshevik movement portended, the Mahammadans of Kashgar were disposed to keep an open mind;—perhaps, after all, the men who had seized the power were champions of political liberty, and this not merely for the Russians, but for the natives as well. But they were again

thrown into a state of doubt when, at about the end of December, 1917, the *Ulugh Turkistan*, a Turki newspaper at Tashkent under Bolshevik control, published an appeal to all Mahammadans under foreign yoke, be they in China or in India, to rise and throw off that yoke, and proclaim their independence from their oppressors. Of course, as soon as the Chinese authorities became aware of the circulation of this inflammatory matter in the bazaars, they took precautions. But in reality none were needed; so flat did the crude Bolshevik manifesto fall in Kashgaria that it failed to disturb the country even with a ripple of unrest.

But it was otherwise in Russian Turkistan, where truly it may be said the Bolsheviks were hoist on their own petard.

Taking the Bolsheviks at their own word, some of the educated Mahammadans in Ferghana tried to form an autonomous Government under the presidency of a Kirghiz named Tanishbaieff; and meetings were held, at which the point was mooted whether the old royal family of Kokand should be re-established. But before the Kokandis had had time to take serious action, Red Guards from Tashkent pounced on them, and, declaring that a backward race like the natives of Turkistan had no business to think of self-government, fired on Kokand with artillery, destroyed half of the town, looted the merchants' quarters, killed several hundred defenceless natives, and carried off some millions of roubles in gold; and all this was done before there were even signs of a native rising. I believe this happened about the end of November, 1917. When the news of the Bolshevik treatment of the town of Kokand reached Kashgar, widespread was the indignation; and it grew none the less strong when it was known that some twenty Kashgarians had perished in the flames, and had had all their belongings looted by the Red Army. "And so," it was said, "we Musulmans in China are to rise and throw off the Chinese yoke, whilst our co-religionists in Russian Turkistan are to remain Bolshevik slaves."

This revulsion of feeling was intensified by a further incident.

The Bolsheviks at Tashkent had sent emissaries to Bukhara. These emissaries seized all the gold they could lay hands on in the Russo-Asiatic Bank; but, not content with that, they made a proposal, rather forcibly urged, to the Amir—not, indeed, that he should give self-government to his country, but that he should hand over to the Soviet Republic the contents of his treasury. Unfortunately the Amir could not see eye-to-eye with the Bolshevik representatives in the matter, and he signified his disapproval of the emissaries' proposal by having one of them taken to the top of a minaret and hurled down from it. The Bolshevik answer was the despatch of troops to Bukhara. Several encounters took place, with heavy losses on both sides. But when the Bolsheviks noticed that the ranks of

the Bukharan Army were being increased by Afghan volunteers, and that the Amir had asked assistance of Kabul, they stopped their blackmailing, having made the opportune discovery that, after all, Bukhara was a native State, and, not being an integral part of Russian Turkistan, the call to present to it the millennium was not as urgent as it might otherwise have been.

These events which I followed at Kashgar bring me down to the spring of 1918, and realizing, as we then did, what an organized force for disorder was rife in Russian Turkistan, with no aim but the spoliation of the rich and the dissemination of literature for the creation of class warfare anywhere and everywhere, my colleague, Mr. Uspensky, Russian Consul-General—than whom there can be no stauncher pro-Ally—and I thought that it was high time to suggest to the Chinese local authorities some measures for preserving Kashgar from the Bolshevik danger. This seemed all the more necessary because a constant stream of Sarts from the disturbed area in Ferghana was crossing the Tianshan range and practically forcing its way into Kashgar, regardless of Chinese passport restrictions; and it was impossible to discriminate who among the travellers were *bona-fide* refugees, and who were simply the native riff-raff that had followed, and then deserted, the Red Army, making off possibly with looted property.

Besides this, indications were not wanting that the Tashkent Soviet were devoting a certain amount of special attention to Kashgar. On the Kashgar-Ferghana border they were busily engaged in establishing a cordon of soldiers on whom they thought they could depend. The Pamir garrison, which ordinarily consisted of Cossacks, was replaced by a detachment of Austrian war prisoners who had taken service in the Red Army. And Red Guards had similarly ousted the Cossacks at Gulcha, on the Kashgar-Osh caravan route; and they were being pushed up to the very frontier at Irkishtam, where Bolshevik signallers were already in occupation of the telegraph office. At the same time, some of my personal friends in the Russian community at Kashgar were honoured by the Soviet with notifications of the establishment of "The Turkistan Soviet Republic in the Russian Federation," and with offers to be taken into the Soviet service. Well do I remember the wry face made by my Russian colleague when he received a note from the Bolshevik Commissary for Foreign Affairs intimating to "Tavarishchi" Uspensky (Comrade Uspensky) that official correspondence concerning the Turkistan Republic should in future be sent to the office of the People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs at Tashkent, to which intimation "Comrade" Uspensky replied that, owing to a previous engagement with the Omsk Government, he must forgo the pleasure, etc. Then the manager of the Russo-Asiatic Bank at Kashgar got an intimation

that that institution was in future to be known, not as the Russo-Asiatic, but as the People's Bank. Another friend of mine in an honoured position in the Russian colony was informed that the title of Commissary had been conferred on him—an honour of which he was singularly unappreciative. And that the Chinese authorities might not feel neglected by a want of Bolshevik attention, my old and highly esteemed friend, Chu Tajen, the Taotai of Kashgar, was the recipient of a telegram from the Bolshevik Foreign Affairs Commissary suggesting that China should establish a Consulate at Tashkent to watch over the interests of the numerous Chinese citizens in that town. Chu Taotai was, however, too old a diplomat to be caught by so palpable a ruse to gain China's recognition of the Bolshevik régime; so he politely wired back to the Commissary that Kashgar was not the place where a matter of such importance could be treated, and that, under the circumstances, the Commissary would be well advised to go to Peking, the headquarters of the Chinese Government.

All this happened just at the time when the war was passing on to its most critical stage; and though Kashgaria remained unruffled, yet precautions had to be taken; and we took the following:

The Chinese authorities were induced to close communications with the conterminous Russian province of Ferghana by the despatch of troops to the frontier posts in the Tienshan Mountains, these troops being ordered to turn back all and sundry, except Chinese subjects who could prove their status by their Chinese passports. Then the Chinese, the Russians, and the British combined in organizing a censorship of letters and newspapers going to and fro between Kashgar and Ferghana through the Russian post.

At the same time the British Consulate, which till then was unprotected, was furnished by the Government of India with a guard of thirty sepoy from the Kashmir Imperial Service troops. And lest Bolshevik agents, amongst whom there was a goodly sprinkling of Germans and Austrians, should, disguised as natives, attempt to penetrate into Hunza, and to tamper with the tribes in the Gilgit Political Agency, we continued to keep on the Taghdumbash Pamir a small body of Hunza scouts to bar the road. (These are splendid fellows, so active and businesslike; and I well remember the trick they played in 1916 on a German and an Austrian officer who, travelling as Norwegians, had made their way across from Shanghai to Turkistan on the benevolent mission of scattering gold sovereigns among the Afghans and of instructing these people the way they should go. The Hunza men pretended to be Afghan soldiers, and as the German officers were in some doubt as to the road to Wakhan, the Hunza scouts undertook to act as guides for them, and guided them into Gilgit and into the arms of the British representa-

tive there.) Another measure that was taken against German-Bolshevist activities was the speeding-up of communications between Kashgar and India by the establishment in the British Consulate of a wireless receiving apparatus; so that, when the Armistice was signed, people at Kashgar knew about it almost as soon as did the people in London.

Modest as these steps were, there can be no doubt that, at a critical time, they did have a steadying effect, not only on Chinese Turkistan, but also on our own Kashmir border.

Still, for the safeguarding of the Indian Frontier from the north, other measures also had to be taken, and these, not at Kashgar, but further west in Russian Turkistan.

In May, 1918, the Germans had established a military dictatorship in the Ukraine, and the port of Rostoff, on the Sea of Azov, had passed into their hands. In Caucasia, too, the Turks were advancing on Baku, and it was doubtful if the small detachment we had sent there via Enzeli would be able to hold their own. Altogether, the situation was such that if the German Berlin-Byzantium-Baghdad scheme had broken down, the alternative one of Berlin-Batum-Baku-Bukhara wore, at any rate, a promising appearance. Who knew but that at any moment the enemy might not cross, via Krasnovodsk, into Transcaspia and take possession of the Russia Central Asian Railway? From Merv, which is on that railway, it is only a short run to Khushk, and Khushk is on the very border of Afghanistan.

These possibilities were certainly in the air; and yet we in England and in India had little or no means of knowing the condition of things in Russian Turkistan, the country on the very border of Persia and of Afghanistan—and threatened with an enemy invasion.

In order to keep ourselves *au courant* of events there, we decided to send openly a Mission to Tashkent, the once beautiful capital of Russian Turkistan, but now a stronghold of Bolshevism. You will be specially interested to hear that a member of the Central Asian Society was the head of the Mission. Colonel F. M. Bailey, C.I.E., has already made his mark as an explorer in Tibet and South-West China, and is one of those officers in the Indian Political Department on whose ability Government rely to extricate themselves from a tight corner into which duty sometimes leads one, by a reliance, not so much on Government assistance as on their own tact and ingenuity. With Bailey were Major P. T. Etherton, of the Gurwal Rifles, author of "Through Mongolia," and Major L. V. S. Blacker, of the Guides—both experienced travellers in Central Asia.

They arrived at Kashgar from India in June last year; but as I was then going on leave, it was arranged that Major Etherton should not proceed to Tashkent, but remain at Kashgar to officiate as H.M. Consul-General; whilst I should, as soon as I should have made over

charge, and before going on leave, follow Bailey and Blacker to Tashkent, introduce them to the Bolshevik authorities, and generally help them to get themselves established in their dangerous surroundings.

Bailey and Blacker left Kashgar for Tashkent on July 24, and that there might be no misunderstanding, through language difficulties, with the Russian border officials—not a few of whom had, as a matter of necessity, and not of conviction, accepted Bolshevism, but this in a dilution only just strong enough to insure the preservation of the substances known as bread and butter—I got Mr. Stephanovich, Secretary of the Russian Consulate-General, to go with the British officers and pilot them through the region, just within the Russian border, where Bolshevism was more feigned than real. As matters turned out, it was well that that precaution had been taken; for even before the Mission set out from Kashgar, there were the wildest rumours among the Russian Kirghiz in the Tianshan Mountains, and even in the Soviets at Osh and Andijan, that a British-Indian force, 12,000 strong, was advancing through the Pamirs to deliver Ferghana from the Bolsheviks, and that the officers leaving Kashgar for Tashkent were a sort of advance guard sent to make preliminary reconnaissances. But, thanks to the personal influence which Mr. Stephanovich possessed with the quasi-Bolshevik officials, not only did the Mission pass through Irkishtam, Osh, and Andijan unmolested and unchallenged, but was even given assistance to entrain for Tashkent, where it arrived without any mishap at the end of August.

Bailey and Blacker lost no time in announcing their presence to the Foreign Affairs Commissary. The reception they got was decidedly cool, not to say hostile. By whom was the Mission sent? it was asked. What papers had it besides the passport issued by the British Consul at Kashgar? To which Bailey answered that he had been sent by the British Consul, and that the Consul himself was on his way to Tashkent and would explain the object of the Mission. It was just a touch and go that they were not arrested forthwith as spies.

I did not keep the Bolsheviks waiting long. As soon as I had received the approval of Government to my proceeding to Tashkent I left Kashgar, and performed the journey in twelve days, arriving at Tashkent some ten days after Bailey and Blacker.

I fear that I have no stirring adventures to relate in connection with that journey. To while away the monotony of marching through the Tianshan, there was, it is true, to preoccupy one's mind, a gang of some sixty armed robbers—Russians and natives of Margillan—looting the Kirghiz and carrying off their women. They, however, took no notice of my caravan. But when I got to the station at Andijan, I discovered that railway travelling was no easy matter. Owing to the general disorganization and to an alarming

shortage of naphtha, trains ran only at irregular intervals, and when a train did start, the rush was fearful. Everyone scrambled in as best he could, some through the doors and others through the windows; and as the inside of the carriages soon became choke-full, a dense mass of humanity invaded the carriage-roofs, on which they stood or squatted. I, however, did not fare badly in this crush. Through a lavish distribution of bribes, which cost twenty times more than my railway tickets, I secured a coupé for myself, my two servants, and my baggage—there was no luggage van to the train. But just as I was congratulating myself on the prospect of a comfortable journey to Tashkent, lo! a fair Bolshevik, half stifled in the corridor, forced her way into my coupé; and seeing all the available space lumbered up with my luggage, opened (very naturally) a volley of abuses on me. In vain I pleaded that the coupé was for two only, and that there were already three of us in it, not to mention that the Railway Commissary at Andijan had had the coupé specially reserved for me. Still, I said I would do my best to make room for her. "Oh yes," she screamed, "you are a bourgeois, and you think you can do what you like because you have money. Turkistan is no longer the bourgeois' country, but the people's. And if you say much more"—though I had scarcely opened my mouth—"I'll have you thrown on the lines—you, your servants, and your baggage. Do you know who I am?" she asked theatrically. "I am the wife of the Commissary for all the railways in Turkistan." (What she said was quite true, as I found out later on at Tashkent, where I saw her husband, who, however, did not carry out his wife's threat about throwing me out on the lines, but, on the contrary, placed at my disposal, three weeks later, on my return journey from Tashkent to Andijan, not only a coupé, but an entire railway carriage.) However, the Bolshevik lady soon simmered down; and when the train stopped at the Chernaev Junction, and I went out and fetched some hot water for her tea-kettle, she was all sweetness; and by the time we reached Tashkent, I had learnt from her not a little about the new condition of things in the town, and also a thing of which I had no notion when I started from Kashgar—namely, the appearance of Indian troops at Askabad, about which she showed me an indignant paragraph in a Bolshevik newspaper.

This bit of news, so casually obtained, caused me some anxiety; and it was with thoughts of the effect that our proceedings at Askabad might have on the Bolshevik reception of Bailey and Blacker that I went to join them at Tashkent. They were, however, very jolly; and I found they had already struck up quite a number of friendships in the Russian and non-Russian communities. Perhaps, even after this lapse of time, it may be inadvisable to particularize; but no harm can be done by my mentioning Mr. Tredwell, the American Consul, who

helped us in every way, and with whom I had the pleasantest relations during the three weeks I was at Tashkent.

It goes without saying that the presence of three British officials at Tashkent did not escape the attention of the Bolshevik press—all other organs had been ruthlessly suppressed—and the greetings we received were by no means cordial. We were called the scoundrelly English, the plunderers of India, whose millions we treated with brilliant contempt. Now, it was pointed out, our attention had been turned to the Turkistan Republic, because "the Soviet existed there as a forge of a revolution which at any moment could call into existence serious trouble for the British, and could smash England's power as a colonial Empire." And what cool insolence, too, that whilst Indian sepoy were aiding and abetting the Turkomans to fight the Red Army at Askabad, we should be sending a Mission to the Soviet Republic! Many things needed explaining before that Mission could be received, etc.

Whilst the *Nasha Gazetta* was indulging in these invectives, another paper, printed in German, and known as the *Völker Freiheit*, which formally announced itself as "the organ of the German Group of the Russian Communistic Party," published daily articles on Marxism, summoned the proletariat of all countries to unite in their warfare against Capitalism, and incessantly urged the Austrian war prisoners in Turkistan to join the ranks of the Red Army and carry on the war against the capitalist Government of Great Britain.

It was with the political atmosphere at Tashkent at this tension that I accompanied Colonel Bailey and Major Blacker to call on the Foreign Affairs Commissary Damagatsky on August 26. We were well enough received, and we explained the objects of the Mission, about which we were quite frank, viz.:

1. To procure information on the advance of the Germans in the Ukraine and of the Turks towards Baku, seeing that the invasion of Russian territory in those directions by our enemies was a matter of grave concern to us, and could well have a bearing on the tranquillity of the Afghan and Indian borders.
2. To report on the behaviour of the German and Austrian war prisoners, and on the steps the Soviet were taking to keep them interned, and to prevent them from escaping into Persian and Afghan territories.
3. To report on the disposal of the raw cotton in Turkistan, of which some fifteen million poods were said to be lying in Ferghana and Samarkand. As was well known to the Soviet, the Germans were after this cotton, and we should like to know what the Soviet proposed doing with this important war material.
4. To watch over the interests of British subjects in Turkistan, the Mission using its influence informally with the Soviet to prevent

British subjects from suffering a repetition of those hardships and losses to which they were subjected when Kokand was attacked only a few months ago.

Generally, we were interested in knowing how far the Soviet of Turkistan were able or were willing to maintain an attitude of neutrality in the war between the Entente and the Central Powers.

As for myself personally, I did not, I explained, belong to the Mission; but as a British Consul, I wished to introduce it to the Soviet before I went on leave to India; and I hoped the Soviet would be disposed to accord to it a friendly, though informal, reception. Informal, I added, because the Mission itself, which had no power to recognize the Republic officially, could only treat with the Soviet in Tashkent in an informal way.

Damagatsky was very guarded in his utterances, and what he said—at first, at least—was in such general terms that little or nothing could be made of it. But he was not backward with his questions. Were the Afghans likely to interfere in the affairs of Turkistan? And what was the meaning of British activity at Askabad, where it was reported that twenty British officers, with machine guns, had appeared, and were taking part on the side of the Turkomans in the fight against the Soviet troops? Well, I replied, there was the wireless at Tashkent, and there was also the wireless in India; and if the Government of India were asked for explanations, they would surely give them; but of one thing Mr. Damagatsky might rest assured—as the Germans were on Russian territory, if we had come there, too, it would be for strategical reasons connected with the war against our enemy.

The upshot of this interview was that Damagatsky said that, though personally he was in favour of the Mission being received, he would have to refer the matter to the Soviet.

This reference took a long time; but we soon had an inkling of the cause of delay. We discovered that, in the main, there were two parties in the Soviet. The one consisted of the out-and-out Bolsheviks, men of the type that made the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and would not mind if they sold the whole of Russia to Germany; the other party, known as the Left Socialist Revolutionists, though Bolsheviks on most points, still wished to keep Russia for the Russians, and in a lukewarm way talked of continuing the war against Germany. Damagatsky was one of these, and his party was inclined to keep an open mind as to the reception of the Mission; whilst the other, whose spokesman was one Tobolin, was all for having us arrested as spies. Such was the contention over us that for a time the Left Socialist Revolutionists threatened to resign if hands were laid on us. Anyhow, between the two parties, we remained in comparative security, though, to say the truth, we had thought it

advisable to make preparations for making ourselves scarce, should at any moment we receive warning that the Red Guards were on our heels.

Whilst we were being kept thus on the *qui vive*, we received a message from Damagatsky that the Chairman of the Commissaries desired to see us at the White House, as is now called the residence where *ci-devant* Governors-General represented the majesty of Russia in the days before her humiliation.

We accordingly went, and when we arrived we were conducted by a few slovenly dressed Red Guard soldiers through what must have been, under the old régime, the Throne Room; and then, after we had passed through a succession of corridors, we were ushered into a small sitting-room with a bed in one corner and a writing-desk in another, behind which latter sat a young man dressed in a brown greasy blouse. This was Kolaeseff, ex-sergeant-major of the Tzarist Army, now the successor in power to General Kuropatkin, and for all purposes the President of the Republic and the most influential man in Turkistan. (He was, it is said, on the Merv front in January of the present year leading the Bolsheviks against us, and it is just possible that some of our own officers came then into very close quarters with him.)

He greeted us coldly, and began immediately to question me as to the objects of the Mission; and to him I gave the same explanation as I did to Damagatsky. He made no comments on what was developing on the Askabad front, but he denounced roundly our action at Archangel as tantamount to a declaration of war on the Soviet Republic of Russia, and wondered how this action was to be reconciled to our despatch of an ostensibly friendly Mission to Tashkent. But when it was pointed out to him that the move was directed against Germany, whose troops were already in Finland, Kolaeseff said nothing more. The interview began rather badly; and when Kolaeseff said in an excited tone that, in his opinion, the Mission was quite unnecessary, I certainly thought that we had been finely trapped, and I had visions of the interior of a Bolshevik jail. However, things took an unexpected turn for the better; what caused it I don't know. Certain it is that it suddenly occurred to Kolaeseff to hope that the Mission might be the means of fostering communication and friendship with India, adding that he would refer for orders to Moscow whether it should be received, and that, in the meantime, it would be treated with consideration.

This interview took place on September 1, and a fortnight afterwards I left Tashkent for India, travelling back into Chinese territory, and thence onwards to Gilgit and Kashmir. Blacker had been in bad health all the time he was in Kashgar and Tashkent; and as Bailey thought that he had better go back with me, Blacker and I returned together. When Bailey and Tredwell and some other friends of ours

saw us off at the Tashkent Railway Station on the afternoon of September 14, Bailey was going strong, and as he had got tired of his hotel life, was making arrangements for taking a house at Tashkent. His position then seemed fairly tenable, though there was no disguising the fact that it might at any moment develop into one of great danger. What happened to him afterwards, I only heard after my arrival in India. It appears that on October 20—some five weeks after I left Tashkent—in consequence of an order received by the Turkistan Soviet from Moscow for the arrest of all Allied subjects, Tredwell was seized and kept in confinement in his own house; and as Bailey was "wanted," too, he disappeared, and since then little or nothing has been heard of him. No doubt he is having many thrilling adventures. Let us hope that before long our anxiety concerning him may be allayed, and that he will reappear, and maybe continue in this very room the story of the Tashkent Mission.

So much, then, for the Mission. It may be asked: What was the good of it? Well, as we openly told Damagatsky and Kolaeseff at Tashkent, the officers had been sent to collect military information in view of the then very possible advance of German and Turkish troops into Transcaspia and Turkistan. The reports made by them on that subject have been very valuable, and I submit would have been of the greatest use to us had the Central Powers not collapsed at the time they did. That fact alone ought to be an ample justification for the journey. Risks there were, undoubtedly, in going into a Bolshevik country; but they were risks undertaken, not recklessly, but with a definite purpose, and in the stress of the war against Germany.

Now may I make a few observations on the conditions of Russian Turkistan as I saw that country in August-September, 1918?

Turkistan was then like an island, so isolated it was—difficult to get into and equally difficult to get out of. On the east the Chinese at Kashgar had closed their frontier against it as a plague-stricken country. On the north-east, in Semiretchia, some Siberian Cossacks and Checho-Slavaks were moving through Kopal on Vierny, and were thrusting the Vierny Bolsheviks back into Turkistan. On the north-west, severe fighting was going on around Orenburg between the Orenburg Cossacks, under Doutoff, and the Red Guards sent from Tashkent to meet them; and all communication, except by wireless, was cut off between Central Russia and Turkistan. Then, on the west, we ourselves had made a descent on Krasnovodsk, thus controlling the Caspian; and on the south, the Turkomans of Transcaspia were in revolt against the Bolsheviks; and fighting was in progress around Askabad and Merv. Altogether, the Red Army, under Kolaeseff, were then being attacked on several fronts; and had the attackers shown determination, and had they been able to act in

co-operation instead of keeping up a desultory warfare, the Bolshevik forces could easily have been overthrown. As for the Russians in the country, certainly, as a body, they were dead against the Bolsheviks, and so were the native Mahammadanis. Indeed, such was their condition, that they would have welcomed any deliverer, be he English or German, Afghan or Turk.

The Bolshevik forces, whatever they may be now, were by no means considerable last autumn—17,000 all told. But 50 per cent. of them were Austrian ex-war prisoners, who were vastly superior to those Russians who had joined the Red Army. The Austrians held, I verily believe, the whole situation in the hollow of their hands; and had we not barred the road to a German advance by our control of the Krasnovodsk-Askabad section of the Central Asian Railway, and had, of course, the Central Powers not collapsed in Europe, these Austrians would certainly have converted Turkistan into a German province, or at least into another Ukraine. Though technically speaking they were war-prisoners, they were free to do just as they liked at the time when I was at Tashkent. Not a few of them had trekked into Afghanistan; and when the history of the present Afghan War is written, no doubt we shall see that the rôle played by them has been an important one.

I cannot say that Bolshevism, as I saw it in Turkistan, had taken a virulent form. The disease centre was certainly Tashkent; but the outlying districts seemed to have taken the infection mildly, and this only through their economic and financial dependence on Tashkent. The gang of adventurers who had seized the power were all local men, sprung from the lower ranks of official life. Damagatsky was a draughtsman in the Topographical Office, and he was given the post of Foreign Affairs Commissary because he, at any rate, understood a map when he saw one, and knew something of the lie of the countries by which Turkistan was surrounded. Another Commissary whom I came across had been a ticket-seller in the booking office at the Tashkent Railway Station. How these men raised themselves into power I do not quite know, beyond that they played into the hands of a number of soldiers and workmen, and got these to form a sort of Pretorian guard, and, with the help of these men, they turned out and murdered those officials of the old régime who held out against recognizing the Bolshevik Government.

I was fortunate enough, during the time I spent in Tashkent, not to be the witness of actual executions, though a number of them did take place only a few days before my arrival. Nevertheless there was undoubtedly a reign of terror. Armed men forced their way into private houses any time of the day or night, and unless bought off with a good round bribe, they just seized any object they took a fancy to, and never a receipt did they give for property so

removed—not, of course, by way of brigandage, but in the sacred name of “nationalization.” And all this was done to the accompaniment of other sounding words, too—“indemnization,” “socialization,” “common property,” and what not. Yet, with it all, it did not seem that *very much* property passed from the hands of owners into those of the Soviet. The fact is, the self-constituted Bolsheviks were quite satisfied with things as they were, which allowed them to terrorize the rich and to hold them up to *irregular* ransom, but which did not force them to adopt any genuine Socialistic scheme such as would benefit the proletariat as a whole. So it was that I noticed a phenomenon, strange for these so-called Communistic days—the degradation of the old bourgeoisie on the one side, and the rise of a new, on the other—the bourgeoisie of Bolsheviks, or, rather, I should say, of active Bolsheviks. The distinction is important, for it is no good being a sleeping partner in a Bolshevik concern.

And a man who has been one is my authority for this assertion. This is how I had the privilege of a conversation with him: When I came to Tashkent, my train reached the station late at night, and as the Bolsheviks had decreed that all traffic should stop at 10 p.m., and that anyone seen in the streets after that hour should be marched off to the police jail, I remained in the station, and spent the night on the floor of the waiting-room, with my portmanteau for a pillow. At daybreak, however, I tried to make my way to more comfortable quarters in the town; but no *isvoschik* was to be had; so, seeing a *mujik* driving an empty truck, I hailed him, and got him to take me and my luggage. Sitting on my kit, whilst the truck jolted through the streets, then empty and silent before the troubles and persecutions of another day, I aired the little Russian I knew by engaging the *mujik* in conversation, and this is what I gathered from him touching the prospects of those of the proletariat who happened to be sleeping partners.

He was a poor man, he said, and didn't see why he shouldn't have a share of the good things promised by the new régime, which was to make the Poor richer by making the Rich poorer. So, like many others, he became a Bolshevik, and, for all he knew, he might be one still. He had waited a long time for his share of riches, and it looked as if he might whistle for it for ever. The only people who had enriched themselves, he said, were those who had the power in their hands, and they were working for their own ends, and for no one else's. But they were *not* Bolsheviks, he exclaimed with warmth; had they been Bolsheviks, he said, they would have looked after the poor, besides clapping them in jail when a half-dozen of them were seen talking together in a street corner. He was sick of Bolshevik oppression, and did not care who took Turkistan so long as there was peace.

Then, as we jolted through the main avenue-street of Tashkent, pointing with his whip to a brand new street plate on which the single word "Karl Marxskia" was painted, the man exclaimed, "This is all these people have done for the town; they have changed the Kaufmann Street into the Karl Marx Street."

I have often thought since, did Karl Marx, who now lies buried in Highgate Cemetery, see the egoist robberies that had been perpetrated in his name in far-off Tashkent, even he, sinister preacher of class warfare though he be, would turn in his grave. He, at least, was sincere, and did not work for personal gain, as are doing those so-called disciples of his whom I met at Tashkent. President Kolaeseff was as poor as my companion the mujik cart driver, when he was a sergeant-major in the Tzarist Army; now he is a wealthy Bolshevik bourgeois, the possessor of a private fortune of over a million roubles. *Ex uno disce omnes.*

The CHAIRMAN said they should feel very happy if someone would make some observations or put questions to Sir George Macartney in regard to the paper he had read. It would be interesting if someone would perhaps relate personal experiences of their own in Russia or elsewhere in connection with the Bolshevik movement.

Mrs. SLATER: I should like to ask why the men were not recalled from Tashkent when the Armistice took place? Why should they still remain in Tashkent after they there found out information about the Germans and the Turks coming down on the railways, and after they heard about the Armistice being signed? Why did they do so?

Sir GEORGE MACARTNEY: When I was in Tashkent the war was still going on. I was three weeks there, and during those three weeks I had no letter, no telegram, and no one knew what was going on in Europe at all.

Mrs. SLATER: That was in October?

Sir GEORGE MACARTNEY: Yes, that was in October.

Mrs. SLATER: And the Armistice was signed in November,

Sir GEORGE MACARTNEY: Quite. People in Tibet or Mongolia or Timbuctoo might know about the Armistice, but not in Tashkent.

Mrs. SLATER: I thought you said there was such a splendid wireless system there, and that everybody in Tashkent and Kashgar knew it as soon as the people in London.

Sir GEORGE MACARTNEY: I thought I made it clear that the wireless—only a receiving apparatus—was established at Kashgar after I left Tashkent. In fact, I saw the officer going up to establish it when I passed Gilgit on my way down to India. But even after I left the country Colonel Bailey could not leave Tashkent.

Mrs. SLATER: He could not get back?

Sir GEORGE MACARTNEY: He could not get back. The Government

of India tried every means possible to get him recalled. They sent wireless messages from India to Tashkent—to the Bolsheviks there—but in spite of every effort, we could not get into touch with Colonel Bailey.

Lieut.-Colonel A. C. YATE remarked that twenty-nine years ago he found himself in Tashkent. Colonel F. M. Bailey's distinguished record as an explorer was well known to all his friends and to all geographers and students of Asiatic affairs. They had necessarily been very anxious about him. They had experienced the pleasure that day of hearing more about the circumstances under which Colonel Bailey had found his way to Tashkent, and the objects for which he was sent there, than they had known before. He personally had heard a good deal privately from Mrs. Bailey, with whose anxiety all must warmly sympathize. It had recently occurred to him that the attitude which had been assumed by the new Ameer, and which was so opposite to that of his predecessor Ameer Habibullah, who had unfortunately been murdered, must have produced relations between Russian Turkistan and Afghanistan which certainly a little time ago were quite unforeseen. The conviction was paramount, until the late Ameer Habibullah met with so untimely a death, that Afghanistan would remain loyal to its alliance with its suzerain, Great Britain. The situation had now greatly altered. A considerable time ago—well, before the death of Ameer Habibullah—a confederacy of the Central Asian Khanates, with the Ameer Habibullah as its head, had been rumoured, but with the death of the Ameer that prospect seemed to have passed away. They had listened to a lecture from Sir George Macartney which had greatly opened their eyes; for none of them, he might fairly say, had any means of ascertaining what went on in remote parts of Central Asia such as Kashgar, Tashkent, and in the countries which lay between or were contiguous to them. Belated news of the troops that were sent, thanks to the construction of the Nushki-Duzdáb Railway, into Persia, to Mashhad, and the Trans-Caspian Railway, had reached them. Sir George himself had said it came as an absolute surprise to him to hear that British troops were actually occupying the Trans-Caspian Railway. A most interesting and graphic account of this little force was given in an article which appeared in *The Times* some few months ago. The scene there depicted gave the reader a more vivid idea of the spirit and tone that animated the anti-Bolshevist troops of Russian Turkistan than any other book or article that he had come across. The probability was, as the writer said, that in that force under the garb of Menshevism, Tsarism and Imperialism lay low. Seeing the present position of affairs in Afghanistan, we have some cause to regret that we did not longer maintain our British troops up at Mashhad. It was possible that we were even now sending them back there; for it stood to reason

that, whether from Sistan or Khorasan, from the valley of the Helmand or the Hari-Rud, we could bring a good deal of pressure to bear upon Afghanistan.

MISS TUDOR FRERE: It would be very interesting if you could give us any information of the fate of Kuropatkin. - I was in that part years ago.

SIR GEORGE MACARTNEY: I heard that he had been arrested by the soldiers, and then afterwards we in Kashgar got the impression that he left Tashkent for Russia. I should not be at all surprised if he is safe, though nothing is known of his whereabouts.

SIR PERCY SYKES said that eighty years ago Pottinger made a great name for himself in Herat, and Shakespeare also made a great name for himself, as others had done in connection with the Indian Political Service, but he thought that when the history of what had transpired in Central Asia during the war came to be written it would be found that Political Officers like the lecturer and Colonel Bailey would be found to have done even better work than any of them. He did not think anyone could read or listen to the lecture without being impressed with one thing. Although Sir George Macartney had been very modest in his reference to the risks he had run, they could not help realizing how appalling those risks had been. Those of them who had been in those parts knew very well the extraordinary risks that had been run, but they could also feel assured that Colonel Bailey, who was one of the most brilliant members of the Indian Political Service, would give an extremely good account of himself wherever he might be. He thought the latest news of him was that he was all right in March. They might feel fairly safe in saying that he would not only escape with very great honour to himself, but they might also hope that he would give an account of his adventures in that very room. Before sitting down he desired to say that he thought that what the Hon. Secretary of the Society had read out was more than justified by that lecture alone. Lectures such as the one they had just listened to, that by Colonel Webb, and by others, were of fundamental importance, because those who desired to write upon or study a subject relating to Central Asia must refer to them as they appeared in "The Record of the Central Asian Society." That fact alone should stimulate all who were members of the Society to induce others to join it. The work of the Society, though done in a quiet way and by a very small membership, was of extreme importance.

The CHAIRMAN said that as no one else wished to make any further observation it was his pleasing duty to propose a very cordial vote of thanks to Sir George Macartney for his most able and instructive paper, and for the very vivid and interesting picture he had drawn of his experiences of the situation in Russian Turkistan. He was sure they all re-echoed the hope expressed by Sir Percy Sykes that they

would soon receive definite news of the safety of Colonel Bailey. It would give members of the Society the very greatest pleasure if Colonel Bailey would take up, in that very room, the story where Sir George Macartney had left it. Whether or not one could perhaps entirely agree with the optimistic and sanguine forecast they occasionally heard of the rapid collapse of Bolshevism, he was afraid that there was still a considerable power of defensive and offensive resistance in the Bolshevik forces. Though, no doubt, they had suffered serious reverses, he himself would not feel that the end of Bolshevism was near until they heard that these forces had been compelled to evacuate Petrograd and Moscow. And even when that event happened, it would be appalling to reflect upon the wreckage which had been caused and the desolation the Bolsheviks had spread throughout the very fertile and fairest districts of the Russian Empire. They all knew that Russia is a country of almost illimitable resources, but even the richest country in the world could hardly pass through the serious ordeal which Russia had undergone without feeling the effects for a very long time afterwards. Not only had they destroyed much that had existed, but the Bolsheviks had also destroyed a great deal of material, both human and other, by the use of which reconstruction was possible. The first thing Russia would have to do would be to re-establish her financial credit abroad, and he did hope that then she would be able, with the assistance of England and other countries, in various forms to recreate and develop her industrial, agricultural, and mineral wealth. In any case, he hoped our country would be one of the foremost to offer assistance and to do all it could to re-establish our former Ally on a sound and stable basis, thereby enabling her to enter upon an era of real peace, progress, and prosperity. He now desired on behalf of the meeting to tender most hearty thanks to Sir George Macartney for his very able and interesting lecture.

Sir GEORGE MACARTNEY, in acknowledgment, said he fully realized the honour implied in the vote of thanks the meeting had so kindly passed. But he desired on his part to thank them also for their kind attention, and for the indulgence they had shown in listening to his paper.

The proceedings then concluded.

CYPRUS

ON the afternoon of Wednesday, January 21, 1920, at the Royal Society's Lecture Room, Burlington House, Piccadilly, London, a lecture on "Cyprus" was delivered by Mr. Roland Mitchell, C.M.G., ex-Commissioner of Limassol, before a large meeting of the members and friends of the Society. In the unavoidable absence of the Right Hon. Lord Carnock, P.C., G.C.B., the Chairman of the Society, Colonel Sir Thomas Holdich presided.

The CHAIRMAN, in opening the proceedings, expressed regret at the absence of the President on the occasion, because of his intimate knowledge of all that concerns both the Middle and the Near East as well as the Far East, and the benefit of that knowledge would have been most invaluable to them in considering the position of Cyprus, which was the subject of that afternoon's lecture. In the absence of his Lordship, he had the honour to introduce to them Mr. Michell, whose knowledge as an administrator and first-hand knowledge on all matters relating to Cyprus enabled him to afford reliable information regarding the island and its future. He was sure that gentleman would give them a most interesting and entertaining paper.

Public attention is seldom directed to Cyprus, and this is natural in view of the immense extent of the British Empire, the comparative insignificance of the island, and the fact that its interests have been to some extent neglected. Those, however, who visit this picturesque and once flourishing island find that it has many attractions, and travellers now describe it in glowing terms as a fairyland of romance. Its importance, which in present circumstances is not to be underrated, will perhaps become more evident in the coming chapter of events in the Near East. The countries embraced by that term are largely in a state of unrest. Judging from recent opinions in the Press, British policy can hardly be congratulated on its achievements in that part of the world, although many thought that peace would bring an admirable opportunity of settling all Eastern questions. I would suggest that the future of Cyprus is one of the questions which deserve very close attention. At the present moment the "Cyprus question" is still one of the problems which hang in the balance.

I will endeavour to describe the island very briefly, glancing at such features of the past and present as will serve to present a fairly

accurate sketch. It is the third largest in the Mediterranean (coming next to Sicily and Sardinia), and lies on the angle formed by the coasts of Asia Minor and Syria. It is about 40 miles from Asia Minor, 60 from Syria, and 240 from Port Said. An excellent map of Cyprus was made in 1882 by Lord (then Lieutenant) Kitchener.

Its greatest length is about 140 miles, and breadth 60. Two mountain ranges run from west to east; the southern culminating in Mount Troodos (6,400 feet above sea level); the northern, about 100 miles long, rising to 3,100 feet. The area of the island is roughly 3,600 square miles, classified approximately as follows: Delimited forests, 700 square miles; uncultivable, 400; uncultivated, but capable of cultivation, 500; and cultivated, 2,000. There are but few large estates. The land is held in small holdings.

The principal area of cultivation is the great central plain called the "Mesaoria," lying, as the name implies, between the two ranges mentioned. The soil is rich, owing to the fertilizing silt which is brought down annually from the hills by winter torrents. The rainfall (October to April) is now from 17 to 20 inches. Natural pasture is scanty, and in dry years precarious. The island supports about 170,000 sheep and 240,000 goats. There is a good breed of island ponies; also of horned cattle, raised chiefly for agricultural purposes. The methods of husbandry are still patriarchal. The principal products are cereals, vines (wine and raisins), locust-beans (from the carob-tree), and silk cocoons. These together represent about three-fourths of the export trade. The yield of wheat is about 2,000,000 bushels, and of barley 2,200,000 bushels; of carobs about 35,000 tons. The tree grows in the plains and up to 3,000 feet. Vines are grown on the hills up to 4,000 and 5,000 feet. The wine is chiefly a strong red kind. A sweet wine called Commanderia (from a Commandery of the Templars), once celebrated, is made in diminishing quantities. A good brandy is made. Some advance has been made in wine manufacture, but this, and every industry, is in a very backward condition.

Cotton once was, and might again be, an important industry. Olive cultivation is much neglected. The silk industry equally calls for development. Fruits, which include grapes, oranges, lemons, pomegranates, apricots, figs, cherries, quinces, plums, melons, walnuts, almonds, and various other kinds, could be produced in far greater abundance. Tobacco is being now cultivated, but it is too early to say whether it will be a success. It must be confessed that little agricultural progress has been made. But the Department of Agriculture is doing all it can with very limited and inadequate grants. The productiveness of the island can be much more than doubled under improved conditions, which of course implies large expenditure, in view of the neglect of past ages. The needs of the future are clear. Foremost is that of increased artificial irrigation;

and next the emancipation of the peasantry from the grip of the moneylender. Cheap credit must reach the needy and honest members of the community, and the present conditions of husbandry must be reformed all round. The haphazard and unsystematic methods of the past must be replaced under proper guidance. The Agricultural Department, praiseworthy as its efforts have been, has only prepared the soil for future work.

Time permits only the briefest reference to Cyprus annals. Of the earliest inhabitants we know nothing. There was a language of syllabic character, akin to Lycian. There were early waves of Greek colonization; and from the East Phœnicians founded settlements, bringing a lasting influence in arts and religion. Thotmes III. (about 1450 B.C.) subdued the island, and introduced Egyptian influence. When the power of Phœnicia declined before that of Assyria, Cypriot kings transferred their allegiance to Assyria. The Greek element, which grew in strength, adopted many customs and religious ideas from the Phœnicians (Astarte becoming Aphrodite), such as the "great myth of Adonis." Remains of sculpture and art indicate Assyrian and Egyptian influences—often a blend of the two. Of Phœnician industries there are numerous relics. Greek influence was a later inspiration. Excavations in Græco-Roman and Byzantine necropoleis have yielded harvests which have enriched the museums of Europe and New York.

About 560 B.C. Amasis of Egypt conquered the island. In 525 Cyprus became subject to Persia, and then figured in the Græco-Persian wars. In 387 Cyprus was definitely assigned to Persia. In 332 Cyprus aided Alexander with ships. In 303 B.C. begins the Ptolemaic rule, which lasted till A.D. 45, when Rome annexed the island. In A.D. 395 Cyprus was incorporated in the Byzantine Empire, and for three centuries appears to have enjoyed tranquillity, until the rise of Islam. Then for 300 years (perhaps the darkest in Cypriot annals) the island suffered from Arab invasions. In 964 Cyprus was regained for the Byzantine Empire. After two uneventful centuries, we reach an interesting date—viz., 1191, when our King Richard I. conquered the island. He was married at Limasol to Berengaria of Navarre, by the Bishops of York and Evreux. By him it was sold to the Templars, who returned it, as giving more trouble than it was worth. It was then sold to Guy of Lusignan, and a Lusignan dynasty ruled for nearly 300 years. This was a remarkable period of feudal aristocracy, and of luxury for the rich. To it Cyprus owes its splendid monuments of French architecture, the beautiful cathedrals (now mosques) of Nikosia and Famagusta, and the fortresses, now ruins, of Hilarion and Kantara. The Abbey of Bellapais on the north coast is one of the finest relics.

In 1488 the island passed to Venice, for eighty-two years. In 1570

the Turks invaded and conquered the island, ruling till 1878. In that year Britain, under a Convention of Defensive Alliance between Queen Victoria and the Sultan (dated June 4), took over the administration of the island, which still remained part of the Ottoman Empire. Under this Convention it was agreed that if any attempt were made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further territories of the Sultan in Asia, England would join the Sultan in defending them by force of arms. In return the Sultan promised to introduce reforms into his territories (these to be agreed upon later between the two Powers); and for the protection of his Christian subjects. In an Annex (July 1, 1878) it was agreed *inter alia* that if Russia should restore Batum, Kars, and Ardahan (her conquests in Armenia), Cyprus would be evacuated and the Convention at an end. Also it was agreed that England would pay to the Porte an annual sum, supposed to represent the average excess of revenue over expenditure. This was computed, on a very questionable basis, to be £92,800.

Now, as regards the question of reforms, it was explained in Parliament that England assumed no responsibility. Turkey was to reform herself. Needless to say, this was not done. With regard to the other stipulation, adverse critics subjected the Convention to severe criticism. The Liberal Party regarded it as a reprehensible and unprofitable political blunder. It was considered in that quarter as one-sided and disadvantageous to Britain. Mr. Archibald Forbes, in an article in the *Nineteenth Century* entitled "The Fiasco in Cyprus," put the case thus:

"The island is occupied as a base of operations for a land expedition towards the north-east and east frontiers of Asia Minor; the reasoning being as follows—Russia's goal in Asia is India. The road to India lies through Persia. Russia cannot acquire Persia without first getting possession of the Euphrates Valley. The occupation of Cyprus will effectively prevent Russia from getting the Euphrates Valley. Thus the Anglo-Turkish Convention will terminate British anxiety in that direction. But," said the writer, "there is no clause in the agreement requiring the Sultan to defend the Euphrates Valley, or to engage in war with Russia. Russia, too, can acquire Persia without setting foot in Asia Minor. What would confront Russia would be an Anglo-Indian army, via the Persian Gulf, *en route* for Ispahan (Outram was on that war-path in 1857), not a handful of fever-stricken soldiers from Cyprus."

Lord Northbrook remarked that "to undertake hostilities in the right rear of the enemy is not precisely the way to defend a country." In 1826 General Paskievitch, Russian Commander-in-Chief in Asia, marching from Tiflis, invaded Persia and took Erivan. The Persians made terms, which they promptly repudiated. Paskievitch then

marched rapidly through the snow to a point about 200 miles from Teheran, and there told the Shah's plenipotentiaries that if he did get all he wanted he would march on and occupy Teheran. He got what he wanted. From his success in Erivan he received, by the way, the title of *Erivanski*. "Had Beaconsfield been a Russian," said Mr. Forbes, "he might have gone down to history as *Cypruski*."

Thus Russia ninety-three years ago penetrated to the heart of Persia without going within 300 miles of the Euphrates Valley, or 1,500 miles of Cyprus. The line of advance to India exposed no flank towards Persia; *a fortiori* none towards Asia Minor. The occupation of Cyprus could therefore have no influence on either. Our safety, Mr. Forbes considered, lay in the military occupation of Afghanistan. "It is," he said, "from Kabul and Herat that the words 'Thus far and no farther' will resound alike to St. Petersburg and through the bazaars of Hindustan. The phantom of covering India by maintaining Turkish integrity in Asia Minor is not worth catching at, in view of the risks incurred."

On the other hand, the acquisition of Cyprus by a far-seeing statesman has not been generally regarded in this prejudiced and unfavourable light. The matter of the road from Russia to India was not the sole consideration. There were other weighty reasons, of which time has not diminished the validity.

The "tribute" of £92,800 has no doubt been a terrible burden. The Greeks, and many others, have always contended that, as Cyprus was taken for Imperial purposes, it should be borne by the Imperial Government. This millstone round the neck of the Cypriots has been the principal obstacle to the development of the island.

After twelve or fifteen years it was found that we had not made such a bad bargain as many had imagined. Financially the situation was this. The "tribute" of £92,800 was applied to the Turkish loan of 1855, guaranteed by France and England, and repudiated by the Porte. Half of it (£40,876) a year went to the French and the same sum to the English bond-holders. The annual deficit in Cyprus was, on an average, for many years, about £30,000, which the British taxpayer had to pay. Thus the British taxpayer was a gainer by £10,000 to £11,000 a year. After some years the island began to pay its way, and the balance is now on the right side. The Imperial Government now grants £50,000 a year to Cyprus. This, I think, dates from the time of Sir Charles King Harman, who did much for the relief of the financial burden, and the welfare of Cypriots.

The view generally taken by politicians and the Press was that even if Cyprus were an incubus or a white elephant, we had undertaken duties towards the Cypriots, and that we could not throw off the responsibilities incurred by our occupation.

We may regard British rule from two points of view: (1) What has Britain done for Cyprus? and (2) What has it failed to do?

As regards (1), those who desire to examine the record of progress will find volumes of information in Blue Books and the annual Reports of forty years. No reform gave greater satisfaction in Cyprus than those of the Law Courts, carried out in 1883 under the late Sir Robert Biddulph, who so ably governed Cyprus for seven years from 1879. Before this the native courts carried on, but a British Assistant-Commissioner sat as an assessor. They did not always escape criticism. Many anecdotes were told. Sir Hamilton Lang, who wrote a book on Cyprus, records one. A criminal was being tried. The court decided to inflict as punishment a year's imprisonment. The decision was communicated by the interpreter to the assessor, who had been asleep during the trial, except when attending to his little dog. Looking at the culprit, he said to the interpreter: "He looks a great blackguard; ten years would not be too much for him." This was communicated to the court, which, agreeing to what they supposed was the wish of the assessor, said they would make the punishment five years. The assessor felt embarrassed. The interpreter proposed that the term should be left to the assessor, who, of course, ultimately decided on the original term of one year. I hope it will not be supposed that this example, if a real one, represents the general attitude of assessors, or officials, at that time!

The highest praise is given by all classes to the judicial department, with its Supreme Court at Nikosia, and a British President in six District Courts. Reforms were similarly carried out in all branches of the administration. The financial department was reorganized. That of the public works constructed roads, bridges, and Government buildings. A light railway now connects Famagusta with Nikosia and the central plain. Education has made considerable advance. The medical department shows a good record as regards public health, sanitation, and hospitals. Lepers and lunatics are properly cared for. Forests are preserved, and nursery gardens have been established. An experimental farm has done some good work. The breeds of horses, donkeys, and cattle are being improved. The campaign against locusts is maintained. The post and telegraph services are efficiently managed. A small harbour has been constructed at Famagusta. Municipalities have been given wider powers. The standard of comfort has been greatly raised in both towns and villages. Details would occupy far too much time; only those who knew Cyprus as pioneers in the early years, or old residents, can appreciate the complete transformation that has been effected.

2. In the second place, however, it must be candidly admitted that much has been left undone during our trusteeship. The most severe criticism has come from English pens. I will take one only—that of

Sir William Ramsay. Last year, in the *Quarterly Review*, Sir William stated that "the story of British administration in Cyprus will stand out in history as a record of incapacity." It was occupied for a military purpose, "in order to be a base from which the protectorate of Asia Minor could be exercised. When the war broke out with Turkey the island proved to be absolutely useless. Why? It has never been developed industrially, commercially, or as a naval or military station. If Britain had spent one-fifth of the money that Germany spent on Heligoland (bartered to Germany ten years after the occupation of Cyprus), it might have been of incalculable service in the late war." History will, it must be feared, endorse this accusation, but the blame should be placed on the right shoulders. The incapacity to deal creditably with Cyprus must be regarded as a part of British policy in the Near East as a whole, which Sir William strongly condemns.

But as regards Cyprus, which was to be a model to Asia Minor, the truth is that it never had a chance of becoming so, mainly for the following reasons: (1) The condemnation of its occupation by a powerful party in England; (2) it was condemned and written down as a pestilential and feverish spot, whereas by 1881 Sir Robert Biddulph was able to say that it was, for our troops, the healthiest place in the British Empire; (3) the burden of the "tribute"; (4) the occupation of Egypt in 1882, which caused further disregard; (5) the anomaly of our tenure, which prevented the investment of capital. Attempts to develop the island were stifled by the Home Treasury. Among the attempts were the following: M. Madon, an able French Forest Officer, was borrowed from France. His advice was not followed. A French expert was called in to advise regarding vines and the wine industry. His counsels were not carried out. Artesian borings were attempted very late, and in a half-hearted and inadequate manner. Professor Wyndham Dunstan visited Cyprus to advise regarding cotton. His advice was not followed. The vital needs are evident, but no development is possible without capital and credit, and the trouble is that so many parts of the Empire have equal, or prior, claims for consideration. Also the great and peculiar difficulties of the Government in Cyprus must be fully admitted.

With regard to the charge of culpable indifference (which can hardly be denied), it may be pertinent to quote Sir Charles Bruce. He tells us that on a visit to the Colonial Office he expressed a desire to see Mr. Chamberlain. "You can't see him," was the emphatic reply. "Chamberlain has been here only a few weeks, and is giving a great deal of trouble." I soon learnt the secret of the trouble. Up to that time, it was frankly admitted, the Colonial Office had "run the Secretary of State." Mr. Chamberlain proposed to reverse the process and "run" the Colonial Office. The change was effected, with the

happiest results, as to which we have the testimony of, amongst others, Sir Augustus Hemming, Sir Charles Bruce, and Lord Milner.

Cyprus was included in the list of places which benefited from the policy of progressive development inaugurated by Mr. Chamberlain.

I

The people of Cyprus are keen-witted and in a high degree intelligent. The villagers are strong, hardy, and frugal, law-abiding, and remarkably courteous and hospitable. The population is now about 290,000, including 230,000 Greeks and 60,000 Turks. In speaking of Greeks I should observe that they are not Hellenic subjects. Up to 1914 they were Ottoman subjects (*rayahs*), when they became British subjects. It is very difficult for an Ottoman subject to become a Greek, because an Ottoman subject must not only invest himself with Greek nationality, which is easy, but he must also divest himself of Ottoman nationality by permission of his Sultan, which is far from easy.

It is necessary to give a brief account of the *agitation* for "union with Greece" which has been kept up by a section of the Greek community, and has become a conspicuous feature of the present situation. To anyone acquainted with the Greek spirit it was obvious that such a movement (quite impossible under Turkish rule) would be developed in the island as soon as British "liberty" was introduced. No one can object to the growth of patriotic sentiment, and no Englishman would quarrel with it, provided it were manifested within proper bounds, and in a manner compatible with loyalty to the Government in power. It was not, as was pointed out by Sir Robert Biddulph, entirely of island growth. The leaders were small groups in the chief towns, including, of course, a few of the more hot-headed type. The town people, at first absolutely indifferent, became by degrees, luke-warm adherents. Town people are easily led, and moderate men with no taste for politics gradually follow the lead for fear of being classed as "traitors." As one of them once expressed it to me, "If I did not vote with So-and-so, I could not sit in the same coffee-house with him." The movement coincided with a feeling of discontent which the new order brought about, and which arose to a large extent out of disappointed hopes and expectations of a golden age which the British occupation was to bring. Some townspeople, *e.g.*, failed to obtain posts. Others, including Church dignitaries, resented the loss of privileges which they had enjoyed under Turkish rule, but which were incompatible with British justice for all. Alien rule is never loved, and a certain antipathy to foreigners (*ξενοφοβία*) has always been a strong instinct in Cyprus. All this led to whatever British unpopularity has existed in some classes of the town population. National egotism unfortunately

leads to misrepresentation. Thus, in Cyprus persons have been regarded as hostile to the Greek "idea" who may be quite good friends to Hellenism, as properly defined or professed. At all events, the agitation assumed an anti-Government, and to some extent an anti-British, character. The Government was represented as working selfishly against the interests of the people; so that practically loyalty to the Government was regarded as disloyalty to Hellenism. The agitation was marked by a pettiness quite in contrast to Greek feeling in Athens and other larger Greek communities, and often by very bad taste. Greek flags have been displayed, to the exclusion of the British. The Greek national air has been played without the British. Greeks have sometimes abstained from attending Levees of the High Commissioner on the King's birthday. Municipalities have refused to take part in Government-aided movements, exhibitions, shows, etc. These manifestations did not represent any spontaneous feeling of the Cypriot people. They were the outcome of decisions at clubs or meetings of leaders. The Church gave its powerful aid. Political Bishops exerted their influence. Church funds were devoted to the cause. The Greek Press—with a growing number of weekly papers—was a potent ally. Schoolmasters in town and village instilled into the minds of their pupils that they were something more than Cypriots. Clubs aided the propaganda. Demonstrations were organized. Every village petition contained a declaration of the unalterable desire for the realization of Cypriot Greek hopes. From 1883, when natives were elected by votes to the Legislative Council, Greek members made use of their position to push their programme. This intrusion of politics into the debates and addresses led to regrettable friction, and to lamentable waste of time which should have been devoted to co-operation with the Government. Visitors to Cyprus went away with the idea that relations were strained, not only with the Turks but with the British authorities. "The policy of the Cypriot patriot," says Mr. Mallock, "has been from the beginning consistent and simple. It has been to oppose every scheme or suggestion that originated with the British authorities."

By 1889 the organized and systematic obstruction of the Greeks became a serious impediment to progress, and to the work of the Legislative Council. The interests of Cyprus became a secondary consideration. In 1904 *The Times*, in an article on Cyprus, observed that this obstruction, if persisted in, could only lead to a remodelling of the Council; just as at Malta, owing to a similar attitude of the elected members, it was necessary to revert to the Constitution as it had existed in 1887. About a month later, the Secretary of State, in a despatch, stated that if the agitators pursued their obstructive policy, His Majesty's Government would be obliged to reconsider the whole question of the Constitution of Cyprus. This brought the agitators for a time to their senses. By 1912, however, the Greeks had decided to

force the pace. A fresh Memorial was put forward, to which an unfavourable reply, as it was considered, was given. Whereupon the Greek members took the ill-advised step of withdrawing from the Legislative Council in a body. Another deputation visited England. It was given to understand that certain claims were inadmissible. The members then decided to adopt a conciliatory attitude, as more expedient.

The agitation, it should be observed, received no encouragement from Greeks outside Cyprus. It was distinctly embarrassing to the Greek King and Government. Both naval and military officers from Greece who visited Cyprus pointed out to the Greek leaders that they were not pursuing a wise course. Another fact is that there is not, and never has been, any anti-British feeling among the rural population. They have no taste for politics, and only desire to be justly governed and left in peace. They have been perfectly satisfied with British rule. The propaganda has been entirely manipulated from the town headquarters, whence influence can always be exercised for bringing about so-called demonstrations when required.

One thing is certain, that much more might have been done for progress, had Greeks devoted themselves more to the duties for which they were elected, instead of subordinating them to political aims at variance with the existing convention. Had they dealt properly with real grievances, they would have had the support of officials and non-officials alike. Their line of action has probably tended to damage their own cause. It cannot be surprising if their provocative attitude should have tended to alienate to some extent that sympathy which ought to exist between the different communities. Greek opinions are no doubt divided. In a letter to the *Morning Post*, Mr. W. P. Stebbing stated that even in the bazaars there was a strong feeling against cession.

Now as regards the Turkish minority of the population. When the island was taken over, the Moslem community accepted with loyalty the decision of their Sultan, and they have maintained that attitude without any deviation to the present time. They have given unwavering support to the Government in the Legislative Council; and on many occasions it has been possible by their aid to proceed with necessary measures in spite of Greek opposition. They have, of course, opposed the Greek claims, which have aimed at changes at variance with the Anglo-Turkish agreement. But on the occasion of Greek deputations, demonstrations, etc., they have contented themselves with submitting their protests; and in reply, definite promises have been given that the interests of the community will be fully considered and respected. The Moslems have refrained from demonstrations, and have exercised the greatest forbearance, often under strong provocation.

There is, no doubt, a strong feeling in the island that the promises made should be strictly fulfilled.

On the day following the announcement (November, 1914) that the island had been annexed by Great Britain, the Moslem leaders promised the same loyal obedience as heretofore. They expressed to the High Commissioner their gratitude for the sympathy and help accorded to the Ottoman Empire and the Moslem community; and also their displeasure and shame at the action of the Turkish Government in entering into hostilities with England, in alliance with Germany. With reference to the flaunting of the Greek flag, I may quote the following from an English paper: "During the whole of the British occupation the Turkish element has refrained from manifestations, although it would have been far more permissible, and consistent with the fitness of things, had this community proceeded to carry its flags in procession, say on occasions of Bairam and the civil and religious anniversaries. The Turks have merely displayed a flag here and there on a minaret, or during Ramadan. Whether," as *The Times* observed, "the unrestricted use of an alien emblem (viz., the Greek) in an Ottoman island under British rule should be permitted is questionable."

The Turkish community, in a word, has always behaved with dignity, tact, and good taste. It is therefore most natural that the British and the loyal element should regard with complete sympathy and goodwill the Moslem ranks in the island. A correspondent, I.G.C., writing last September to the *Near East*, said: "All this has been kept too much in the background, while Greek missions have endeavoured to monopolize the attention of the public in England. It is high time that the record of the Moslem element were better known and appreciated in England. I should add that there is no desire whatever among the rural classes—the bulk of the population—for any change; quite the contrary. The town agitators have entirely failed to arouse any desire for the substitution of Greek for British rule by their racial propaganda."

Turks and Greek have lived in harmony during the occupation. Only once, in 1912, disturbances occurred. Riots took place in one town, and it became necessary to fire on the mob, several being killed and about eighty wounded. A small force of British troops was sent from Egypt. Some think that if the island were handed over to Greece conflicts might again occur. Personally I do not think so.

One thing is certain, that, if the island were ceded, there would be very bitter feeling on the part of the Moslem community, who would consider such a decision as a poor return for forty years of unswerving loyalty to the British Government.

II

The future of Cyprus has been, and is, under discussion. The war has changed the situation and brought new factors into play. A deputation of Greek Cypriots, headed by their Archbishop, and representing those who advocate "union with Greece," has once more laid their case before the Government in London. The reply given has been that it will receive careful consideration. At the time of writing these remarks, the public has no information as to what will be decided. The situation, as far as it is known, is this: A definite promise has been given in Parliament that the question will not be decided before it has been referred to the House of Commons. The British Government is, of course, quite independent of the Paris Conference in this matter. The claim does not emanate from Greece, and was not included in "the full and complete statement of the Greek case" (the Dodecanese area does not even include Rhodes, far less Cyprus). It is presented by a section of the Cypriot people. It is very doubtful whether it would be for the interests of Greece to take over this responsibility. It is reasonable to assume (as a late writer has done) that our Government does not desire to add to Greece's difficulties by giving her more territory than she can at present administer. This is not the moment to act on grounds of sentiment. Greece has enough to do to set her own house in order. She is acquiring sufficient new territory, and can afford to wait. The questions are, What is best for Cyprus? and What do British interests demand? Taking the first question, as regards the material interests of the island, it can hardly be to its advantage that it should pass from the hands of a powerful and wealthy Power to those of a nation still weak and poor. It stands to reason that its development (which, now that it is a British possession, should certainly proceed) will be better promoted by Britain than by Greece. But the dominating question is, What line does British policy dictate? I would say that not only the argument for retention holds the field, but that it is stronger than it ever was before. The offer made in 1915 (without reference to Parliament) was, I believe, strongly condemned by public opinion. No valid reason is offered for reversing that judgment; and general opinion is, I believe, equally opposed to abandonment now. It disapproves of a policy of scuttle from any British possession at all, at the present time of unrest. Far more would it condemn the cession of a strategic point of great, and probably increasing, importance in our line of communications with the East. There could not be a more inopportune moment for entertaining the idea. So far from surrendering it, we might rather reflect that, were it not in British hands already, its occupation, pending developments, would have become necessary. A survey of the past furnishes almost unanswerable argu-

ments against it. Lord Cromer and Lord Milner have expressed the view regarding Egypt that, though we have nothing to gain by owning the country ourselves, we should have a great deal to fear if it fell into the hands of another Power. Our position in Cyprus is in many respects analogous. It is surely not the time for any enfeeblement of our power in the Mediterranean. I would strongly endorse the opinion of your Secretary, Colonel A. C. Yate, who has recently expressed the opinion* that there are the strongest possible reasons why Cyprus should be retained by Britain as a base in the Levant. In the uncertain future of Constantinople, and the unsettled state of Egypt and the Levant, the hands of Britain, and indeed of the Western Allies, need to be strengthened from end to end." It has been stated in the House of Commons again and again that Cyprus does not stand alone. It is part of a much wider problem. It has not ceased to be such a part. Sir William Haynes Smith, who was Governor of Cyprus from 1898 to 1904, speaking a year or two ago, said: "We acquired Cyprus for definite objects of importance, and we ought to keep it. It was taken by Disraeli as part of a large scheme, at the time of the Treaty of Berlin. It was acquired as commanding the approaches to the railways projected by the then Government in Asia Minor. These were to start at a point on the coast adjacent to Cyprus; one branch was to run up to the Black Sea near Trebizond, some 300 miles; the other down the Euphrates Valley to the Persian Gulf." At that time, he said, we were working laboriously up the Euphrates and Tigris in order to control Baghdad and Mesopotamia; and our road was barred to the Black Sea, whence we could have obtained valuable supplies of grain and other food. We should do well to consider these large questions. The objects the Government had in view should not be thrown away in a moment. He hoped, however, that the Fates had been good enough to save the island.

The geographical position of Cyprus, in close proximity to Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, is, I submit, alone a conclusive argument against abandonment. Cyprus is, it has been said, to the Bay of Alexandretta as Heligoland is to the Elbe and Wilhelmshaven, and Alexandretta may in future be a second Smyrna—a great port of trade to and from Mesopotamia.† Cyprus, with its large coast-line, should remain in the hands of a Power that can efficiently police the Mediterranean.

There are, however, many other reasons hitherto insufficiently appreciated. Cyprus is a valuable half-way house to India for our young soldiers. It affords an admirable training-ground for troops. Its value as a sanatorium is important, as has been amply proved by

* In the *Near East*, 1919.

† V. Letter to *Morning Post*, October 25, 1915.

our troops in several campaigns. Again, the future of aviation, which is to revolutionize the world, is not to be overlooked. The island should be an important station and base in connection with British and international aircraft.

It is safe to say that, for a long time to come, the Near and Middle East will be a source of anxiety and trouble. Many think that we are diligently sowing the seeds of unrest in those regions at present. What was the menace in 1878 compared with that of 1920? I would earnestly recommend to those who have an open mind that the importance of this question should not be under-estimated; and that all who are able to influence opinion (all, indeed, can do so) will throw their weight into the scale, in order that the country should not commit the blunder of relinquishing an island which may become of great value to us, as lying so near the trade routes and storm centres of the present and the future.

May I conclude with an extract from an article in the *Daily Telegraph*, which, I think, puts the case very appropriately? "At this moment, when so many world problems—political, territorial, naval, military, and economic—press for settlement, the question of the future of Cyprus has been raised. We trust there will be no misconception in this matter, as there was when, without consultation with the naval and military authorities, Heligoland was given to the Germans, with a fine gesture of liberality, to be developed as the outpost of Prussianism. This hasty and ill-considered act was the cause of many of our strategical embarrassments in the North Sea in the war.

"Greece is a small nation, with a population about half that of London scattered over some 25,000 square miles. It is strategically weak and relatively poor. . . . We have to deal with the present, and must be on our guard against any action which, owing to the weakness of Greece to defend her sovereignty, might lead to Cyprus becoming a sort of Heligoland in the Mediterranean, situated at a point where our essential sea communication with Egypt and India could be threatened.

"Sir Edward Grey, without consulting Parliament, offered it to Greece; but fortunately, we think, for all concerned, no bargain was come to. It cannot be urged that we have turned the island into a fortress like Heligoland, to promote the selfish interests of the British people either in the West or the East. On the contrary, we have held our trust with jealous regard for the interests of other Mediterranean Powers. Yet we can imagine conditions which would render Cyprus a pistol aimed at the main artery of the British Empire. And so, with all cordiality to Cypriots, who with a large proportion of Moham-medans make up the population, we cannot see any valid argument for ceding this island, which has for so many generations been an

outpost of Western influence in a region subject to recurring troubles."

The CHAIRMAN, in inviting discussion, said that beyond expressing his own personal appreciation of the paper, which contained what he believed to be a most useful summary of our former and present political relations with Cyprus, and some very valuable suggestions regarding its future, he could not offer any comment upon it. His own knowledge of Cyprus was so very limited that he did not think he would be justified in making any lengthy remarks on the various topics which the paper raised; but there were gentlemen present who had an intimate knowledge of the country, and who had made the characteristics of the island a study from every point of view—socially, politically, and geographically. He thought he could not do better than ask them to address a few words to them on the various points mentioned by Mr. Michell. He would first of all call upon Sir William Haynes Smith, who had been a High Commissioner of Cyprus, and whose opinion had been quoted by the lecturer.

Sir WILLIAM HAYNES SMITH said that he was in office in Cyprus for some years, and had spent a very pleasant and happy time there. The country was a most interesting one, as any who visited it would find. It had been his pleasure to collect various interesting anecdotes both from the old classics and from ancient history of what had occurred in Cyprus, but it was not his intention to weary the audience with these. His collection included records of the relations which the Phœnicians, the Egyptians, the Greeks, and the Romans had with the island; but what, perhaps, interested him more than anything, was the part played by the old Crusaders in its history. They had heard how Richard Cœur-de-Lion met his bride there, marrying her at Limasol. When she arrived she was kept on the vessel for two days looking at the land until Richard arrived. She was naturally very angry, because it was not pleasant being detained on a vessel anchored so near the shore—an experience, he could assure them, which was not very pleasant when a heavy swell was on. Richard was also very angry that she should have been subjected to this annoyance, and when he arrived he retaliated by taking their country. It was of interest to follow up some of the journeys Richard took through Cyprus, and the extent of ground he covered in so short a time was simply amazing. It was hard indeed for anyone to keep up with and follow the daily footsteps of Richard, hindered though he must have been by impedimenta, in journeying from one part of the country to another. He might go back to the classics to show that in ancient days Cyprus was a place of some importance. It was recorded, for example, that one of the Kings of Paphos offended the Romans, who in consequence thought that he ought to be removed, and that

his office should cease. They accordingly sent down one of their officials to wind up his estate. His pictures and furniture were put to auction, and on sale realized a sum equivalent to two million sterling according to present-day value, so that he must have lived fairly comfortably. This afforded evidence as to the style of living in the island at that time. An incident took place during the Turkish invasion which might be mentioned. When the Turks took Famagusta, they were alarmed at the resistance offered by the defenders. The Venetian officer in command held out for a very long time, and ultimately the Turks offered very good and honourable terms. They promised that the life of the Commander and the lives of his officers would be spared. The Venetian officer and his garrison, pressed by hunger, surrendered; but the Turks treated them very badly—very much, indeed, as the Bolsheviks have treated their victims. The Turks flayed the brave Venetian alive, and stuffed his skin with straw. They carried it as their flag into Constantinople. The Venetians, when they were able to make peace, ransomed the skin of their brave countryman, and one could see the place in Venice where his honoured remains lie buried. With regard to the Biblical history of Cyprus, they would find that St. Barnabas was a native of, and was connected with, the island for a very long time. When the Archbishop of Cyprus signed any document, he did so in imperial purple. Authority for his doing so had a very interesting origin. It was said that the Gospel of St. Mark was taken out of the arms of St. Barnabas who, on his death, was buried in a sitting position. The Emperor Zeno was so glad to receive this authentic copy of the Gospel of St. Mark that he authorized the Archbishop of Cyprus always to sign his letters and his various orders and official documents in the imperial purple, and also gave him the right to carry the imperial insignia, which the Byzantine Emperor was entitled to. During his term of office as High Commissioner of Cyprus, one of the Archbishops died. He attended the funeral, and the insignia of the Emperor of the Byzantine Empire was carried before the Archbishop's remains. Indeed, in dealing with matters relating to the island, one could not help constantly coming across points in ancient history in one's daily work, but this was only the fringe of the subject. With regard to the country itself, there was no doubt it could be made a prosperous island, but it required expenditure. He was afraid that he somewhat got into hot water with the powers that be because he was very anxious to improve the internal communications of the island, and desired to have good roads laid right through it. The question of Cyprus involved, however, larger issues. The object of the Treaty of Berlin after the Russo-Turkish War was unquestionably to settle once and for all the troubles of the East. Those who at that time had control of the foreign policy of this country foresaw to a great extent what had actually occurred in recent

years. As he looked in imagination upon the shores of Gallipoli, strewn with our dead, when he reflected upon this unnecessary sacrifice of gallant lives, he thought one could not but regret that the mistakes of those who succeeded the statesmen who framed that Treaty had never been previously remedied. Cyprus ran to a point up the Bay of Iscanderoon, like a finger directed to Central Asia, and the plan was that communications should be established by means of railways from Alexandretta to the various countries in Central Asia and Southern Russia. He felt sure that the various countries that were now in seething discontent and in constant warfare one with another would never be in a settled condition unless the plan which was then intended was carried out. Easy communication should be provided from Alexandretta up to Trebizond in the Black Sea. If they carried a map of Asia Minor in their minds they would remember that the line from Trebizond down to Alexandretta was the narrowest part of Asia Minor. The proposed line was surveyed, and it would have given access behind Constantinople to the corn-producing countries of Southern Russia and, in fact, to all the countries bordering on the Black Sea, whilst also giving access to Persia and other places. Well, that was the idea of those who formulated the famous Treaty, and stipulated for the occupation of Cyprus, as guarding the entrance to the projected system of internal communication. But there was a change of Government after the Treaty, and everything that was in mind at that time was by the Gladstonian Government considered anathema, and had since been considered anathema, not only by the Gladstonian Government, but by others. Even the late Lord Salisbury, they would remember, stated that in this connection we had "backed the wrong horse." With all due deference to that great statesman, he did not think we had "backed the wrong horse." We had rather selected the wrong jockey, and put the horse under the control of the wrong persons. England, with the rights then obtained of controlling administration, had at that time an opportunity of producing a condition of affairs, and of so acting that there would have been peace in these countries during all these years. We could have had the means of opening what he might call a back-door entrance to the whole of these countries, irrespective of the entrance by the Straits so strongly defended by Turkey. As they were aware, Turkey, under German influence, laid down a railway on the Euphrates Valley from Constantinople to Baghdad, and selected the route with the special object of evading the British Navy. And the whole of that policy had been, he would not say supported, but had been acquiesced in by the British Government. Fortunately for us, the result of the war enabled us to dictate terms with regard to these matters; otherwise, he thought, the railways, designed and controlled as they then were by the Germans, would have ultimately led to

the complete destruction of our Eastern Empire. In another respect Providence intervened in an episode regarding Cyprus, when the Foreign Secretary, off his own bat, without reference to any of his colleagues, offered Cyprus to Greece. Fortunately the Greek Government refused the offer. They told our Foreign Secretary that they did want the island and that they would not do what they were asked to do. He was glad of that opportunity of urging that the proper mode of producing peace in the countries there, including Armenia, was to look at the question from the geographical point of view. The natural configuration offered the means for obtaining easy access to these countries, thus facilitating the settlement of the difficult questions that are constantly troubling us—indeed, they would settle themselves. With regard to Cyprus itself, the island was a comparatively small one. But it had splendid natural resources; it had capabilities with regard to producing corn, barley, oil, silk, and wine. He dared say many of them during the war, and without knowing it, had consumed brandy which was said to be the best French brandy, but which, if they had traced it to its base of production, they would have found it had its origin in Cyprus. And very good brandy it was, too. With regard to wine, it came into the English market under different names and brands. As they might be aware, the Jews had had a large interest in the matter. The settlements supported by the Rothschilds had produced an immense quantity of wine in Palestine, which had come into England, and there was a large quantity of it now in the country awaiting to be consumed. Cyprus was a very interesting country, which might be made most prosperous both for its inhabitants and those who were connected with it. But apart from this aspect, he regarded Cyprus from the point of view of its being the key to the whole system of easy communication in Central Asia. For that reason he should resist to his utmost the idea that it should be surrendered to the Greeks. As soon as he had heard of the proposal, he wrote as strong a letter as he could to the Prime Minister urging the various points which he had at this meeting incidentally alluded to. It was his sincere hope that the British people would strongly support those who opposed the cession of Cyprus to any other nation.

The CHAIRMAN said that he welcomed the presence of another gentleman who had held the high position of High Commissioner of Cyprus, Sir Charles King-Harman.

SIR CHARLES KING-HARMAN said he had been asked to say a few words about Cyprus, although he was afraid he could not add anything of special interest to what they had heard in the course of the excellent lecture given them by Mr. Michell, whom he recognized to be the greatest living authority on all matters connected with the historic island. At the same time, he might offer a few remarks on

the crucial question of the day so far as that country was concerned—namely, its ownership in the future. The whole matter was in the melting-pot at the present moment. The question at issue was of intense interest both to the people there and, he thought, also to those at home. Cyprus had changed hands a great many times; and without going into its ancient history, which the lecturer had already very ably sketched for them, he might remind them that at the time of the British occupation in 1878 the island had been in the possession of the Turks for about 300 years. Only those who had any practical knowledge of Ottoman rule and of what it means could form any adequate conception of the pitiable condition to which the people of the island were then reduced. It was perhaps enough for him to say that in all matters relating to civilization the unfortunate inhabitants were, under Turkish rule, reduced to the darkness and desolation of the Middle Ages. Then came the occupation of the island by the British in 1878. This was hailed by its people with the greatest delight as meaning for them the dawn of freedom, and as giving the promise of prosperity and progress in the island—a promise, he maintained, which had been more than amply fulfilled. After some forty years of British rule—a very short period, indeed, in the history of a country or of a people—the island had risen from the lowest depths of ruin and depression to the height of prosperity. It was perhaps a curious commentary on Oriental conceptions of appreciation and gratitude to say that at the present day the great desire of those who claim to voice and represent the feelings of the majority of the people was to get rid of the English out of the island altogether. We saw exactly the same thing going on in Egypt, whose phenomenal prosperity was very largely due to British administration. He thought that if any student of history could write or lecture on the psychology of the Oriental mind it would be a very interesting and informative work. The lecturer had told them what the people of the island owe to us, and he would only lay emphasis on the fact, without mentioning anything else, that the reforms we effected in the Courts of Justice there for the first time in the history of the island brought justice to the doors of its people. The causes of the people are now heard and dealt with under the supervision of a thoroughly impartial legal tribunal. That alone was a matter for which the whole population of Cyprus should be eternally grateful to the English Government. They had with them that afternoon the late Chief Justice of Cyprus, and if that gentleman cared to contribute to the discussion he could tell them a great deal of how even-handed justice had been secured for those Oriental people for the first time in the history of the world. That alone, he repeated, was enough in itself to make the people of Cyprus grateful to us. Sir William Haynes Smith had very appropriately reminded them that nothing could add more to the material

prosperity of any country than proper and efficient means of internal communication. Under the able government of Sir William Haynes Smith, roads were constructed where nothing previously existed, except, perhaps, goat tracks. There was previously only one road over which any wheeled vehicle could go. At the time we occupied Cyprus the island was regarded as being of the greatest strategic value to the Empire, commanding as it does the mouth of the Suez Canal. Subsequently, under an arrangement made with the French Government, we were given a free hand in Egypt, whereby that strategic value was reduced. Even now the island, from its geographical position in regard to Egypt, to Syria, and to Asia Minor, was not only of great importance to the British Empire, but it was also of value from another standpoint. If Cyprus were to fall into the hands of any power hostile to us, it might easily become a very serious menace to our communications with the East. At the present moment there was a certain noisy section in the island whose leaders, he thought, were chiefly lawyers, who most certainly owed their position and all their fortune to our administration. Its members were now clamouring for the island to be ceded to Greece. The proposal involved points of very great importance to its people. First of all, looking at it from a purely material point of view, it was hardly to be expected that the island, if it formed part of Greece, would flourish or prosper any more than the unfortunate Ionian Islands had done. Indeed, it was certainly more than probable that it would fall back into a condition of poverty and decay if it were deprived of the powerful assistance, financial and otherwise, of the British Empire. Then, looking at it from the political point of view, the question was a serious one both for the inhabitants and for the people of England, because, as he had already said, the island in the hands of any other Power could very easily be used for the weakening of our position in the East. So that we could see that from a material as well as from a political point of view it would seem to be a most unwise thing to abandon the island to Greece. He himself was perfectly confident that if it were possible to obtain a free, uninfluenced, untutored expression of opinion from the people on this matter, their self-determination—and self-determination was a very blessed word in those days—would be overwhelmingly in favour of the island remaining an integral part of the British Empire. Of course, those who know the island are perfectly well aware that it would never be possible to obtain a proper expression of opinion from the people of Cyprus. The Pro-Greek organization was far too strong and too far-spread to allow of any untrammelled vote on the question being taken. He went to the island very shortly after the British occupation. He was there some three years, and knew it well. He returned to it in 1904, and had the honour to administer the government for seven

years, till 1911. He might therefore claim to be very fully informed as to its circumstances; and he was strongly of opinion that to cede the island to Greece would be not only a most cruel thing for the people themselves, but a most disastrous mistake for ourselves.

The CHAIRMAN reminded the audience that they had with them a very old friend of the Society, Sir William Ramsay, whose delightful lecture on "The Road to Anatolia" they all remembered.

Sir WILLIAM RAMSAY said he would not detain the meeting more than a few minutes. He should speak from the point of view of history. It had been his study through life to trace the relation between Europe and Asia; and he had acquired, as a student of history, the definite opinion that the British Empire, with many mistakes, some acts which he might call crimes, in spite of a good deal of ignorance in high places, and still worse, narrowness of view on the part of Governments which looked only to the prospective results of the next election—with all these faults and mistakes, the British Government as a whole had moved nearer the line of the progress of the world than any other Power. And if we turned our back on Cyprus, if we retired from it and from the line of progress, we would turn our back on our own history and on everything that made it right to believe in the future of the British Empire. He should regard it as an act of falseness and of disbelief in the mission and in the character of our country, if we should now abandon Cyprus. It was a totally different thing to speak of what took place in 1878-79, and to speak of what might now be done. The question now is not whether what then took place was right or wrong. When we had once gone so far forward in a line which is so closely related to one of the greatest problems in history—the relation between East and West—we could not turn back with safety or with honour. Like Sir William Haynes Smith, he was under the disadvantage of speaking as an owner of property in Cyprus. For twenty-five years he had been the registered owner of considerable property, on part of which, as he was informed—though he had never seen this property—stood the great stronghold of the Knights Templars at Kolossi. Turkish law did not recognize ownership of property in the hands of a *Société anonyme*, and required that any landed property must be registered in the name of a certain individual. Consequently, a company in which he had a small share selected him as the person who should be the registered owner of the property. Part of the estates was sold about twelve years ago, and whether Kolossi still formed part of the property he did not know. But he used to regard himself as being a kind of feudal lord by a legal fiction. That fact might, perhaps, create a certain prejudice, but he was not himself conscious of it. In any case, when he spoke on the matter under discussion, he went back to what he learned in Anatolia about 1880 and the following years. What he had

learned was largely due to Sir Charles Wilson, who was sent to investigate the state of matters (especially regarding the character of the encampment, and the grounds for maintaining that Cyprus was a pestilential hole), soon after the island was taken over in 1878. He spoke on Sir Charles Wilson's authority and on the authority of many other residents in Western Asia, and entirely apart from any supposed commercial interests that afterwards connected him with the island. He would repeat what he ventured once to write in 1901 to the late Lord Percy. It had not been a habit of his to intrude his opinion on influential persons, but in 1901 he felt bound to write Lord Percy as a traveller in Anatolia, who was then Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, protesting against the withdrawal of the Consulate from Konia. He pointed out that that was not the time for us to be pushing forward when there was a development of the Anatolian and Baghdad railways, but that once we reached a point, we should never turn back. He urged that what we needed to do at that moment was to rest quietly. All who had lived any time in Turkey knew the virtue of sitting still. It was an extremely important thing for us to learn to sit quietly, when it was not the time to push forward. He said to him in his letter: "Let the Germans carry forward this Anatolian railway to Baghdad, and within fifty years it will be in the hands of the British."

The CHAIRMAN invited further observations or questions.

Colonel C. E. YATE, M.P., expressed agreement with what had been said as to the results that would happen were the idea of the abandonment of Cyprus to be entertained. He also desired to say how cordially he appreciated the remarks made by Sir Charles King-Harman about lawyers having been some of the principal originators of the movement for the cession of Cyprus. He thought the same observations might be applied with equal truth and force as to the origin of the troubles in Egypt as well as in India. Indeed, he could not help wishing that the old regulation, which he enforced when he was Chief Commissioner in Baluchistan, that no lawyer should be admitted to the province, could be more generally observed than it was, in order to better safeguard the real interests of the mass of the people of those countries. He observed that he should like to ask the lecturer one or two questions before he sat down. First of all, he was not quite sure of what the Greek population of Cyprus consisted, and he should like to know what claim it had to be called Greek. So far as he knew, the people of Cyprus had been the people of Cyprus since the dawn of history. He acknowledged that they now professed the religion of the Greek Church, but he wished to know what claim they had to be called Greeks. We called them Greeks, but was there actually any racial or blood affinity between them and the people of Greece, and how did they stand in these respects? We all realized

the support given to our rule by the Turks, and this was an additional reason that we should never desert the latter. It would be impossible for any Greek Government to govern a country like Cyprus with so large a population of Turks who, if we were to abandon the island, would naturally claim to maintain their rights as British subjects, and would be entitled to do so. He did not think a Greek Government in Cyprus with such a large population of Turks would tend to harmony in any possible way whatsoever. The second question he would like to ask had reference to the agriculturists of the country. Mr. Michell had referred to the great difficulties against which they had to contend, and had shown how completely they were in the power of the money-lenders. This was a subject which had created a great deal of trouble in India, where, at various times, legislation had been passed to protect the agriculturists against the money-lenders. Could the lecturer say if any legislation had been passed by the Cyprus Government with a similar object in view, or were the wretched agriculturists still left entirely at the mercy of the lawyers and the money-lenders? Thirdly, he should like to know what had been done to open up, develop, and improve the forests of Cyprus. There were many valuable trees in the island, and it was well known how the demand for wood and timber of various kinds was increasing. Had anything been done, and if so, what, to preserve and reforest lands in Cyprus suitable for the purpose? It struck him that Cyprus had a very valuable timber industry before her, and he should like to know what her Government had done or is doing in the direction of developing it. Finally, he should also like to know what harbour accommodation there was in Cyprus. Was there any harbour in which our Navy could ride in safety, or was there any safe anchorage or only open roadsteads? Some little information from the lecturer on these points would be very useful if he had the time at his disposal to give it.

Mr. ROLAND MICHELL, in replying to the discussion and questions, said he did not think the Greeks of Cyprus could be called Greeks as a race in the strict sense of the term. The only claims they had to be so designated were that they spoke the Greek language, and were believers in and were adherents of the religion of the Greek Orthodox Church. He did not think they could claim to be racially Greek any more than the Coptic people, the descendants of the former inhabitants of Egypt, could be regarded as of Arab origin. In Egypt the Arabic language was impressed upon the Coptic people, and the language of Egypt was Arabic. They could not call those people Arabian. In a similar way, the Greek language was impressed upon the people of Cyprus who, in addition, adopted or followed the religion of the Greek Church. Moreover, the Turks, the former rulers of the island, had rendered it almost impossible for any Greek subject of Turkey to become the subject of a foreign nationality. The people of

Cyprus spoke the language and took the religion of the people of Greece as a result of having mingled with their Greek invaders. With reference to the money-lenders, Mr. Michell said that their relations with the agriculturists involved a long question. There were great hopes that, when Sir William Willcocks formed his society to establish a bank for the benefit of the agriculturists, good results would follow. He had the sole right to establish agricultural banks in the island, he thought, for a period of fifty years. There were great hopes that this would do a great deal for the peasantry in delivering them from the grip of the Greek money-lenders, but he did not think it had been at all the success which it was hoped it would be. He quite agreed that relief of the peasantry from the trammels imposed upon them by these people was one of the great reforms which ought to be introduced in the island. The forests were certainly being preserved by the Forestry Department of the Cyprus Government. A great deal had been done for their protection, although reafforestation had not received so much attention as its importance merited. An excellent report by a former Chief of the Department, M. Madon, embodied proposals for re-afforestation, but unfortunately they involved too great an expenditure, although he believed this would in the end prove to be very remunerative. At the same time, he did not think all had been done that might with advantage have been done. Too much cutting down was, perhaps, going on at present. With regard to harbour accommodation, two schemes were formulated by Mr. Brown, the able engineer. One would have involved an expenditure of about a million and a half. It provided for a harbour being constructed at Famagusta which could accommodate the whole of the Mediterranean Squadron. The other scheme, which cost very much less, was sanctioned by Mr. Chamberlain and carried out. The existing conditions were most unsatisfactory. If we are to hold the island, the larger scheme should be carried out at Famagusta.

The CHAIRMAN thought the audience would agree that they had had a very enlightening and helpful discussion on the paper. It only remained for them to join in a very hearty vote of thanks to Mr. Michell for his kindness in addressing them.

The proceedings then concluded.

THE ORGANIZATION OF BRITISH RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A MEETING of members and friends of the Central Asian Society was held on the afternoon of Wednesday, February 18, 1920, at the Royal Astronomical Society's Lecture Room, Burlington House, London, when a paper entitled "The Organization of British Responsibilities in the Middle East" was read by Captain Hon. W. Ormsby Gore, M.P. The chair was occupied by the Right Hon. Lord Carnock, P.C., G.C.B., the President.

The CHAIRMAN, in introducing Captain Ormsby Gore, remarked that the time of our legislators is at present so fully occupied that they were indebted to that gentleman for having found time to attend that afternoon and to give them a lecture on what was a most interesting subject.

CAPTAIN HON. W. ORMSBY GORE, M.P., said: Lord Carnock, Ladies and Gentlemen,—My excuse for opening a discussion on this very difficult subject is that for the last few years, at any rate, I have been somewhat intimately connected with various aspects of the Mid-Eastern Question. I am quite prepared to admit that, compared with most of you present here this afternoon, I am probably but a beginner, and therefore hardly qualified to lay down the law. I served as a Political Officer in the Arab Bureau at the outbreak of the revolt in Hejaz in the middle of 1916, up to the middle of 1917; and then I was brought back as Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet for the Eastern Section of the work. I was Assistant Secretary of the Middle Eastern Committee, which was a Committee of the Foreign Office, the War Office, the Admiralty, and the India Office, under Lord Curzon, whose duty it was to try and co-ordinate the sometimes, fissiparous activities of different Government Departments dealing with the Near East. Then I went back to Palestine in the spring of 1918, when I was again Political Officer in Judæa, and when the armistice came I went to Paris for two months as one of the British Delegation in connection with the Turkish Treaty. My point of view, therefore, is largely that of a person who has looked at it a good deal through other than ordinary spectacles: from the extreme western end—that is to say, from the Palestine, Sinai, Red Sea end—in particular, and from the point of view of the Government in London. I think I may tell you

that in the Arab Bureau we were formed with our headquarters in Cairo. It was our duty to collect information from Morocco, from Zanzibar, from Mesopotamia, Palestine, Arabia, and even from Cyprus—I might say from the whole of the Arabic-speaking world and its fringe. We were a sort of Political Intelligence Office with links of our chain at Zanzibar, Busra, Morocco, and so on, and all this multiplicity of political information was collected in an office at Cairo. We, of course, dealt with Hejaz and Aden. When our information was collected it was at once communicated to the Foreign Office, to the Directors of Military and Naval Intelligence at home. Thus we got rather a comprehensive survey of the trend of events and of some of the post-war possibilities in this vast new area, for which we have now become practically responsible. Now I think I should say a little in detail of what that is. We found at the outset that, for Cyprus, British Somaliland, and Zanzibar, the Colonial Office was responsible, and the British officers were agents of the Colonial Office. Then for the Persian Gulf, for Mesopotamia, and for very nearly half of the regions of the Red Sea, the Government of India and its agents were responsible. At the beginning of the war the political direction of the admiral in the Red Sea was under the Government of India, and later on there was a new demarcation of spheres of influence between the India Office and the Foreign Office. To start with, the Arabian Peninsula, including the Red Sea right up to Suez, was still under the Government of India, and the area now forming the Kingdom of Hejaz was placed under the High Commissioner at Cairo and through him under the Foreign Office. Sir Mark Sykes quoted in the House of Commons one of the most famous instances of how things sometimes break down. It had reference to negotiations between the High Commissioner in Cairo and the King of Hejaz, with whom we completed a treaty about Kunfidah, a small town on the Red Sea coast. It was very interesting to see what happened, the way in which imperial business is done. The Political Officer in the Red Sea communicated with his chief in Aden, who communicated with the Foreign Department of the India Government at Simla, which communicated with the India Office in London, who sent across to the Foreign Office for the Foreign Office to communicate with the High Commissioner in Cairo, and the reply went back through the same channels. The duration of time for the transmission of the telegrams, apart from the discussion of the decision, amounted to eighteen days. So you will see it would have been very difficult to get anything like a rapid decision if there had been fighting going on. It shows you in addition that sometimes, when we get a conflict of authority, it is extremely difficult to get an early answer from His Majesty's Government on any point that may be at issue. Especially so is this the case when you find that probably there is a

considerable difference of opinion between the Foreign Department of the India Government at Simla and the Foreign Office in London.

I have dealt so far with preliminaries. Let me now deal with the position in which we find ourselves to-day. By the time the armistice had arrived the British armies were in possession of the whole of Mesopotamia and of Palestine and we had either by treaty or arrangement established for Britain quite a unique position in the whole of the Arabian Peninsula. Practically there are none of the many independent chiefs in this enormous area who have not concluded some separate agreement with the British Government. These treaties all recognize the unique position of the British as compared with any other Power, and we are in special relations to each and all of them. Turkey has, of course, entirely disappeared from the Peninsula, I hope never to return. The hold of the Turk on Central Arabia has always been more or less ineffective. He has had, of course, nominal possession of the Hejaz, but there again only more or less with the tacit assent of the Arab population. In Mesopotamia he has had perpetual difficulties, and the tribes of Oman and of the south-eastern portion of Arabia have been far more closely connected with the British Empire through India than with the Ottoman. I do not know if you have read an extremely interesting article on the Middle East which recently appeared in the December number of *The Round Table*. The upshot of this article is to show that apart from the great political and economic difficulties presented in the internal administration or direction of this new area, for which the British Empire has become directly or indirectly responsible, we have added a long, new, and still indeterminate land frontier open to attack by military forces at many points along a line where many of the great conflicts of history have taken place during the last four thousand years. Hitherto the British Empire has to all intents and purposes consisted of a series of islands. Egypt, even, has hitherto been, as it were, an island, surrounded on the east and on the north by the sea, and on the west by a sea of sand. The frontiers of India, consisting of the great mountains of the Himalayas and the Hindu Kush, have made India virtually an island empire, and these frontiers, troublesome though they have been and still are, are far more easily defensible when compared with the new open land frontiers of Mesopotamia and Palestine and the semi-desertic region lying between them.

Between Mesopotamia and Palestine there lies the Syrian desert, which, unlike the western desert of Egypt or the desert which has hitherto separated Egypt from Palestine, is not a sea of sand, but is a hard-surfaced desert traversible by modern wheeled transport and destined to become an aerial highroad. The old caravan routes across the Syrian desert have been for long comparatively disused (I do not

say absolutely disused), compared with the uses made of them in Roman and Early Islamic times, but there is no doubt that they could be reopened to a considerable extent. Then Haifa, Damascus, and Bagdad may be connected by railway. This desert is not an entirely rainless country, and, as I have said, it is a hard-surface country, and the sandbelt is extremely thin in parts. There is a sort of hook or query mark that comes round to the great sandy desert of Southern Arabia, and in some places it is quite narrow. One has therefore got to remember that it is very difficult to say that there is a natural frontier anywhere in the land north and south in that desert between Syria and the valley of the Euphrates. Now my object this afternoon is to consider not so much the immense military problem presented by this new frontier as how we are to organize the administration, development, and political relations with the inhabitants of the area lying within this new frontier. Of course, it will make the whole difference to our military obligations and the size of our garrison there if we can establish such conditions inside this new frontier as will ensure peace, content, and progress. Then, also, we must immensely lighten the burden on the British taxpayer, who is now paying dearly for Palestine and Mesopotamia. Now we cannot, of course, consider this inner organization, that of the countries within the frontier, without also considering the neighbouring States and peoples immediately outside it. The biggest and most indeterminate section of this frontier will be that lying between an as yet absolutely undefined point somewhere in the north-east of Syria, and the Persian frontier north-east of Mosul. That is an appallingly difficult frontier to try to draw. It is a region of country inhabited, I suppose, mainly by Kurds, by Kizil Bashas, by Arabs, by Armenians, and by Turks. It is a country which for ages has been particularly unruly and particularly given to disturbance, brigandage, and all the other pleasant state of things that go on in those mountainous regions. I want you to remember that within the last five months we have lost six Political Officers in the country immediately north of Mosul. Each one as appointed gets killed by the Kurdish tribesmen. There is absolutely no doubt that we cannot at present look forward to a peaceful northern frontier in Mesopotamia. The conditions are absolutely shifting, and there is no homogeneity amongst the peoples. You hardly ever see it suggested that there should be an effort to co-ordinate the peoples there into one. It would, indeed, be extremely difficult. The chief of each Kurdish tribe has, more or less, a law unto himself. Then there is one additional difficulty that a large number of the Kurds live on the Persian side of the frontier, many are found in Mesopotamia, a good many live in Armenia, some live in this indeterminate area lying to the north of the irrigable plain of northern Mesopotamia, whilst, of course, a considerable number shift up and

down in a semi-nomadic state. Obviously, then, the future of the Kurdish tribes alone presents an almost appallingly difficult problem. The other point is, of course, that the Persian frontier forms a new big mountain frontier, but history shows us that that mountain frontier is really not an effective separation between the people of the plains of Mesopotamia and the people of the highlands of Persia. After all; right away back from the days of Cyrus the Mede to Hulagu the destroyer of Bagdad, the main route of invasion from the north-east, from far beyond the boundaries of the Persia we know to-day, has always been movement across this mountain frontier into Mesopotamia. They all swept down across these passes into the rich plains of Mesopotamia, under the economic pressure in their less favoured homes or inspired by the desire of some chieftain like Tamerlane for conquest or of possessing the cradle of ancient civilization and wealth. Central Asia has nearly always found the same sort of safety valve in this westerly and south-westerly direction. Empire after empire has been set up in Mesopotamia and has been in turn overwhelmed by the people coming down from the mountains. Of course, nowadays, it is a more difficult business. To bring armies you must have railways to munition them and feed them. There is no doubt that, supposing Russia developed a Napoleon, and that the Russian Revolution went the way of most revolutions and ended in a military autocracy; supposing you had a situation in which the Russian people wished to enforce their ideas or spread their conceived mission by armed force as the French did 120 years ago: if they tried to do that in Mesopotamia, as did Napoleon in Germany and Italy, they would have far greater difficulty than had the forces of any previous military leader down to the time of Hulagu, because nowadays they have got to fight with weapons which require railway transport, and the task of constructing a railway across Persia, between Hamadan and Kermanshah, is gigantic.

The bulk of the population of Mesopotamia consists of Arabs of the Shiah persuasion. In other words, the overwhelming majority of them are of the same faith as the Persians. The holy places of pilgrimage for the Shiah's sect are in Mesopotamia. The two great Persian shrines, apart from Meshed, are Kerbelia and Nejef, and these are in the Arabic country, to the west of the Euphrates, in the midst of an entirely Arabic-speaking country. To these shrines you have a continual flow of Shiah and Persian pilgrims, and actually they are almost Persian towns. Anybody responsible for Mesopotamia must realize this, and you will see that whoever has the political control of Mesopotamia has got to be intimately connected with Persia at the same time.

Now, I must next turn to the western side of the area we have acquired—namely, to Syria. It seems pretty clear that we are going

to remain in temporary possession, at all events, of Palestine. There is the narrow plain between the highlands of Judæa and the Mediterranean Sea, which also form the neck of a funnel into which have poured successive migrations of people from the north and east, attracted by the other great corn-growing basin, the Nile. It is essential that we should retain that bridgehead across the Suez Canal which Palestine forms, and further that we should be on the flank of the Hejaz railway so that no subsequent revival of the Turk, should such a calamity come, will be able to turn the flank of the Suez Canal as he tried to do during the war by coming down the Hedjaz railway, and floating mines and all the rest of it in the Red Sea. The strategic problem of Palestine, of course, lies in the determination of its natural boundaries, and really the possession of the whole Jordan Valley is essential to the creation of a satisfactory Palestine from every point of view—economic, political, and military. Now as to the political difficulties which we have and which we must a little consider before we go into the proposed organization which I have to put before you. I do not think there is any desire on the part of the inhabitants either of Palestine or of Mesopotamia, or indeed of those of any part of the Arabic-speaking world again to come under the Ottoman rule, or even suzerainty, however shadowy. I think there is no doubt whatever on that point. All the Bedouins want, the real Bedouins—that is to say, the tribes of Arabs who still have their tribal existence under independent chiefs in Hejaz and other parts of Central Arabia—is, of course, absolute independence. Each tribe desires to be allowed to continue, unmolested, untaxed, and uninterfered with, the nomad lives they have led for probably some thousands of years, and wisdom dictates that that is the right thing too—that is the right thing to let them do that. The proper policy, in my opinion, is to allow them complete freedom and, above all, to make no effort to force them under any one suzerainty. Such an attempt would be doomed to failure. I am perfectly convinced of that. There are those who may have thought that an Arabian Empire could have been formed, but to my mind that is absolutely impossible—it is not within the horizon of practical politics. Of course, the biggest individual block of Arabs, probably, is right down to the south-west corner, and we still know very little about them. There are, possibly, three or four millions of them in Yemen. They occupy the well-watered highlands and mountains, some of them ten or twelve thousand feet high. There are a few scattered relics of the old Sabian civilization. They form interesting primitive communities who still live in the highlands almost wholly unattached to the world. Again, the Turks have always been ineffective there, and any attempt to put these people under the government of any of the other Arab emirates is out of the question.

Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine were probably the worst-governed and the worst-administered provinces of the Ottoman Empire, while the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula have never, during the four centuries which have passed since Selim and Grim added these Arabic-speaking provinces to the Ottoman throne, done more than barely acknowledge a suzerainty of doubtful efficacy. The Arab chiefs have to all intents and purposes exercised sovereign powers, and even in settled districts like the Yemen in Southern Arabia the writ of Constantinople has only run spasmodically. In Mesopotamia the Arab inhabitants are at present prepared to exchange masters: at present they have no present desire for complete independence and no desire for even a figurehead sovereign of their own race.

And now I come to another element in the question, and that is the importance of Damascus. Let me say at once that Damascus is the economic, the cultural, and the industrial capital of the whole of Arabia. Before the war the chief products of Central Arabia found their market at Damascus, and all the tribes of the east and south-east of the historic Syrian oasis look to it as the centre of their national traditions, of their national hopes. In matters of religion they think of Mecca and Medina as we think of Canterbury and York; so in matters relating to trade and commerce and politics they regard Damascus as we do London. Mecca and Medina are holy places to which they go on pilgrimage, but if they want to sell camels and buy clothes, to transact business of any kind, it is all done at Damascus. There is an elaborate system in Central Arabia by which practically the whole of the surplus products—ghee, the native butter, and all the other things included in ordinary Arab commerce—go up to Damascus, where they are in turn sold and exchanged for all the principal necessities of the people. Go where you will, certainly over the whole of the west and into Palestine, and you will find that in connection with the buying and selling of every commodity, no matter what, Damascus is the place which looms large in the Arabian mind. And, after all, it is very natural, for it was the first great capital of the Islamic Empire. The Caliphate shifted there very quickly after the death of Ali, and from the very first Damascus has been the great glory of Islamic culture and tradition. On the Caliphate being driven out of it, the new capital was founded at Bagdad with probably very much less success, for it became Persianized and ceased to be purely Arabic in character. As a matter of fact, the Arab looks to Damascus to be his independent capital, the one that he longs for as the symbol of his newly rediscovered national consciousness.

Now, the desire of most Arabs is to be left alone, to live their own lives in their own way, as they have lived it for two thousand years. But among the settled and semi-settled tribes and townsmen of Eastern Syria—a very considerable population—there is a real, new,

cohesive national consciousness, and undoubtedly Damascus is the centre of this feeling. But there is now a fear in their minds that after having fought against the Turk for their independence in this war they will be subjected to European rule. That is a very genuine feeling, and though, for the moment, it is apparent that anti-French sentiment is the predominant feeling in Arabic-speaking Eastern Syria, and particularly among the Arabic-speaking Mohammedans there, there can be little doubt that if the British were in the same position as the French they would be equally strongly anti-British. They want independence, nothing more and nothing less. It is difficult to generalize about Syria as a whole, because along the coast and in the Lebanon there is a large section that is not really Arab, who do not share this new Arab national sentiment of which I have been speaking. Those of you who know Beyrout know what sort of a place it is. Its population is quite different in culture, probably of different racial origin. It is, in fact, a Levantine population, partly Greek, partly Jewish, partly Phœnician, which has assimilated at least a veneer of Western civilization, wears European clothes, and looks down upon the Arab who wears the *kafiya* as semi-barbarous and as belonging to a lower scale of civilization, and I am doubtful whether they are right. There is a different civilization, and some of them fear that Damascus would be a State formed upon purely religious lines. There is at the present moment, and it is likely to continue for some time, a cleavage between those who are pro-French and those who are pro-Arab, and a frontier will have to be arrived at between them. In Palestine there are, of course, still greater complications. Take the city of Jerusalem alone. There are, I believe, in Jerusalem at the present moment approximately 30,000 Jews, 15,000 Christians, divided into forty different sects or communities, many of them European, and 15,000 Mohammedans. The Christians and Mohammedans combined about equal the Jewish population, or did before the war. Then there are scattered up and down Palestine colonies of every kind and description. Gaza is an Egyptian colony. Then you get the Jewish colonies and a certain number of European semi-monastic settlements. Bethlehem and Nazareth are purely Christian towns; Tiberias and Safed are almost entirely Jewish; and then when you come to deal with the Mohammedan population of Palestine, having seen something of them myself, one is struck with the age-long differences. There is an Arabic-speaking population of mixed racial origin, but there is no racial or political cohesion there at all. The mutual dislike between the Mohammedans of, say, Jerusalem and Hebron is almost amazing, and, as I have written down here, Palestine, above all the countries of the world, is the one where at present self-determination means anarchy—it is altogether inapplicable. There is no getting away from the fact that Zionism presents

difficulties as well as hopes. The non-Jew in Palestine mistrusts Jewish intentions, and the Jew in Palestine mistrusts the non-Jew's intentions. But Zionists have this great asset, that they have a very skilful and highly organized organization in Palestine and throughout the world, whereas the non-Jewish elements have, as I have said, little or no cohesion. Further, neither discouragement nor practical difficulties can deter the tenacity and obvious determination of Zionist efforts now going on in Palestine. The Zionist leaders have proved themselves most anxious to avoid embarrassing the British administration, and are loyally working with them. But this administration, in endeavouring to hold the scales evenly between the interests of all the different communities in Palestine, is bound to incur the criticism of all to a certain extent. Zionism necessarily involves great changes in the country. With the best will in the world those changes cannot always prove palatable to many of the existing inhabitants, who do not want to see any change from the old Turkish system of taxation, for instance, but want the same old bribery and corruption, the same old way of dealing with land. There is a strong conservative force in Palestine, and to make the land pay its way, to make it prosperous and become fit for development, many radical changes will have to take place. But, as I have said before, changes of this kind in the East are not always popular. Still, there is so much room for an increased population both in Palestine and in Mesopotamia that there can be little doubt that the increase in population in Palestine as well as the provision of the necessary capital and brains will be found by Jewish immigrants and Jewish effort from all parts of the world. As time goes on, therefore, the Jews are bound to play a more and more preponderating part both in the development and in the internal politics of their ancient country. Mesopotamia is quite different. It has been suggested that the development of Mesopotamia, denuded as it is of its proper complement of population, can be effected by encouraging Indian immigration. Such an eventuality would, I fear, bring with it a host of new problems even more difficult to solve than those which have already arisen in Palestine. The Indian, whether Mohammedan or Hindu, does not mix well with the Arab. In fact, there is certain to be a good deal of fundamental antipathy between the two; and it would seem that the development of Mesopotamia must be limited by the natural growth of the existing Arab population with a possible increase in the number of Persians and Jews. Now it has been suggested that Indians could not be brought in as permanent colonists so as to form a mixed race, but only on the indenture system. India is not going to stand any more indentured labour; the feeling in India against the indentured system is tremendously strong as a result of what happened in Fiji and elsewhere. Besides that, India has realized in the course of the war that she can produce industrially for

herself on a manufacturing scale and that she can absorb, in the near future, with the overflowing capital that is waiting to be invested in her own industrial activities, any surplus labour that she may previously have had. I am quite sure Mesopotamia cannot be developed with Indian indentured labour. There has been a suggestion that the Samalis can be introduced. There again I have seen something of Samali labour, and I doubt again whether it could be safely utilized. The Samali of to-day is not exactly the person I would invite to Mesopotamia at the beginning of the expansion of that country. And so I think the development will have to depend very largely upon the local population and its gradual increase. After all, in the East, population increases rapidly given proper conditions, given peace and the cessation of murder and an increase in the area of cultivation. It has been suggested that we can introduce Jewish colonists to Mesopotamia as in Palestine, but I do not think that would work. After all, the Jews in Bagdad and Mesopotamia are, and will remain, merely townsmen and merchants. They will not do there what they are doing with an effort of will in Palestine that is almost amazing—namely, deliberately turn themselves from being townsmen into a peasant population for the sake of an ideal. That is what is happening in Palestine, and it is happening there simply because Palestine is the quasi-religious centre which the Jews, with all their extraordinary age-long pertinacity, are setting themselves to achieve—forming themselves once more into a race of peasants and herdsmen, and giving up town life.

Now the economic possibilities, of course, are eventually enormous, but rapid economic development cannot and should not be looked for. In fact, if it is pushed too fast we shall be involved in grave political difficulties and financial disappointment. Further, while Palestine should early be able to pay its way, Mesopotamia will, for many years to come, prove a considerable drain on imperial resources, apart altogether from the cost of maintaining the new imperial frontier, if the Government is to undertake great public works. The demand for capital outlays on public works, notably drainage and irrigation, will have to be met from somewhere, and it may be some years before anything like an adequate return can be obtained on the bigger schemes. I will say here that one thing which I think should be observed in connection with our future organization of these areas, particularly Mesopotamia, is not to go in too much for State or Government development. I am perfectly certain that if you are to develop a country like Mesopotamia on really effective lines, if you are to have it done in a business-like way, and on an economic basis, it ought to be done as far as possible by private enterprise. Capital expenditure by military offices with the British taxpayer to draw up is apt to be expensive. After all, an Army training is not conducive

to economy in the use of public money. It is extraordinary, when a general office is empowered to spend money *ad lib.*, how quickly he can get through it. I am not now referring to expenditure for military purposes, but to expenditure for all things like railways, harbours, docks, and all the etceteras that are a long way away from but often essential to the actual fighting. Then, I do not think you would get much capital for the development of Mesopotamia from the Government of India. Of this I am certain—the attempt to follow Indian models too closely, either in administration or development, is doomed to failure, and Mesopotamia cannot and will not be financed by the new India, which will make ever-increasing demands upon the Indian revenues for internal objects of expenditure under the new Reform Act passed last session. Every penny of taxation under that Act will be earmarked to meet local expenditure in India itself, on things like education.

How, then, are we to set about consolidating our position in this our new Arabic-speaking empire? I use the word advisedly, for it is nothing else than a new empire. The first necessity seems to me to be the provision of an entire new British Civil Service. So far Mesopotamia and Palestine have carried on with the loan of Civil Servants and British officers whose experience has hitherto lain in Egypt and the Sudan on the one hand and in India on the other. In Palestine this has not been altogether satisfactory, as the Jews, the Levantines, and even the Arabic-speaking population of Palestine, are all utterly different from the Sudanese and from the Egyptian fellah. Mesopotamia has had in the person of Sir Percy Cox and his successor, Colonel Wilson, two men at the head of the administration of quite outstanding knowledge and character, but it is a question as to whether India will be able to go on producing or can afford to spare, if she does produce, many men of this type for service in the Arabic-speaking countries. The new India will want such men in India. My hope is that a new service recruited in England with a separate examination and clearly defined contract will be formed for service in Mesopotamia, Palestine, Aden, etc., and as Political Officers attached to the many independent Arab chiefs throughout the Peninsula. I would advocate the surrender by the Indian Government and the India Office of all existing responsibilities outside the frontiers of the Indian Empire. I still cherish the hope that some day a separate Ministry under a separate Secretary of State may be formed in London for the control and direction of this new Middle-Eastern service, but necessarily we must proceed step by step, and the first step seems to me to be the creation of an administrative department in the Foreign Office for the carrying out of the functions which I would like to see eventually transferred to a new Secretaryship of State. I prefer the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office, because,

although the duties would be mainly administrative and financial, the political conditions are such that the administration of the territories for which the British Empire is directly responsible, either to itself or to the League of Nations, cannot be separated from the political relations with the neighbouring States and the various independent Arab chiefs. I should say here in passing that I am quite certain that I see no prospect of the various independent Arab chiefs becoming federated under the King of Hejaz or anybody else into one independent Arab Empire; in fact, I go so far as to say that it would be quite impossible to put the Hejaz under Damascus or Damascus under the Hejaz. If Feisal becomes established as independent Emir of Damascus, as I hope he will, it will only be on terms of complete independence from his father. Therefore, while I suggest that the new department should be organized under the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I hope that that department will form a quite separate branch of the office, staffed by men who give their whole lives in the service of the Middle East and who are personally conversant with its many special problems—that is to say, the personnel of the Middle Eastern Department of the Foreign Office should not be interchangeable with the rest of the staff of the Foreign Office or with the Diplomatic Service, but should be interchangeable only with the Civil Service in Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Arabia. I have always felt that the staffing of the Residency in Cairo by members of the Diplomatic Service has been a misfortune from the purely administrative point of view, in spite of the excellent diplomats who have from time to time been sent to Egypt by the Foreign Office. It is found that when the diplomat comes to deal with irrigation, education, problems of finance, and matters of that kind, he is not always the most competently qualified to do so. On the other hand, the administrator in the Middle East must, I think, have some conception of diplomacy and of political matters. We shall have to build up in Palestine and Mesopotamia completely new legal and revenue systems. The old Ottoman ones must go, and go for ever. We shall require the services of a considerable body of engineers, doctors, and agronomists, all of whom will have to have a knowledge of Arabic, and some will no doubt be encouraged to take up Hebrew and Persian as well. All these men will have to find their counterparts in the London office which will control and direct both the politics and the administration under the Secretary of State. I would suggest that the head of this new department should be on an equality with whoever is in Lord Hardinge's position, and not under the Permanent Under-Secretary, but his equal. For some years to come the relations between the British authorities in the new territories and the authorities in Whitehall must be somewhat similar to the new relations between the Government of India and the Secretary of State for India under the

Reform Act; that is to say, the Secretary of State should only interfere with the people on the spot on imperial grounds, leaving his chief agents in the East the widest latitude in internal and local affairs. As far as possible I would allow the man whom you put at the head of the Mesopotamia service, at the head of the Jerusalem service, or the other heads, the freest possible hand. Now it has been suggested that if this new department is formed there should be here in London something parallel to the India Council in the Foreign Office. There is no doubt that on political questions, at any rate, it would be of greater assistance to a Secretary of State not familiar by actual personal contact with the problems of the Middle East to have at his elbow one or two representative men from those countries. But that seems to me at present a detail, and I am not sure that it is wanted at the present stage.

Now, as to the character of this proposed new Civil Service, Sir Percy Cox and Colonel Wilson have started a new tradition which it is most important should be maintained. It is quite a new and distinct tradition compared, say, with that of the Indian Civil Service, which, of course, we all admire; but it has already got quite a different outlook and quite different ideals. In the first place, whatever happens, I hope that the number of administrative posts in the service given to Englishmen will be kept down to an absolute minimum. I personally know that recently Palestine is overstaffed. Everything depends on the quality of the men, and not on the quantity. If we can get the young men that Sir Percy Cox and Colonel Wilson have been getting, if you can get a small number of men of first-rate quality, it is better than ten times the number of a lower quality. In order to do so you have to give special consideration to the exceptional conditions of the country. In dealing with Mesopotamia you have to bear in mind that its climate and amenities of life are not of the very best. The climate of Palestine is one of the very best; but that of Mesopotamia is pretty bad. You have to give conditions of service which will enable, as it were, the Percy Cox-Wilson tradition to exist; that is to say, you have to give pretty frequent leave and very good pay—indeed, a small number but a highly paid staff of officials, but with a clear understanding that the men will be weeded out very quickly if they are not up to the standard you set for them. For this service the idea must not hold that once a man has passed the examination and got in it is a safe billet rising by easy stages to a moderate pension. I am perfectly certain that if we are to get just the men wanted for this service you must give higher pay in the first instance, because if a man gets into a groove, if a man ceases to have enthusiasm for the country and enthusiasm for his work, well, then I am afraid that there is a great danger if he is kept on and goes on under the ordinary system of seniority, because the

service in this new Middle Eastern world is, of course, a service where the thing that counts is personality. You are dealing both with the Arabs and with the Jews; you are dealing with a people who, after all, will never regard themselves as subject races. After all, you are in the cradle of Islam, you have among the people who gave Islam to the world this idea of Islam; let us make no mistake about it—that to the Arab the mere idea that he is a Moslem means that you are a member of a great, free, conquering race, and that they should not be ruled as a subject people. That is what the Arabs feel deep in their bones. Whilst they are willing and, it may be, anxious to get Englishmen to help them, it is not on terms of anything like subservience; it is barely on those of recognized equality. I remember a scene down the Red Sea when an officer in the Indian Army did not like the way in which some of the Arabs treated him. One of the English officers who knew the Arabs well, having lived a good deal amongst them, said: "Well, thank Heaven you are a gentleman, for then they will treat you as an equal; if you had not been they would have treated you very much as an inferior!" That is also the relation in Palestine. You have not only to live up to the highest standard, but you have got to have an intellectual appreciation and an intellectual knowledge of the amazing conditions of Palestine, the centre of the world's faiths. You have got to be able to realize that Patriarchs and Chief Rabbis in Jerusalem are people who have got to be treated not merely with respect but in a particular way. And there is no doubt that in order to get a proper service you have got to get a type of men like Colonel Lawrence, Cox, Deedes, Wilson, and Shakespeare, who was killed in the service—men who are specially gifted, who have got the feeling of the Middle East in their blood, and are not already too much subject to any other tradition.

One word about the military situation. The smaller we can keep the military garrisons the easier we shall get on with the peoples. We shall have to have garrisons in both countries, but the smaller we can keep them the better. What is wanted is, of course, a small striking-force. There is no doubt there will have to be punitive expeditions from time to time. In that part of the world I have been struck with the things that tell, and the things that tell in the maintenance of law and order and in the resistance of any possible invasion by the Bedouin or Kurdish tribes are frankly modern developments of the arts of war. A few aeroplanes, and a few light armoured cars, and you won't want garrisons of 50,000 or 60,000 infantry. They are not wanted in Palestine or Mesopotamia, although on the whole of the northern frontier of the latter garrisons will be very necessary for some time to come.

The first thing wanted in Mesopotamia is drainage and irrigation,

but in connection with any great work of that kind I am particularly anxious to see that the Government do not try to do it all themselves, and that much of the development will be left to private enterprise. I am particularly anxious that there should not be set up in the Arabic-speaking countries and in Palestine a great army of British officials, increasing as it undoubtedly increased in Egypt before the war. Capital provided by a Government is often wasted by officials. What I want to see is the appointment of a staff of picked men, but few in number, and the actual development of the country left as far as possible to men who have to produce commercial balance-sheets. Let us get to civil conditions and civil ascendancy as soon as possible. We should get a body of men who will be qualified to advance the best progress and development of this new area, who have vision, sympathy, and enthusiasm in the important work they will undertake. The possibilities are amazing. There are thousands of acres now derelict that can be brought under cultivation sooner or later in Palestine and in Mesopotamia. It is a conservative estimate to say that the population of Palestine numbers 600,000, but there is no reason why it should not be 4,000,000. Then, when we hear of the ancient Babylonian greatness, we can see that gigantic possibilities are before us in Mesopotamia if we go steadily and the right way about it. I have endeavoured to sketch the ideas that have formed themselves in my mind as a result of my experience for the last three years, and I thank you very much for listening to me so long.

The CHAIRMAN, in opening the discussion, said they had listened to a lecture which was most thoughtful and illuminating. In these days, when a great portion of the globe was being redistributed and when new states were being formed and established, it was most necessary that we should realize what our future responsibilities are likely to be and that we should reflect as to the best method in which we can meet them. There were several points which Captain Ormsby Gore had raised with which he was in entire agreement. The first of these related to the proposed new department for the management of the affairs of the Middle East. He should like to see it established as soon as possible as a perfectly independent department, not even connected with the Foreign Office. To start with it might be thought necessary that it should be connected with that Office, but latterly to have an independence of its own would be the best, and he hoped to see the lecturer hold a very distinguished position in that department. There was one country to which Captain Ormsby Gore had casually referred in which he personally used to be very much interested. He alluded to Persia. There, he thought, we also have an opportunity for furthering our interests, because, as they all knew, the conditions which formerly governed our position towards that country had been entirely altered of late. Now we had a perfectly free hand there, there

being no longer spheres of influence opposed to our own. He was thoroughly at one with Captain Ormsby Gore that private enterprise should take up public works and development free from Government interference, and that it would find a very fruitful field for activities in Persia. There was one other point to which reference should be made, and which was causing a certain amount of disquietude, and that was the spread of Bolshevism in that part of the Mid-East. He thought that menace should be scotched. He did not think it could be removed for some time to come, but it would be a cause of great anxiety for the future. Captain Ormsby Gore had spoken about Mesopotamia and Arabia with such force and eloquence and in such a really instructive and illuminating manner that he would not venture to make any remarks upon that portion of his paper. He dared say there were some members of the audience who would like to make a few observations, and he would be very glad if they would kindly do so.

SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND thought they had listened to a lecture of the very type which members of the Society liked most to hear. It was one which aroused keen interest and helped them to think out the problems of Central Asia and the Near East, caused questionings within them, and led them to try to find solutions for them. He should say, if his opinion were of any value, that the main idea of the lecturer, the formation of a separate Ministry in London for the Near East, was a very sound and sensible proposal. In accordance with our British custom, he supposed we should go about carrying it into effect in the way the lecturer had suggested—namely, that the department should first of all form part of the Foreign Office, and in the course of time develop into an independent Ministry. There were one or two points of detail in the paper regarding which he should like to make a few observations. Both the lecturer and the chairman had expressed themselves as opposed to State management in the development of Mesopotamia, but personally he should not feel inclined to too hastily dispense with State management in regard to the development of irrigation and similar works of utility. Of course, we in this country are accustomed to the advantages of private enterprise, but those of them who had had experience in India and the East knew that in connection with enormous irrigation schemes, the construction of great canals, and the development of other public works, intricate land questions were involved as well as dealings with the peasantry of a country which, perhaps, it would be as well to leave to the management of a State agency. If they got a firm of contractors going into a country like Mesopotamia who had no experience of dealing with the inhabitants they were very liable to get into considerable trouble. At any rate, he should not feel inclined too hastily to decry State management in relation to great schemes of irrigation. They ought

to realize that in India, where these great irrigation schemes were carried out by State enterprise, they formed a source of very considerable revenue to the State. He was not quite sure about the figures, but he thought he was right in saying that the expansion of these public works in India, taking the good with the bad over the whole area, gave a return of 11 per cent. on the total outlay, and some of the undertakings, particularly in Punjab, were exceedingly productive. He thought there was one canal now at work there which brought in a return of about 48 per cent. Bearing these facts in mind, he should not feel inclined to throw cold water upon State enterprise in connection with these great irrigation schemes to which the lecturer had referred. Then with regard to the enlistment of officers for the proposed new administration, the lecturer had referred to the work accomplished by Colonel Sir Percy Cox and Colonel Wilson. These were both men from the Indian Army, and he thought that probably in Mesopotamia we might draw out a plan similar to the one followed in the Indian frontier and to the one we followed in the original development of India. In these cases we had looked to the Army to produce officers for undertaking the first dealings with rough peoples, and he thought that from amongst the magnificent officers who had been serving in Mesopotamia we should find very capable and sympathetic men for dealing with the Arabians. Then with regard to the settlement of Indians in Mesopotamia, he entirely agreed with what the lecturer had said, that probably this was not satisfactory or desirable. He also agreed that in India itself there is full scope for the employment of Indians. Great portions of the country were still undeveloped even agriculturally, and, as the lecturer had said, there is a great industrial development going on in India at the present time which will give ample employment for the surplus population of the country. He congratulated Captain Ormsby Gore on the very interesting lecture he had given them. He repeated, it was precisely of the type they liked to hear at meetings of that Society.

GENERAL SIR EDMUND BARROW said he was sure all of them were in agreement with the views expressed by the lecturer regarding general principles. There were, however, one or two points on which he would like to offer a few remarks. He might, in the first place, say that he had hoped that the lecturer would have said more regarding Persia, which he himself thought was essentially a part of the Middle Eastern Question. He had been disappointed in this respect, but supposed that Captain Ormsby Gore had not been able to make fuller reference to that country owing to lack of time. If any scheme for a great new administrative system that would comprise the whole of what was generally called the Middle East were introduced, he hoped it would include Persia. However, that was a point he would not dwell upon, because it was really a very large subject, which required

a good deal of thought and a great amount of intimate knowledge. The lecturer had proposed that the whole of Arabia should be included in the suggested Middle Eastern area, but he was not so sure that it was desirable that one particular corner should be so included. He referred to Oman or Muscat, which was entirely separated from the rest of Arabia by the great sandy desert. Moreover, its politics, its commerce, its relations in the past had been not with Arabia but with India. There had been infinitely more connection with it and Bombay than with Cairo. Therefore he advocated that Muscat should be separated from any Middle Eastern organization and should come within the orbit of the Indian Empire. Another point to which he would like to refer was that on which Sir Francis Younghusband had so forcibly spoken; he alluded to the lecturer's remarks on the bureaucratic nature of our administration as applied to new countries. Here again he was more inclined to agree with Sir Francis Younghusband than with the lecturer. In the first place they must recollect that, though India was a country with a bureaucratic organization, no one could say that in one particular aspect Indian administration had not been an enormous success. He referred to its railways and canals. In India these were practically nationalized, in that they were administered by the Government and not by the commercial world. In the management and control of these the success had been astounding. This arose from the fact that from Cæsar there had been no appeal. Success had been achieved because the bureaucracy had been supreme. In this country, as in other parts of Europe, undertakings of the kind had been subjected to the constant interferences of various influences—the press, Parliament, and the various other agencies and interests concerned, but in India this was not so. There the Government had decided what railways and canals were to be laid down, they had selected the men to make them, and controlled them when they were made. They had also taken care that the Irrigation Department was in touch with the Civil Service and with the Administration generally, and the result had been a wonderful financial success. Sir Francis Younghusband had told us that the average gain to India was about 11 per cent.; that, he thought, was about the right figure, so far as most of the canals were concerned. He might say the same thing of the railways of India. There had been an efficient bureaucratic control over them. When the railways of India were chiefly, though not entirely, under the management of private enterprise they were very successful, but the money gained went to the shareholders of the companies concerned. At the present day India was not only obtaining a handsome revenue from these railways, but there was an increasing revenue, and why? It was because the railways were coming more and more under State control, and because that control was not interfered with by outside elements.

Therefore he was inclined to think that in the development of new countries bureaucratic control would not be so opposed to the views of the new democracy as was commonly imagined. It gave efficient control combined with economic gain. On the whole he thought it had proved a success in one of the greatest experiments ever made in the history of the world, and that was the development of India. He had enlarged more than he had intended on this particular subject, for the reason that he thought it a most important one. Dealing next with the military aspect of the question, Sir Edmund Barrow expressed entire agreement with Captain Ormsby Gore as to the necessity for reducing our armies in the Middle East to the very smallest figure possible. As to the military methods we should employ, he said that he drew a great distinction between the invasions that poured down upon Mesopotamia from Persia and the north in old days and the present situation. As the lecturer had said, armies in our day are tied to railways, and therefore if a great invasion were to be attempted from the north it could only follow the line of a railway. Well, there was only one possible main trunk line of railway, at all events within a decade or two, between Northern Persia and Mesopotamia, and that was the line from Teheran through Hamadan and Kermanshah down to Bagdad. If they had a military force sufficiently strong to protect that one line they would be in a position to repel invasion from the north. The invaders could not come through the mountains of Kurdistan in large numbers because they could not be fed, nor could they bring with them all the modern military munitions necessary for such an undertaking. Therefore he did not regard the military problem as so difficult as he gathered that the lecturer was inclined to suppose it was. He did not despair of being able to defend the Middle East from that direction.

COUNT A. TCHEREP-SPIRIDOVITCH said that as a Russian he viewed with the greatest apprehension the question which was to be decided that week, the question as to which Power was to remain in Constantinople. As a Russian they might permit him to urge upon them the necessity of seeing to it that the Government of this country should insist upon retaining possession and on remaining in occupation of the Ottoman capital. Great Britain, he would most seriously plead, must not lose the opportunity at present afforded of taking that sure step towards providing a sure safeguard for the future if she wished to keep intact her splendid Asiatic empire. If she left Constantinople with the Turkish administration, then it was an absolute certainty that sooner or later, and probably sooner than later, it would become a German possession. That country would control Vienna, Budapest, and all the territory lying between these places and Constantinople, including Kurdistan. The present was the moment when both Houses of Parliament should be urged to

insist that Constantinople must not be left in the hands of the Turkish administration. They all knew what the Young Turks were. They were simply German agents who would hand over their territory to the late enemies of Great Britain at the earliest opportunity.

COLONEL C. E. YATE, M.P., expressed regret that he could not agree with the previous speaker that the Turks should not be allowed to remain in Constantinople. The danger of turning the Sultan out of Constantinople would be a very great one throughout the whole of the Moslem world, and as we were the greatest Moslem Power we ought to pay some attention to Moslem feelings, especially to those of many millions of people in our Indian Empire. If we could retain the Sultan of Turkey at Constantinople we should best be giving recognition of those feelings, and he thought it would be better if the Sultan were allowed to remain there as an independent Power. When they remembered that an independent Caliphate was the great tenet of the Mohammedan religion, they must recognize the great bearing the question of the retention of the Sultan in Constantinople had upon the maintenance of peace among all Moslems in our own Empire. He was sorry he could not agree with the previous speaker, but he gave that gentleman his opinion, and he hoped the Houses of Parliament would confirm what, so far as they were privileged to know, the Government had already done in giving the assurance to the Sultan that he would be allowed to remain in Constantinople. So long as everything was going on all right and so long as proper precautions were taken for the international administration of the Straits, he fancied the safeguards proposed were sufficient. With reference to the lecture itself, Captain Ormsby Gore had given them so much food for thought that he was afraid that he could not speak on all the points that had been covered. The proposal for the formation of a new department to look after the affairs of the Arabic-speaking portion of the Near East was one, he thought, which would meet with universal approval. Personally he agreed with what had been suggested, but he would like to see the new department independent of and not under the Foreign Office. His experience of the Foreign Office was that they had no knowledge whatever of administrative functions they had to discharge. When Somaliland, for instance, was taken over from India its affairs were at first administered by the Foreign Office, but subsequently it was found that this work was entirely out of its province, and Somaliland was handed over to the Colonial Office. The Foreign Office, as a matter of fact, did not understand administration, they had no administrative work to do, and so it was that in this instance they handed over the work to the Colonial Office. If they took over the administration of the whole of the Arabic-speaking portion of the Near East now the probability was that they would either have to hand it over to the

Colonial Office or to the India Office ; but his own opinion was that the administration of the affairs of the Arabic-speaking people should be left to an entirely independent department. Sir Edmund Barrow and the lecturer had referred to the relation of Persia to Mesopotamia and to the inclusion of the former in the proposed new administration. He agreed that the affairs of the two countries were intimately connected, but hitherto a large portion of Persia had been more or less embraced within the Indian sphere of influence, and where the dividing-line between the administration of the India Office and that of the new department would come in was at present rather difficult to say. He entirely agreed with Sir Edmund Barrow's observations with regard to Muscat. That country had come under the Indian sphere of influence for a hundred years or more—indeed, it had always been connected with it. They might almost say that the whole of the interests of the Persian Gulf were directly connected with India, but one could not go into the question of where the dividing-line should be drawn at the present juncture. He should like to say how heartily he agreed with what Sir Francis Younghusband had said with reference to the administration of Mesopotamia by the officers of the Indian Army. They had an extraordinarily fine set of men in Sir Percy Cox and Colonel Wilson and the other officers and civilians associated with them in their present work. These men had been trained in administration on the Indian side, and unquestionably formed the best men with whom to staff the administration of Mesopotamia. We had to train up an entirely new Civil Service, we could not have it ready made, and for the present the men who were there and those who could be lent by India would be the best men available for the work. In speaking of irrigation in Mesopotamia, the lecturer had said that the work of dealing with it could not be done by India, but they had to remember that modern irrigation first commenced in India, and that it was India that originally lent her irrigation engineers to Egypt. Sir William Willcox and the other great Egyptian irrigation engineers were drawn from India and were the pioneers of irrigation in Egypt. And so, he believed, it would be in Mesopotamia. There, as in Egypt, it would be found that the best men to initiate irrigation would be the engineers who had done such splendid work in India. He could not see how private enterprise could ever start and carry out the gigantic works which were necessary in that country, and he did not see where the money for such works was to come from ; but in any case the revenue from such undertakings should not go into other hands than those of the Government of the country. He agreed with the lecturer that there could never be a great Arabian State formed by the cohesion of all the small tribes, for the reason that no one chief would consent to come under another. In Mesopotamia we required one controlling authority, and that controlling authority could only be the British Government. As

Captain Ormsby Gore had pointed out, an entirely new legal and revenue system was required there, and such a system could only be started by experienced men drawn from India, and, it might be, from Egypt. It would be impossible to start it with an entirely new Civil Service. He sincerely hoped that in accordance with the scheme submitted by the lecturer it would be a condition of employment under the new Civil Service that all its members should learn Arabic and speak Arabic well and fluently. He congratulated the lecturer on the time and careful thought he had devoted to working out his scheme, and he hoped that the energy he had put into the work would in due course bear its fruits. It was his sincere hope that the proposed new department would be inaugurated at no distant date.

MR. C. C. GARBETT remarked that he had served two years in Mesopotamia, and he knew from the experience which he obtained there that there were dozens of things mentioned in the lecture on which one could comment. He felt in duty bound to make one observation on a subject of which they had often heard. Time and again one heard and read about the alleged extravagance of the military officer. For some of this he confessed himself responsible. He had, however, seen from the civil side the working of the military machine in connection with various schemes of development, and as an Indian civilian he was staggered at its efficiency. In connection with the same extravagance, he would like to refer them to the report of Sir John Hewitt, where it was shown that by the expenditure of £21,000, at the time regarded as extravagance, His Majesty's Government was in one instance saved over £2,000,000.

CAPTAIN ORMSBY GORE, M.P., in thanking the audience for the way in which they had received his lecture, said that he had no doubt qualified some of his remarks rather more than he might have done. With reference to the expenditure by the State on schemes of national development, he had frankly to say that in preparing his paper he had at the back of his mind a whole series of votes which he had had to give in the House of Commons last year. When one remembered the way in which we are piling up an enormous public debt in this country in connection with undertakings which yielded no return, one felt it becoming more and more unbearable. The British Treasury would be called upon for more millions for gigantic public works to be carried out in the near future. One did not like to vote against these things, but when one had to do so day after day, when one saw millions and millions showered out right and left, one began to feel in one's consciousness that when one delivered a lecture such as he had, one must utter a word of warning. He did feel that when it came to a great irrigation scheme such as was contemplated in Mesopotamia it must be done by the State; but he hoped that for a few years ahead we would go gradually and not embark on a great big capital expenditure falling on the British taxpayer. It was the need for precau-

tions in this direction that was really at the back of his mind when he referred to the development of public works. He was not in a position to contradict what Sir Francis Younghusband and the other gentlemen had said with reference to administration in India, nor could he in view of their great knowledge and wide experience; but he did hope that it was not contemplated to ask for an enormous loan or anything of that kind for what he might call a great Willcox scheme in Mesopotamia. He rather advocated that things should be allowed to develop and grow slowly for a time at least, and, as far as possible by private enterprise. What he really meant to say was that all our ventures should be gone into on a business basis. The previous speaker had assured them that they were according to what he had seen, and frankly he had heard that in Mesopotamia; but certainly there had been a good deal of waste in Palestine. A great deal of money had been spent there, and things were run at a pretty heavy loss. He knew that the railway involved an appalling loss to the taxpayers of the country. At the present moment the weekly cost, apart from the maintenance of the garrison, was very heavy indeed. What was really desired was that the country should develop on a slow but sure economic basis. He had to thank Colonel Yate for what he had said, but he desired that gentleman not to misunderstand him with reference to the new Civil Service for the Middle East. He agreed with him entirely when he said that in order to start it satisfactorily they must draw from India and elsewhere really efficient officers. Having got the proper men to start it, then he hoped that in the future they would train the young men for the new service direct from England. Mesopotamia was an entirely new country, where we would have entirely new responsibilities. We would be very much in the same position there as we had been in India in the eighteenth century. In India great traditions had grown up and a great code of regulations suitable to Indian needs had been promulgated. But it had to be remembered that these were not necessarily suited to countries like Mesopotamia, which might be described as brand new. They should start entirely new traditions there, starting with what was being done by Sir Percy Cox and those associated with him. Let us start building up new Arabian traditions through efficient administration of the new men they would get there. As he had said, he was not competent to deal with the Indian Civil Servant, but he did know that in the case of very many Sudanese Civil Servants they were pitchforked into towns and positions in Palestine for which they were in some cases unsuited. He did not wish to see a parallel case in Mesopotamia. He had to thank them all for the kind way in which they had received his lecture.

On the proposition of the Chairman a hearty vote of thanks was accorded Captain Ormsby Gore for his address, and the proceedings then terminated.

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" 1 Journal subscription at 16s. in arrears	0 16 0	" lantern operator	6 10 0
" 2 Journal subscriptions at 10s.	1 0 0		
" 2 Journal subscriptions at 10s. in advance	1 0 0	By stationery and printing	15 9 11
		" petty cash (stamps, teas, etc.)	20 10 0
Sale of Journal	8 8 0	" Royal Society (lantern, lighting, etc.)	1 7 6
Miscellaneous receipts	22 5 1	" Amount debited in error	0 5 0
Amount credited in error	0 1 6	" bank charges	0 4 9
	0 4 10		
Balance at bank, January 1, 1919	180 19 5		87 17 2
Petty cash, January 1, 1919	90 0 8	" balance at bank, December 31, 1919	219 17 2
	2 17 11	" balance petty cash, December 31, 1919	52 2 2
			1 18 8
	92 18 2		
			54 0 5
	£278 17 7		£278 17 7

Audited and found correct, *March 17, 1920.*

FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND.
EDWARD PENTON.

LIST OF MEMBERS
OF
THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

CORRECTED TO MARCH 4, 1920

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL

Hon. President:

THE RT. HON. EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

Chairman of Council:

1919. THE RT. HON. LORD CARNOCK, P.C., G.C.B.

Vice-Presidents:

- 1906. COLONEL SIR THOMAS H. HOLDICH, K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E., C.B.
- 1908. SIR VALENTINE CHIROL.
- 1913. THE EARL OF RONALDSHAY, G.C.I.E.
- 1917. THE RT. HON. SIR H. M. DURAND, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.
- 1919. SIR FREDERIC W. R. FRYER, K.C.S.I.
- 1919. SIR EVAN JAMES, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

Hon. Treasurer:

1919. BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. C. BAILWARD.

Hon. Secretary:

1918. LIEUT.-COLONEL A. C. YATE.

Members of the Council:

- 1916. E. R. P. MOON, ESQ.
- 1917. A. L. P. TUCKER, ESQ., C.I.E.
- 1918. SIR HUGH BARNES, K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O.
- 1918. T. J. BENNETT, ESQ., C.I.E.
- 1918. LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR H. MCMAHON, G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E.
- 1919. SIR EDWARD PENTON, K.B.E.
- 1919. LIEUT.-COLONEL H. P. P. PICOT.
- 1919. COLONEL C. E. YATE, C.S.I., C.M.G., M.P.
- 1919. LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.
- 1920. CAPT. THE HON. W. G. A. ORMSBY-GORE, M.P., J.P., D.L., F.R.G.S.

Assistant Secretary:

1917. MISS L. B. PHILLIPS.

LIST OF MEMBERS

The names marked with an asterisk are of those who have served on the Council. The names in capitals are those of present Members of Council. Names in italics are those of Councillors resident in India. The names marked with a dagger are those of original Members.

A

- 1910. Abdul Qaiyum, Khan Bahadur Sahibzada, C.I.E., Assistant Political Officer, Khaiber, Peshawar, N.W.F. Province.
- †Aglionby, Captain A., Junior Naval and Military Club, 96, Piccadilly, W. 1
- 1916. Ainscough, T. M., McLeod House, 28, Dalhousie Square, Calcutta.
- 1919. Alexander, Y. Patrick, F.R.G.S., 2, Whitehall Court, S.W.1.
- 1919. Allahabad, University of, History Department.

B

- 1908. *Baddeley, J. F., 94, Bruton Street, W. 1.
- 1917. Bahrein, The Political Agent, Persian Gulf.
- 1910. Bailey, Col. F. M., 7, Drummond Place, Edinburgh, N.B.
- 1914. Baillie, J. R., 1, Akenside Road, Hampstead, N.W.
- 10** 1906. Bailward, Brig.-Gen. A. C., R.A. (ret.), 1, Prince's Mansions, Victoria Street, S.W. 1. Hon. Treasurer.
- 1916. Baluchistan, The Hon. the Agent to the Governor-General and Chief Commissioner, Quetta.
- 1918. Mrs. M. M. Banks, 7, Wadham Gardens, N.W. 3.
- 1905. *BARNES, Sir Hugh Shakespear, K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., Woodlands Corner, West Byfleet, Surrey. M. of C.
- 1918. Barrow, Major-General Sir Edmund, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., India Office, S.W. 1.
- 1919. Basset-Digby, F.R.G.S., Saltsjobaden, Nara, Stockholm, Sweden.
- 1919. Bateman, H. G., F.R.G.S., Beamsley Hall, Bolton Abbey, Nr. Skipton, Yorks.
- 1910. Beaclerk, Lord Osborne de Vere, A.D.C. to C-in-C. Advance G.H.Q., and Brooks's Club, 4, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.
- 1907. Benn, Colonel R. A. E., C.I.E., Resident, Jeypore, Rajputana, India.
- *†BENNETT, T. J., C.I.E., Harwarton House, Speldhurst, Kent. M. of C.
- 20** 1916. Bernière, Col. H. J. de, 115, Jermyn Street, S.W. 1.
- 1910. Bigg-Wither, Captain F., I.A., Deputy Commr., c/o Messrs. A. Scott and Co., Rangoon, Burma.
- 1916. Bombay, Sec. to Govt. Political Dept., Bombay, India.
- 1919. Bone, H. Peters, 5, Hamilton Mansions, Kings Gardens, Hove, Sussex.

Bosanquet, O. V., C.I.E., Agent to the Governor-General in
Central India, Indore, C.I.

1916. †Bruce, General C. D.
†Buchanan, W. A., 23, Great Winchester Street, E.C. 2.
1919. Bunsen, The Rt. Hon. Sir Maurice de, P.C., G.C.M.G.,
Old Lodge, Taplow, Bucks.
1919. Burdwan, The Hon. Sir Bijay Chand Mahtab, K.C.I.E.,
K.C.S.I., T.O.M., Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of, The
Palace, Bardwan, Bengal, India.
1914. Bury, C. Howard, Bath Club, Dover Street, W. 1.

C

- 30** 1907. †Carey, A. D., I.C.S., East India United Service Club, 16,
St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1918. Campbell, John MacLeod, Glen Saddell, Carradale,
Argyll.
1919. Carnock, The Rt. Hon. Lord, P.C., G.C.B., 53, Cadogan
Gardens, S.W. 3.
1908. *CHIROL, Sir Valentine, Kt., 34, Carlyle Square, Chelsea,
S.W. 3. Vice-President.
1918. Christie, Miss A., 40, Ovington Street, S.W. 3.
1919. Coales, Oliver R., H.B.M., Consulate General, Shanghai,
China; R. Societies Club, St. James's Street.
1918. Collis, Mrs., 17, Hamlet Gardens, Ravenscourt Park, W. 6;
The Ladies' Army and Navy Club, Burlington Gardens,
W. 1.
1919. Cowell, Mrs. M., 36, Alexandra Court, Queen's Gate, S.W. 7.
1908. Cox, Lieut.-Col. Sir Percy Z., K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Knockrind,
Simla.
1920. Crawford, Lt.-Commander C., R.N., c/o L.D.D., Admiralty,
Whitehall, S.W. 1.
40 1914. Crewdson, Major W. T. O., R.F.A., Queen Anne's Mansions,
S.W. 1.
1907. Cunningham, Sir William J., K.C.S.I., I.C.S. (ret.)
1907. *CURZON OF KEDLESTON, The Rt. Hon. Earl, P.C., G.C.S.I.,
G.C.I.E., Hackwood, near Basingstoke, Hants,
1, Carlton House Terrace, S.W. 1. Hon. President.

D

1908. Dane, Hon. Sir Louis, G.C.I.E., C.S.I., Clarendon Lodge,
Millbrook, Hants.
1919. Dane, Sir Richard Morris, K.C.I.E., East India United
Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1908. Daukes, Major C. T., c/o Thos. Cook and Son, Bombay
India.
†Dartrey, The Earl of, 10, Upper Belgrave Street, S.W. 1.
1906. Davis, W. S., Stoke, Old Headington, Oxford.
1918. Davis, Mrs., 46, Sussex Gardens, Hyde Park, W.

1903. *Donoughmore, The Earl of, 5, Chesterfield Gardens, W. 1.
50 1906. Dobbs, The Hon. Mr. H. R. C., C.I.E., I.C.S., C.S.I., Agent
to the Governor-General and Chief Commissioner,
Quetta, Baluchistan.
1910. Douglas, Captain H. A., Derwent Lodge, Lansdowne Road,
Tunbridge Wells.
1910. Drummond, Miss, Kensington Palace Mansions, W. 8.
1903. *†Durand, Colonel A. G. A., C.B., C.I.E., 31, Park Lane,
W. 1.
1907. *DURAND, The Right Hon. Sir H. Mortimer, P.C., G.C.M.G.,
K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Penmayne House, Rock, Wadebridge,
Cornwall. Vice-President.

E

- †Elphinstone, Lord, Carlton Club, 94, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1911. Etherton, Captain P., Lansdowne, Garhwal, U.P., India.
1918. Evans, T. Herbert, St. David's, Lisvane, Glam.

F

1919. FitzHugh, Capt. J. C., D.S.O., M.V.O., c/o Messrs. Cox &
Co., 16, Charing Cross.
1915. Flower, Hon. E., Durrow Castle, Durrow, Queen's County,
Ireland.
60 1916. Forbes, Sir George Stuart, K.C.S.I., The Athenæum Club,
Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1920. Fraser, F. A., F.R.G.S., Beaufort, Knap Hill, Nr. Woking.
1915. Fraser, George, Imperial Institute, S. Kensington, S.W. 7.
1916. Fraser, The Hon. Mr. S. M., C.S.I., C.I.E., the Resident,
Hyderabad, India.
1918. Frazer, R. W., The Hollies, Balcomb, Sussex.
1918. Frazer, Mrs. R. W., The Hollies, Balcomb, Sussex.
1906. *FRYER, Sir Frederic, K.C.S.I., 23, Elvaston Place, Queen's
Gate, S.W. 7. Vice-President.

G

1908. Gabriel, Vivian, C.V.O., C.S.I., c/o The War Office, White-
hall, S.W. 1.
1919. Garbett, C. C., c/o Messrs. Grindlay & Co., 54, Parliament
Street, S.W. 1.
1913. Garrard, S. H., Cavalry Club, and Welton Place, Daventry,
Northants.
70 1919. Gaulter, Mrs., 152, Earl's Court Road, S.W. 5.
1909. Gearon, Miss S., Ladies' Empire Club, 69, Grosvenor
Street, W. 1.
1919. Goold-Adams, Col. Sir H. E. F., K.B.E., C.M.G., United
Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1919. Grant, H. D., F.R.G.S., F.R.A.S., Automobile Club, S.W. 1.

H

1918. Harford, Frederic Dundas, C.V.O., 49, Egerton Gardens, Chelsea, S.W. 3.
 1919. Hill, Lt. H. Brian, F.R.G.S., c/o Messrs. King, Hamilton & Co., Calcutta, India.
 *†HOLDICH, Colonel Sir Thomas H., K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E., C.B., 41, Courtfield Road, S.W. 7. Vice-President.
 1919. Hope, Miss T. M., Crix, Hatfield Peverel, Witham, Essex.
 1918. Hunter, Mrs., 81, Holland Park, W. 11.

I

1916. India, Foreign and Political Department of Government, Delhi.
 80 1906. India, Secretary of State for, India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
 1915. Ingram, M. B., Cavendish Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.
 1919. Inman, Miss H. M., 12, Sloane Terrace Mansions, S.W. 1. (Journal subscriber.)

J

1920. Jacob, Col. H. Fc., C.S.I., British Empire Hotel, De Vere Gardens, W. 8.
 *†JAMES, Sir Evan, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Glenshee, Cambridge Park, Twickenham. Vice-President.
 †Jardine, Mrs., 25, Nevern Place, S.W. 5.
 *†Jardine, W. E., I.C.S., C.I.E., The Residency, Gwalior, Central India.
 1919. Jeejeebhoy, Lieut. J. P. B., F.R.G.S., Pedder Road, Bombay.

K

1920. Keeling, Capt. E. H., M.C., 1, Suffolk Street, S.W. 1.
 1907.*KELLY, Col. J. G., C.B., 1, West Cromwell Road, Kensington, S.W. 5.
 90 1913. Kemp, Miss, 26, Harley House, Regent's Park, N.W. 1.
 †King, Sir H. Seymour, K.C.I.E., 25, Cornwall Gardens, S.W. 7.
 1920. Knox-Niven, Lt.-Col. H., 74, Grosvenor Street, W. 1.
 1918. Kuwait, The Political Agent, Persian Gulf.

L

- 1904.*LAMINGTON, The Rt. Hon. Lord, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., 26, Wilton Crescent, S.W. 1.
 1908. *LLOYD, H.E., Capt. Sir George A., D.S.O., Government House, Bombay.
 1912. Loch, Capt. P. G., 97th Infantry, c/o Messrs. Cox & Co., Bombay, India.
 1908. Lockhart, Lady, C.I., 187, Queen's Gate, S.W. 7.
 1918. Lovett-Beresford, Major-Gen., C.B., C.S.I., 59, Madeley Road, Ealing.
 1909. Lyall, Major, R.A., I.A., 3rd Kashmir Rifles, E.E.F., c/o Messrs. Grindlay & Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.

M

- 100** 1909. Macartney, Sir George, K.C.I.E., Les Vaux, St. Saviour's, Jersey, Channel Isles. M. of C.
 1920. Mackenzie, Lady M. M. Owen, 26, Chesham Street, S.W. 1.; Brantham Court, Suffolk.
 1908. Malcolm, Brigadier-General Neill, D.S.O.
 1920. Massy, Col. P. H. Hamon, C.B.E., United Service Club, Pall Mall.
 1920. Mathieson, Wilfred, Braceland, Box, Nr. Minchinhampton, Glos.
 1915. McCoy, Mrs., c/o Messrs. Glyn, Mills, and Co., 67, Lombard Street, E.C. 3.
 1906. McMahon, Lieut.-Colonel Sir H., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., 59, Pont Street, S.W. 1. M. of C.
 1912. Medlicott, Captain H., Cavalry Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1920. Mellor, Donald, 180, The Grove, Wandsworth, S.W. 18.
 1920. Michell, Roland, 22, Lansdowne Crescent, W. 11.
110 1910. Miles, Major-Gen. P. J., c/o Lloyds' Bank, Bath.
 1920. Molony, Wm. O'Sullivan, Christ Church, Oxford.
 1908. Moon, E. R. P., 6, Onslow Gardens, S.W. 7. M. of C.
 1920. Mules, Sir Chas., C.S.I., M.V.O., O.B.E., c/o Messrs. H. King & Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W., 1.
 †Murray, John, M.A., D.L., J.P., F.S.A., 50A, Albemarle Street, Piccadilly, W. 1.
 1915. Mylne, Miss Nina, 14, Old Square, Lincoln's Inn, W.C. 2.
 1916. Mysore, The Hon. the Resident, Bangalore, S. India.

N

1919. New York, The Library, American Museum of Natural History, 77th Street, Central Park West, U.S.A.
 1916. North-West Frontier Province. The Hon. the Chief Commissioner, Peshawar, India.

O

1906. O'Connor, Major W. F. T., R.A., C.I.E., H.B.M. Consul, Shiraz, Persia.
120 1905. Oliver, Captain D. G., 67th Punjabis, Junior United Service Club, Charles Street, S.W. 1.
 1920. Ormsby-Gore, Capt. the Hon. W. G. A., M.P., J.P., D.L., F.R.G.S., 5, Mansfield Street, Cavendish Square, W. 1.

P

1908. Payne, Mrs. Wood, 101, Philbeach Gardens, S.W. 5.
 1918. Patel, F. B., 208, Upper Clapton Road, E. 5.
 †Peel, The Viscount, 52, Grosvenor Street, W. 1.
 1907. Pemberton, Col. E. St. Clair, R.E. (ret.), B6, The Albany, Piccadilly, W. 1, and Pyrland Hall, Taunton.
 *†Penton, Sir E., K.B.E., 2, Cambridge Terrace, Regent's Park, N.W. 1. M. of C.
 †Perowne, J. T. Woolrych.

1919. Phelps, Chas. Milbrook, Childe Okeford, Shillingstone, Dorset. (Journal subscriber.)
1919. Philby, H. St. John, 17, St. Petersburg Place, W. 2.
- 130** 1908. Phipson, H., 10, Hyde Park Mansions, N.W. 1.
- *†Picot, Lieut.-Colonel H. P., Indian Army (ret.), 33, Onslow Gardens, S.W. 7, Junior United Service Club. M. of C.
1920. Platt, T. Comyn, 47, Cadogan Place, S.W. 1.

R

1910. Raines, Lady, 46, Sussex Gardens, Hyde Park, W. 2.
1916. Rajputana, The Hon. the Agent to the Governor-General, The Residency, Mount Abu, Rajputana, India.
1920. Raynardson, Capt. H. Birch, 1st Oxford and Bucks L.I., 29, Beaumont Street, Oxford.
1912. Richmond, Mrs. Bruce, 3, Sumner Place, S.W.
1919. Ridgeway, Col. R. Kirby, V.C., C.B., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
- *†RONALDSHAY, H.E. THE EARL OF, Governor of Bengal, Government House, Calcutta, India. Vice-President.
1914. Rose, Archibald, C.I.E., 46, Abingdon Villas, Kensington, W. 8.

S

- 140** 1918. Salvati, Signor M. N., Via Lamarmora 41, Torino, Italy.
- †Sandbach, General A. E., D.S.O., R.E., Naval and Military Club, 94, Piccadilly, W. 1.
1918. Shah, Ikbāl Ali, 11, George Square, Edinburgh.
1919. Silberrad, C. A., I.C.S., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1916. Spranger, John Alfred, 2nd. Lieut. R.E., 4, Via Michele, Florence, Italy.
1912. Stainton, B. W., c/o Messrs. Hickie, Borman, Grant & Co., 14, Waterloo Place, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1919. Stebbing, E. P., Hawthornden Castle, Lasswade, Midlothian.
1909. Stein, Sir Aurel, K.C.I.E., Ph.D., D.Litt., D.Sc. Superintendent Arch. Survey, Frontier Circle, N.W.F. Province, India.
1907. Stokes, Major C. B., 3rd Skinner's Horse, Military Attaché at Teheran.
1903. Stoner, J. J., 19, Kensington Court, W. 8.
- 150** †Sykes, Miss Ella E., 36, Alexandra Court, Queen's Gate, S.W. 7.
1905. Sykes, Miss Ethel R., 36, Alexandra Court, Queen's Gate, S.W. 7.
1904. Sykes, H. R., Lyndham Manor, Bishop's Castle, Shropshire.
1907. Sykes, Brigadier-General Sir Percy, K.C.I.E., C.M.G., Elecombs, Lyndhurst, Hants.

T

1903. Tanner, Miss, 8, Cavendish Place, Bath.
 1908. Taylor, Arthur Boddam, c/o Mesopotamia Persia Corp.,
 Teheran, Persia.
 1919. Teague-Jones, Major R., 80, Philbeach Gardens, S.W. 5.
 1919. Teichman, Eric, British Legation, Peking, China.
 1905. Thomas, F. W., Ph.D., India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
 1919. Thorburn, Major H. Hay, c/o Messrs. Grindlay & Co.,
 Bombay.
160 1908. Tod, Colonel G. K., C.M.G., Lingwell, Putney Heath,
 S.W. 15.
 1920. Tokyo, Japan, S. Manchuria Railway Co., 1, Itchome
 Yurokucho. (Journal subscription.)
 1907. Trevor, Sir Arthur, K.C.S.I., 16, Harcourt Terrace, Redcliffe
 Square, S.W. 10.
 1919. Trotter, Lady, 18, Eaton Place, S.W. 1.
 1908. *TUCKER, A. L. P., C.I.E., Hayes, Northiam, Sussex. M. of C.

V

1905. Vanderbyl, P. B., B4, The Albany, Piccadilly, W. 1.
 1919. Van Ness, Major W. Waters, c/o T. Bowen Reese, Smyrna,
 Asia Minor.

W

1911. Waller, Miss D., 32, Knightsbridge, S.W. 1.
 1911. Waller-Sawyer, Mrs., 32, Knightsbridge, S.W., and Moystown
 House, Belmont, King's Co., Ireland.
 †Walton, Sir Joseph, M.P., Reform Club, 104, Pall Mall,
 S.W. 1.
170 1905. Watson, Major John William, I.M.S., c/o Messrs. Grindlay,
 Groomer and Co., Bombay.
 †Whitbred, S. H., 11, Mansfield Street, W. 1.
 1916. Wilson, Lieut.-Colonel James Allan, D.S.O., 8th Gurkhas,
 c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., Calcutta, India.
 1919. Wilson, Johnstone, Lieut.-Colonel W. E., C.I.E., D.S.O.,
 c/o War Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
 1912. Woods, H. C., 171, Victoria Street, S.W. 1.
 1918. Worthington, A. B. Bayley, Town Thorns, Rugby.

Y

- *†YATE, Lieut.-Colonel Arthur C., Beckbury Hall, Shifnal,
 Shropshire. Hon. Sec.
 1905. *Yate, Colonel C. E., C.S.I., C.M.G., M.P., 17, Prince of Wales
 Terrace, W. 8. M. of C.
 1916. Yorke, Mrs. R. F., F.R.G.S., M.R.I., Ladies' Imperial Club,
 17, Dover Street, W. 1, and Hotel Cecil, Western
 Parade, Southsea.
 *†YOUNGHUSBAND, Lieut. - Col. Sir Francis E., K.C.S.I.,
 K.C.I.E., 3, Buckingham Gate, S.W. 1. M. of C.
180 1918. Young, Mrs. Henry, Galgorm Castle, Ballymena, Co. Antrim,
 Ireland.

RULES

OF

THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

1. THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY was founded in 1901 for the encouragement of interest in Central Asia by means of lectures, the reading of papers, and discussions.

2. Persons who desire to join the Society shall be proposed by one Member and seconded by another, and shall then be balloted for by the Council. Ladies are admissible.

3. The Secretary shall in all cases inform Members of their election.

4. The Annual Subscription of Members shall be £1.

5. The Council shall have power to remit subscriptions in special cases in which such remission shall appear expedient.

6. All subscriptions are due on election, and thereafter annually, but if the election takes place in November or December, the second annual payment will not become due till the expiration of the succeeding year; thus if a person be elected in November, his second subscription will not be due till the second January following.

7. Every person elected a Member of the Society shall make the payment due thereon within two calendar months after the date of election, or if abroad within six months after election; otherwise the election shall be void unless the Council in any particular case shall extend the period within which such payments are to be made.

8. Annual subscriptions shall be due on the tenth day of January in each year; and in case the same shall not be paid by the end of the month, the Treasurer or Secretary shall be authorized to demand the same. If any subscriptions remain unpaid at the Anniversary Meeting of the Society, the Treasurer shall apply by letter to those Members who are in arrear. If the arrears be not discharged by the 1st of January following such application, the Member's name as a defaulter shall be suspended in the meeting room, and due notice be given to the Member in question of the same. The name shall remain suspended, unless in the interval the arrears be discharged, until the Anniversary Meeting next ensuing, when, if the subscription be not paid, the defaulter will cease to be a Member of the Society.

9. A Member, who is not in arrears, may at any time resign his

membership by notice in writing, but such notice of resignation must reach the Secretary before the 1st of January, otherwise the subscription for the current year will be payable.

10. A Member's resignation shall not be valid, save by a resolution of the Council, until he has paid up all his arrears of subscription; failing this he will be considered as a defaulter, and dealt with in accordance with Rule 8.

11. The Officers of the Society shall be: (1) The Honorary President, (2) the Chairman of the Council, (3) six Vice-Presidents, (4) the Honorary Treasurer, and (5) the Honorary Secretary, all of whom must be Members of the Society. In addition to these there shall be an Assistant Secretary.

12. The Chairman shall be elected by the Council, and shall hold office for one year from the date of his election. He shall be eligible for re-election on the expiration of his tenure of office.

13. The Honorary President shall be elected by the Council, and shall hold office for five years, and shall be eligible for re-election. The Vice-Presidents shall be elected by the Council, and shall hold office for four years. Two shall retire annually by rotation, and not be eligible for re-election as such until after the expiration of one year. They are eligible on retirement for re-election on the the Council.

13a. The Honorary Treasurer and the Honorary Secretary shall be elected at the Anniversary Meeting, on the nomination of the Council, for two years, and are eligible for re-election.

14. The Assistant Secretary shall hold office during the pleasure of the Council.

15. The Chairman, as head of the Society, shall have the general supervision of its affairs. He will preside at Meetings of the Council, conduct the proceedings, give effect to resolutions passed, and cause the Rules of the Society to be put in force. He shall, ex officio, be a Member of the Council and of all Committees, and may at any time summon a Meeting of the Council.

16. The Honorary Treasurer shall receive all moneys, and shall account for them. He shall not make any payments (other than current and petty cash expenses) without the previous order of the Council. He shall, ex officio, be a Member of the Council and of all Committees. He shall exercise a general supervision over the expenditure of the Society, and shall prepare and submit to the Auditors at the expiration of each year a statement showing the receipts and expenditure of the Society for the period in question. All cheques must be signed by him, or in his absence any Member of the Council acting for him.

17. The Honorary Secretary shall, in the absence of the Chairman,

exercise a general control over the affairs of the Society, and shall, ex officio, be a Member of Council and of all Committees.

18. The Honorary Secretary shall attend the Meetings of the Society and of the Council and record their proceedings. He shall conduct the correspondence and attend to the general business of the Society, and shall attend at the Rooms of the Society at such times as the Council may direct. He shall superintend the persons employed by the Society, subject to the general control of the Council. He shall be competent on his own responsibility to discharge small bills, but any account exceeding the amount of Five Pounds shall, except in cases of great urgency, be submitted for approval to the Council before payment. He shall have the charge, under the general direction of the Council, of printing and publishing the Transactions of the Society.

19. The Assistant Secretary shall act generally under the orders of the Hon. Secretary, and if at any time the latter is prevented by illness or any other cause from attending to the duties of his office, the Assistant Secretary shall act in his absence; but in the case of prolonged absence the Council shall have power to make such special arrangements as may at the time be considered expedient.

20. There shall be a Council consisting of the Vice-Presidents and twelve Members of the Society, exclusive of the Chairman but inclusive of the Honorary Officers of the Society.

21. The Members of Council as aforesaid shall be elected at the Anniversary Meeting on the nomination of the Chairman in Council, subject to any amendment of which due notice has been given, as provided in Rule 23.

22. There shall be prepared and forwarded to every Member in Great Britain, together with the notice as to the Anniversary Meeting, a list containing the names of persons so nominated to serve on the Council for the ensuing year, together with any other names, should they be proposed and seconded by other Members, a week's notice being given to the Secretary. The List of Members nominated as aforesaid shall be first put to the Meeting, and, if carried, the amendments (if any) shall not be put.

23. Of the Members of Council other than those referred to in Rules 12 and 13—i.e., the Officers—three shall retire annually by seniority. They shall be eligible for re-election.

24. Should any vacancy occur among the Honorary Officers or other Members of Council during the interval between two Anniversary Meetings, such vacancy may be filled up by the Council.

25. The Ordinary Meetings of Council shall be held not less than once a month from November to June inclusive.

26. Special Meetings of Council may be summoned under the

sanction of the Chairman, or in his absence by a circular letter from the Secretary.

27. Three Members of the Council shall constitute a quorum.

28. At Meetings of Council the Chair shall be taken by the Chairman, and in his absence the Senior Member present shall take the Chair. The decision of any matter shall rest with the majority, and in case of an equality of votes the Chairman shall have the casting vote in addition to his ordinary vote.

29. Committees may be appointed by the Council to report on specific questions, and unless otherwise stated three shall form a quorum. Such Committees shall be authorized to consult persons not members of the Society.

30. Ordinary General Meetings are for hearing and discussing papers and for addresses, but no resolutions other than votes of thanks for papers read shall be passed at such meetings except by permission of the Chairman.


31. Special General Meetings are for considering and dealing with matters of importance, such as the making or amendment of its Rules, or questions seriously affecting its management and constitution. No business shall be transacted at such meetings except that for which they are summoned, and of which notice has been given.

32. The Anniversary Meeting for receiving and considering the Annual Report of the Council and Auditors, and dealing with the recommendations contained therein for the appointment of Members of the Council and Officers for the ensuing year, and for hearing the President's Address (if any), and deliberating generally on the affairs of the Society, shall be held in June of each year. But no resolution seriously affecting the management or position of the Society, or altering its Rules, shall be passed unless due notice shall have been given in the manner prescribed for Special General Meetings.

33. Ordinary Meetings shall be convened by notice issued to accessible Members, and as a general rule they shall be held on the first Wednesday in each month from November to May, both inclusive, the Wednesday of Easter, Whitsuntide, and Christmas weeks being excepted. At such meetings, and also at the Anniversary Meeting, but not at special General Meetings, each Member of the Society shall have the privilege of introducing, either personally or by card, two visitors.

34. Ten Members shall form a quorum.

The Accounts shall be audited annually by an Auditor nominated by the Council. The employment of a professional Auditor shall be permissible. The Report presented by the Auditor shall be read at the next ensuing Anniversary Meeting.



JOURNAL

OF THE

CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

VOL. VII.—PART IV.

1920

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CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.


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OFFICERS AND COUNCIL FOR 1920-1921.

LIST OF MEMBERS ELECTED SINCE MARCH 4, 1920.

PUBLISHED BY
THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY
74, GROSVENOR STREET, W. 1.



THE NINETEENTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

THE anniversary meeting of the Central Asian Society was held at 74, Grosvenor Street, London, W., on Wednesday, June 23, 1920, when there was a large attendance of members and friends. The Right Hon. Lord Carnock, G.C.B., etc., Chairman of Council, presided.

THE CHAIRMAN said that this being the annual meeting, in which the Council had to present the report and accounts for the past year, he would open the proceedings by asking the Hon. Secretary to read the report.

THE HON. SECRETARY (Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate) then read the Report of the Council for 1920.

Since the Annual General Meeting of June, 1919, our Society has had to change its premises. The helping hand which the Royal Asiatic Society has held out to us ever since our inauguration in 1901 has been again extended to us, and it must not be forgotten that both the Royal Society and the Royal Astronomical Society placed their lecture halls at our disposal in December, January, and February last. During all this difficult time Miss Phillips, our Assistant Secretary, kept everything going; and when it is borne in mind that during the last eight months the membership of this Society has been increased by about 70 per cent., which means a great deal of additional work, perhaps the Society will be able in a measure to realize the gratitude that is due to Miss Phillips.

Most people know that the cost of paper and printing and publishing has trebled, if not quadrupled, during the past twelve months. This fact being borne in mind, this Society has every reason to be proud of the way in which it has continued to maintain its *Journal*. The activity of the propaganda set on foot by the Council since January, 1919, accounts for this. In this both the R.G.S. and the R.A.S. have helped us, and among our new members we count alike men whose fame is made and men whose fame is yet to make. The old school of "Central Asians" know quite well that a new era has commenced, and welcome to their ranks the younger generation, who have problems to face which differ essentially from those which were the framework of what was known for a good half century as the "Central Asian Question." It has been the custom hitherto to read out the list of those who year by year have joined the Society, but on

the present occasion I will merely mention that among the ninety odd new members of 1919-20 are Lady Trotter, Lady Macgregor, the Maharaja of Burdwan, Sir Richard Dane, General Sir Reginald Wingate, Major Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, the Civil Commissioner of Mesopotamia, Colonel Sir A. T. Wilson, Lieut.-General Sir Alexander Cobbe, V.C., Brig.-General E. W. Costello, V.C., General Sir Leslie Rundle, Colonel Sir Richard Temple, Sir Charles Marling, the Rev. W. A. Wigram, D.D., Brig.-General R. E. H. Dyer, and Major-General L. C. Dunsterville of "Dunsterforce" fame. We have in this large and influential accession of new members the material wherewith to carry on the work which the old Central Asian school initiated twenty years ago. Arabia, Mesopotamia, Persia, Afghanistan, Egypt, the Soudan, Palestine, Asia Minor, Turkestan, the Caucasus, the Levant, and the Balkans have all sent us their quota; and there is no better gauge of the renewed vitality of our Society than the fact that in the year before the Armistice four new members only joined against eight lost by death and resignation, whereas since the Armistice our numbers have been increased by 130.

The list of lectures for the session which ends to-day is as follows:

1. Ikbal Ali Shah, "Afghanistan," October 22, 1919.
2. Sir M. de Bunsen, Bart, P.C., G.C.M.G., etc., "New Levant Co," November 19, 1919.
3. Mr. Funduklian, "Armenia," December 17, 1919.
4. Mr. R. Michell, C.M.G., "Cyprus," January 21, 1920.
5. Captain E. H. Keeling, M.C., "Through Asia Minor in 1917," February 6, 1920.
6. Captain Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, M.P., "The Proposed New Department for dealing with British Interests and Responsibilities in the Middle and Near East," February 18, 1920.
7. Colonel the Hon. Dudley Carleton, "From the Adriatic to the Oxus," March 17, 1920.
- 7a. Sir W. M. Ramsay, *vice* Miss Louise Peralta, April 21, 1920.
8. Mr. E. H. Freshfield, "Old Fortifications of Constantinople," May 19, 1920.
9. Mr. H. St. J. Philby, C.I.E., "The Highways of Central Arabia," June 23, 1920.

The appreciation of these lectures must mainly rest with those who were able to come and listen to them, although most of them have also been read in the *Journal* by those who could not attend the lectures. Mr. Ikbal Ali Shah is, not improbably, the first Afghan who has ever lectured in London, and the interest of the audience was still further aroused when it became known that two Scotchmen, Sir Alexander McRobert and Sir Logie Watson, who had been in Kabul and had had interviews with the late Amir Habibullah Khan but a few months before his most regrettable assassination, were also present. Sir Maurice

de Bunsen fascinated us with his scholarly sketch of the old and new Levant Companies, and two ex-High Commissioners of Cyprus endorsed to the full Mr. Roland Michell's plea that Britain should not part with Cyprus. The conditions which attend its ultimate transfer to Greece are, as worded in the Peace Treaty with Turkey, such as may justify us in mentally postponing that transfer almost to the Greek Kalends. Captain Keeling's romantic story is still fresh in all our minds, and Captain Ormsby-Gore's advocacy of a New Middle Eastern Department of the Foreign Office has, as we learnt from *The Times* of June 7, not been long in bearing fruit. We may very well associate what we heard from Colonel Dudley Carleton and from Colonel Tod with the marvellous story of Lieut.-Colonel F. M. Bailey's adventures in Russian Turkestan between the autumn of 1918 and the spring of 1920. Just fifteen days ago I heard from Colonel Grey, the Consul-General at Mashhad, who was amongst us last January, that some three months ago his and Colonel Bailey's "motor-cars crossed a few miles south of Birjand. They stopped and had half an hour's conversation." Colonel Bailey's mother very kindly sent me early intelligence of her son's safe arrival in Persian territory, and also some details of the devices by which he concealed his identity and finally accomplished his escape from Bolshevik territory. That information, however, I was enjoined not to publish.

Influenza deprived us of Miss Peralta's lecture (Sir W. M. Ramsay most kindly stepping into the breach), and Mr. Freshfield kept me on tenterhooks by camouflaging all his movements and finally landing in London on his return from the Near East a bare eighteen hours before he was due to lecture. However, he was up to time, and personally conducted us on a tour round the ancient walls of Constantinople, to recall which will always be a pleasure.

Mr. Philby addresses us this afternoon. One upon whom the Royal Geographical Society has conferred its Gold Medal needs no further tribute.

The Society's policy during the past twelve months has, in addition to gathering many good men from the Middle East into its fold, been to establish relations, firstly with the Universities of the British Isles, and secondly with the provinces of the Middle East. Cambridge, Oxford, and Edinburgh have formed small Societies for the discussion of Asiatic problems, and some members of each of these Universities have joined our Society. I have communicated also with Aberdeen, St. Andrews, and Sheffield, but not to my knowledge so far achieved anything. Mesopotamia has responded most promptly and effectively to our appeal, and Palestine and Egypt, will I trust, follow suit. This Society owes much to Lord Ronaldshay, and once again he, as Governor of Bengal, is spreading our propaganda in the province which he governs.

The affairs of the Society at this moment are fairly prospering. All we want is propaganda. We are not sufficiently known, and many even who know us do not seem to think of becoming members until they are invited to do so. I wish specially to mention Captain G. C. Stephenson for the success which has attended his invitations. Since I became Honorary Secretary I have pursued one uniform policy. When I am brought into touch with a person who obviously takes an intelligent interest in Asia and Asiatic affairs, I say to him, by letter or by word of mouth, "Will you join the Central Asian Society?" and about 80 per cent. of the people to whom I have said that, many of them being perfect strangers whose names I have just come across in the Press, have joined. Therefore to all my fellow-members I tender this gentle hint: "Go, and do thou likewise!" We shall then become a great Society and capable of doing efficiently the work which we regard as our privilege and duty.

The Council regrets to report the loss by death of Professor J. W. Neill, Mr. T. Hart-Davies, the Earl of Dartrey, and Captain H. F. D. Stirling. Lieut.-Colonel S. H. Godfrey resigned his membership, and the names of two other members have been struck off the list. This leaves a net gain for the year of eighty-eight members—a record.

The Society will, the Council feel sure, be pleased to learn that Lord Carnock has accepted the invitation to retain his Chairmanship for the year 1920-21. The following changes in the Council are recommended: Under Rule 13, Colonel Sir Thomas Holdich and Sir Valentine Chirol retire; the Council recommend the election of Colonel Sir Francis Younghusband and General Sir Edmund Barrow in their places. Brigadier-General A. C. Bailward, who intends to pass the coming winter out of England, has resigned the post of Honorary Treasurer. The Council recommend the election of Sir Edward Penton. They also recommend the re-election of Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate as Honorary Secretary for 1920-21. Under Rule 23 three Members of Council, Mr. Moon, Mr. Tucker, and Mr. Bennett retire. The Council recommend the re-election of Mr. Moon and Mr. Tucker, and the election of Mr. H. St. J. B. Philby in place of Mr. Bennett. To replace Sir F. Younghusband and Sir Edward Penton, the Council recommend Sir M. de Bunsen and General Sir Reginald Wingate.

The time seems to be approaching when we may look to forming a Library and also a collection of photographs and lantern slides. For the present we trust to the generosity of the members of the Society. At the end of this year our office-room will have to be furnished, and, in view of limited funds and high prices, that is a serious matter. Therefore, though the session of 1919-20 has seen progress, its close leaves us face to face with some anxieties, and at the root of them all lies "£. s. d."

The CHAIRMAN : Ladies and gentlemen, I think we have listened to an interesting and on the whole most encouraging report from Colonel Yate, and that we have every reason to hope that in time this Society will become a really thoroughly going concern. I am sure I am expressing the views of my colleagues on the Council, and also of the meeting here, when I say that we fully endorse the reference which Colonel Yate has made to the invaluable services of Miss Phillips. What Colonel Yate, however, naturally omitted was that the record increase of our members is almost—I might very nearly say entirely—due to his own indefatigable efforts. He has been unwearied in his search for new members, and his quest, as you will see from the data he has given you, has been most successful. Moreover, I should like to call the attention of the meeting to the fact that it is owing to his unbounded energy that we have been able to give so many interesting lectures, and are now fully engaged in arranging a programme for the next session. I think the Society really owes a great debt of gratitude to Colonel Yate, and I am very pleased to think that he has consented to continue as our Honorary Secretary for another year—of course subject to your approval. I think that the relations which he has established with the Universities in the United Kingdom and in what we term the Mid-Eastern Provinces are likely to bear fruit. We have already, as he mentioned, a very considerable number applying for membership from Baghdad and Mesopotamia ; I hope the Universities will also respond when this society becomes better known amongst them. I have now been asked by the Treasurer to refer to our accounts, as we are bound to submit them. You will find them in the JOURNAL, which was published the other day. I am not going into the accounts in detail ; but I would point out that the balance at the bank at the beginning of last year was £90, and the balance at the end of the year was £52—which shows a reduction of about £40. That is not quite so satisfactory as we should wish. I really wish to impress very strongly upon members kindly to do their very utmost amongst the circle of their friends and acquaintances to enlist as many members as they can. I should point out that the existence of this society depends very largely upon the JOURNALS and the lectures which it publishes. Of course non-resident members form a very large number of our members, and it is the only means they have of gaining any benefit from the Society. It is by the dissemination of our lectures that we have been able to secure a considerable number of recruits outside the United Kingdom. The cost of printing and of paper has become very largely increased, and, feeling as we do that it is essential to maintain the publication of the JOURNAL, the Council really had in contemplation at one moment whether it would not be necessary to ask the members to increase their subscriptions, so as to enable it to meet these heavy charges. We hope to be able to avoid that, and the

best means to avoid it is certainly to increase the number of our members and, if possible, establish for the coming year a record over the very satisfactory results of the last. I will now formally put to you the recommendations as to the Vice-Presidents. It is a little embarrassing for me to suggest anything concerning myself, but the Council has done me the honour of proposing me as your Chairman. I feel myself a very inadequate one, but, with your suffrages, I shall be encouraged with your permission to continue the office for one other year. Then I should like to propose that General Sir Edmund Barrow and Colonel Sir Francis Younghusband be elected Vice-Presidents and that Sir Edward Penton should replace General Bailward as Honorary Treasurer. Colonel Yate we have remaining on for another year as Honorary Secretary; and there are new Members of Council—subject to your consent—Mr. Philby, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, Mr. E. R. P. Moon, Mr. A. L. P. Tucker, and General Sir Reginald Wingate. I have heard from Sir Maurice de Bunsen that he would feel very pleased to join us—naturally subject to your approval—and I am still awaiting a reply from Sir Reginald Wingate. I hope you will agree to all these new nominations and elections. I do not know if anybody present would like to make any new nominations or ask any questions; I am sure we shall be very happy to do our best to answer them if any be put.

There were no other nominations or questions.

The CHAIRMAN: As nobody seems to have any other suggestion I will now call upon Mr. Philby to read the paper which he has promised. I do not think it is necessary for me to introduce Mr. Philby, as Colonel Yate has already informed you that he is one of our most distinguished travellers and was honoured by receiving the Gold Medal of the Royal Geographical Society.

Mr. H. St. J. B. PHILBY followed with a paper on "The Highways of Central Arabia."

I must start by disabusing you of the idea that the title of my address this afternoon has any very definite bearing on the subject I propose to discuss. Some months ago, when I was asked to select a title for my paper, my idea was to discuss some aspects of the economic and social conditions of Central Arabia, and to make the great highways of commerce and pilgrimage which traverse the desert in various directions as it were the framework of my picture. That picture, however, would inevitably in the circumstances have been more in the nature of a negative than a positive, for, when all is said and done, Arabian commerce is a negligible quantity.

After further consideration, therefore, it seemed to me that there was also a positive aspect of Arabia, which, difficult as the subject is to treat adequately in a short space of time, it seemed worth while to attempt to sketch, however roughly, more particularly in view of the

fact that Arabian affairs, or rather the affairs of the whole Middle East, are just now beginning to loom rather large in the public eye, and it seems to me exceedingly important that we should endeavour to view the Middle East as a whole, and to make clear in our own minds the links which connect the various parts of the huge area which makes up the Arab world.

Central Arabia must necessarily be my theme, but I wish you to regard it simply as a single unit of the much larger area of the Middle East, for whose wellbeing we are generally responsible, and for whose rescue from Turkish misgovernment and tyranny we may fairly claim the credit. Those of you who read the papers in these days must know that there is a widespread feeling that this country has not made, and is not making, the best of its great opportunities. That, of course, is a question on which, as a Government servant, I am not at liberty to express my personal opinion, but in any case my personal opinion is of no moment; what does matter is the collective opinion of a Society like this, whose rôle, as I conceive it, is not only to discuss questions of Asiatic politics, but to endeavour to formulate views on such questions with a view to influencing the policy of this country in relation to them. And, if I am not mistaken, this Society left little doubt as to what its opinion on the general question of the responsibilities of this country in the Middle East was when, four months ago, it acclaimed a very striking address on the subject by Captain Ormsby Gore. Much as I am in sympathy with the general tenor of that address, there are some points in it on which I join issue with its author, and those points appropriately enough concern one section of the Middle East of which he admitted having no personal knowledge—namely, Mesopotamia. I am very sorry that Captain Ormsby Gore is not present to-day, but he is doubtless engaged in another place in trying to influence the policy of this country in relation to the Middle East and Mesopotamia.

Now in talking of desert Arabia he could not have put the position more lucidly or more accurately than he did. "All the Bedouins want—the real Bedouins," he said, "is, of course, absolute independence. The proper policy is to allow them complete freedom." That seems to me a very sound view of the position.

In dealing with Syria he was equally happy. "The desire of most Arabs," he said, "is to be left alone to live their own lives in their own way as they have lived it for two thousand years. But among the settled and semi-settled tribes and townsmen of Eastern Syria . . . there is a real, new, national consciousness, and undoubtedly Damascus is the centre of this feeling. But now they fear that having fought against the Turk for their independence they will be subjected to European rule. That is a very genuine feeling, and though, for the moment, it is apparent that anti-French sentiment is the predominant feeling . . . there can be little doubt that if the British were in the

same position as the French, they would be equally strongly anti-British. They want independence—nothing more and nothing less." That view also seems to me very sound.

But when Captain Ormsby-Gore came to deal with Mesopotamia, it seemed to me that he allowed strategic and economic considerations to stifle his judgment. "In Mesopotamia," he said, "the Arab inhabitants are at present prepared to exchange masters; at present they have no desire for complete independence." With all due deference to Captain Ormsby-Gore, I submit that the people of Mesopotamia, the great bulk of them, have no desire to exchange masters. We must face the facts, and I would almost go to the length of saying that if they were given a free choice without prejudice, there would be a very substantial majority in favour of Turkish domination rather than British. But that is beside the point. What they want, like the people of Arabia and Syria, and want because they are Arabs, is complete independence, nothing more and nothing less, and that is exactly what the British Government promised them in the most unequivocal terms by joining with the French in the momentous proclamation of November, 1918. The terms of that proclamation have been somewhat overlooked by the public in the rush for oil which has been so prominent a feature of the last twelve months; but none the less that proclamation is the charter of Arab liberty in Mesopotamia as elsewhere. I was at Baghdad when it was published and had opportunities of ascertaining the very favourable impression it created. I was personally very glad of it, and from that moment I have looked forward with hope to the fulfilment of our promise. Surely we must now be almost on the threshold of its realization.

All this is by way of preamble to my theme, to which I will come without further delay. I merely wished to impress on you that, great as is the diversity of sentiment in various sections of the Arab world in regard to many matters—religion, politics, and the like—there is the completest unanimity in regard to one point, the passionate love of liberty, which is characteristic of the Bedouin stock to which not only the people of Syria, but the bulk of those of Mesopotamia, belong by origin. I have laid especial stress on Mesopotamia, because its rich alluvial plains, lying at the north-east extremity of the Arabian peninsula, constitute the terminus of the most important of the highways of Arabia—the great highway, not of commerce or pilgrimage, but of human migration, whose starting-point lies in the Yaman highlands at the south-west corner of the peninsula, and along which through all the ages has poured a stream of human traffic which is not yet spent. An Arab proverb says: "Yaman is the cradle and Iraq the grave of the Arab race." That saying will be seen to be as true in the future as it has been in the past, and in this connection I must refer once again to Captain Ormsby-Gore's address. In considering the strategic aspect of

Mesopotamia he had much to say about the Persian mountain barrier and its possibilities as a route of invasion, but he left out of account the long desert frontier towards Arabia, which after all has left a more permanent mark on the history of the country, in that over it have come those successive waves of Arab invaders—the last being in the early days of Islam, whose descendants now form the bulk of the population. Again, in considering the labour problem he failed to realize that when labour—agricultural labour—is wanted it must largely come whence it came before, across Arabia. It may be thought that I am unduly optimistic in expecting a sufficient access of labour to Mesopotamia from the depleted population of Arabia, but it must be remembered that that population has been depleted by two causes—war and infant mortality. The former it should be our rôle to check by a judicious use of our influence, and it should be borne in mind that now that modern weapons are in every man's hands war is not so popular as it used to be even in Arabia, while the possibility of checking it to a very great extent has been admirably demonstrated in the last twenty years by Ibn Saud, the present ruler of Central Arabia. To this I can testify from my own experience, for I have travelled over 3,000 miles in his territories, not without occasional alarms but without serious danger, and over many of these routes one could not have marched with any assurance twenty or even ten years ago. As regards infant mortality I made a rough calculation when I was in Arabia, that no fewer than 75 per cent. of the children born in the country die in the first few years of life. That, at any rate, would not be difficult to stop, though I greatly shocked the venerable Amir of Anaiza by making such a suggestion. Nevertheless, he agreed to my applying for a supply of vaccine for the use of his town, and I have no doubt that that supply has already saved some lives. Smallpox is the curse of desert Arabia, and carries off its children in thousands. Now if that percentage of infant deaths could be reduced to, say, 10 per cent. and the survivors cured of their desire to kill each other, the population of Arabia would in a very short time outgrow the capacity of the country to maintain it, and the surplus would be available to colonize Mesopotamia as rapidly as its development expands. That was what happened nearly two thousand years ago, when the bursting of the great dam at Marib in the Yaman threw the populous colonies of that province on to the desert with the alternatives of dying there or finding their way to Mesopotamia.

The path which they followed is the most romantic highway in the country, and is still the route by which the famous Yaman coffee percolates towards the centre of Arabia, where no self-respecting person will drink Indian or other imitations of that product if he can get the genuine article. We know it as Mocha coffee because it is shipped at Mocha, but the Arabs call it Barriyya, or that which comes across the desert.

Its starting-point in the Yaman may be taken to be the flourishing oasis of Najran, between which and the oasis of Wadi Dawasir, a caravan journey of six days, it has never been traversed by a European though we know that it lies for the most part over a desert with water at rare intervals. From the latter point I have followed it northward to the two great towns of the Qasim, Anaiza and Buraida, a distance of some 500 miles, whence it radiates in many directions to the great commercial centres of the Middle East—to Basra and Lower Mesopotamia, to Baghdad and Babylonia, to Damascus and Syria, and to Egypt. These radiations, with the tracks leading from the Qasim to Kuwait on the one side and to Mecca and Madina on the other, constitute also the modern commercial highways of Arabia, whose commercial centre is without doubt the great towns of the Qasim. In every one of the towns and countries I have named—to say nothing of Bombay and Karachi—you will find agents or partners of the great trading houses of Anaiza and Buraida, but in those two towns you will not find a single foreigner. The trade of Central Arabia is a trade of a very special nature, and the Arabs themselves have an uncontested monopoly of it.

But for the moment I am concerned rather with the historical than the economic aspect of this great highway, whose stages I now propose to discuss briefly, showing you, as occasion offers, photographs of some of the places I have to mention.

In former times—two thousand years ago or more—Arabia was not as barren and desolate as it is now, and its most fertile and prosperous portion was the south-western corner, which comprises the uplands of Yaman and Hadhramaut, the once famous Spicelands of Arabia. Much of that area now lies under the southern and western extremities of that vast waterless sand desert known to us as the Empty Quarter; and when I was in Southern Najd I was informed that in that desolate wilderness there may still be seen the ruinous remnants of two settlements which were once great cities—Jafura and Wabar. We may conjecture that those cities lay on the caravan route leading from the Spicelands to the ancient port of Gerra, which ceased to exist when the Empty Quarter became empty, and has since been replaced in the greatly reduced trade between Central Arabia and Bahrain by the pretty seaport of Uqair, a short distance farther north, whose name alone recalls the flourishing earlier settlement, whose trade routes reached not only to the Spicelands but to Egypt itself, via the city of Petra. The present desolation of Arabia covers the record of a prosperous past, and though doubtless the greater part of that prosperity is gone for ever, there is every reason to suppose that a considerable part of it could be restored under existing conditions by European science.

From Yaman, on the one hand, to Mesopotamia and Syria, on the other, we may at the present day read in the oasis settlements of

desert Arabia the record of the migrations which resulted from the declining prosperity of the Spicelands. Stratum by stratum the history of those migrations is exposed to our view almost with the precision of a geological record, and as an example of this I may quote the greatest and noblest of all the Arab tribes, the tribe of Anaza, whose tribal home at the present time is the Syrian Hamad, the hard desert of Northern Arabia, extending from Mesopotamia to Palestine and Northern Hijaz, but whose remnants, deposited in the backwaters of the human stream in the course of their northward progress, can be traced on the ground as far south as the province of Aflaj and in legend farther still to the Yamen itself. The tribe of Anaza is the leaven which has leavened the whole lump of Arabian society, and its importance in the Arabian scheme may be best realized by the reflection that of the five great independent rulers whose sway covers by far the greatest part of the Arabian peninsula no fewer than four are of Anaza extraction. The greatest of these is the Saud dynasty of Riyadh, the others are the dynasties which rule Jaufr in the far north, and Kuwait and Bahrain on the extreme east. The fifth, of course, is the Rashid dynasty of Hail, which is of different stock, but until comparatively recently owed allegiance to Ibn Saud. As you know, the last reigning Ibn Rashid was murdered only a short time ago, and there seems to be some doubt whether he has been succeeded by one of his own house or not. If not Hail may well return before long to its old allegiance.

Just as the Anaza are one of the oldest and most widespread tribal elements in Arabia, so one of the youngest is the tribe of Dawasir, who are shown in Ptolemy's map of Arabia as still occupying at that time the country round Najran, which we may take to have been their starting-point when they found it necessary to migrate. The Anaza must have had a long start of them, for they had already been driven out of the Wadi to the northward by a tribal group which is difficult to identify with any of the modern tribes and may have been aboriginal, very much as the Bani Tamim and Bani Hanifa seem to have been in the northern provinces. This group, known in tradition by the name Abat Dawasir, or ancestors of the Dawasir, still survives in a few colonies in the Wadi, though they have lost their once dominant position to the Dawasir, whom in a moment of evil inspiration they welcomed as homeless wanderers and allowed to settle as their guests. The simplest stratum of the Arab tribal system is therefore to be found in the province of Wadi Dawasir, where remnants of a possibly aboriginal stock survive side by side with the latest invaders, the Dawasir. There is also a third element in this tract, perhaps one of the most interesting elements in Arabian society; it percolates without a break right through the peninsula up to Hail and Jaufr, and wherever it is found it occupies and is quite satisfied with a subordinate

position in the social scale. Its density decreases in proportion as we proceed northwards, and it is found in its greatest numbers in Wadi Dawasir and Aflaj. That element is a negroid element emanating from Africa; they crossed the Red Sea, not as slaves, but as conquerors, at the time of the Abyssinian invasion which preceded the birth of Islam; and they have been impelled across the peninsula very much like their Arab predecessors. Though not organized as a tribe they are known as Bani Khadhir to distinguish them from the pure Arabs, on the one hand, and the negro slaves, on the other. Their strong point is agriculture, and the Bedouin Arab, regarding camel breeding alone as fit occupation for a real gentleman, and sheep breeding as suitable for those who do not quite aspire to be in the first flight, is very glad to leave agricultural pursuits, which he regards as seriously derogatory to his dignity, to the negroid element, which is therefore generally to be found in the position of occupancy tenants of lands of which the Badawin are the acknowledged proprietors. I exclude various negroid settlements, such as Khaibar, along the eastern fringe of the Hijaz, from the scope of this survey, as they possibly do not emanate from the Yaman stream, but in all probability are direct immigrants from the African coast opposite Mecca and Madina.

While on this subject I would like to say a few words about slavery and the slaves. The League of Nations Covenant, as you know, contains a clause binding the signatory nations to do all in their power to put a stop to slavery. It would be interesting to know what the effect of this clause has been or will be—interesting because one of the signatories is Great Britain, which effectively commands the routes by which slaves come from their distant homes in Central Africa across the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the ports—Port Sudan and Suakin—whence they are shipped to the Arabian coast, while another of the signatories is the King of the Hijaz, whose capital is Mecca, perhaps the biggest slave market in the world. The Arabs, of course, have no such rooted prejudice against slavery as we profess to have, and for a very good reason. They treat their slaves at least as well as their camels, and that is saying a very great deal, while in the days when European planters had gangs of slaves to work for them I believe the treatment they gave them was shocking. As for the moral aspect of slavery, there are two points of view from which it must be regarded. In Arabia itself, as I have said, slaves form a recognized element in the population and are exceedingly well treated. I had many slaves in attendance on me during my stay in that country, and their testimony was unanimously enthusiastic. In Riyadh, there are about sixty or seventy of them, mostly in the palace service; they have plenty of food, adequate accommodation, good clothes and plenty of money; in all these things they contrast strangely with the majority of Arabs, who, noble and free as they are, are always hungry and needy. Moreover they are provided with

wives when female slaves are available; in a word they are exceedingly happy, and would certainly not elect to go home if they could.

The other side of the shield is dark enough—the African side, where young children, boys and girls, left by careless parents to watch their flocks in the pastures, are filched away by the slave-merchants and hurried across the African continent, journeying for months until they come to the Sudan and are shipped across the Red Sea. Of that side of the shield I know but little, but the worst part of the business is the mortality it involves, for of the children thus stolen only a small percentage reaches the coast of Arabia to enjoy the happiness I have described. That part is very bad, and it seems to me very surprising that it is allowed to go on in a country like the Sudan. It will be interesting to see whether the King of the Hijaz and Great Britain will now, in consequence of the Peace Treaty, take serious steps to put down slavery altogether.

Now I must return to the highway. The next stage northward of the Wadi Dawasir oases is the Aflaj province, perhaps the most remarkable province of Central Arabia, a province which contains more water than the whole of the rest of Arabia together, and in which we may still study those early struggles of humanity to terminate their wanderings in the desert. The lowest stratum of which we have the record here is one that has vanished altogether, leaving only material remains by which posterity may judge of the standard of civilization attained by it. The intricate and elaborate irrigation system built up on the basis of the great natural reservoirs of this district, the so-called bottomless pools, one of which is a small lake and probably the most extensive sheet of water in Arabia, and the ruins of their cemeteries, point to the conclusion that this early stratum of the population was not of Arab origin at all. A chain of evidence, by no means as complete as we could wish, but suggestive enough, connects it with the shores of the Persian Gulf, and we may for the time being assume that these first inhabitants of the Aflaj came from Persia or some country near it. When or how they disappeared we have no means of judging, but the next human stratum above them is the Anaza, of whom scattered remnants still hold out in some of the oases side by side with the element which overwhelmed them, the Dawasir, who occupy by far the greater part of the province.

But those who know anything about the tribal system of Arabia may object that I have so far conveyed the impression that the only tribes who count in Arabia are the Dawasir and the Anaza and the negroids. A study of Wadi Dawasir and Sulaiyil might very well leave one with that impression, but it is in the Aflaj that we begin to find a more correct idea of things, for, apart from the old Persian element which has vanished, the Anaza, who turned them out, and the Dawasir, who eventually dominated and still dominate the whole province, we

find traces of several of the other great tribes. On either side of the channel which is dotted with the Dawasir settlements we find parallel streams, starting from the highlands of the Yaman and trending north-eastward. One of those streams had its source in the Yam tribes who still occupy Najran, while the other is represented by the Qahtan, whose base is still in the upland valleys of Tathlith and Bisha. Yet another stream is that of the twin tribes of Subai and Suhul, starting from Ranya, north of Bisha, and, yet another, the Ataiba, starting from a point still farther north in the mountains of Taif and Mecca. An interesting point about all these tribes is that all of them, unlike the Anaza and Dawasir, are still to be found in part in their original homelands, and that none of them has made as much progress towards their ultimate goal, the cultivated lands of Syria and Mesopotamia, as the Anaza and Dawasir. The natural inference is either that they started later or that they proved to be weaker than their rivals for the possession of the land.

I will first try to dispose of the Yam tribes, because the path of their migration lies wholly south of the Dawasir route. Though they are at the present day in undisputed possession of the great and fertile oasis of Najran, their original homeland, they never seem to have been strong enough to establish themselves in the oases of the interior on any considerable scale in face of the rivals with whom they came in contact. They must have gained a temporary footing on the great lake of the Aflaj province, for tradition credits the Murra tribe, a branch of the Yam, with the construction of an aqueduct, whose remnants are still to be seen, for the purpose of providing water for their main body, which was encamped during the struggle at a distance of several days' journey in the great desert. But that is about as much as they achieved here, and it is not till we get to the next province northward, the Kharj, that we find scattered settlements of this tribe, which succeeded in obtaining a permanent footing side by side with the Dawasir and other elements. For the most part the Yam tribes were continually edged out into the desert by the more powerful Dawasir. No Arab tribe envies the Murra their long undisturbed title of lords of the Empty Quarter, where they eke out a picturesque but precarious existence, retaining to this day something of the practices of their ancient pagan ancestors. Their marriage ceremony is a case in point, for, according to one of them who accompanied me on my excursion to these southern provinces, the prospective bridegroom and bride have only to walk several times round a stick set in the ground, each holding it with one hand and repeating a simple formula as they go round, to become husband and wife. They are the great camel breeders of Arabia; milk and the products of the chase are their sole sustenance. Some of you may have seen a specimen of the animals they hunt which has recently been deposited in the Zoo—an oryx, which is an interesting

acquisition in that it is certainly the first living creature which has ever been brought to Europe from the Empty Quarter.

Akin to the Murra are the Ajman, another branch, perhaps the premier branch, of the Yam tribes; it must have been the first to migrate from its home, for they have not only left traces of themselves in the settlements of the Hasa district, but, wandering farther north in their Badawin capacity, have reached as far as the marches of Kuwait and even Basra. This tribe has an intimate and somewhat sinister connection with the history of the Saud dynasty. The great Faisal Ibn Saud, who ruled Najd in the 'fifties and 'sixties of last century, took one of their girls to wife, and by her left a younger son, who not only challenged his elder brother's right to the throne and wrecked the throne itself in the process, but left numerous offspring to be a perpetual thorn in the side of the ruling branch. Every subsequent pretender to the throne of Najd has had the Ajman tribe solid at his back, and has had the mortification of realizing that, if the original pretender had not quarrelled with his elder brother, the latter's death without offspring would have left his line natural heirs to the throne. The present ruler belongs to a yet younger branch, but occupies the throne in virtue of having recovered it from a foreign usurper, Ibn Rashid, whose temporary usurpation was the direct result of the actions of the first pretender. The Ajman tribe is not yet reconciled to its position, and there is still blood between it and Ibn Saud, who has not yet avenged the death of his favourite brother at its hands in 1916, but Ibn Saud is clearly in a winning position.

The main point to note about these sections of the Yam tribes is that, though their advance guard has reached almost to the gates of Mesopotamia, their ultimate goal, theirs has been a desert journey all the way, their line of march lying southward of the direct line in a wide curve. It is far from unlikely that if Mesopotamia requires an immediate accession of cultivators these Ajman nomads, rebellious towards their ruler and weary of their desert life, will be the first candidates in the field, and they are of a good stout fighting stock.

It is not only, however, on the south of their route that the Dawasir have had to contend with rivals, for relics of the Qahtan tribe in the Aflaj province show that they had to eject an older group of settlers on that side, but the mention of the Qahtan here anticipates the course of history, and I must take you to the more northerly province of Kharj, where the ethnological record is easier to read; but I must also take you westward to the Najd highland country and nearly to the frontier of the Hijaz. In Kharj, by the side of a group of bottomless reservoirs like those of the Aflaj, we again find the remnants of an old and foreign type of civilization, which we may take to be of Persian origin. No human relic of that period survives, but we now come into contact for the first time with what looks like an aboriginal tribe of

Central Arabia, the Bani Tamim and Bani Hanifa, who have lived, at any rate as far back as we can go in the history of the country, in the many flourishing oasis settlements of the great gorges of the Tuwaiq plateau and in the valley of Wadi Hanifa. One or other of those settlements was at various times, in medieval days, the capital of the great Central Arabian kingdom of Yamama, the bulk of whose inhabitants were of the Bani Tamim and Bani Hanifa. There is sufficient evidence, I think, to warrant the conclusion that these tribes had lost, if they ever had, their nomadic character, and were already settled down to agriculture and commerce long before the birth of Islam. They were then, as they are now, sturdy yeoman farmers, who, in the seclusion of their upland settlements, developed on different lines to the nomad tribes, whose rules of honour and hospitality they do not recognize. They have always provided the best fighting material in Arabia, largely, no doubt, owing to the fact that they have everything to lose by running away, while the true Badawin run away as a matter of course when the odds are against them, partly because they have nothing to lose by doing so and partly owing to their uncontrollable desire to live to fight another day. The difference, in a nutshell, between the settled and nomad elements of Arabia is that the latter love fighting and fight but poorly, while the former fight only when they must and fight to the death. The strongholds of these settled elements were formerly the neighbourhood of Ghat Ghat, west of the Tuwaiq barrier, the oasis of Hariq on the uplands of Tuwaiq and the Wadi Hanifa valley, but a study of the present composition of the population of these tracts shows that at one time or another the Bani Tamim have been subjected to powerful attacks from various quarters, and that, though they still exist as a powerful unit, they have lost much ground of which they were formerly undisputed masters. I have already mentioned the intrusion of Murra elements into the settlements of Kharj from the south. I now turn to the west, whence came the hardest blows against the existence of these old-settled folk.

The desert westward of Tuwaiq, extending for nearly 300 miles to the Hijaz border was first occupied by the once powerful but now much reduced tribal confederacy of the Subai and Suhul, who were based on Ranya and Khurma in the west and still hold out in those tracts. Their desert settlements may still be traced by human relics in the Najd highlands, while a very considerable proportion of these tribes is now to be found eastward of Tuwaiq in Wadi Hanifa, and in the eastern desert almost to the borders of the Hasa. Their present distribution is the result of attacks made on them in their homelands by the Qahtan and Ataiba tribes, migrating eastward in proportion as their numbers outgrew the natural resources of the Asir and Hijaz mountains.

It seems probable that these migrations began some time after the

Anaza migration was in full swing. A fearful state of anarchy must have reigned in desert Arabia when that race for cultivable lands was being run. The Qahtan and Ataiba pushed eastwards side by side and were continually engaged in fighting each other for the possession of the settlements of the Subai and Suhul, whom they displaced. The Subai and Suhul managed to ward off these attacks in Ranya and Khurma, where their strength was greatest, but further east in the Najd highlands yielded step by step to the invaders, and eventually found themselves between the devil and the deep sea. Fighting rear-guard actions against the Qahtan and Ataiba they found the Bani Tamim and Anaza in front of them, contesting their advance. In the meantime the Anaza, pushed on by the Dawasir from behind, had attacked the Bani Tamim in Hariq, and the latter had moved down the valley to found their impregnable city of Hanta, where they have remained ever since. The Subai and Suhul then gained a footing side by side with the Anaza at Hariq, and standing at bay at the edge of the eastern desert, managed to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with the populations already in possession in Wadi Hanifa and the Kharj. The oasis of Hair in the former is the centre of their eastern section and quite recently they have planted another colony in Kharj at Dhabaa. The Qahtan, pursuing hotfoot upon their traces, were brought almost to a standstill in the Kharj and Wadi Hanifa, with the result that they had to be content with consolidating their gains in the west, and with such vacant spaces as they could find in the more easterly tracts, while the Ataiba, warded off by them to the northward and pursuing another branch of the Subai, found their progress eastward checked by the barrier of Tuwaiq and its sturdy warriors and eased off northwards towards the Qasim, where they came in contact with the Anaza, who had by then reached and founded the oasis of Anaiza.

In Kharj and the surrounding districts we find, therefore, the early traces of practically all the important tribes of modern Arabia—except the northern tribes of Harb, Mutair, and Shammar, whose course towards Mesopotamia was from westward and of whom I need not now speak—and we find them here in contact with what appears to be a settled and more or less settled aboriginal population of Bani Tamim.

Up to this point I have attempted to distinguish the various strands of migration from their sources in the western and south-western mountains of Hijaz, Asir, and Yaman. The province of Kharj represents, as it were, the point of their confluence just as it is from the geographical point of view the nodal point of the great drainage arteries of Central Arabia. Just as those arteries collect at the extreme point of this district to flow out eastward by the single channel of Sahaba towards the Persian Gulf, so do the human streams merge here in a common channel on their way through the northern provinces to their eventual goal in the fertile lands of Syria and Mesopotamia.

In all the cases northward of this point, that is to say from Riyadh to the Qasim inclusive, it is indeed possible to diagnose the constitution of their populations, tribe by tribe, but for all practical purposes they have sunk their differences in the realization of a communal existence, and henceforward the communities of Central Arabia, hitherto tribes struggling with each for the right to live, must be regarded not as a congeries of tribes, but, as it were, as a tribal conglomerate moving no longer in parallel or converging streams, but in a broad, steady, flowing channel to its predestined goal, and we turn with relief from the study of perpetual petty warfare to that of the development of the communal idea by way of preparation for the new existence which awaits the Arab race when it at last reaches the Mesopotamian flats.

Hauta, the Bani Tamim city, Hariq, its Anaza counterpart, and Dilam, the most northerly purely Dawasir settlement, lie nearly in a straight line marking the northerly limit of homogeneous tribal townships. Northward of that line Riyadh, Daraiyya, and Ghat Ghat, form the southern boundary of heterogeneous communities, and represent the most primitive stage of real communal life in Arabia. The transition from tribal to communal settlements is abrupt and well marked, and from this line northwards the communities we find show a steady development in the direction best suited to fit the Arab race for the agricultural and commercial pursuits which await them at the end of their journey.

Time does not permit of a detailed description of the stages of that development, and I must pass over them without comment, as I have not been able to have slides prepared from my photographs taken during my journey in August, 1918, through the provinces of Mahmal, Washm, Sirr, Mudhnib, and Qasim, with Ibn Saud and his Wahhabi army destined for an attack on Hail.

Riyadh is, as I have said, a primitive type of communal settlement. Prince and priest here perform the functions relegated by custom to the patriarchal heads of tribes; the community has little or no voice in the administration. Badawin ideas of hospitality still prevail and, not unnaturally in a city where free meals are provided for all visitors from the palace kitchen, commerce is stagnant.

The next important town northward is Shaqra, the capital of Washm, whose development is intermediate between that of Riyadh and of the Qasim towns. Commerce is fairly brisk and the local administration is in the hands partly of merchant princes and partly of representatives of the central government. Life is less severe than in puritan Riyadh; prayers are not quite so regular.

And finally we come to the Qasim, where the two great towns of Anaiza and Buraida represent the climax of communal development on purely Arab lines—that is to say, of Arab development untainted by the foreign influences which have been brought to bear on Arab

immigrants into Syria and Mesopotamia. This was the end towards which the old tribes of the Yaman set out perhaps 2,000 years ago. The tribal jealousies have merged completely in a universal recognition of the superiority of the common weal; prosperity has taken the place of the eternal poverty of the Badawin; and the fanaticism, which alone served to weld the many strands of nomad humanity into some sort of unity at Riyadh, has disappeared from the scene and has been replaced by ideals of comfort and tolerance. Commerce is the mainstay of these towns and is well developed. No one who has been much in Arabia can fail to realize at first sight the fundamental difference between the Qasim towns and the tribes and settlements of Najd. I have endeavoured to-day to show that the results achieved in the Qasim are but the natural outcome of those wanderings in the desert on which the once settled Arabs of the Yaman embarked long ago. Through a terrible ordeal of fire they have fought to a very creditable achievement, and that achievement is and can only be due to that principle of progress which underlies all nature—the principle of evolution—which impels all living creatures to perfect themselves by way of preparation for another sphere of action. Yaman is the cradle and Mesopotamia is the grave of the Arabs. That is indeed a true proverb, but the Qasim should not be forgotten, for the Qasim represents the prime of the Arab race; from it they go down to their racial grave to be corrupted by the worms of foreign influence but that is after all a natural end, and towards it they will ever be impelled to fulfil their rôle in this world.

For us it is exceedingly important to realize that the Arab population of Mesopotamia and Syria is the direct outcome of the converging and subsequent remoulding in the deserts of Arabia of the various strands of Arab migrations which I have attempted to sketch, and that, that being so, we can only expect to find in Syria and Mesopotamia a continuation of the main characteristics of the Arab tribes which form their population. One characteristic, as I have already indicated, is common to all the tribes—the love of liberty—and that is a factor which we must take into account in any attempt to solve the problem of the Near East, including Mesopotamia.

The CHAIRMAN: I think at this late hour all that will be necessary is for me to convey the best thanks of this meeting to Mr. Philby for his interesting lecture.

This terminated the proceedings.

OBITUARY.

MR. T. HART-DAVIES.

It was my good fortune during my twenty-six years' service in India to be constantly brought into touch with Mr. T. Hart-Davies in Sind, in which province our lines were laid. I cannot do better than quote here the tribute paid to him in *The Times* of January 9, 1920. This, as far as it goes, is quite true to life. It runs thus :

"MR. T. HART-DAVIES.

"Mr. Thomas Hart-Davies, formerly Liberal M.P. for North Hackney, died at Jersey on January 3, aged 73.

"A son of the late Archdeacon Hart-Davies, he was educated at Marlborough and Pembroke College, Oxford, where he was an exhibitioner. Passing the I.C.S. examination of 1867, he served for 28 years in the Bombay Presidency, chiefly in Sind, where he was successively education inspector, manager of encumbered estates, district magistrate, Judge of the Karachi District, and Acting Judicial Commissioner. He unsuccessfully contested Rotherhithe in 1900, but in 1906, at North Hackney, was one of half-a-dozen retired Indian civil servants to enter Parliament on the flowing tide of the Liberal revival.

"Mr. Hart-Davies was progressive in his views of Indian administration. He joined the British Committee of the Indian National Congress, and supported the Morley-Minto reforms. A poor speaker, diffident in manner, he made no marked impression in the House of Commons, and few of his colleagues came to know how many-sided were his gifts. He lost his seat at the General Election of January, 1910.

"Long furloughs from India and bachelor freedom had enabled him to travel widely. He had been round the world at least eight times, and knew well remote countries, such as Siberia, Persia, and the least accessible South American republics. A good linguist, he had translated works from Russian; the possessor of a dry humour, he had written readable short stories for magazines. He was fond of music, conjuring, fishing, and golf.

"In 1913 he married a daughter of Mr. George Boothby, R.N., and widow of Colonel G. B. Wauhope, of the Lancashire Fusiliers."

Strange to say, it omits all reference to "India in 1883," which Mr. Hart-Davies brought out in 1883—the cleverest thing he ever wrote,

and in its cleverness a mark of his genius. When he gave me a copy he told me that he had refused to let a second edition appear because the publishers had absorbed all the profits of the first. "Profiteering" is a windfall of the pagoda tree. When I saw that the author of "India in 1983" had joined the Indian National Congress and entered Parliament as a follower of Campbell-Bannerman and a sympathizer with the Morley-Minto Reforms, I confess that I was surprised. Mr. Hart-Davies translated Catullus—whether with success or not I cannot say. Of his translation of Reliaief's Voinarovski he gave me a copy. Voinarovski was a nephew of Mazeppa, and his aspirations to the dignity of "Hetman" ended in Siberia. Of Mr. Hart-Davies as a conjuror I have vivid recollections. If he was no orator in the House of Commons, his "patter" in his own drawing-room, when he was juggling with a pack of cards, was quite delightful. His talents were not those which conduct to high official employment.

A. C. YATE.

THE EARL OF DARTREY

THE death of the Earl of Dartrey took place on June 14 at Dartrey, Monaghan, at the age of seventy-eight. He succeeded his father, the first Earl, in 1897. As Lord Cremorne he represented Monaghan in the House of Commons from 1865 to 1868. He served in the Coldstream Guards, retiring as Lieutenant-Colonel in 1876.

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL FOR 1920-21

Hon. President:

THE RT. HON. EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON, P.C., K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.,
F.R.S., ETC.

Chairman of Council:

1920. THE RT. HON. LORD CARNOCK, P.C., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,
K.C.I.E.

Vice-Presidents:

1918. THE EARL OF RONALDSHAY, G.C.I.E.

1917. THE RT. HON. SIR MORTIMER DURAND, P.C., G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I.,
K.C.I.E.

1919. SIR FREDERIC FRYER, K.C.S.I.

1919. SIR EVAN JAMES, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

1920. LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.

1920. GENERAL SIR EDMUND BARROW, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.

Hon. Treasurer:

1920. SIR EDWARD PENTON, K.B.E.

Hon. Secretary:

1918. LIEUT.-COLONEL A. C. YATE.

Members of the Council:

1918. SIR HUGH BARNES, K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O.

1918. LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR A. H. MCMAHON, G.C.V.O., G.C.M.G., K.C.I.E.,
C.S.I., F.S.A.

1919. LIEUT.-COLONEL H. P. PICOT.

1919. COLONEL C. E. YATE, C.S.I., C.M.G., M.P., D.L.

1920. CAPTAIN THE HON. W. G. A. ORMSBY-GORE, M.P., D.L.

1920. H. ST. J. B. PHILBY, ESQ., C.I.E., I.C.S.

1920. E. R. P. MOON, ESQ.

1920. A. L. P. TUCKER, ESQ., C.I.E.

1920. THE RT. HON. SIR MAURICE W. E. DE BUNSEN, BART., P.C.,
G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., C.B.

1920. GENERAL SIR REGINALD WINGATE, BART., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., G.B.E.,
K.C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.L.

Assistant Secretary:

1917. MISS L. B. PHILLIPS.

OFFICES: 74, GROSVENOR ST., W. 1.

LIST OF MEMBERS ELECTED SINCE MARCH 4, 1920


1920. Allechin, Geoffrey C., Oxford and Cambridge Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
- „ Allen, William E. D., Common Wood, near Chipperfield, Herts.
- „ Ashton, Captain F. T., Glendower, Pinner, Middlesex.
- „ Ballard, Mrs. C. R., Hadham Mill, Much Hadham, Herts.
- „ Barstow, Captain Arthur E., M.C., 15th Sikhs, United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
- „ Beale, Charles Thomas, East India United Service Club, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
- „ Bros, Major Henry A. (R. of O.), Travellers' Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
- „ Buxton, Leland W. W., 45, Kensington Park Gardens, Ladbroke Grove, W.
- „ Carey, Lieut.-Colonel A. B., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.E., 52, The Close, Norwich.
- „ Carleton, Colonel the Hon. Dudley, 21, Upper Berkeley Street, W. 1.
- „ Cameron, Major G. S., M.C., Deputy-Director of Agriculture, Lower Bagdad, Mesopotamia.
- „ Childs, W. J., The Quadrangle, Foreign Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
- „ Chitty, Christopher, 2, East Heath Road, N.W. 3.
- „ Christie, Miss Ella R., F.R.G.S., Cowden Castle, Dollar, N.B.
- „ Cobbe, Lieut.-General Sir Alexander S., V.C., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O., 29, Kensington Square, W. 8.
- „ Costello, Brigadier-General E. W., V.C., C.M.G., D.S.O., 12, Cardinal Mansions, S.W. 1.
- „ Costello, Mrs. E. W., 12, Cardinal Mansions, S.W. 1.
- „ Chesney, G. M., 69, Courtfield Gardens, S.W. 5.
- „ Dunsterville, Colonel K. S., C.B., 12, Oakwood Court, Kensington, W. 14.
- „ Dunsterville, Major-General L. C., C.B., etc., Barham Lodge, Buckingham.
- „ Dyer, Brigadier-General R. E. H., 33, Clarges Street, W. 1.
- „ Empson, C., 1, Driffeld Terrace, The Mount, York.
- „ Fardell, Mrs. H. A., 16, Brechin Place, S.W. 7.
- „ Fitz Gibbon, Captain H. C. D., M.C., 13th Hussars, White's, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.
- „ Footman, David J., Lambourn, Berks.
- „ Forbes, Mrs. Muriel, Naval and Military Hotel, Harrington Road, S.W. 1.
- „ Fowle, Captain T. C. W., I.A., Junior Army and Navy Club, Horse Guards Avenue, S.W. 1.

1920. Fuller, Flight-Lieut. N. B., R.A.F., c/o Civil Commissioner, Bagdad.
- „ Garbett, Captain R. B. L., 40th Pathans, Civil Commission, Bagdad, Mesopotamia, c/o Eastern Bank, Crosby Square, E.C. 3.
- „ Gaster, Dr. M., 193, Maida Vale, W. 9.
- „ Griffin, Captain A. C., O.B.E., R.E., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
- „ Gorbold, Captain R., R.A.O.C., 17, Kingsthorpe Grove, Northampton.
- „ Gregson, Lieut.-Colonel E. G., C.M.G., C.I.E., Buncrana, Rake, Liss, Hants.
1919. Grey, Lieut.-Colonel W. G., Consul-General at Meshed, Persia.
1920. Grieve, Capt. A. McLeod, 3rd Black Watch, c/o Civil Commissioner, Bagdad, 21, Queen's Crescent, Edinburgh.
- „ Harley, Lieut. J. R. H., Highland Light Infantry, Brampton Bryan, Herefordshire.
- „ Kay, Professor D. M., Marine Hotel, St. Andrews, Fife, N.B.
- „ Kennedy-Craufurd-Stuart, Major Charles, D.S.O., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
- „ Longrigg, Major S. H., Political Officer, Kirkuk, Mesopotamia.
- „ Lowis, Lieut. H. R., I.A., c/o Civil Commissioner, Bagdad, Mesopotamia.
- „ Marling, Sir Charles, K.C.M.G., British Legation, Copenhagen.
- „ Macgregor, Lady, Hampton Court Palace, Hampton Court.
- „ Marrs, Major R., C.I.E., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W.
- „ Matthews, Captain L. S., 2nd Euphrates Levy, c/o Eastern Bank, Ltd., Bagdad.
- „ Mann, Captain J. S., A.P.O., Eastern Shamiyah, Umm al Ba'rur, Iraq, Mesopotamia.
- „ Monteath, David T., India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
- „ More, Major J. C., D.S.O., 51st Sikhs (F.F.), c/o Civil Commissioner, Bagdad.
- „ Murray, Major S. G. C., I.A., c/o Civil Commissioner, Bagdad.
- „ Napier, Major Alexander H., I.M.S., c/o Marshall, Jerne, N. Queensferry, N.B.
- „ Noone, H. V. V., c/o Messrs. R. G. Shaw and Co., Winchester House, Old Broad Street, E. C. 3.
- „ O'Connor, Captain K. K. O., M.C., 14th Sikhs, attached Political Dept., Mesopotamia.
- „ Parr, Robert, Black Birches, Hadnall, Shrewsbury.
- „ Perowne, Colonel J. T. Woolrych, 32, Lowndes Square, S.W. 1.
- „ Pickthall, Captain C. M., East India United Service Club, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
- „ Rundle, General Sir H. M. Leslie, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., etc., The Old Mill House, Hunton Bridge, Herts.


1920. Rynd, Major F. F., D.S.O., R.A., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
- " Simpson, John Alexander, India Office, Whitehall.
- " Skrine, Francis H., I.C.S. (retired), 147, Victoria Street, S.W. 1.
- " Slater, Captain A., I.A.R.O., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Indian Dept., Charing Cross.
- " Smith, A. A. F., Education Dept., Bagdad, Mesopotamia.
- " Stephenson, Captain G. C., 99, Inverness Terrace, W. 2.
- " Sykes, Lady, Sledmere, Malton.
- " Temple, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Richard, C.B., C.I.E., F.S.A., The Nash, Worcester.
- " Thomson, J. S., I.C.S., c/o The Commercial Bank of Scotland, 62, Lombard Street, E.C.
- " Tudor-Pole, Major W., 61, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.
- " Waller, Major A. G., I.A., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Indian Dept., Charing Cross.
- " Watson, Sir Logie P., c/o Cooper, Allen and Co., Cawnpore, India.
- " Webb-Ware, Lieut.-Colonel, C.I.E., F.R.G.S., Fort Anne Hotel, Douglas, Isle of Man.
- " Wilson, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Arnold, K.C.I.E., I.A., Acting Civil Commissioner, Bagdad.
- " Wilson, Major W. C. F., I.A., Mesopotamia Civil Service, c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
- " Wingate, General Sir Reginald, Bart., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., G.B.E., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., Knockenhair, Dunbar, N.B.
- " Wigram, Rev. Dr. W. A., Watling House, St. Albans.

To be elected at next Council:

1920. Buchanan, Sir George C., 16, Victoria Street, S.W. 1.
- " Douglas, Major-General J. A., C.M.G., C.I.E., 5, Hyde Park Chambers, Knightsbridge.
- " Forbes, Mrs. Rosita, 69, Curzon Street, W. 1.
- " Hendley, Major-General, M.B., c/o Mrs. Hendley, 5, St. Andrew's Mansions, Dorset Street, Baker Street.
- " Morison, Sir Theodore, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Overdale, Lindisfarne Road, Newcastle-on-Tyne.
- " Swettenham, Sir Frank A., G.C.M.G., C.H., 48, Seymour Street, W. 1.
- " Also eleven others proposed by H.E. the Earl of Ronaldshay, Governor of Bengal, and
- " Hunter-Weston, Lieut.-General Sir Aylmer, K.C.B., D.S.O., D.L., M.P., Hunterston, West Kilbride, Ayrshire.
- " Shakespear, Lieut.-Colonel John, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., 15, Alexandra Court, Maida Vale, W. 9.
- " Stewart, G., M.P., House of Commons, S.W. 1.



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
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NOTICE

In the leaflet explaining the constitution and aims of the Central Asian Society which was issued under the authority of the Council on July 1, 1920, it was suggested that the time had come "to lay the foundations of a library and a photographic collection." Since then gifts of books and one or two other objects of value and interest have been received. The Council now desire to invite members of the Society to contribute, as far as it lies in their power to do so, to the formation of a library and a collection of photographs and lantern slides. As is no doubt understood, the sphere of the Society is—except, possibly, in some special cases—limited to the Continent of Asia. The central subject of the Society's study is *the Middle East*, and it is essential to the Society's success that the literature of the Middle East should first and foremost be represented on its bookshelves. The Near and the Far Easts are the complements of the Middle. Contributions to all three sections will be cordially welcomed.

A. C. YATE, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL,
Hon. Sec. Central Asian Society.

74, GROSVENOR STREET, W.1,
November 24, 1920.

THE ANNUAL DINNER.

THE Annual Dinner of the Central Asian Society, interrupted by the war, was resumed on October 12, 1920, at the Imperial Restaurant, Regent Street, under the chairmanship of the President, Earl Curzon of Kedleston, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Lord Meston, as the guest of the Society, was on his right, and Lord Carnock, the Chairman of the Council, on his left.

The toast of the King having been honoured,

Sir ARTHUR HARDINGE proposed the toast of prosperity to the Central Asian Society, coupled with the name of the President. He said he was the latest recruit to the membership, his qualifications for which were not really considerable. Although he had spent a good deal of time in the Middle East in an official capacity, he could not claim a reputation as an explorer, geographer, or great writer upon this subject. But he realized how enormously important was the study of Central Asian and Middle Eastern problems—intervening as the countries concerned did between two other very distinct regions, the Nearer and the Farther East—from the standpoint of all Englishmen who had the interests of their country and the Empire at heart. The most interesting transitional region was that where the Buddhist and Mahomedan worlds met and intermingled, for our relations with it affected our policy in so many other parts of the globe. He was sure that the concentration of attention to those regions by so many persons who had experience and knowledge of them was of great value, and he attached particular importance to the fact that the Society had secured for its presidency the distinguished, celebrated, and justly admired administrator and statesman who was presiding that evening. (Cheers.) He supposed there was no one who occupied the first rank to-day in our public life with a name appealing more strongly to all concerned with the Middle East than that of Lord Curzon. It had been his good fortune to be associated with their President in some of his earlier explorations. When he (the speaker) was in St. Petersburg and their President a rising Member of Parliament, they travelled together in Central Asia to Samarkand and Bokhara and back. Subsequently they were associated together in more important and responsible, and also official, journeying. Their President had in the interval come to write not only the results of his observations in Central Asia, but also a great work on Persia which was accepted as the most exhaustive account of the past history, the geography,

and the existing political and economic conditions of that country. Many years later, when he himself was representing Great Britain in Persia, their distinguished President was Viceroy of India and had some authority over him, for the Legation at Teheran was then under what in more recent Indian phraseology was called a diarchy—a double government. It was under two heads—the Foreign Office in Whitehall and the Government of India at Simla or Calcutta. It was well, in these circumstances, that they had a Viceroy thoroughly familiar with Eastern problems. Russia was then very strong in Persia, and consequently held the Government of the Shah very much under its control. The British authorities were able to make advances through that excellent institution the Imperial Bank of Persia without running counter to the letter of the Russo-Persian Treaty, and thus our influence was maintained. It was his privilege to accompany Lord Curzon when as Viceroy he toured in the Persian Gulf and visited not only many places in South Persia, but also those little Eastern States, Muscat, Koweit, and Bahrein. The visit was of great advantage in cementing good relations with Persia. Through the war Great Britain had obtained an ascendancy in the historic region of Mesopotamia. That great region had become a field of considerable political and commercial British activity. He little realized when assisting in negotiating at Teheran a concession for the Persian oilfields how vast a commercial and industrial prospect that apparently insignificant arrangement was likely to open up. In linking the toast with the name of Lord Curzon, he could only say that his association with the Society was a pledge of the period of usefulness and prosperity which stretched before it in these days.

THE PRESIDENT, who was received with warm applause, said that Sir Arthur Hardinge was well qualified to propose the toast. As he had said, they were associated in the old days as travellers in Central Asia; they had been associated through their lives by close and intimate personal friendship, which the divergence of their public lives had not in the slightest degree shaken. Circumstances had brought them together on more than one occasion in connection with the affairs of the Middle East. As young men they had threaded together the bazaars of Bokhara and Samarkand, and visited those wonderful regions in Central Asia which had then been opened up for the first time by the Russian railways. At a later date he (the speaker) had the privilege of visiting in an official capacity the Persian Gulf in Sir Arthur's company. Having been connected with Persian affairs for the best part of thirty years, he could say that Great Britain never had a more vigorous or capable representative there than Sir Arthur Hardinge.

I regard this Society (continued Lord Curzon) with great interest

and peculiar affection. I do so because during the greater part of my life Central Asia has been my study: I might almost say, my hobby. Perhaps I am peculiarly fortunate in having had a great deal to do in an official capacity with countries which I studied long since as a traveller, little thinking, perhaps, that I should one day be called upon to bear any part in determining their future destinies. I think I was one of the earliest members of this Society. I recall an occasion when I had the honour of dining here as your guest in the early days of the Society, with a very distinguished and thoughtful man in the chair—the late Sir Edwin Collen. I remember sketching out some of the problems of Central Asia then awaiting development. I have forgotten what I then said, excepting that Central Asia was certain to be connected to an increasing degree in interests affecting the fate of the British Empire. History has shown that the anticipation was well founded. That will be clear to anyone who follows the published proceedings of this Society—a course I would advise to all who wish to seriously study Central Asia. I gladly accepted the great honour of your invitation to be your honorary President, not because I thought that in my very busy life I could render any great service, but because I regarded the invitation as a culminating point in my study of Central Asia. The Society, though it may not be very widely known, is carried on by men of distinction and ability; it discusses problems submitted by experts; and it fulfils a great public service in familiarizing that portion of the public which is interested in Asia with the history, traditions, and problems of its central areas. I hope this Society may long flourish, that its membership will increase, and that all its members will be duly impressed with the knowledge that its work is connected closely with problems vital to the future interest and development of the British Empire, and to the peace of the world.

In my early days Central Asia was a land of interest and romance. To it rare travellers penetrated, crossing mighty mountain ranges, meeting strange peoples, and encountering adventures. Such was its romantic and imaginative vesture. Its political significance at that time was small, except in so far as it provided a field for the forward energies of Russia. Thirty years ago it meant little except as a theatre of the rivalries of this country and Russia. If you look back to the writings of many of us twenty-five, thirty, and forty years ago, you will find that they were mainly directed to the problem of how we in India were to meet the advance of Russian authority in Asia.

All this is changed: the veils have been torn aside, the vast area affected has been exposed to the gaze of mankind; there are few geographical problems left to be solved, and few places left to be visited by the explorer. On the other hand, we have seen this great

block of territory drawn into the vortex of European politics, and some parts of it applying the most desperate experiments in the politics of modern democracy. Look at Central Asia as it is at the present moment. The Russian Empire, which most of us regarded twenty-five or thirty years ago with apprehension, has for the moment been obliterated from the scene. Tibet, which was then a *terra incognita* scarcely known to any European, has been penetrated not merely by our arms—which was a passing phase—but by our influence, which is likely to endure. Bokhara and Samarkand, two centres of mediæval romance, have been laid bare, and are at the present moment in the hands of the Bolshevik Government. China—a part of which at any rate is in Central Asia—has become a republic and is in the throes of a military crisis the upshot of which no man can foresee. To Persia and Mesopotamia I will allude presently. Afghanistan at the time to which I refer was more or less under the protection of Great Britain, but has now acquired something like independence, although I hope that it will not deviate, at any rate irremediably, from the alliance which has been of so much advantage to it in the past.

From this brief survey it is obvious that Central Asia has ceased to be a land of mystery and has become a land of acute political problems. All these areas are seething with agitation and burning to establish some new form of government, to break away from their old traditions, thus providing an entirely new set of problems to be solved by the statesmen of the future. The question which any British statesman has to put to himself is this: From what angle of vision ought these problems in their younger development to be viewed? I venture to think that the point of view is the same although the problems are different. In my studies of Central Asian politics I have always viewed them not so much from the standpoint of the traveller, the discoverer, the explorer, the lover of ancient history and remains, but from the point of view, on the one hand, of the security of India, and, on the other hand, of the gradual and peaceful development of the countries of the East. I suggest to you, in the changed circumstances with which we are confronted, that we cannot adopt a better guide than these old principles, and to bear in mind that the solution of these problems depends first and foremost, so far as we round these tables are concerned, on the security to the British Crown of that price of Empire, that secret of dominion, that core called India; and, secondly, how we can expedite the peaceful evolution of the countries of Central Asia to a happier state.

One principle I think we must admit without any difficulty or reluctance. Empire has had different connotations at different times in the world's history. Most of us here are Imperialists, but none

of us here is in favour of expansion for expansion's sake. Let us face the fact that the era of expansion of the British Empire in Central Asia is at an end, and that it is rightly at an end, and that our function in the future is not to absorb the inhabitants. It is true that our responsibilities have been added to as a result of the war, but this has not been by the expansion of territories under the Crown, but to give security to those we possess, and to arrange that the evolution of those countries to a higher state of things shall be easy, pacific, and honourable.

That is the conception of Central Asian policy I have in view. Starting from my pivotal principles, I hold that what we have to do is to try to make islets in the ocean, peaceful spaces in the chaos, landing-places in the storm; to elaborate palisades of stable and peaceful States round the fringes of India. It is for that object that I am working. Let us take a glance at the condition of this fringe.

I am glad to see Sir Francis Younghusband at this table. When he took his expedition to Lhasa we were freely denounced as buccaneers and dangerous Imperialists, forcing ourselves upon the modest and retiring Tibetan people. It was quite untrue, and I think one of the most remarkable things in Central Asian history in the last fifteen years has been this: that whereas we were supposed to enter Tibet as aggressors and enemies, there is no European people more warmly welcomed there than ourselves. The amicable relations maintained in the last fifteen years are entirely voluntary, and are largely the result of the spirit inculcated by Sir Francis Younghusband when he was in charge of the expedition to Lhasa.

Take Persia. Sir Arthur Hardinge has alluded to the circumstances which have drawn me into close association with the fortunes of Persia for the last thirty years; and for that country I can truly say I entertain the most profound interest and the most sincere respect. I think I have been—at least I have always tried to be—a good friend to Persia during all those years. It has not always been easy. These efforts culminated in the conclusion, rather more than a year ago, of what was called the Anglo-Persian Agreement, by which I hoped to regulate the future connection of Persia with ourselves, and to assure the integrity and independence of that important country in the Middle East. I have no greater desire than that the Agreement should be ratified by the Persian people and the Persian Parliament. For months I have been pressing that the Agreement should be submitted to them. If they choose to accept it (and I am bound to say that in their own interests they should do so), the best efforts of the British Government will be used to secure for Persia that chance of regeneration which the history of her people and the spirit of the country appear to justify.

If they reject our would-be support and advice, the responsibility will be upon them; but my conception of the Persia of the future is that of a sovereign and independent State, capable of retaining her independent existence in the world and sustaining the majestic traditions of her past, but at the same time relying for support on the only European Power which by virtue of her traditions and authority is in a position to afford it.

Take Mesopotamia. Does any man here, or any writer in the Press, really imagine that this Government or any British Government would have any particular interest in spending scores of millions of money in Mesopotamia or in keeping a large garrison in that country? What we did in Mesopotamia was to destroy the form of government that existed before the war. We left an aching void, a gap that had to be filled for the time being by ourselves, because there was no one else to fill it. No one has been a more consistent or sincere advocate throughout of setting up an Arab form of administration than I have been. A friend for whom I have the most intense regard and esteem, Sir Percy Cox, has now gone out to assist us in carrying out that purpose. It is not a question of painting the map of Mesopotamia red, but of obtaining a stable spot in the Middle East, and of redeeming the country from misrule and anarchy in the future. I hope we may succeed and have one more spot of tranquillity in this seething world of Central Asia.

Next take Arabia. Arabian ambitions and hopes have been largely aroused by the recent war. Arabian ambitions as against Turkish rule have been justly fomented. Great difficulties have occurred owing to the ambitions of other countries, and owing to apparently insoluble features of the problem. But I should bitterly regret if out of this welter there did not arise some form of Arabian unity worthy of the traditions of the past.

In Afghanistan, as I have said, there is serious trouble and commotion. We know very well from the evidence at our disposal that to no country in Central Asia have the Bolsheviks directed their gaze with greater hope and expectation of causing injury to us than upon Afghanistan. Some of these plots I have had occasion to expose to the public and the Press. My own feeling is that even in the changed circumstances the interests of that country and our own still remain identical. It would be a great misfortune for Afghanistan if she severed her historic connection with Great Britain, and we also shall suffer unless we maintain our traditional friendship with her. We want everywhere in Central Asia, so far as it rests with the Government here, to promote the peaceful development of the countries I have spoken of, and to encourage their gradual passage to more modern conceptions of life, together with freedom from the contagion of Bolshevik misgovernment and anarchy, which

will not only be injurious to the British Empire, but which will mean their ruin.

Do not let anyone suppose that our ~~work~~, the work of Englishmen in these countries, is over. I do not mean the ~~mere~~ work of the exploring traveller in climbing mountains and tracing rivers to their source, though that is a very honourable accomplishment. Our task is bigger and higher than that. The era of commotion and unrest in Central Asia has not subsided: it is only beginning. In Europe we have great difficulty in composing affairs: it may take years before the commotion subsides; but in Central Asia it will take at least a generation. I want the members of this Society, and especially the young and active members, to recognize that they have still a great part to play in the future of these countries. I hope the Society will regard itself as existing not only to read papers, examine problems, and display knowledge, but also as a Society which trains men and inspires men with the ardour and ambition to support the interests of our Empire in Central Asia, and to help its countries to a peaceful solution of the very intricate problems with which they are confronted. It has been a great pleasure to me to see some of the younger members of the Society justifying its existence by work of this kind. Lord Ronaldshay in Bengal, Sir George Lloyd in Bombay: these are men who have been brought up in the spirit and under the inspiration of this Society, and their careers provide an example and incentive to others. Long may this Society flourish to carry on the great work which assuredly lies before it.

The toast I have to propose is associated with the name of Lord Meston. His career in India, as is known to all present, has been one of singular distinction. There is hardly any position of great importance in the Indian Service that he has not filled. When we had the Imperial War Cabinet and Conference two years ago he was one of the representatives of India sent to London to support the interests of that great Dependency. Since then (I hope he will regard it as a compliment) he has been elevated, or at any rate removed, to the House to which we both belong, and already in that Assembly when he has spoken he has made a great impression by his sincerity and his power. The duty laid upon England in India is going to be more onerous than in the past, but I hope that no more in the future than in the past will its agents there fail in the devotion to duty and interest in the welfare of the people so consistently shown by the Indian Civil Service. (Cheers.)

LORD MESTON, replying to the toast, said that the kind references made to him by their President had covered him with confusion as so wholly undeserved. He was merely a very lucky, otherwise a very ordinary, member of a great public Service, a Service which was carrying, and had carried, the British flag in India through

good report and ill report, and had carried it high. He fully realized that it was in his capacity as a former member of that Service more than on account of any personal merits or good-fortune that they had done him this honour, but it enormously added to the gratitude it was his duty to express to them. The Indian Civil Service had been going through the crisis of its fate. It had enjoyed, and still enjoyed, the friendship and confidence of all that was best in India—of such men, for example, as their guest the Maharaj-Rana of Jhalawar; but on the other hand, from many to whom it might naturally have looked for encouragement and support it had met with much obloquy and misrepresentation. During the war it had passed through a period of isolation and stress, and it was now undergoing the deepest anxiety as regards its own future. In these circumstances the Indian Civil Service would be enormously appreciative of the message of sympathy and kindness sent it by proxy that night, and on behalf of his comrades in the Service he thanked them most earnestly and sincerely.

He would condense what he had to say of India into the two words "courage and confidence." Although it was confronting in the near future a strenuous and difficult time, a time equally difficult for Indian gentlemen themselves and for British officials in India, India could look with confidence to a greater and finer future. That in working toward that future the best type of Englishmen should have an influential share was the desire of all of them who had served, or were still serving, in India.

He wished to express on behalf of his fellow-guests the gratitude they felt for the splendid hospitality shown them, and still more for the pleasure and privilege given them of sitting under the banner of that eminent and learned Society. He could not help feeling how much Central Asia meant to the members and how little it meant to the average stay-at-home Englishman. He supposed it was a Palmerstonian tradition that so long and exclusively confined the interests of the ordinary intellectual Englishman to European politics; but even after that, when men began to talk about the Far East, the Near East, and the Middle East, how little they knew about that vast intermediate area—neither far, near, nor middle—which was the particular interest of the Society. The men of an earlier generation had heard of Marco Polo (though few of them had probably read him), of Chengis Khan, of Tamerlane, and of Firdusi and his great epic, but how little they knew of the ethnology, geography, or tortuous politics of countries like Mongolia. They knew something of India and Persia, but Samarkand and Bokhara were mere names to them. He did not pretend to any great antiquity, but he thought he remembered the discovery of Central Asia on the part of the British public. It dated from the publication of Frederic

Burnaby's "Ride to Khiva." Since then there had been a stream of exploration and of diligent research which their Society was doing so much to encourage and record. In this work many of their hosts that night had had an honourable share, as the names of Holdich, Younghusband, and later those of their distinguished President, of Littledale, Skrine, and others, reminded them. They had a writer the other day saying that the trouble with Persia was that she had a Constitution and did not know what to do with it. It seemed as if other countries of Central Asia had ancient Constitutions and did not know what to do with them; but one thing was probable: there could be little doubt that out of the present welter and chaos there would emerge the aggressive, incalculable spirit of Nationalism which had done so much in Asia to change their history and outlook. Thereby an immense burden would be thrown upon those who were responsible for the welfare and security of our great Indian Empire. There was a most vital connection between India and Central Asia. He did not suppose that in this country there was any historical figure whose name was such a household word as the name of Nadir Shah was on the lips of Indian peasants. Indeed, it was sometimes overdone. He had heard the illustrious President called by that name in Indian newspaper comment years ago on some question of policy, and in his own small way as a provincial ruler at a later date he also had been called a Nadir Shah. That conqueror was only one of many adventurers who descended from Central Asia in a long succession of invaders of the plains of India, and who were only stayed from continuing their depredations by the British becoming the trustees of the Indian Empire. It was in truth Central Asia which thrust India into the British Empire, and consequently the interests of India in Central Asia and its affairs were close and intimate. (Cheers.)

SOME MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE MESOPOTAMIA PROBLEM.

LECTURE BY CAPT. E. W. SHEPPARD, O.B.E., M.C.

THE 1920-1 Session of the Central Asian Society was inaugurated on the afternoon of Thursday, October 21, 1920, at the Rooms, 74, Grosvenor Street, London; W.1, by a lecture on "Some Military Aspects of the Mesopotamia Problem," by Captain E. W. Sheppard, O.B.E., M.C. The Right Hon. Lord Carnock, P.C., G.C.B., Chairman of the Society, presided.

The CHAIRMAN, at the outset of the proceedings, remarked that that afternoon the Society was opening its Lecture Season for 1920-1, and he did not think they could inaugurate it more auspiciously than by the paper which Captain Sheppard had kindly consented to read to them on "Some Military Aspects of the Mesopotamia Problem," as Mesopotamia was at that moment occupying a good deal of attention and engaging a certain amount of public criticism. He was sure they would listen with great interest to the observations which Captain Sheppard would make.

INTRODUCTION.

MY LORD, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,—The problem of Mesopotamia, which has recently come so much into the foreground of our Middle Eastern politics, is one that may be approached from many standpoints, of which I can this afternoon deal with but one—the military one. I do not wish to be understood as saying that this standpoint is the most important, though it is certainly at the moment the most prominent. Nor do I propose to go into details as to the best military methods of dealing with the internal problems of the country; data for such an enquiry are deficient, and must be so for some time to come. All I intend to do is to consider the military value, if any, of Mesopotamia to us from the point of view of Imperial defence; and if, in so touching, I tell you some things you already know, I must hope that I can, at any rate, throw a little more light on the whole question as a military matter.

I propose first to give a brief and general description of the country, and an account of how and why we first came to occupy it, and follow that up by a discussion of its present importance to us, and some considerations as to the means of maintaining our military foothold in it, presuming that it is desirable to maintain it.

WHAT MESOPOTAMIA IS.

The territory usually known as Mesopotamia is in its general form a wide but shallow depression running south-south-east from the Anatolian plateau to the head of the Persian Gulf. This depression is traversed by two great rivers—the Tigris and the Euphrates, respectively some 800 and 1,200 miles in length from source to mouth; to the west and south-west it is bounded by a broad belt of desert, separating it from Syria and Arabia; to the east and north-east by a stretch of hilly country rising rapidly to the mountainous edge of the plateau, in the neighbourhood of which runs the frontier between Persia and Mesopotamia.

This shallow and wide depression may be regarded from the point of view of commercial and political geography as the shortest overland route from Central and Southern Europe to Southern Asia. It forms a great corridor, shut in by mountains on the one side and desert on the other, from the Eastern Mediterranean and Anatolia to the Persian Gulf. But in itself also Mesopotamia is commercially of great value and importance, although, owing to the lack of suitable means of exploitation, its mineral wealth is largely untapped. The chief product—oil—is found in large quantities in the foothills bordering the whole of the Tigris Valley, in that valley itself, and in the area north and north-east of Baghdad, and in the Middle Euphrates Valley; while in the north there are deposits of iron, copper, lead, and coal.

The population consists mainly of Arabs inhabiting the southern and central parts of the country, with a solid block of Kurds in the north-east corner spreading westwards and southwards roughly as far as a line drawn from Mosul to Mendali. The Arab population is nomadic, except in the river and watercourse basins and in the towns; it still remains largely under the sway of its tribal Sheikhs, who have always exercised a far more real control in the country than that of the nominally supreme Turkish officials. The Arab is, generally speaking, intelligent, generous, and humane, but he has a bent for intrigue, is a time-server, untrustworthy, and often unscrupulous; he is a formidable fighting man for the purposes of guerilla warfare, but lacks determination and never shrinks from deserting a cause he believes to be lost. The Kurd is a wilder and more lawless person and a more formidable foe; brave and resolute, and possessed of great physical and mental stamina, but unintelligent and simple, he is a member of a good military stock, of which the Turkish Government made great, and not always scrupulous, use in the past for the purpose of keeping under the various discontented elements within its dominions. The population of all Mesopotamia was estimated to be about 1,500,000 before the war;

both Arabs and Kurds are, of course, Moslems, but the former tend rather to the Shiah persuasion, while the latter are Sunnis.

Generally speaking, before the war the Turkish administration of Mesopotamia was more theoretical than real. It was effective in certain limited areas—*e.g.*, in the towns; but the real authority lay with the tribal heads, ruling in accordance with tribal or local custom. Taxes were paid partially and infrequently, and often were not paid at all. It has been estimated that in the Basra Vilayet seven-tenths of the people escaped scot-free of taxation and paid to the Turkish officials nothing whatever except bribes. The dealings of the Turkish Government with the Arab and Kurdish tribes were a mixture of diplomacy and spasmodic displays of force which generally had little or no permanent results.

Such, then, was the picture of Mesopotamia before the war. It appears therein as a land of immense promise, as yet unfulfilled, thanks to the backwardness of its inhabitants and the lack of enterprise and capacity of its rulers. Small wonder that other nations, seeking an outlet for their energies, had cast a covetous eye over this territory, so rich in possibilities, so important a link in the highway between two civilizations. I need not tell you how Germany's "Drang Nach Osten" found its expression in the Berlin-Baghdad project, nor how nearly that project came to being an actuality. The World War brought the solution of this as of other vital disputes; and it was to us and not to our enemies that there fell the privilege of bringing the benefits of civilization to Mesopotamia and its people. How this came about we must now describe.

HOW WE CAME TO BE IN MESOPOTAMIA.

As is well known, the opening of the war against Germany in August, 1914, was followed on November 5 by the declaration of hostilities between Great Britain and Turkey. For the time being our policy in the Middle East was one of defence, and it was for the purpose of securing our large oil interests at the head of the Persian Gulf, and forestalling a German-Turkish advance down the Tigris and Euphrates Valleys which might debouch on the flank of our sea route between Egypt and India, that a Division was sent to Basra. It was none too soon, for early in 1915 Basra was menaced with attack by superior Turkish forces, and reinforcements had to be sent. It was decided with these fresh troops to occupy all the Basra Vilayet; and by the end of July we had advanced some hundred miles upstream from Basra town in both the Tigris and Euphrates Valleys. The offensive was continued in the autumn up the Tigris as far as Kut-el-Amara, whence it was resolved to make a push for Baghdad, despite the difficulties of keeping open a long

line of communications and coping with defective transport facilities. Everyone is familiar with the glorious tragedy of General Townshend's army; its gallant dash to Ctesiphon; its resistance against the overwhelming force of its assailants till a third of its own numbers had fallen; its withdrawal to Kut-el-Amara; the '44 days' siege, and its final capitulation after two attempts to relieve it had failed and all hope of rescue was at an end.

It became clear that an offensive against Baghdad, to be successful, must be less in the nature of a *coup de main* than of a regular and methodical advance, carefully prepared and scientifically executed. Accordingly, no immediate effort was made to retrieve the severe moral and material disaster suffered at Kut; and the summer of 1916 was given up to the task of consolidating our position in Arabistan, and to making all possible preparations for a renewed offensive in the cooler season. Meanwhile the attention of our enemies was being ever more and more diverted by the brilliant Russian advance in the Caucasus. By December all the measures for the prosecution of our advance were fully taken; and General Maude—the most honoured name in all the most recent history of Mesopotamia—initiated that series of brilliantly successful operations which culminated on March 11, 1917, in the occupation of Baghdad, and which an untimely death was to forbid him to pursue to their triumphant conclusion—the complete liberation of all the country from the rule of the Turks.

By the end of the campaigning season of 1916-17 we were in possession of the Tigris as far up as Tekrit, of the Euphrates to Ramadie, while we had also cleared the mountain area on our right as far north as the Kifri district.

During 1918 the British forces, now under General Marshall, inflicted a series of defeats on the Turks, culminating in the capture of all the Turkish army on the Tigris and the occupation of Mosul by the date of the Armistice. At the same time our advanced posts on the Euphrates were pushed upstream to Albu Kemal. To the north of Mesopotamia the situation in Persia, which was threatened by the advance of Turkish forces from Eastern Anatolia, compelled General Marshall to detach forces up the Kermanshah-Enzeli road in May, 1918. Resht and Enzeli were occupied about the middle of June. An attempt to maintain a detachment at Baku had to be given up; but no serious attack materialized against the thin and precarious line held by us along the Kermanshah-Enzeli road. After the Armistice Baku and the railway thence to Batum were occupied by us, as also Krasnovodsk, on the eastern shore of the Caspian.

At the conclusion of hostilities, therefore, we held practically all the country usually known by the name of "Mesopotamia"—that is, the whole of the Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra Vilayets—an area

of some 180,000 square miles. Our relations with the Arabs were friendly, our prestige in the country stood high. It was clearly our policy to hold this land which we had gained during the war, pending its eventual disposal by the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, and to administer it to the best of our ability until such time as it should be in a position to administer itself.

Moreover, we had expended on Mesopotamia an immensity of material effort which few even to-day realize. So far it had all been devoted to the development of the country for war purposes, and had yielded little or no return. It was only by the continuation of this effort in time of peace, and by its direction towards the arts of peace, that we could hope to gain some return for our expenditure in the months of war, and to carry on that civilizing task, to which we had already laid our hands, for the benefit of the inhabitants of the land and of the world at large.

Unfortunately, many factors combined to cause us by slow degrees to lose the high esteem in which we were held at the end of the war, and to render our rule more and more irksome and unpopular. It is not my intention to deal with these causes at length. Anti-British propaganda by Turkish Nationalists, and Pan-Arab and religious fanatics, has played its part. Discontent among those who desired to be a law to themselves at the very efficiency and vigilance of the new administrative machine set up by us, the appearance of the usual effects of war on prices and food-supplies, and the sudden rise of a class of new rich, combined with increasing strain and poverty among the less fortunate sections of the community (these things unfortunately are not confined to England or even to Europe!), also fanned the smouldering flames. More than this, British prestige began to decline as the Arabs believed that our military forces in the country were being gradually weakened (they were reduced from over 220,000 to less than 90,000 between November, 1918, and June, 1920) because the occupation of Mesopotamia was proving a great financial strain on our resources, and as local risings and disturbances were treated somewhat mildly for political reasons.

Moreover, the defiance of the British régime by the unruly Arab Governor of Deir-ez-Zor, on the Euphrates, and the gradual withdrawal of our forces from this part of the country, following on our evacuation of Trans-Caspia and the Caucasus, was put down to the fact that we were militarily unable to stand up against attack; and this view was confirmed by the set-back suffered at Enzeli and Resht in the early summer of this year.

The Arab therefore imagined himself subjected to, and oppressed by, an alien and unsympathetic set of rulers whose only support lay in an obviously insufficient armed force. He believed that he could rise and shake off the yoke, and only awaited an opportunity

to do so. In July an outbreak of disorder occurred at Rumeitha, an unimportant township on the Lower Euphrates. It was not suppressed. The fiery torch was carried throughout the length and breadth of the country, and by the end of the month it was all aflame.

THE MILITARY VALUE OF MESOPOTAMIA.

First of all, it must be made clear that our occupation of Mesopotamia is a matter of Government policy, and is based on many other considerations besides those of a military order. I can, of course, make no attempt here to deal with any but matters of the latter category, and to try and explain to you how our occupation of Mesopotamia is of value from the military point of view, and also the military disadvantages occasioned by its occupation.

As you all know, we are essentially an Eastern Empire—the greatest and most powerful of all Eastern Empires. For generations now we have ruled over many millions of Eastern subjects, and none have, or could have, proved themselves more loyal or more devoted. The corner-stone of that Empire is, of course, India, and to the defence and safeguarding of India all our policy in the East has for many decades been directed. It will be realized from a glance at the map that India may be menaced with an attack by land from two directions—and two only. Her land frontiers are exposed to China on the north-east and east, to Russia on the north and north-west. China is, for the present, and will probably be for some generations yet, a negligible enemy. Russia has been in the past, and now is again, the most formidable foe the British Empire has to face. Possessed as she is of a new and subversive social theory, she finds herself a Cain among nations. Animated as she is with a spirit like that of the followers of Mohammed in the days of Islam's first crusading ardour, the *leitmotif* of her policy is the fomenting of revolution in every land. And for revolutionary Russia, Britain, the embodiment of sanity and order, the fine flower of Western democracy, is the arch-enemy. I need not labour the point; the public utterances of the leaders of Soviet Russia are evidence enough of its truth. What more certain than that these leaders, seeking the Achilles heel of our Empire, should find it where the Czars found it—in India—and so finding should strive there to deal the fatal blow? It is a peril to which we should be foolish to blind ourselves, and to which, in fact, we have not been blind.

There are two possible routes by which Soviet Russia may advance on India. The first is the traditional route by Tashkent and Merv, which is now provided with a railway—though a bad one—and is the most direct way to Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier. But at its southern end this route is blocked by the huge

bulk of the Hindu Kush—a most formidable obstacle only to be passed by threading a way through long and narrow passes, easily defensible by a handful against a host. This obstacle can, however, be turned at its western end by the Merv-Kandahar route, where a broad gap of fairly practicable country intervenes between the Hindu Kush Mountains on the east and the desert of Central Persia on the west. Here, then, is one danger point.

The second line of advance may be described as the Caspian-Persian route. It is longer than the other, but easier and safer for any Russian invading army. It would be possible for such a force to advance rapidly from a base somewhere on the Caspian direct on Teheran and Astarabad, and to overrun all Northern Persia in a very short space of time. This would only be the first stage in the operations, and no doubt a long pause for consolidation and further preparations would have to ensue before the offensive could be resumed against Afghanistan and India. We may be sure that, if once Bolshevik Russia establishes its armies in Northern Persia, they will not only have obtained a rich prize, but also have taken a long step on the road to India.

Such an army would be a grave peril to the safety and stability of our Indian Empire, though not mainly from a military point of view. The loss of prestige which would be caused us would be aggravated by the increased facilities for Bolshevik propaganda aimed at the foundation of our power in the Middle East. I need not go further into this point; the formidable nature of Bolshevik propaganda and its power for destruction is fully realized by most thinking people. The occupation of Northern Persia by a Red army would increase both the possibilities of spreading this pernicious poison and the potency of its effects amid the already highly inflammable material which is even now smouldering discontentedly throughout all our Eastern Empire.

While we can do so, without weakening our forces elsewhere, it is to our interest to maintain a small force in Persia for the present, which shall afford the necessary backing for the native Persian troops, still little more than a negligible factor. We must remember that Bolshevik Russia is a more formidable enemy than Czarist Russia ever was; that the latter could be bound by agreements, whereas the former has frankly admitted that she will hold to no agreement with "capitalist" countries one moment longer than it suits her; and that the whole *leitmotif* of Red Russia's policy is war to the knife against "capitalism" and against us, whom she regards as "capitalism's" protagonists. Moreover, Bolshevik Russia has an immensely powerful weapon in her excellent propaganda service, which she knows well how to use. With the situation as it is in the Middle East at present, we can afford to take

no risks, and probably would be wise to try and hold off any Russian army as far as possible from the North-West Frontier.

Now, there are only two possible zones of military action, owing to the topography of the country and in particular the great Persian desert which occupies all its central area. The one is in the north-eastern corner of the country around Meshed. A force there is dependent, however, on the long and exposed line of communications from Quetta by Neh and Duzdap (the railhead); this railhead is 500 miles from Meshed, and the whole line from Quetta to Meshed measures 900 miles. Every yard of it is exposed to attack by a hostile Afghanistan, and Meshed itself is a dangerous position for a garrison, which would be liable to an enveloping attack by superior Russian forces, capable of being secretly and swiftly concentrated on the frontier along a wide arc from Kushk to Ashkabad. Moreover, no force at Meshed could defend the vital area of North Persia around Teheran, which is some 500 miles away to the west and separated from Meshed by the Elburz Range.

The other possible line of action for a force opposing a Russian invasion of Persia is to the west of Teheran towards Resht, and a force on this line must draw its supplies from a base at Baghdad by the Kermanshah-Hamadan road. The events of the last three years have proved that our force acting on this line, small as it has been, has been to some extent effective against both Russian and Turkish attempts to force their way into North Persia. This it has been able to do not only by its own strength, but by the moral effect of its presence on the Persian Government and people.

Mesopotamia thus forms the base for any force in North Persia. From it our troops there must draw their supplies, reinforcements, and ammunition. If Mesopotamia is lost to us, they will be cut off from all assistance, and left isolated and exposed to attack.

But there is not only this, but the fact that it must form the base for any offensive operations that might be undertaken in Persia against the Bolsheviks that makes it of importance from a military point of view to retain it in our hands. Any counter-offensive against the Reds in Persia must be undertaken from Mesopotamia if it is to have a chance of success. Any defensive battle against them can best be waged by a force based on Mesopotamia, and holding the difficult defiles in the hill country of South-Western Persia and the Kurdish border against an attack that must arrive in small columns and incur danger of defeat in detail.

From the purely military point of view I should wish to insist first and foremost on this point—that Mesopotamia forms the base for a forward defence line in front of India, if it is thought wise to hold any such line. We must hold it, or withdraw that forward line. We could, of course, do so without entirely compromising our

prospects of successfully defending India, but we could not do so without bringing the chief peril to India much nearer her borders and rendering our task of defence more difficult in many ways.

I have said that we went into Mesopotamia to avert the peril of a German-Turkish advance by the Balkans and Baghdad to the head-waters of the Persian Gulf—a menace to our sea route to India. We are remaining there because it is at present our policy to support the present Persian Government, and such support must be based on Mesopotamia; and also because we are bound to keep order and retain control pending the setting up of an Arab Government and the raising of an armed force to support it. That we are bound to do by the terms of our mandate for Mesopotamia, which we have accepted and must fulfil. There could be no question of retiring from Mesopotamia at the moment, and by so doing leaving the land to fall back into a state of complete disorder and anarchy, and exposing helpless Persia to be overrun by Bolshevik armies without hope of resistance or rescue.

At present, then, our policy involves the maintenance of our forces in Mesopotamia, and that in fairly large numbers.

On the other hand, there is, of course, the other side of the question to be considered. There is no doubt that our occupation of Mesopotamia absorbs a large number of troops, and will do so for some time to come. This in itself is a real drawback from the military point of view, for the demands on the armed forces of the Empire are great and various enough, and no addition to them should be undertaken without serious and good reasons; in fact, with our present military resources there could be no possibility of our keeping a large garrison permanently in Mesopotamia.

HOW WE CAN REMAIN IN MESOPOTAMIA.

There is, then, no doubt that the size of Mesopotamia, the lack of communications, the hostility of the Arab population, all combine to cast a great strain on our military resources; cannot we find some half-way course between holding the land from end to end and evacuating it entirely, to the detriment of our position in the Middle East?

Various suggestions to this end have been put forward, such as that we should limit ourselves to the holding of the Basra Vilayet; that we should go no farther north than Baghdad, and so forth. It is always a sound maxim to cut one's coat according to one's cloth, but there are real and grave military considerations which militate against any such "half-way houses" as those suggested above.

A glance at an ethnographic map of the Middle East will show that to the north-east of the Arab *bloc* in the Tigris and Euphrates

Valleys lies a solid mass of Kurds. The Kurd is a turbulent and warlike hillman with predatory instincts, who has a great contempt for military weakness, but a great respect for military strength. So far we have managed to instil into him a wholesome regard for our power which has served to prevent any outbreak against us; and this end has been achieved by the presence of our troops in the midst of his territory. It is to be feared that a retirement into the plains would undo all this, and expose us to a whole series of raids and incursions with which we should be in no favourable position to deal. It must be realized that this Kurdish bloc extends right to the edge of the plains to within 100 miles of Baghdad and the Tigris Valley, and that it lies absolutely astride the south-western end of the Persian road and railway. The first effect, then, of any rising among the Kurds would be the severance of the line of communications of the force in North Persia, which it is our main military interest to preserve. In a word, our occupation of Kurdistan covers the Persian road; our withdrawal from Kurdistan would expose that road. That statement would, of course, apply still more to any withdrawal to the south of Baghdad, and that is the military reason against such a withdrawal.

The situation is closely analogous to that in the North-West of India. Here it has, up till quite recently, been our policy to hold only the eastern edges of the frontier territories, such as those inhabited by the turbulent Wazirs and Mahsuds, with the result that these lands have been a perpetual breeding-ground of raids and disorders. We are now maintaining a foothold within the Mahsud territory as the surest means of being able to stifle any outbreak before it can come to a head. Just so in Kurdistan we stand the best chance of ensuring peace if we firmly establish our military forces in the heart of the country itself rather than from motives of economy withdrawing to the plains and allowing storms to brew up for us in the hills without being able to lift a finger until they have burst upon us.

The occupation of a vast area such as Mesopotamia is, of course, a difficult military problem, and there is now an evident tendency among the Press and the public to consider that we have failed to solve it, and that it is therefore insoluble. But it is not—under certain given conditions. We are now establishing all over the occupied area a network of blockhouses and fortified posts, which will secure our garrisons against being rushed by surprise attacks or against having the communications cut between themselves and their base. We are sending to Mesopotamia a number of aeroplanes and armoured cars which will be able to take some of the work off our infantry, and will form a mobile reserve capable of dealing swiftly with any outbreak of disorder and preventing its spread over

wide areas of country. These measures, together with the increased experience which time will bring to our troops, should be effective in preventing any recurrence of the outbreak we have seen in the last few months.

Moreover, it must not be forgotten that our army in Mesopotamia has come quite well out of its ordeal. Only one real check (the incident of the Manchesters near Hillah) has been suffered by British troops at the hands of the Arabs, who have, on the other hand, been severely handled whenever they have put up a fight against us. The garrisons they have besieged have all been relieved in due course; the outrages they have committed have all been visited with speedy punishment; the communications they have cut have all been quickly restored. The situation has—from a military point of view—never got really out of hand, and when once quiet is restored again, we may hope for a considerable respite from strife and disorder. The history of India after the Mutiny tells us that never can one more confidently count on a prolonged period of peace and progress than in the period immediately following an unsuccessful rising.

To recapitulate, then: we went to Mesopotamia in the first place to secure ourselves against a German advance by way of the Persian Gulf against our communications with India; we are remaining there in accordance with our mandate pending the setting up of an Arab Government and the raising of an Arab army, and also in order to give all possible aid to our friend and ally Persia. The military advantages of the policy are somewhat counterbalanced by the fact that we cannot hold part of Mesopotamia without holding it all, and that the occupation of so extensive a country involves a serious expenditure of military effort.

But, of course, no one hopes or desires to hold down Mesopotamia by force of arms alone.

I have this evening tried to keep away from questions of high policy, of which all the necessary data cannot be known to me. Nevertheless, it is clear that we must in the future adopt in Mesopotamia a policy of conciliation and magnanimity, once we have shown that we are capable of holding our own in fair fight. In the East, as is well known, generosity and moderation are regarded as weakness if they are adopted under the pressure of defeat, but are appreciated and regarded when they are freely accorded by the victor to the vanquished. If we are to remain in Mesopotamia at all we must not dream of giving up an inch of ground in the present struggle; but if we are not to be bled white in the future by the drain of keeping up an enormous and costly garrison there, we must temper our victory with moderation, and show the Arab and the Kurd that we are ready freely to give what we will not permit to be

extorted from us. Let us, then, set to work to heal the wounds of war; let good sense and good-will labour to turn our late enemies into friends; let us try to ensue the old Roman maxim *parcere subjectis* after we have carried out the *debellare superbos*. If once we can impress on the people of that land the idea that we seek first and foremost their well-being and happiness, and desire nothing more than to help them to reap the benefits of civilization and progress, then we can feel that our Empire there, as in many another foreign land, does not rest on "military considerations" at all, but is firmly and surely based in the hearts of a grateful and happy people—of every human society the only enduring foundation.

DISCUSSION

The CHAIRMAN said they had listened with the greatest interest to the very instructive lecture which Captain Sheppard had been good enough to give them. That gentleman had contributed a very clear and correct summary of the events that had occurred in Mesopotamia and its neighbourhood during the war, and had also touched, he thought with a very great sound sense, on possible future developments there. He must say that he rather agreed with Captain Sheppard, who he understood to be of his own opinion, that there is more to be feared from Bolshevik propaganda than from Bolshevik armed forces. As far as one's information went, that propaganda was exceedingly active, and indeed successful, throughout the whole of Central Asia. He thought they should be justified in believing, especially after the speech which they heard from Lord Curzon, at the Annual Dinner of the Society a night or two previously, that His Majesty's Government were really at pains to establish some system of administration which would, they hoped, by degrees, bring peace and contentment to those regions. Of course, they should all take into account that they could not expect that Arabs or Kurds, with their nomadic habits, should immediately welcome or receive this with any kind of enthusiasm. Indeed they would probably resent the sudden introduction of a civilization so perfectly alien to their customs and traditions. He dared say that if we were in their position we should also experience that hesitation. But still, he thought that, with time and patience—and in this connection he had very great hopes of the Mission of that very eminent official, Sir Percy Cox, who had gone out to Baghdad—that we should succeed in removing any misunderstanding and misapprehension, and be able to show the natives of those regions that our real and our sole aim is to give them, as far as we can, self-government, together with the benefits of our civilization, and also develop the resources of that country. He should be very happy if any gentleman present would make observations or

ask any question in regard to the paper they had just listened to. He did not know if Lord Rawlinson, who was going to take up a very high office in India, was disposed to say anything, but he was sure it would be very great encouragement to Captain Sheppard that he was able to give them his company that afternoon.

The Rev. Dr. W. A. WIGRAM said he should like to make use of some local knowledge of Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in order to direct the attention of the meeting to certain factors which, he thought, were important, and certainly picturesque, in the military situation which Captain Sheppard had outlined. He referred particularly to the Assyrians or Nestorians, those Christian Highlanders who threw in their lot with us during the war, and who are, in consequence, at present refugees in British territory. A contingent was raised from among them, and, serving under British officers, in 1919, did good service in the Kurdish troubles of that year. Now, the quality of those Christian Highlanders as fighting men might be judged by the fact that they were brigaded along with a regiment of Gurkhas who, when asked what they thought of their comrades, gave this as their verdict: "Why did you not give us the same mountain sandal that those fellows made for themselves? Then we should have done as well as they did." He thought members of the Society would agree that when Gurkhas apologized for not doing as well as irregulars there was not much doubt about the fighting quality of the latter. He must admit, according to the verdict of the Political Officer employed with them, that they, having a blood feud against all Kurds, were described as a "trifle indiscriminate." Irregular they certainly were. In fact the General in command of the force once expressed himself thus to the Commander of this Assyrian contingent: "I don't care how many Kurds your scallywags scupper, but do please take care they do not wipe out Kurds who have influential friends in Constantinople." He regretted to say that a certain party of the Highlanders deserted during the war, finding the movements of an ordered campaign too slow for their liking. But they sent in a unique apology in a delightful letter of excuse, addressed: "To our Beloved and Reverend Commander. Peace and love be multiplied unto you. Be it known to you, our dear Father, that we did not run away because we did not wish to kill Kurds, but because we wished to do so, and by the blessing of God we have been doing that for the last eight days." Then, with a drop into English, they said: "Regret to report following casualty: Soldier, Private So-and-so; but we have killed a lot more Kurds! And now if you will promise to punish us yourself and not send us to the dreadful Mosul gaol, be it known to you that we will return to duty." Their C.O. promised he would punish them all right when they came in, and he some way managed to square it with his

conscience by reporting the men as having been "absent without leave," which is not so serious a crime as desertion while on active service. During the recent rising those same fellows had done an extremely useful bit of service against the Arabs. He desired to emphasize what Captain Sheppard had indicated, that what we want is small military garrisons in Kurdistan and the hills, and here we had the material already made to our hands. Those Highlanders altogether presented themselves as an asset too valuable for us to throw away. They would form a military garrison of extremely high fighting value, which could do very good service just at those points over which we wished to exercise control. All they asked was rifles and ammunition, and they were quite prepared to do the rest. If armed and repatriated they would constitute just such an "oasis" in the country as our policy required for its effective control. Dr. Wigram endorsed what Captain Sheppard had said about the mineral wealth of the country. He had, he said, ridden along a continuous stretch of coal fields, extending to sixty miles, and it went again eighty miles north. There was a district in the mountains where the Highlanders had been in the habit of digging out lead which they used for making bullets. They used a thimble-like arrangement as a mould to make bullets for their Martini rifles, and regarded this source as having been provided for them by Providence. Captain Sheppard had spoken of our good fortune in that the unruly Kurds of Central Kurdistan had given no trouble of late, or taken any part in the recent trouble. Before sitting down, he desired to bear testimony to the services of one particular officer, the man in charge of Sulimanieh, the key and capital of the whole district of Kurdistan. Major Soane, as Political Officer there, being left practically alone, merely by means of his personal influence and his knowledge of the turbulent people whom he knew so well, had been able to keep control of the situation.

The HON. SECRETARY (Colonel A. C. Yate), in the course of a few observations, said that no doubt it would be remembered by most that after Lord Curzon made his speech at their Annual Dinner, on the Tuesday of the previous week, he was immediately attacked in *The Times*. They had just heard from Captain Sheppard a very strong endorsement of the correctness of what Lord Curzon had said, and an adequate reply to the ill, or warped judgment of *The Times*. Recently Sirdar Ikbāl Ali Shah, a well-known member of the Society and an Afghan of great ability, who was to lecture to them on November 10, had pointed out that there was interned, in Constantinople, a descendant of that particular family at Mecca which monopolized the Sharifate, named Ali Haidar Sharif. That political dénoué Ikbāl Ali Shah had singled out as the Arab best qualified to rule, under British guidance, over Mesopotamia. Professor Kay, of

St. Andrews, who is also a member of this Society and takes a great interest in it, very shortly afterwards endorsed what Sirdar Ikbāl Ali Shah had said. Coupling these facts with other opinions which he had heard from competent judges, the suggestions made by Sirdar Ikbāl Ali Shah seemed worthy the attention of our Foreign Office.* From what Captain Sheppard had said we should distinctly realize the importance of maintaining ourselves in a strong position from a strategical point of view in Mesopotamia. In this connection we had a good right to look for support to the nation which we had so strongly befriended and endeavoured to satisfy in that quarter, viz., the French, who had got what they asked for in Syria and Cilicia. We had a right to look for their cordial help and support, and that the more so as 25 per cent. of the oil of Mesopotamia was to be theirs. The barrier between Bolshevism and the mandatory Powers in Mesopotamia and Cilicia is the Republics of Georgia and Armenia, and it is for Britain and France to support them against the Bolsheviks and the Turkish Nationalists. Colonel Stokes, whose name had come to the front when America, about 1911, sent her Finance Minister, Mr. Morgan Schuster, to Persia, was now in Trans-Caucasia, and he wished him every success in his efforts to keep Georgia and Armenia straight. He hoped these countries would become a bulwark for Mesopotamia against any Russian Bolshevik projects. The Dardanelles, the Bosphorus and the Black Sea, and the ports of Trebizond and Batoum were now all thrown open to the world's trade, and it was the policy of the *Entente* to keep them so. They were, in fact, reopening one of the great trade routes of the Middle Ages, and that being so, he regarded the independence of Armenia and Georgia, and their freedom from Bolshevik intrigue and influence as of the very highest importance. He could only hope that by the influence of the *Entente* and of the League of Nations that independence would be fully maintained.

A MEMBER remarked that at the beginning of this paper Captain Sheppard had suggested that the bulk of the Arabs were Shiites. On the other hand, according to an official census which he (the speaker) saw compiled by the Chief Commissioner, something like one-third of them were now believed to be Sunnis. He regarded the question involved by the proportion of one faith to another as very important, because, if it be a fact that a large portion of the Arabs were Sunnis, the problem of establishing an Arab Government which would command the allegiance of the entire population was obviously very much more difficult. Could Captain Sheppard throw any light on the point?

* *The Times* of 26th and 30th November, 1920, has made it known that His Highness the Nakib of Baghdad has accepted the office of President of the Provisional Council of State in Mesopotamia. We have good reason to believe that this selection, made under the advice of the British High Commissioner, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Percy Cox, will prove to be a happy one for Mesopotamia.—A. C. Y.

Captain SHEPPARD replied that the information on the particular point raised he got from an Admiralty handbook which he thought was reliable. But he thought it professed only to take matters down in detail to the beginning of the war, so that he should imagine it quite possible that what the questioner said was correct. If so, he quite agreed that the difference in the religious belief of the Arabs would make it very difficult for an Arab Government to command the allegiance of the whole people. He had not himself seen the particular figures or census to which the questioner had referred, but he thought there was no doubt about it that, if these were accurate, the problem would add another thorn to the many with which its solution was surrounded.

The CHAIRMAN thought he was expressing the feeling of every one present in conveying a vote of thanks to Captain Sheppard for the most interesting paper he had given them. They might congratulate themselves on the short discussion which had ensued. The lecture had certainly been of great value and profit.

The proceedings then terminated.

THE FEDERATION OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES UNDER THE KABUL GOVERNMENT.

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held at 74, Grosvenor Street, London, W.1, on Wednesday, November 10, 1920, when Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah delivered an address on the Federation of the Central Asian States. General Sir Edmund Barrow (in the absence of Lord Carnock) presided.

The CHAIRMAN, in opening the proceedings, said: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I regret to say that Lord Carnock is unable to attend this afternoon owing to indisposition; and I particularly regret it, because I shall have to take the chair in his place, and I am afraid I do not even know what the lecturer is going to talk about. I will now introduce to you Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah, who will soon enlighten you on that point.

THE LECTURE.

THE question of a federation of Central Asian States of which I shall speak to-day is no novel one. Its origins are probably to be referred to an amalgamation of the Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turanian movements. Both of these movements are religious as well as racial in character, but when they effected a junction and developed into the ideal of a federation of the States of Central Asia, they took on a colour more purely political. So long ago as 1863, in the reign of Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, Syed Jamaluddin, "The Afghan," posed as the protagonist of a Pan-Islamic doctrine, and his most powerful argument on behalf of the cause he advocated was that the Moslem Powers should ally themselves for the consolidation of Islam, and should in future possess a common political aim.

However reasonable in itself was the ambition of Syed Jamaluddin, it soon became evident that he was merely the instrument of forces whose aims were by no means so idealistic as he would have had his hearers believe. It was observed that during his travels in Egypt, India, and Persia, his exhortations were marked by studious moderation, but that when he reached Turkey they became more militant in tone. It then became apparent that Sultan Abdul Hamid was using him as an agent for the promotion of his own private and less innocent Pan-Islamic doctrines throughout the

East. For example, in 1889, during the reign of Shah Nasiruddin of Persia, Jamaluddin was urging the Persians to acknowledge the Sultan's claim to suzerainty over their country, his chief argument being that it would be well that all the Islamic countries should place themselves under the direction of the Yildiz Kiosk if they desired freedom from European interference. Later it became abundantly clear that for Abdul Hamid the Pan-Islamic movement meant a movement for his own personal aggrandizement. It was proposed to hold a great Moslem conference at Mecca in 1902. But Abdul Hamid dreaded that such a conference might bring the claims of the Arab nation into prominence, a claim which the Arabs as the founders of Islam might be very likely to try to further, so he at once took steps to quash the conference at Mecca.

A year or two after this the Pan-Turanian movement was launched. It was, of course, calculated to bring about not only a cultural and religious, but also a political bond amongst the Tartar race. The party responsible for this movement at first proposed that the sermons (*khutba*) should be read in Turk language, that that language should be used throughout the Mohammedan world, and that all Arabic words should be eliminated from the Turkish literature and language.

At first sight that programme looked to be antagonistic to the views of the orthodox Moslem Church, as indeed it was. Its promoters modified their doctrines, so that the two movements were irreconcilable for a time, but for a time only.

These earlier and diverse forms of the Asian national idea, although crude and unworkable, had a lasting effect on the people of Central Asia, causing them to reflect on political affairs generally, arousing them to the danger of the Russian menace. As time went on, the notion of a confederacy of Central Asian States grew in popularity, and men looked backward with more kindly eyes to the Pan-Turanian and Pan-Islamic efforts, trying to discover in them a basis for the affiliation of the several States which owe allegiance to the rule of Islam, in the hope that a barrier might thus be erected against Russian aggression; for Russia was and is an avowed enemy of Islam.

The various forms which such an allegiance might take were keenly discussed, but without much definite result, until at last Amir Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan suggested a definite alliance between his own country, Persia, and Bokhara. The chief intention behind this proposal was that it might act as a check to Russian aggression. This union, as then outlined, was purely a defensive one, and the parties to it retained their normal position as rulers of the several countries involved, no one being exalted above another. But simple as was the scheme, Abdur Rahman did his utmost to

render it of as much practical utility as possible. He had been a witness of the virtual ruin of Khiva and the fall of Bokhara; he had marked the course of the Russian overtures to Persia, and had seen the results of the Muscovite treachery at Panjdeh. The rulers of the new allies had no illusions as regards the intentions of Russia towards their several States. The Russian policy was one through which the Islamic kingdoms in Asia would assuredly suffer a slow but certain disintegration. This was to be effected in three different ways: first by force of arms; secondly by false alliance with the several Islamic States, by which the territorial expansion of Russia might be aided; thirdly by the creation of political difficulties between the Islamic countries of Asia and the British and French, with the intention of weakening the Asian countries so that they might more easily fall a prey. No stone, indeed, was left unturned to arouse anarchy and unrest. For example, it has now been proved to the hilt that Russia was primarily responsible for the origin and continuance of the Armenian massacres. These massacres were not due to religious movements, but political, and history bears witness that that political move was of Russia and Russia alone. That move was directed towards Turkey, so that Islam should have a bad name for those massacres. It is known, too, that the quarrel between Britain and Amir Sher Ali was brought about through Russian intrigue. If it be hoped that this malevolent policy has disappeared with the rise of Bolshevism, that hope must speedily be dispelled in view of the overwhelming evidence regarding the Bolshevik operations in Central Asia, which, if they were responsible for nothing else, were certainly the cause of the Anglo-Afghan War of last year. The character of a people does not alter with a change in the form of their government.

That Russia had always aimed at the destruction of Islam is demonstrated, amongst other things, by a letter which General Kaufman dispatched to his Government through Count Schouvaloff, the Russian Minister in London in 1875. It pretended to set forth that the mission of Russia in the East was a civilizing one, and that the true enemy of the Western nations was Islam. It suggested that Afghanistan and the Central Asian States generally should be divided into Russian and British spheres of influence. Kaufman was perfectly correct in his statement that Russia had a dangerous foe in Islam, and not without reason; for the entire Mohammedan world fiercely resented the constant aggression of the Muscovite upon its boundaries.

When the late Amir of Afghanistan, Habibullah Khan, came to the throne, he at once attempted to bring the scheme of his illustrious father into the sphere of practical politics. He recognized that, if the States of Central Asia were to save themselves from the hungry

northern bear, they must defend their freedom by the creation of a common federacy.

When the Bolsheviks first came into contact with the peoples of Central Asia they posed as being the saviours of Islam. They at once gave their freedom to the Khanates, but that freedom was only a nominal one, as they made the condition that the dissemination of their pernicious doctrines should be carried on throughout Central Asia. So long as they desired to keep themselves safe from attack in these regions they kept peace with the Usbeks and ceded the region of Merv to the Afghans. They made Tashkend their headquarters for propagandist purposes, sedulously sowing their doctrines in Afghanistan. Amir Habibullah was unfavourable to the Red philosophy, however, and tried to bring about a Central Asian alliance against Russia. From that moment he was a marked man, and his tragic end was undoubtedly the result of Bolshevik agency.

The present Amir of Afghanistan showed almost at once that he was in favour of a Central Asian confederacy. He has by no means been convinced by the arguments of the Bolshevik envoys who thronged his court, being fully aware that it is not in the nature of things that Russia should wish well to Islam, her hereditary enemy. Nor had the Amir of Bokhara a dissimilar experience.

The Bolsheviks have nothing to learn from their Czarist predecessors. In their true Russian fashion intrigues were set up in Persia and Bokhara alike. As was the case with Kocheh Khan's party in Tabriz, so also in the Khanate a Bokharian revolutionary unit was organized, and these Bokhariots proclaimed a revolution on the morning of August 29; this event was organized to take place on Friday, August 27, after the Juma'h prayer.

Immediately masses of Bolshevik mounted troops pushed along the railway from the east and the west towards Bokhara. The Amir concentrated the majority of his available forces and such Afghan troops as were in Bokhara for the defence of the city, and the Red advance met with little opposition from small detachments along the railway, although the Bokharan and Turkoman irregulars caused casualties in their ranks at various points. At Bokhara itself the Bolshevik command found it had underestimated the strength of its opponents, and the spirit of resistance displayed by the Bokharan people came as a complete surprise.

The battle for the city swayed to and fro, both sides losing heavily. Positions were won and lost again and again. The Red command was forced to draw more and more on its reserves before the capture of the city was completed, and the Amir forced to fly towards the Afghan frontier with the remnants of his army. After capture Bokhara was given over to the troops to loot, and its wealth and the bazaars fell into the hands of the Red soldiery. This is an

irony of fate, that once Abdur Rahman was a refugee at Bokhara, and now the Amir of Bokhara is a refugee at Kabul.

As a measure of self-defence it is absolutely essential that Afghanistan should proceed with the task of founding a Central Asian alliance. This design is one which should be of the greatest importance to the British people, who by fostering such a scheme will help to erect a barrier between Bolshevism and their Indian Empire. It must not be forgotten that the British Empire is now more truly an Eastern Empire than at any time in its history; intrigues against its position in the East should be resisted with all the address at its command. The danger of Bolshevist aggression in the East is no mere bogey, no mere journalistic figment, but a very real menace indeed, the shadow of which is gradually creeping farther and farther south. It is therefore essential to take the most active steps for the protection of your interests in Asia, which are most assuredly in jeopardy from the Bolshevist operations in Turkestan and Persia. It seems to me that an alliance between the Central Asian States and Great Britain, as one of the paramount Powers in that region, is inevitable if the threat of Bolshevism is to be successfully combated.

However sound the idea of a Central Asian alliance, it is clear that if it is to be brought to a successful issue the means employed to achieve this end must differ materially from any so far put forward. It has already been recognized that the best way of dealing with the Asian peoples is to show sympathy with their aspirations and sentiments—not to ignore them or throw cold water upon them, but to attempt to enter into the new spirit which most certainly lies behind the Asian desire for advancement. If Great Britain desires to remain paramount in Asia, she must show its peoples that she sympathizes with their point of view, and that she is willing to foster and advance this rather than foist upon them only the kind of institutions she deems good for them. It would be ill that she should try to increase her prestige by belittling that of her Asian friends. Doubtless one day administrators will understand how easy it is to guide Asian peoples, to lead them, how very difficult to drive them. It is quite a mistake to suppose, as some officials still do, that the most dignified way of administering the British Raj is to do so with a high hand. And let it be said that this is precisely the spirit in which the Russians in Central Asia behaved when the country was subject to them—their present attitude, in fact. That may be partly true, but times have changed: the outlook is entirely different, and it is highly injudicious for any rulers, British or Asian, to speak to the people from a pedestal. By doing so you are throwing them into the arms of the Bolsheviks. Treat them as reasonable men, and you will find them so. It seems

to me that the root of political difficulties all the world over is planted in official loftiness. Has this not been the case in Ireland, in Germany, in Russia—in fact, in those very spheres where revolution and disaffection now raise their heads?

It is difficult to express oneself regarding the harm, the great harm, that one knows is brought about in Central Asia by inconsidered speeches or even remarks of a public nature in this country. Your respected President, Lord Curzon, speaking at the annual dinner of this Society, gave it as his opinion that Afghanistan some years ago was more or less under the protection of Great Britain, "but had now acquired something like independence." With all due respect to your able and brilliant President, one of the wisest and most remarkable men of his time, I am very much afraid that the phrase in question will make rather bad hearing at Kabul. Afghanistan, as a matter of fact, has from the beginning of its existence exercised a complete independence. It owes suzerainty to no one; it is a free and a sovereign State—as free in every sense as Spain or Denmark or any other separate kingdom. Such a statement as Lord Curzon's is calculated to foment the deepest regret at Kabul. But I, for one, do not believe that it was more than a passing indiscretion, and I am sure that if Lord Curzon was definitely questioned on the point he would be the very first to admit the full independence of Afghanistan. At the same time this is the very kind of remark that alienates Asian sympathies and breeds a sense of insecurity and unfriendliness, which the British nation cannot afford, owing to its imperial interests in Asia.

I pass on to the question of the Khilafat. I am not sure that that question comes within the province of my lecture, yet I will just mention that, to my way of thinking, the question of the Khilafat is purely a religious one, and might well be left to the Moslems themselves. With it is bound up the subject of Hijrat or the migration of Moslems from India to Afghanistan. I am not going out of my way when I discuss this Moslem emigration, because the Central Asian alliance, the subject of this lecture, is intended first and foremost to safeguard Asia from Bolshevism, and the emigration of the Moslems is in a manner bound up with this, because anything which agitates popular sentiment in India is certain to have a bearing upon the subject of popular unrest in the East.

Mr. Montagu, the Secretary for India, has to my mind shown great insight in dealing with this matter, and has, indeed, more than once saved the situation. I may say that I speak with some personal knowledge of the facts. No restraints were placed upon the emigration of the Moslems into Afghanistan. This was not the gravamen of the complaint, but those who were responsible for the

emigration arrangements did not, unless I am badly informed, act wisely in the matter. Neither the Indian Government nor the authorities at Kabul saw any harm in the passage of the Mohajirin or emigrants from one sphere to the other. Molana Abdul Bari, the Sheik ul Islam, or High Priest of India, announced that Hijret, or emigration, might take place; in consequence thousands of people left their homes without adequate preparation, without arrangements for food-supplies or shelter. No special railway or other facilities were extended to them. Indeed, the migration was more of the nature of a folk-movement on a small scale, a sort of nomadic trek, than a well-conceived plan. Unused to the severity of the Afghan climate and exposed to the dangers and difficulties of the long and arduous journey, many of these poor emigrants laid down their lives. It is surely extraordinary that these people should have been permitted to leave their homes and to travel hundreds of miles to a strange country without adequate transport and other arrangements having been made. Surely, in the first place, a committee might have proceeded to Afghanistan to enquire regarding the territory available for the emigrants, the possibilities of labour in these districts, and so forth—in fact, to examine into the feasibility of the whole scheme. Relief committees ought also to have been established. The great majority of the emigrants were impecunious families of the lower classes, who, influenced by promises of material prosperity, believed themselves to be bound for a land of milk and honey. Many of them seemed to have the idea that the Afghans would provide them with food and clothing and, above all, with rich agricultural land. The Afghans are a hard-working race, intolerant of indolence, shrewd and careful, and they were not inclined to regard this invasion of penniless thousands with any degree of satisfaction if the emigrants came as permanent guests. Also, a suitable committee ought to have been appointed to examine the fitness of intending emigrants, and to ensure that every kind of nondescript who wished to go to Kabul was not allowed to do so.

The reasons for a failure in that direction have been, therefore, those of which I have spoken above, and the Hijret has in no sense received a set-back on the part of the Afghans themselves. I have discussed this for the reason that, if a large number of emigrants populated a province in Afghanistan, their attitude has to be taken into consideration in any undertaking to which Afghanistan may commit itself, such as a Central Asian alliance. It is a pity that Hijret has not been handled more efficiently.

To return, in conclusion, to the question of a Central Asian alliance, this is undoubtedly a matter which should at present be discussed fully at home as well as in India. A more fitting opportunity for the establishment of such an alliance could scarcely be

hoped for. Popular as well as educated opinion in the Central Asian States is most ripe to entertain it. Bolshevism, at first almost welcomed in Asia, has now been unmasked and is regarded with the greatest disquietude—at least, by the ruling and educated classes. A Central Asian alliance which had the countenance and assistance of Great Britain would render the intrigues of Moscow entirely nugatory in the Khanates and in Persia, would check the onward flow of the distorted philosophy of Lenin, and would, indeed, act as a barrier, both moral and physical, between Red Russia and susceptible India. The desire of the Central Asian peoples for such an alliance does not arise out of a wish for aggrandisement, and is not so much an expression of nationality as an aspiration after peace and territorial security. His Majesty Amir Amanullah Khan, in a meeting of Council Chambers on September 20 last, convened at the 'Arg,* has most pointedly favoured the question. The first step towards this is naturally the Afghan ratification of the Massuri Conference. That wise nobleman Sirdar Mahmud Beg Tarzai, and his compatriots General Abdul Qodoos Khan and the Prime Minister, have now been able to secure the help of General Nadir Khan also. That, to my mind, marks the dawn of a great age in the Middle East. Our common enemy is Bolshevism, and to defend ourselves we must have a Central Asian Alliance.

The CHAIRMAN: Before I invite discussion there are one or two remarks I might make in order to clear the ground. I noted that the lecturer said or thought that the British Mission had actually gone to Kabul. That is not the case; no such British Mission has gone.

The LECTURER: I said it might have gone.

The CHAIRMAN: It actually has not gone. Another remark that I noticed was that he said the terminus of the Nushki railway was at Neh. Well, that I am sorry to say is not the case. The terminus of the Nushki line is at least sixty or a hundred miles—I really do not recollect how many miles, but that at the very least—from Neh. In fact, I think it is well over a hundred miles from Neh, at a place called Duzdap, which he may possibly know. It is almost at the meeting-point of Persia, Afghanistan, and British Beluchistan. The lecturer also made certain remarks about the Khyber Pass. He expressed a hope that the Khyber Pass would soon be opened every day of the week, and said he could not understand why this was not done. The real reason is that we have only a certain number of men to guard the Khyber Pass, and if they were on duty every day of the week—a duty which goes on for about twelve consecutive

* Regarding the 'Arg at Kabul, see Angus Hamilton's *Afghanistan*, pp. 348-9. The Dane Mission of 1904-5 was quartered in the 'Arg.—A. C. Y.

hours through the day—they would soon be worn out. In fact, more than two days would be quite impossible under our present arrangements in the Khyber. I will now invite discussion on the lecturer's remarks.

Mr. W. E. D. ALLEN: I only speak with some diffidence, as I have never been in Central Asia, but I happen to have read one of Ikbal Ali Shah's articles. I referred it to a member of the South Russian Government, and asked his opinion on it. I think we are more or less under moral obligations to Russia, because of the service she rendered us at the beginning of the war. He expressed the personal opinion that the South Russian Government, as representing Russia, would certainly not favour any movement on the part of Britain to support a nationalist movement in Central Asia; and he seemed to be of the opinion that they would rather have Russia there in any form than that the Russians should be expelled. Personally, I do not see how we can possibly hope to defend Central Asia if Russia ever attempts to regain it, granting that it has attained its independence. Further, Central Asia is but an economic unit of Russia. We have the example of Azerbaijan, which attempted to be independent; the result was that they found they could not export their oil, and had to go Bolshevik in order to get rid of the surplus oil. I think it would be a mistake for us, when Russia, so to speak, is in the dust, to support promiscuous nationalist movements, such as Poland and Roumania in Europe or Bokhara in Central Asia. I think it is thoroughly disloyal, and about on a level with Russia turning against us on the ground that we had a revolution in this country.

Colonel C. E. YATE, M.P.: Ladies and gentlemen, I did not quite follow the last speaker, as I could hardly hear him; consequently I cannot make any remarks on what he said. One of the things the lecturer told us—which I have not heard before—was that the Afghan boundary was not at Kushk, but at Merv. This is news to me, and, I think, to most of us. We have heard that some Afghans were in Merv, but we must always remember that Merv is one of the stations on the Transcaspian railway, and I think it very doubtful, if there is any power in Russia at all, that they will allow their Transcaspian railway to be cut by Afghanistan. Whether the Afghans have succeeded in that I cannot say, but it seems to me rather a dangerous policy to pursue. I am one of those who look back to the arduous days in the eighties when we defined the Afghan boundary, and Panjdeh was given over to Russia. The Afghans may have returned there, but what authority the lecturer has for saying that Merv is now an Afghan possession I do not know.

The LECTURER: About this question of Merv, I may just recall to your mind that just before the close of the war, just a few months

before that, a certain detachment of the British forces was in the north-east of Persia; and they were pressing rather hard on the Bolsheviks there. The Cossacks in Central Asia and Afghans were asked whether they could go up and create a sort of wedge there to stop the Bolsheviks coming to Hamadan and Meshed. The Afghans got up to that city, viz., Merv, and the recent information which I have received has given me reason to believe that the Afghans are to this day at Merv. They are in Merv, not as enemies of Bolshevism, because there is a great deal of predominance of Bolshevism in Central Asia; they, viz., the Bolsheviks, can drive even a bigger power than the Afghans out; but there is just that question going on whether the Afghans are going Bolshevik or not. If the Afghans finally decide not to go Bolshevik, Afghanistan will probably be shoved back right to Herat; but up till now Merv is in Afghan hands, and they are discussing on what terms friendship can be retained with Russia. The Massuri Conference has put this finally before them, that they must be friends either of the Bolsheviks or of Great Britain. After a discussion it has been resolved that Afghanistan is to be a friend of Great Britain, and in that case I am afraid that the Afghans might have to retire; but they must endeavour to retain a territory up to Panjdeh—that was undisputedly Afghan territory.

The CHAIRMAN: Perhaps I can throw some light on the matter. I believe what the Sirdar has just told us is true—that Afghan troops, certain detachments of them, are in Merv; but at the same time a very much larger number of Bolsheviks are much farther south in Kushk.

Colonel C. E. YATE, M.P.: At any rate, the Afghan possession of Merv is apparently rather nebulous at the present time. We can hardly say, from what Sirdar Ikbāl Ali Shah has told us, that Merv is now in fact an Afghan possession. Whether the Afghans will eventually turn to the Bolsheviks or to the British we cannot say. At any rate, they do not seem to be in great force at Merv, and I do not think they can have control there at the present time from what has been said. Another curious point was raised. The lecturer told us that Enzeli, a port on the Caspian Sea, was to be the scene of the great battle of the future—battle of the future between what?

The LECTURER: That is what I cannot commit myself to.

Colonel C. E. YATE, M.P.: I am afraid none of us can commit ourselves to it. Enzeli, as we all know, at the present moment, is apparently in the possession of a small force of the Bolsheviks; and, so far as we can gather, the Persian troops, known as the Persian Cossacks, have been driven back, and have retreated through the British lines. I do not know whether they have disbanded themselves or what has happened; but apparently there is a British force

at Kasvin which is holding the road to Tehran. I think we can all agree—all who know Persia—that if there is anything we can reckon on from Persia or the Persian army, it is that very few Persian soldiers will give up their lives to save their country from invasion. That is my experience of the Persian sarbaz as a fighting man. Consequently, the safety of Tehran at the present moment rests very largely with that small British force which is now holding Kasvin. We have seen a considerable Persian force raised in Southern Persia, known as the Southern Persian Rifles, under British officers and non-commissioned officers. They are a disciplined force. What has become of the Persian Cossack force in the north we none of us can say, and whether they will be brought together again, or be able to make a stand against the Bolsheviks, we cannot say either. At present, I think, the defence of Persia against the Bolsheviks seems to rest in British hands. We have a great agitation going on in this country at the present moment to reduce our expenditure in Mesopotamia and evacuate that country. I trust everybody will try to maintain British honour (applause), and not permit this sudden collapse of British prestige in all those regions. We want to see order restored in Mesopotamia. We have heard it said that the Arabs of Mesopotamia are revolting against what, I think, the lecturer described as the high-handedness of British officials. Was not that the expression used?

The LECTURER: Yes.

Colonel C. E. YATE, M.P.: At any rate, the Afghan conception of high-handedness of British officials in Mesopotamia. The British officials in Mesopotamia have done their best to make that country flourish again. They have succeeded to an extraordinary extent, both economically and agriculturally, and the unrest has been caused by the agitators—Bolsheviks and Turks—coming down from the north and inciting the Shiah element among the marsh Arabs and along the Euphrates to come out for loot. That is all they are out for—loot; and, unfortunately, they have got it. But I think they are now being brought to order, and I trust there will be no question of withdrawing until we have restored order. When we have got order by all means let us set up an Arab Council and Arab Assembly, and let the people have as much Arab rule as they care to be blessed with. Mesopotamia, so far as I know, consists of many chiefs and many tribes, but I do not think any chief or any tribe will acknowledge the overlordship of any other chief or of any other tribe; and they are all, tribes and chiefs, equally determined not to have the overlordship of any outside chief, whether from the Hejaz or anywhere else. There is great diversity among the tribes, and it would be very difficult to find any chief acceptable to all. I do not think we could have a better prospect than the arrangement

made by Sir Percy Cox for an Arab Council under his supervision. I hope that will remain for some time, until we have things straight. The lecturer, again, has told us we ought to have a federation of Persia, Afghanistan, and Bokhara, and he has told us the Ameer of Bokhara is now a refugee at Kabul. I do not know even that he is in Afghanistan; I do not think anybody here knows where the Ameer of Bokhara is at the present time.

The LECTURER: My latest information is that he is in Kabul.

Colonel C. E. YATE, M.P.: The question was asked in the House of Commons two days ago, and the representative of the Foreign Office said he had no information as to where the Ameer of Bokhara was.

The LECTURER: I have no desire to go contrary to the Foreign Office of Great Britain, but I speak from the unofficial information I get.

Colonel C. E. YATE, M.P.: We could wish him safe in Afghanistan. Perhaps Sir Edmund Barrow can tell us?

The CHAIRMAN: I do not think the Government know anything about it at all; they do not know where he is.

Colonel C. E. YATE, M.P.: Nobody, apparently, knows where he is. We will trust he is alive and well, and safely out of the hands of the Bolsheviks; but where he is we cannot say. Well, as to whether an alliance can be formed between Afghanistan, Persia, and Bokhara is a difficult question. We must remember that there is no love lost between Afghans and Persians, and the Afghans undoubtedly could overrun Persia again to-morrow if they wished, if the Persians were to be left to themselves. The Usbeks are not particularly friendly to the Afghans either. Whether they will ever come to a federation such as the lecturer talks about I cannot say. I dare say, if they could, it would result in stability generally throughout Central Asia, but at the present moment I honestly say that my experience of these three races is that it is very difficult to make them combine at all. The lecturer finally spoke a good deal about the independence of Afghanistan. That was a point he raised very strongly. I think all must acknowledge that when the British Government put the Ameer Abdul Rahman on the throne, and agreed to look after his foreign relations and defend him, the British Government did a great deal for Afghanistan; and the independence of Afghanistan rests a great deal on what the British Government did at that time. Now the Afghans claim absolute independence, and, so far as foreign relations are concerned, the British Government has granted it; but that could not have been possible if the British Government had not first of all guaranteed the Ameer Abdul Rahman on his throne, and guaranteed him against foreign interference. I agree with the lecturer that we all wish to see a friendly

and independent Afghanistan; but, with regard to the Ameer, we all remember the uncalled-for and outrageous attack on India, where he was in alliance with the rebels in India in all the Punjab disturbances last year, and we have very serious doubts as to what the real feelings of the present Ameer are. Whether he is going to turn over a new leaf we cannot say. Our lecturer said he hoped to see the Khyber Pass opened and a railway constructed through it. Sir Edmund Barrow has told us how very difficult it is for us to picket the Khyber as it is, and that we cannot allow more caravans through than two days a week. I agree. Some of the Afridis are apparently always ready to snipe the Khyber Pass, according to the telegrams we get, and we have great difficulty in protecting the caravans. Had the General Officer in Command after the last war with the Afghans been instructed to dictate the terms of peace at Dacca in Afghan territory, instead of the Government of India granting an armistice and wasting two months in useless talking at Rawalpindi, and thus giving time to the Afghans to stir up the Border tribes into a rebellion that is not even yet disposed of, how different the case would have been. Had the General dictated the terms of peace, settled himself at Dacca, and held the whole of the Khyber, we might by now have had the prospect of a railway through the Khyber. If we held Dacca at the other end, it would be possible to make the railway right through, but as it is, without Dacca, there is no proper terminus. Under present circumstances I very much doubt if such a line is practicable, but whether that line will ever come about or not will all depend on the friendship now shown to us by the Afghans, and whether they turn to the Bolsheviks or whether they turn to the British. (Applause.)

Colonel A. C. YATE: I am not going to discuss the subject of the lecture, or enter into any political discussion whatever. I have one or two remarks that I should like to make with regard to the lecturer himself. I do not think that an Afghan, as far as I am aware, has ever before lectured to a London audience. (Applause.) It must be three years since I took up the *Edinburgh Review*, and, to my interest and astonishment, saw in it an article manifestly written by an Afghan, and signed "Ikbal Ali Shah." I wrote to Mr. Harold Cox and expressed my extreme interest, and, through Mr. Cox, Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah and I became acquainted. Our acquaintance has led, I am glad to say, to his becoming a member of the Central Asian Society, and to his twice coming here and lecturing to us. That is a career for an Afghan in this country which I think so far is unexampled. If there is a previous example, and anybody knows it, I shall be delighted to hear it. Ikbal Ali Shah is leaving this country for Kabul in two or three weeks' time, and I think it must be a matter of interest to us who have known him to consider

what his career there is likely to be. We have heard his political opinions, and I have said to him myself that I hoped he would keep up a correspondence with me. I must say for myself that I shall follow his career with the very greatest interest. We know he is a friend of Britain, and I trust he will produce that good feeling between Afghanistan and Britain which will result both in the development of Afghanistan and the stability of the British Empire in the Middle East.

Colonel PEMBERTON: I think the lecture must have been of great interest to many in this audience, especially to those among us who have had the advantage of visiting Central Asia, as it has been my good fortune to do on two occasions, though it is now twenty-eight years since my travels took me to Bokhara.

You will remember that Russian domination in that part of the world may in a manner be said to date from the capture of Tashkent by General Tcherniaief in 1865, and at the date of my visit in 1892 it was still in process of consolidation.

I must pay the Russians the tribute of saying that their administration seemed good, and in a material sense to be benefiting the country; and it may certainly be claimed for them that they excelled in the rapidity with which they pushed forward railway construction, setting in this respect an example to many nations—the British in India among them.

True, this construction was undertaken chiefly on strategic grounds, but none the less the lines, forming great arteries of trade and traffic, were entirely beneficial in assisting very materially the development of the resources of the country, and its commercial relations with other Asiatic lands as well as with Europe.

Then, too, the Russian Government speedily turned their attention to cotton-growing, developing the industry in a very satisfactory manner; while in the Merv oasis, under the guidance of a foreign expert, our countryman Scott Moncrieff, whose services were lent by the British Government, they restored the elaborate systems of canals cut from the Murghab River, and which as a means of irrigation have from time immemorial maintained the well-known fertility of this island in the desert.

On the whole I think there was little to condemn in the Russian methods of civil administration in Central Asia, when you consider the mode of thought and training and arbitrary ways of the official classes in the days of the Autocracy. True, native prejudices were at times disregarded in a harsh manner, but this would appear to be not easily avoidable in dealing with backward races, and to be justified on occasion when not carried beyond a certain point—notably in such matters as sanitation, the prevention of disease, and avoidance of infection, which concern the health and well-being of the general population. Certain it is, however, that the general

impression in my mind of Russian rule in Asia was at that time a favourable one, and I had the advantage of knowing the language and of having had much intercourse with Russians of all classes in Siberia before entering Turkestan from the north.

I gathered from the remarks of one of the speakers that in his opinion a sense of moral obligation to our late Allies should preclude our dealing with the present political position in Central Asia too strictly on its merits. While sharing to some extent the generous sentiments which lead him to take this view, I do myself feel rather strongly that in the recent war we British loyally played our part, and that we cannot be said to owe Russia anything, and that, if the latter country has come to grief, the fault does not lie with us, nor is it advisable that we should consider our hands tied or our freedom of action fettered at a time like this, when new political forces are at work making for progress and reconstruction, and for a possible regrouping of the native States in those regions of Asia.

In the lecturer we have to-day a man who should certainly command our sympathies, for our relations with Afghanistan have not always been of a happy nature, or such as we can look back upon with satisfaction. Let us hope a happier era has begun; but, as Colonel Yate, than whom no one can speak with greater authority on Afghan matters, very justly observes, the nature of our future relations with that country will depend very largely on the attitude of its ruler and Government.

We must look to the Afghans to play their part, and I doubt whether latterly we have not rather looked in vain, or whether the conciliatory attitude of the Indian Government has been properly appreciated across the border.

Talk about the Khyber Pass being opened! Why, it would be opened at once could the Ameer see his way to co-operate with the Indian authorities in curbing the lawless violence of the local tribes. Railways could span Afghanistan to-morrow if the Afghan Government would give assistance and encouragement instead of placing a veto on their construction.

The Sirdar Ikbāl Ali Shah has laid great stress on the fact that Afghanistan is now a sovereign State. We in this country most truly wish God-speed to Afghanistan as such, but I would remind him that to maintain the status his native land will stand in need of the assistance, both moral and material, of its powerful neighbour in India, and not less of its goodwill. If the kingdoms and khanates of Central Asia are in the future to enjoy security and prosperity, their rulers must, above all, display the true qualities of statesmanship—moderation and political sobriety. Of course, no one who was in Tashkent, Bokhara, and Merv so long ago as 1892, and acquainted with the strength of the Tsarist Government in Central Asia at that time, can be otherwise than amazed at the general *bouleversement*

that has taken place as the result of the great Bolshevik wave which has swept over the land, submerging in its course rulers, Government, peoples, and institutions.

But we have seen so many extraordinary things happen in the world of late that we must now, in a political sense, never rule out anything. None the less, it is difficult to conceive that countries and peoples so different as are Afghanistan, Bokhara, and Persia, should be able to form a federation, however loose the political and military ties connecting them might be; for the racial and religious differences which separate them are both real and acute. In any case it behoves their leaders to remember that should the element of Chauvinism, in the form of Pan-Islamic propaganda, prove to be one of the political motives in the creation of the proposed federation of States, the union would at once forfeit the sympathy and goodwill of the Christian Powers.

It seems to me that the lecturer and the administrators of those countries have much to do before they can accomplish their purpose. Meanwhile, let us accept his assurance that their aspiration is one for safety, progress, and not aggression.

Mr. SKRINE: I should like to make one or two remarks. Like Colonel Pemberton, I am one of the few people in this country who have been in Bokhara, Tashkent, and those parts. I was very kindly received by the Ameer of Bokhara, and it was very grievous news to me to hear that he had been dethroned and exiled. I cannot believe the Afghans are in Merv. It is amazing news. It is a wonderful country; I assure you I have walked round Merv knee-deep in grapes. I could have bought a coolie-load, as much as a man could carry, for a halfpenny. I cannot believe the Afghans have got in there. If they have, all I can say is that the Afghans are Bolsheviks. (Laughter.) It is the devil or the deep sea, I do not know which. One or two little things happened to me in that tour of mine. I was very much interested hearing about Kushk. Looking at the lovely slides we had—they are extraordinarily good—those slides made me feel homesick, and carried me back more than twenty years to when I roamed over those countries. You could almost shut your eyes and fancy you were back there. A funny thing happened at Kushk. I had got some Cossacks who followed me about, but I had a Persian there who was more than a match for the Cossacks. We dodged the Cossacks, and I pitched my two tents on a range of hills south of Kushk, known as the Paropamisus. Those hills are supposed to be a terrible drawback to railway construction; they are really about twice as high as Primrose Hill. Well, I got my tent there, and on the other side of the Kushk River I saw a number of tents pitched. I called to my servant to know what it was. "Oh," he said, that is a regiment of Afghan cavalry." I said, "Will you kindly give my salaams to the colonel and major, and ask them to have a cup

of tea." They rode over in the afternoon on superb horses. These were cast horses from the Ameer's stable, the only horses in Kabul marked with a crescent. They were splendid horses, proud as Jupiter. When they came up to my tent I saw, to my astonishment, on the collar of the colonel "Ticket Collector," and on the other man's collar "Guard"—in English. After salaams we sat down and began to eat, and I said, "Do you know what those words are?" They replied, "Oh no; we do not know what they mean. They are English words; I believe one means 'General,' and the other something like that." I do not know whether I ought to tell you this, but the Ameer, although a very great man, had a frugal mind; and he was in the habit of buying at auction in Peshawar the old cast-off uniforms from the State railways—uniforms previously used by the railway officers. I wish our present Government would take a leaf out of his book without going quite so far as that. (Laughter.) The Turcoman carpets are really marvellous. I cannot for the life of me understand how they are made. They are of most extraordinary, beautiful, and complicated patterns; but the last time I was in Bokhara I found them being ruined by German aniline dyes. They used to use old vegetable dyes. What puzzled me was that they have absolutely no pattern. The pattern is given out in a humming tone by an old woman who learned it from her grandmother, and the weavers work according to her verbal instructions. That is how the thing is done—a most remarkable exhibition of the power of the human memory. I will not say any more beyond expressing the great pleasure I have had in the lecture. Also I have learned a great deal from Colonel Yate and Colonel Pemberton. I thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

Colonel E. V. GABRIEL: I should like to express my entire concurrence in the view of Sir Mortimer Durand,* that we should not criticize but show sympathy with the proposal of the lecturer. Our main preoccupation at the present time is to protect India, not from Russia, but from Bolshevism. (Hear, hear.) Anything that tends towards that end should command our sympathy, and this proposed federation is not necessarily a permanent union of those three States—that might cause trouble in another way; it is merely a protective federation against what we regard as a pernicious political creed that is worming its way through to India. It would be a political federation much in the same way as the Holy Alliance of Metternich in 1814, and might dissolve in the same way. There is another point that I hope Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah will have no doubts about. He

* It is much to be regretted that no report of Sir Mortimer Durand's brief but, as coming from him, weighty pronouncement on the subject of a Central Asian Federation has reached me. The opinion which I heard him deliver was opposed to that of Mr. W. E. D. Allen and in agreement with that expressed by Colonels Pemberton and Gabriel. He saw no reason why Britain should be other than benevolently passive, if Afghanistan, Persia, and the Khanates formed a confederacy intended to keep Bolshevik Russia at bay.—A. C. Y.

talked about the high-handedness of the British. Well, from the point of view of the Asiatic, I can quite understand what he means. I consider that the action of the British officers in Mesopotamia, which was mentioned by Colonel Yate, was certainly very high-handed. I am recently from the Near East myself, and I have seen many examples of it. I have been secretary on the North-West Frontier, and have seen many examples of it there. I talk about high-handedness from the point of view of Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah; I do not mean that it is actual high-handedness. We have all of us done our best to avoid anything of the kind on the spot; but we have received orders from people sitting in easy-chairs in London sometimes, that have led us to do what we consider on the spot high-handed action. (Hear, hear.) It has gone very much against the grain, and we sympathize entirely with the Asiatic view on that particular point. But these are matters of high policy with which we cannot interfere, and I hope he will not think that British officers on the spot have taken that attitude generally. It is too late to discuss the main question.

The CHAIRMAN: The lecturer will now sum up.

The LECTURER: Sir, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I may be permitted to elucidate one or two points which have arisen. It was not my intention to bring the Persian and the Mesopotamia questions into our present discussion. I am not sure whether, in such a Central Asian Federation, one would propose to amalgamate Persian and Mesopotamian interests with those of Bokhara and Afghanistan. Personally I do not think so. Besides, I do not believe in discussing either of these countries till I have more data in hand than I possess to-day. A friend of ours who spoke before me said something about official thralldom and high-handedness. What I stated was that all officials, whether British or Asian, should not speak to the people from a pedestal. No doubt at times an official is bound down to the traditions of his service, but I know it for a fact that whenever he is made to do something not quite correct he resents it all the time he is doing it. Further, it is my belief—which I have formed through meeting various people in this country—that a British gentleman is very difficult to beat. Some people possess rare abilities, and to my mind they are not only the Empire-makers, but Empire-sustainers; the latter of the two qualities is the more important. What I complained was that no indiscreet remarks should be made to prejudice foreign people in the East, and particularly the Afghans.

Coming to the actual question, I cannot too often emphasize the fact that this federation of Central Asia is purely a defensive measure. Sir Mortimer Durand has, as you have heard, attested to the truth. I have done my best in telling you about Bolshevism. I am not an avowed enemy of Russia, I am an avowed enemy of a bad system,

of a destructive scheme. Give it any name you like, as long as it is a bad doctrine I am an enemy to it. As it happens, Bolshevism is a bad system, and as Bolshevism is an enemy of Islam, also an enemy of peace of your Asiatic possessions, I consider it important that, if you cannot help in the federation, you should not hinder its progression. It will be a barrier to stand firm in the way of the Bolsheviks—Bolshevism, the common enemy of yours and ours.

I cannot let another point pass which, although I have discussed it in my paper, has not sufficiently been appreciated. This is a perfectly friendly discussion, and I wish to be nothing but a friend of Great Britain, but I must say that whatever obligations may have been on Amir Abdur Rahman, and whatever the status of his illustrious son, Habibullah Khan, there is no denying the fact that we cannot hear such terms used for Afghan independence as "*Afghanistan has now acquired something like an independence.*" The Afghans have complete independence. The phrase "something like an independence" is the only phrase to which I object. Beyond that I consider what Lord Curzon has said is just and right, and I certainly reckon him as an authority on Eastern matters. The present attitude of the Afghans is friendly towards you; do not do anything which may cause misunderstandings. If you can put in a good word for their cause, go out of your way and try to placate them, and bring sentiments of a lasting friendship, so that we can bring the Central Asian people together. I hope to live to see a day when a complete and sincere friendship will be cemented between the East and the West—certainly between Afghanistan and India. I hope to play my part in the furtherance of that noble task, and I am going to the East with this intention.

My friend Colonel A. C. Yate has told you rightly that I have learned a great deal of the inner life of our British gentlemen. He has praised me, and has given me credit which I do not deserve. It is the result of his own noble-mindedness. I have accomplished nothing as yet, but one thing I have acquired, that being to see the fine points of British character. People had often spoken about so-called Jingo Imperialists. Well, I have met many British gentlemen of varied ways of thinking, but I have not as yet come across one single man who may be styled as Jingo. Those people who really matter in this country have no thought of belittling the East. Mistakes have undoubtedly been made, and which human being is free from faults?

You should make a common cause with the Afghans, and when I go to the East, and you are friendly inclined, medicine would be my secondary work, but I shall devote my attention first to advocate Anglo-Afghan friendship.

I may add, ladies and gentlemen, that whatever line of policy I may adopt, I will first and foremost advocate it for the Afghans.

But as would readily be understood, no politics can be discussed, unless one sides with some really useful and disinterested friend. In Afghanistan potentialities there are in plenty, but the help of someone must be sought to build up a greater nation in Afghanistan. The comparative study of various political doctrines has strengthened my mind that by far the best friend that the Afghans can get is this country. But it is not implied that any exploitation of Afghanistan may be the price paid for its development. For my own part, I do not see any fear of that. It must be a disinterested help, and that kind can only be given by this Government. It is, therefore, for this reason that, in advocating the cause of Afghanistan, I praised Great Britain. On that account people have called me traitor to the East and a pro-British. I regard such allegations with the contempt which they deserve. I have no sympathy with the firebrand Easterner. No country has ever gained anything through the agency of bomb-throwers. Russia is a living example.

The CHAIRMAN: Before I ask you to pass a vote of thanks to the lecturer for what he has told us to-night, I would like to observe that I am sure we here are all in agreement that we wish sincerely for the independence of Afghanistan. I am sure those who have had the most to do with Afghanistan are only anxious to maintain that independence. (Applause.) Further, I would say that I think we are all in agreement with him that the spread of Bolshevism to the East is just as dangerous as the spread of Bolshevism to the West. It is a poison which is being disseminated over the whole world, and anything which will arrest the spread of this poison East and West is, I think, to be welcomed. I hope the lecturer, when he goes back to his own country, will endeavour to impress that view upon all those who have any influence in shaping the course of Afghan politics. (Hear, hear.) Remarks have been made here regarding Mesopotamia and Persia, and I can only say this, that if we ever withdrew—but I will not use the word *ever*, as that connotes the future—if we *now* withdrew from those countries we should undoubtedly see them overrun with Bolshevik ideas; and with that fact before us we know that the poison would soon spread to India; and possibly cause the ruin of the British Indian Empire. (Hear, hear.) I will now conclude by asking you to pass a vote of thanks to the lecturer for having come here to-day to inform us of the views of his own countrymen regarding the several movements that are going on in Central Asia at the present time. (Applause.)

The vote of thanks was unanimously accorded, and this ended the meeting.

Note.—As Sirdar Ikbāl Ali Shah left for Kabul very soon after delivering this lecture, he requested me to correct his proof. This has been done with every care.—A. C. Y.

IN RUSSIAN TURKESTAN UNDER THE BOLSHEVIKS.

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held at 74, Grosvenor Street, London, W. 1, on Thursday, November 18, 1920, the principal business being to hear a lecture read by Major F. M. Bailey, C.I.E. The chair was occupied by General Sir Edmund Barrow.

The formal business of the meeting having been disposed of, the Chairman called on Major Bailey to deliver his address.

I PROPOSE to carry on the story which Sir George Macartney told the Society last year of the mission sent to Russian Turkestan in 1918, and to give a short account of events in Russian Turkestan up to the time of my escape to Persia in January last.

After the departure of Sir George Macartney and Major Blacker, the position of Mr. Tredwell, the Consul for the United States, and myself became increasingly difficult. The Bolsheviki were exasperated at our action in sending troops against them both on the Morman coast and in Transcaspia. Permission to leave the country had been refused me, and Kolisoff, the Chief Kommissar, told me that "the Government" had grave suspicions of me.

Mr. Tredwell and I, together with some other foreign subjects, had once been arrested by the Extraordinary Enquiry Commission, a gang of rascals who had power to do what they liked in cases of danger to the republic. Mr. Tredwell had been once released, and Kolisoff and Damagatsky, the Foreign Kommissar, had personally apologized to him. Some days before this the Central Government at Moscow had telegraphed ordering the arrest of all Allied officials, and their "destruction" if they could not be kept safely. To the credit of the Turkestan Government, they refused to carry out this order at once, but telegraphed to Moscow for further instructions, in the meantime keeping six clumsy spies each on Mr. Tredwell and myself. Finally, on October 20, 1918, we heard that the reply from Moscow had been received, directing our arrest, and I disappeared as arranged, and a few days later Mr. Tredwell was arrested and kept under a guard in his own house until he was sent to Moscow and on to America in March, 1919. There had been 110,000 Austrian prisoners in Russian Turkestan, but owing to the dreadful state of the camps, many of these had died of typhus, neglect, and starvation. On the outbreak of the revolution the survivors were set free, and there were about 30,000 in Turkestan at the time of our arrival.

The prisoners were mostly Magyars. It was also reported that a German staff had reached Astrakhan, and were to come across the Caspian to Turkestan for the purpose of organizing them; but our troops in Transcaspia prevented communication except by a difficult desert route, and the collapse of the Central Powers in Europe occurred at this time and no more was heard of them.

The Bolsheviks organized propaganda to persuade the prisoners to join the army, and at least 50 per cent. of the Turkestan Red army were prisoners of war. The Magyars joined in great numbers, but other nationalities for the most part refused. The Germans, of whom there were only about 1,200, retained a certain amount of discipline under Lieutenant Zimmermann, who dissuaded them from joining, but endeavoured to form a detachment under German officers, which the Bolsheviks would not allow, as it would have only been a part of the Red army nominally.

It was a comparatively simple matter to pretend to be an Austrian prisoner. The language difficulty was not serious, as the prisoners in Turkestan consisted of Germans, Poles, Magyars, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Serbs, Roumanians, Italians, Alsations, and people from Galacia who spoke Little Russian. If one met a prisoner one could always pretend to belong to one of the other nationalities; but it was best to avoid meeting other prisoners at all.

The situation of the Government at this time was very serious. They were entirely cut off on all sides by enemies, as described by Sir George Macartney.

On the west in Transcaspia, Askhabad, Merv, and the country almost up to the Oxus, was held by their enemies. On the north Dutoff was holding the Orenburg-Tashkent railway-line with his Cossacks. In Semirechia there was a large rising of Russian peasants, while in Ferghana a Mohammedan named Irgash was out with a large following of natives and a few Russians. The Soviet army also lacked discipline at this time. The troops at the front would hold a meeting and decide whether they would attack the enemy. After much speechifying it might be decided to advance, when someone would point out that it was impossible owing to lack of water or supplies. They would then wait while supplies were brought up, when a fresh meeting would be held, which as like as not would decide not to attack, and the army would sit doing nothing for several days. When it became evident that war could not be carried on on these lines a very strict discipline was introduced, and the poor Soviet soldier found himself much worse off than when in the Russian Imperial army.

Had these different parties acted in concert, there is no doubt that, as far as Turkestan was concerned, Bolshevism would have come to an end, and the people of all nationalities would have been

freed from the most tyrannical oppression. Further, an anti-Bolshevik army would have been formed, which would have advanced along the Orenburg railway, and Kolchak would have found allies on his left flank instead of enemies, and would have been able to draw supplies from Turkestan, and the whole future of Russia might have been altered.

The Bolsheviks in Turkestan formed a very small minority of the whole population. Except for a few adventurers, none of the Mohammedans, who form about 95 per cent. of the population, were Bolshevik, though some of the lower classes were driven by hunger to join the Red army. Bolshevism is directly opposed to the Moslem religion, and it should be noted that the anti-clericalism of the Bolsheviks was as much directed against the Mohammedan clergy as against the Christian, though anti-Christian action was more open. A friend of mine who was in the service of the Bolsheviks wished to get married, but this could not be done in church without getting him into trouble with his employers, and the lady would not be satisfied with the civil marriage which had been instituted by the Government. One great advantage of the Bolshevik marriage was that it entitled the pair to a permit to purchase four bottles of wine to celebrate the event, and people who had been properly married for years would go through a Bolshevik marriage, which only cost seven roubles, for the sake of the liquor. Marriage was accomplished by signing a document in the presence of a notary, and divorce by cancelling the agreement in the same way.

On my disappearance the Bolsheviks at first thought I had been murdered by German agents, or that I had met with an accident. Actually I had left the town and attempted to reach Kashgar via Ferghana, but found this impossible, and I was obliged to remain hidden for some time outside the town.

Our only source of information about the outside world and the war was the Bolshevik Press. This contained telegrams collected by the Moscow wireless and passed on by wireless to Tashkent. According to these messages every country was on the verge of revolution, and strikes and conflicts between the "workers" and the police were reported from all over Europe.

In the summer of 1919 great hopes were centred on strikes which were to take place in Great Britain and France to force the Governments to make peace with and recognize the Russian Soviet Governments. When the strikes failed to materialize and the leaders said things disapproving of the Russian Soviet system, the papers were filled with diatribes against the Western proletariat who had "betrayed" them. There was usually a paragraph in a corner of the newspaper headed "Imperialists' War," from which we gathered that things were going all right for us on the Western front. Then one

day news appeared of the Armistice, and the German and Austrian prisoners at once formed *Soviets*, who took charge of the prisoners' organizations, including the Red Cross and its funds. Later the prisoners formed a Communist party, which the German officers did their best to prevent German prisoners from joining.

In January I was returning to Tashkent when an anti-Bolshevik rebellion broke out in the town. A word of explanation may be given of this clumsy expression "anti-Bolshevik." The Bolsheviks called all their enemies "counter-revolutionaries," and one got into the habit of using this word in conversation. I came across very few Monarchists, and the bulk of the people of education were in favour of some constitutional government and opposed to the former autocratic Tsarist régime almost as much as to the present Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Many of these had been labelled as revolutionaries under the Monarchy, and were mortally offended at being called "counter-revolutionaries."

The leader of the outbreak in January, 1919, was a young man called Ossipoff, who had been War Kommissar, and had in October been a violent Bolshevik, and had personally prevented a courier of mine from going to Kashgar, although the Foreign Kommissar had promised me the permission. He was, like so many Bolshevik Kommissars, an adventurer and opportunist. This man treacherously telephoned to the Government headquarters saying that trouble had broken out, and asking the Kommissars to come immediately to confer. Eight of them came, and were at once shot by Ossipoff and his men. The key to Tashkent is the fort, which is situated between the old Mohammedan and new Russian towns. This was held by Magyars, and the White Guards never took it, though for one day they had command of the Russian town. The railway workmen were well organized and formed a compact political body who were opposed to the Bolsheviks. They had had a leading part in this rebellion, but eventually turned to the side of the Bolsheviks, and of their two leaders one was later tried and shot and the other went mad. There are several stories to account for the failure of their attempt to finish Bolshevism in Turkestan. One is that Kolasaieff, the commander of a regiment who had turned against the Bolsheviks, entered Ossipoff's headquarters and greeted him as "Comrade." Ossipoff, who was drunk, said that they were no longer "Comrades," and he would trouble him to be more respectful when talking to his leader. On this Kolasaieff went out and turned all his men against Ossipoff. The latter then collected what men he could and retired to the mountains to the north, but many parties of his men who were patrolling the streets were never warned of his retirement and were caught and shot. The Bolsheviks exacted dreadful vengeance for this attempt, which they attributed to the bourgeoisie. Every house

was searched, and all officers and *most* men of the upper and middle classes were taken out and shot in circumstances of great brutality. The men were stripped naked, as their clothes were wanted by the Bolsheviks, and they were kept waiting in intense cold until their turn came to be shot. Exclusive of the few killed in street fights, about 4,000 men were executed at this time in a few days. Their trial consisted in some Red soldiers saying that they had carried arms in the street, when a "Judge," without listening to any defence, ordered the execution. Some of those executed were quite innocent. Had the whole of the intelligent classes taken part in the affair, the rebellion would probably have been successful; as it was, the whole of this class suffered. Among the victims was M. Kleberg, head of the Sweden Red Cross Mission, who had nothing whatever to do with the rebellion, but no word of defence was permitted, and probably he was not even allowed to say who he was. A great number of schoolboys of fifteen and upwards were shot, and I knew one boy of fourteen who was arrested but spared on account of his youth. It is difficult here to realize this awful tragedy of Tashkent, a town of about 90,000 Russian inhabitants. Whole streets of the better class districts had every man executed. One man, Tolkachoff, boasted that at this time he shot 758 men with his own hand, and later he shot others, and was even allowed a ration of wine, as he said it helped him in this work! Several women who had fed the White Guards on this occasion were also shot.

It is fair to say that, apart from these executions, which were carried out in the most inhuman manner, I heard of no cases of wanton torture inflicted by the Bolsheviks, such as have been related from other parts of Russia.

At this time a small British force was in occupation of Merv and the country to the east, and the population of Turkestan was daily expecting and hoping for news of an advance to deliver them from the unsupportable Bolshevik tyranny. After the suppression of the January rebellion there were no elements left capable of being organized against the Bolsheviks, and the only hope of the people was the advance of our troops. I myself was so confident of their advance that I did not think it worth while to take the great risk of leaving the town. For some time after the January events the roads were very carefully watched for escaping anti-Bolsheviks, and the danger of being caught was far greater than in December.

I was not myself in Tashkent during this rebellion. I was actually driving into the town the day it broke out, and was turned back by the news when I had only ten versts more to go, and was obliged to hide in a village until the town quieted down and I was able to enter. Here I lived with peasants in the guise of an Austrian soldier, and had a good opportunity of seeing the results of giving political

power too suddenly into the hands of people who neither understood it nor wanted it. The village I was in was divided politically into two halves; one end believed themselves to be Bolshevik, and the other Left Social Revolutionary, though no single man knew anything about differences between these parties. Rumours of the coming rebellion in Tashkent reached the village, and the L.S.R.'s decided to murder the Bolsheviks, who were in a minority; so off they started, full of drink. The Bolshevik portion of the village fled and hid some miles off, and the L.S.R.'s returned home. They then received news that there were no longer such things as L.S.R.'s and Bolsheviks, but that they were united in one party called Communists, and were opposed by the White Guard, who were striving to replace the "old régime." On this the two parties kissed in the streets and went off against Ossipoff.

The Russian peasants were only Bolshevik when Bolshevism consisted in getting rid of a landlord. As soon as this was done, they became landowners themselves, and were consequently classed as bourgeoisie, especially if they employed any labour on their land.

Up to March, 1919, the Soviet Government of Turkestan was cut off from direct communication with Moscow except by wireless, as Dutoff's Cossacks were lying across the Orenburg-Tashkent railway, and an anti-Bolshevik force held the Transcaspian line at Merv and Askabad. In March, however, Dutoff retired, and through railway communication was established for a short time. The Bolshevik leaders in Turkestan included no men of education. The Chief Kommissar had been an oiler on the railway, and most of the other Kommissars were men of this sort. The result was that chaos was worse even than at Moscow and other parts of Russia, where the leaders were fanatical but educated idealists. The Moscow leaders were alarmed at the news from Turkestan, where the Russian population was only 5 per cent., and of this small minority a very small proportion were genuine Bolsheviks. They therefore took the opportunity of the opening of the railway to send some more intelligent men to Tashkent. With them appeared some Indian revolutionaries who had been in Berlin during the war. Prominent among them was one Barkatullah, who had been Foreign Secretary of the Provisional Government of India, Mohendra Pratab, whom later I met in New Bokhara, being president. This "Provisional Government" had been formed in Berlin with the object of administering India after we had been driven out. Barkatullah, when in Turkestan, masqueraded as a German subject, and called himself German Envoy to Afghanistan. With him was associated a notorious agitator, Mohammad Kazim Beg, a Turk, who styled himself Turkish Envoy to Afghanistan. These men conducted a violent Anglophobe propaganda, chiefly directed against the Administration of India. The papers were filled

with lurid accounts of the events in the Punjab in the spring of 1919, of which we have heard so much lately. Their accounts of India would surprise anyone who had had personal acquaintance with our system of administration: "Thousands are hanged for expressing love of their country." "In the gaols they perish of disease." "Trials are conducted in English, a language which the people do not understand." "Parts of India remain uncultivated, as the yield is insufficient to cover the exorbitant taxation, and the famine-stricken people are enticed into the army and forced to destroy their brothers, with the result that many battalions have mutinied." "Factories are not allowed to be established." "Education is not allowed." "Men are forced to work for twelve hours a day in the hot weather on a wage of 3d. to 6d. a day, and often, under a system of forced labour, for nothing at all." "They are sent to British Colonies against their will." "An army, known by the natives as the Army of Murderers, had been raised—from the frontier tribes, mostly Afghans, to subdue the people"—this last a curious confession while the Bolsheviks were considering an alliance with Afghanistan, and had an Afghan Mission in the town. "India was forced to pay vast sums for the war," etc. A good deal of abuse was also directed against the United States.

It was also stated that we had not taken our fair share of fighting in the war, but had egged on the French, Belgians, and others, and especially had employed Indians. The total British casualties had been only 50,000, while the Indian casualties were much higher.

The arrival of the politicians from Moscow had the effect of steadying the Administration to some extent. Executions without trial became less frequent, and when Tolkatchoff amused himself by shooting three men whom he found in gaol the new Government was somewhat annoyed. At the same time, the pursuit of their enemies among the population was more vigorous, and carried on with more intelligence.

Notices were posted in the streets asking people to report the evil doings of the bourgeoisie, speculators, saboteurs, and hooligans. "One word, a small fact, will often give a clue to the discovery of a conspiracy. If desired, these communications will be kept secret." This sort of thing did not make life pleasant.

The Turkestan republic had always shown itself disinclined to obey implicitly the orders received from Moscow, and these new men tried to bring the Government into line with the desires of the Central Government in Moscow, which led to a good deal of friction. One point which Moscow insisted on was that the native population should receive the same treatment, and be given a voice in proportion to their numbers—i.e., 95 per cent. This would have meant the end of Bolshevism at once, as the native Mohammedans, except for a few

adventurers, were directly opposed to Lenin's Dictatorship of the Proletariat.

In the spring of 1919, at the commencement of the Afghan war, a Mission appeared from Afghanistan under command of General Mohammad Wali Khan. He stated that he had come to get the sanction of the Peace Conference to the declaration of independence by Afghanistan. He was accompanied by some Indian revolutionaries, with one of whom I had a talk through an interpreter. He thought I was an Austrian officer.

The Mission was unable to reach the Peace Conference, as the Orenburg railway was again cut by Kolchak's men, and the Transcaspian line still held by anti-Bolsheviks. When the railway to Orenburg was eventually opened, they went to Moscow. The Afghans asked the Bolsheviks for assistance in their war against us, but none could be given. This led to a local sensation when the Opposition asked publicly why assistance had not been given, and the Government replied that they were not sure against whom the arms asked for would be used. This was considered a reflection on the honesty of the Afghans and the Opposition made much political capital out of it, and an Afghan wrote to the papers to say that the British had offered them money and arms if they would fight the Bolsheviks; but the Afghans had rejected the offer, and held out the hand of friendship to the workmen and peasants of Soviet Russia.

The news of the Afghan war as reported in the Tashkent Press showed nothing but Afghan victories, including the capture of Peshawar. Some surprise was therefore caused by a wireless message from Europe saying that peace had been concluded and British troops had evacuated Afghanistan. The Government asked the Afghan Consul, who had been installed on the departure of the Mission for Moscow, to explain the evacuation of Afghanistan by the British, when the only news received had been the capture of Indian territory by Afghans. The Consul published a shameless statement in which he said that the peace was merely to enable the Afghans to harvest their crops, regroup their armies, and consolidate their hold on British territory captured.

An interesting interview with the head of the Mission was published in the Press. The Afghan General stated that the Rowlatt Bill forbade Mohammedans to pray in their mosques and Hindus in their temples. The people of India appealed to Afghanistan through their newspapers for help against this inhuman law. The Afghans, owing to disturbances near their frontier, then moved some soldiers to strengthen their frontier posts. These were attacked without warning by our troops.

The Bolsheviks openly aim at world revolution; the way to accomplish this is to encourage revolutionary elements in other

countries. They openly stated that their policy with regard to Bokhara and Khiva was to support the revolutionary movements of the "Young Khiva" and "Young Bokhara" parties and to organize there "revolutionary colonies." They should not strive for a revolution by force, but await the moment when the revolution will come naturally as a result of this encouragement. The Afghan Government, while welcoming Soviet Ambassadors, made them promise not to indulge in any propaganda.

The economic situation of the republic was desperate. They had no machinery for collecting taxes, and they financed themselves by printing paper money and by levying contributions from people who were known to be wealthy. A representative of the Special Department would call and quietly inform you that your contribution was 50,000 roubles, or some such amount. If the unhappy bourgeois refused to pay he was taken to gaol. Here on one occasion three of them were shot, after which threats were usually sufficient to produce the money. One trick they played was to take the men out of the gaol one by one and say they would shoot them if they did not pay. The man would be walked round the corner and a shot fired, and the Red Guards come round for their next victim, who, thinking his predecessor had been shot, usually promised to find the money somehow; but as far as I know only three men were killed for this reason. Many people actually had not the money. Their money may have been tied up in shares, and of course all such money had long ago been nationalized. People were obliged to sell jewellery and even furniture to meet these demands for contributions.

At first insurances up to a very small amount were allowed to stand, though, of course, the funds of the companies were taken over. Later all insurances were repudiated. All houses and property even of a very small rental were nationalized. Great numbers of houses were required for public offices, which increased enormously with the Soviet régime. Members of the Quartering Commission would appear and inform the resident that his house was required, and he would be told to leave next morning, or at best he would be given a few days to make other arrangements. Later the furniture was also nationalized with the house. In the uncertainty people had been selling their furniture to natives (who had opportunities of hiding it in the old city) for a fraction of its value in order to save something, but eventually this was forbidden by law. On being turned out of one's house, one was obliged to search for quarters, and then to go to the Quartering Commission and wait hours in a queue for a written permission to live there. Then one might find oneself living with rude Bolshevik soldiers or other unpleasant companions. The best thing to do was for several upper-class families voluntarily to vacate their houses and take rooms together. Thus you lived

with decent people, and provided you packed so many people into the house that it could hold no more you were not likely to be disturbed, but if there appeared room the Quartering Commission would put in someone else.

Turkestan is a great country for fruit. This is sold in kiosks in the streets of Tashkent and other towns. Naturally, owing to the increasing depreciation of the local currency, prices rose. This was put down to speculation. The Government then fixed prices for all fruit, and imposed penalties for selling or buying above the fixed rate; but they did not realize how interdependent commodities are, and the immediate result of this order was that no fruit appeared at all, and a fresh hardship was inflicted on the population. At this time I was stopping at a village some fifty miles from Tashkent, and here fruit could be bought for next to nothing, and cattle were being fed on the choicest melons. I found that owing to the high price of fodder, cartage was so expensive that it did not pay to carry fruit in and sell at the prices fixed, and the people of Tashkent were deprived of very valuable food. Very fine strawberries were on sale for a few days in Tashkent, but suddenly an order was issued nationalizing them for the benefit of the Red troops, after which none could be obtained. The fruit-trees in the private gardens even were nationalized, and in the spring lists were made and the occupiers told that when the fruit ripened they were not to eat it as it belonged to the State. All such property as motor-cars, horses and carriages was of course taken, and as many pianos as were required were taken (naturally the best) for the Conservatory of Music. Private teaching of music and foreign languages, by means of which some of the 30,000 German and Austrian prisoners managed to pick up a living, was discouraged. The teacher was labelled a "speculator" and the employer as a "bourgeois."

No private house was safe from requisitions. A party of soldiers or militia would arrive and say that your carpets were required to decorate the theatre in honour of the Afghan Mission or for some other reason. None of these things were, of course, ever returned. The Museum contained articles of all sorts requisitioned from private houses, and even shamelessly labelled as such. Although in the beginning these requisition or other oppressive measures were carried out by the genuine workpeople against the better classes, later the power got into the hands of more fanatical Bolsheviks and of the scum of the country, and workpeople who had been all in favour of the earlier pleasures and delighted in robbing those who were better off than themselves found themselves classed as bourgeoisie and robbed in their turn, until the whole country was and is groaning under a ruthless oppression.

The Grand Duke Nicholas (not the famous soldier, but an uncle

of the late Tsar) had lived for many years in Tashkent, but died during the war. His palace was nationalized and turned into a museum open to the public, and his widow was left there as caretaker.

Before Bolshevism came to upset the economic life of Turkestan the chief crop grown was cotton. The farming of this was so profitable that corn was not grown in sufficient quantities to feed the inhabitants, and had to be imported. The disturbed state of the country has put a stop to all this, and corn was grown. The nationalization of land has now almost stopped this. No farmer was going to sow a crop which would be taken from him without payment, and in 1919 each farmer sowed sufficient for himself, his family, and a few friends. The position became so acute that the Government had to renounce the scheme of land nationalization and do their best to induce farmers to sow. One result of the isolation of Turkestan was that they were deprived of oil, which was the fuel chiefly employed on their railways and factories. A little coal and oil is obtained from Ferghana, but the chief fuel had to be *saxaul* wood (*Anabasis ammodendron*), a bush which grows in the deserts. This even became difficult to obtain owing to lack of transport facilities, as that near the railways was cut. At one time they burnt quantities of dried fish caught in the Aral Sea.

The population of the towns were put on ration tickets. This entitled you to stand in a queue for hours, and then buy half or sometimes only a quarter of a pound of bread at a cheap rate. Occasionally meat or salt fish was given or cotton oil for cooking, "tea" made of dried apples, and perhaps monthly a piece of calico (nationalized from some merchant or private house), a box of matches, or whatever it was. Before the revolution cotton oil was not used for cooking even by the poorest, but now you are lucky if you get any. It is also used for burning; the usual light in a house in Tashkent is a saucer of cotton oil with some twisted bits of cotton-wool as wicks burning round the edge. The streets were quite dark, and trams ran only to take members of the vast bureaucracy to their business and back, and the public were not allowed to use them. Some houses still had electric light, but these favoured buildings were nationalized and the people turned out.

The Bolsheviks are attempting to force their form of government on the Mohammedan population, who desire none of it. The large Mussulman urban population, mostly traders, suffer from the unrest and dislocation of trade.

In the country each Mohammedan village has nominally an executive committee ("Ispolkom"), but the election for this among the natives is purely fictional, as the people do not understand and do not wish to be bothered with an election. The

actual fact is that the "Aksakal," or village headman, is made to call himself "Comrade the President of the Executive Committee," and some house in the village bears a notice-board "Headquarters of the Executive Committee," but there is, of course, no executive committee, and life is carried on much as before. The chief effect of the Bolshevik revolution on the native rural population is that everything is more expensive, and they are liable to be robbed by Red Guards or have their property confiscated. They pay no taxes, as the Government has no means of collecting any.

As their chief source of income was the printing press, the financial situation of the republic was appalling. Part of their system of equality was that all salaries should be equal. The monthly wage was 800 roubles paid in local Turkestan paper money, which was not backed by anything, and in which no one had any confidence; the result was that in this currency prices went bounding up until 800 roubles was insufficient. The Government then simply raised the salaries and printed more paper of higher value.

This system is still going on. In April of this year the ordinary salary was 2,000 roubles a month, while specialists were allowed more. This granting of extra pay to specialists is a distinct renunciation of the principle of equality.

When I left the country the Soviet money was worth one-tenth of a similar face value of the Nikolai or Imperial paper money. Gold and silver and even copper money were unknown. Small change was given in postage-stamps specially printed for the purpose on thick paper. A pound of tea cost 1,200 roubles, $2\frac{1}{2}$ yards of cheap calico 300 roubles, a box of matches 30 roubles. The purchasing power of the one-kopek note can be imagined when it required 3,000 to buy one box of matches. This year I hear the price of a box of matches is 800 roubles—i.e., 80,000 one-kopek notes!

One result of the uncontrolled employment of this useless paper was that gradually the notes of smaller value dropped out of circulation and notes of higher value had to be printed. In January, 1919, the highest denomination was a note of 100 roubles. Then notes of 250 were made, followed later by 500 and 1,000, and now I hear that a million-rouble note has been issued. There can be no end to this system except the exhaustion of paper and ink.

All this time I was living in Tashkent in the guise of an Austrian officer. Most of the Austrian prisoners had by this time discarded their uniform, which was worn out, and wore Russian dress. I had several narrow escapes of being caught, and had to change my name and get fresh papers several times. One couple with whom I lived really believed I was an Austrian, and kept bringing me tit-bits of information that they thought I should like to know, and asking me stupid questions about my country, and I had to simulate interest.

The 1st of May was a great day. The streets were hung with red (frequently old newspapers, which were for some time printed on red paper, as there was a shortage of other colours). Large crowds marched in procession carrying banners printed with the different trade union badges and the usual Bolshevik war-cries: "Long live the world revolution," "Down with the bourgeoisie," etc. All the school-children were also turned out in procession, carrying small red flags in their hands and frequently wearing a wreath. One little girl, seeing I had no red badge, presented me with a bunch of poppies, which I wore. These processions gathered at the cross-roads outside the "Dom Sovieta," or Liberty Hall, where speeches were delivered and revolutionary songs sung, while an aeroplane circled overhead. The Bolsheviks organized these demonstrations very well. Men in different parts of the crowd would hand out the words of the "International" (or whatever the song was) and lead the singing, and the people near would join in until the whole crowd would be singing. It was a very simple matter to make a speech at demonstrations of this kind. The crowds usually could not hear a word of what the orator was saying, but suddenly he would bellow out "Long live Red Russia," or "World Revolution," or "Red Army," or any such cry, or "Down with the Imperialists," or "exploiters," or "bourgeoisie." On this the band, which was always handy, played a few bars of the "International," and all the crowds clapped and cheered. Very few troops showed up on these occasions, as they were mostly away on the different fronts.

In July about 4,000 men in first-class British uniform, with a few in Chinese dress, arrived in Tashkent. At first these were announced as prisoners captured from Kolchak's army in a great victory, but later they were welcomed as deserters, and took part in processions and demonstrations. The papers were full of jests about these men—"Tommy from Tomsk," etc.

The names of the streets and parks of the town were changed to perpetuate the memory of their leaders. The principal street in Tashkent had been called the Kauffmannskaya, after the Russian General who captured Tashkent. This was changed to Karl Marx-kaya. There was also an Engelsky Prospekt, which had been the Moscovskaya, but very few even among the most rabid Bolsheviks could accustom themselves to these new names. They even changed the name of Askhabad to Poltaratsky, a Kommissar who had been shot.

In the centre of Tashkent was a group of statuary representing General Kauffmann with a soldier planting a flag and another sounding a trumpet. This the Bolsheviks removed wholesale, and were about to replace it by a workman carrying a red flag. The only sculptor in the place, an Austrian prisoner, refused to undertake the

job unless they refrained from painting the flag red. Apparently the Bolsheviks could not come to terms with him on this subject, and eventually a bust of Lenin was put up; but as it was only made of mud, it dissolved with the first shower of rain. On special occasions this empty pedestal was decorated with photos of Karl Marx and of the Kommissars who had been shot by Ossipoff's men in January, 1919.

The streets of Tashkent are broad, with trees down both sides, frequently in double rows. These are poplars, mulberries, and acacias. The scent of the acacia-blossoms on a spring morning was really wonderful. Last winter about half of these trees were cut down for fuel, utterly ruining the appearance of the town. Each householder was given a tree standing in the street as a fuel ration for the winter, and was obliged to make his own arrangements for felling and chopping it. A man possessed of an axe or saw could make a small fortune (in paper money) by lending it, and poor people who had no means of felling their tree and could not afford to employ labour must have been very badly off.

The Bolsheviks were very keen on education and what they called "kultur." The streets were placarded with advertisements such as "Get yourself educated," "Culture will be the saving of our revolution," etc.

The school lessons always commenced with the singing of a revolutionary hymn. The children were taught Communism and Bolshevism, and from the age of about twelve and upwards were encouraged to form Soviets who were able to dismiss and appoint their teachers. Sometimes a notice would be posted saying that certain classes had, by a general meeting, resolved on a strike from a given date and hour.

The Government did their best to force everyone to work. A man with a little capital saved from pre-Bolshevik days could live on this cheaply, as the exchange was favourable to him. A 100 rouble Imperial note could be exchanged for 1,000 Bolshevik notes, and would keep him for a month as comfortably as it was possible under the circumstances. Consequently many of them were living in this way. The Bolsheviks wished to catch these people, so one night surrounded the square in the centre of the town, the public park, which had been turned into a private park for members of trade unions only, and raided every cinema, theatre, and place of entertainment. Every single person was then asked for their certificate of employment, one of the papers it is necessary to possess under a Soviet régime. Those who were not actually carrying them with them were all taken off to the various lock-ups and kept until the certificate was produced. I myself was going home about nine that night, when I came suddenly on a crowd of several hundreds,

surrounded with soldiers, who were being hustled into a police-station, and I myself was fearful of hearing the cry "Stoi, Tovarish" (Stand, Comrade), which is the prelude to a street arrest. All those who could not prove that they were working were sent up by train the next day and forced to cut fuel for the railway at a small station some hundreds of miles up the Orenburg line.

About October I managed to get engaged in a branch of the Bolshevik secret service. The Bolsheviks had always suspected that there were British officers in Bokhara organizing the army with a view to an attack on them. They sent spies in to find out, but of these very few returned, and those that did brought wild stories.

I was supposed to have been two years in America, where I had learnt English, and volunteered for this (to a Bolshevik) dangerous job. I had to have an interview with the head of my department, a very violent Bolshevik, which went off all right, and, furnished with the best of secret documents, a Serbian (who had got me the appointment), his wife, and I, left Tashkent by train. There were, of course, no passenger coaches, and we were crowded in goods vans, with many passengers sitting on the roofs of the carriages. On reaching Chernaievo our van was cut off owing to a hot axle, and we were told we could go no farther, but must wait for the next train from Tashkent, which would come in two or three days; and, as every train was invariably filled up to the roof before leaving Tashkent, the prospect seemed gloomy. A secret interview with the station-master, however, resulted in places being made for men going on dangerous secret service for the Soviet Republic, and we proceeded. I had a few hours in Samarkand, and spent them in visiting the ruins of the fourteenth-century buildings of Tamerlane's capital, and took some photographs.

From Samarkand we continued our journey to Bokhara by train. Bokhara city is about ten miles from the railway, and at the time of my visit Bokhara was nominally neutral; but naturally, as the Emir feared for his crown, he was not in sympathy with the Bolsheviks. I drove into Bokhara city, very glad to be out of Soviet territory. Here I remained two months. We left Bokhara, a party of about eighteen, including some guides, and travelled over the desert, crossing the Oxus at Burdalik and the Khushk-Merv railway-line and Murghab River near Sar-i-Yazi. From here we had another stretch of desert to the Sarakhs or Tejent River and the Persian frontier. Here we had the misfortune to be intercepted by a Bolshevik patrol; but in the skirmish which ensued we got off free, save the loss of a little kit which fell from one of the ponies, and we wounded two of our adversaries. We crossed the frontier at the village of Naurozabad, all of us thoroughly glad to be free from the tyranny of Soviet Russia. The villagers turned out armed to the

teeth when they heard the firing. There was at one time a danger that they would fire on us, but this was averted, and I was well received and treated very well by the inhabitants. Not so my Russian companions. The Russians are cordially disliked in North Persia, and a great deal of this hatred is due to their having shelled the Holy Mosque of Imam Reza in Meshed in 1913.

During the whole of the journey to Meshed I had difficulty in getting accommodation and food for my Russian companions; though for myself and the non-Russian members of the party the Persians were most anxious to do anything they could. We rested a day in Naurozabad, and the next morning, with a small escort of Persian cavalry, we travelled in a snowstorm to Serakhs, where we remained two days as guests of the Governor, who helped us on our way to Meshed, which we reached four days later, on January 14, this year.

The CHAIRMAN: The lecture is not one that leads to much discussion, because I do not suppose that anyone here except Miss Houston has had any experience of those countries under Bolshevik rule; but if anyone would like to make any remarks I am sure we should all be very glad. Of course, we should all be very glad if Miss Houston would speak. (Applause.)

Miss HOUSTON: Ladies and Gentlemen, Major Bailey has told you all about this. I was in Turkestan seven years, and came home in August. I came out from Tashkent a different way from Major Bailey; I came down to Askhabad by train. Before I left Turkestan I was requisitioned by the Bolsheviks to teach in a military school there, also in an Oriental school to teach English, as the Bolshevik officers have two hours English every day. That is compulsory in the military schools, and, as I was the only Briton, they requisitioned me to give the lessons. The time came when I felt I must get out of Turkestan, but did not know how. I went to the Commissar of Education, and said I had heard that in Askhabad they wanted teachers in the schools—I said two or three things that were not exactly accurate, I suppose (laughter)—and got the necessary permission. Then I had to go to the secret police and get permission to travel down on the troop train. They gave me permission to travel on this train, and I was very pleased at having got so far all right. But then I heard from one of their spies—or not exactly a spy, but a man who knows everything going on—that they had found out what my little game was, and intended to let me get as far as Samarcand and arrest me there. Now I was between the devil and the deep sea, and did not know what to do; for I could not back out, having asked for a transfer to Askhabad. Fortunately, a Russian engineer that I knew on the Central Asian line came in and promised to take me down to Askhabad on a special train which

was taking some Bolshevik engineers down to Askhabad. He did. I left Tashkent on the Thursday night, and got into Askhabad on the following Sunday morning. I stayed there until the following Saturday, because I did not know exactly how I was to get from there up to the frontier. I got into touch with the Persians, who rather did me over the money part; for I had to pay 240,000 roubles to take me up to the frontier—that is, about 60 toumans, or £12 in English money. I started out about eight o'clock in the evening from Askhabad with one horse; it was a very bad night. The first night I spent in the rain; the second night I spent in some smugglers' caves, the third night I got into Djirestan, on the North-East Persian frontier, not having had any food since Saturday. Eventually I got up to Meshed, where Colonel Grey entertained me very hospitably. I came home from there, via Quetta-Bombay. (Applause.)

Colonel GREY: Ladies and gentlemen, I do not know that I have very much to say, as I never happened to cross the frontier into Transcaspia and Turkestan. I was not at Meshed when Major Bailey arrived, but can testify to the pleasure with which he was received, and the great relief it was to know that he had reached a place of safety. During the summer of 1919 we used, from time to time, to hear from refugees some account of his doings; and I remember one story which, perhaps, will be of interest, because in his lecture, to which we have listened with so much pleasure, he has made very little reference to the intrepidity and courage which he had to show every day of his life while in a position of such extreme danger. An advocate from Tashkent came down to Meshed in search of a missing brother. He called on me, and asked, "Have you many people like Colonel Bailey?" I said I did not know; why was the question asked? He said: "Because he is never happy unless he is in a position of extreme danger. The more acute the danger is, the more hugely delighted he seems to be." I suppose this love of perilous adventure, and the desire to gain information and serve the Government even at the risk of one's life, has helped to make the British nation what it is, and to give us the capability to deal as we do with Oriental races, helping them in their pursuit of the fulfilment of national aspirations. With regard to Miss Houston, I was able to receive her, and right glad we were to see her also, as we knew the position in which she had been. I believe she rendered great assistance to Major Bailey at Tashkent, at great risk to herself, and I think we might put that on record, as it is universally believed to be the case.

The LECTURER: Absolutely true! I do not think I could have got out without the help of Miss Houston. Many times she did things at great risk to herself, getting me quarters and various things I wanted.

Colonel GREY: What surprised us so much about Miss Houston was her extreme cheerfulness. She was much more like a person who had been spending a visit with intimate friends than one who had been in such a precarious position. She belongs to what was called, ages ago, the weaker sex. Heaven forbid that anyone should use that expression now! I think what we have heard and know about her courage in helping Major Bailey at the risk of her own life will suggest to us that there has never been a weaker sex; or, if there has been, it is certainly not that of which Miss Houston is so courageous and distinguished a representative. (Applause.)

Sir MICHAEL O'DWYER: Ladies and gentlemen, perhaps I ought to apologize for addressing a society of which I have not the honour of being a member, though I hope soon to be. My reason is that twenty-four years ago I paid a short visit to Turkestan, and that some of the incidents which Major Bailey has so graphically described reacted on the situation in the Punjab in the spring of 1919, when I was in charge of the administration. At the time I went to Turkestan, twenty-four years ago, the position was very different from what it is now. Major Bailey and Miss Houston had no difficulty in getting there, but considerable difficulty in getting out. I had the greatest difficulty in getting in, but no great difficulty in getting out. I travelled from Russia and had a permit from the Governor of Turkestan; but on the way thither I had to pass through the province of Transcaspia, which was in charge of General Kuropatkin, then very anti-English. At Askhabad I was stopped by a political official—a sort of glorified C.I.D. man. I showed my telegram from the Governor-General in Tashkent; but he said: "We don't recognize that here." I said: "I can only get to Tashkent by going through Transcaspia; if I am authorized by so big a man as the Governor-General of Tashkent, won't that do?" He replied, "No," and I was asked to leave the train while he communicated with Petrograd. That might have meant waiting for a week or two. I asked him to step into the train and talk about it; I knew the way to the heart of a Russian is generally through food and drink, and Major Bailey has shown us the large part wine plays even now under the Bolshevik régime. We went into the restaurant car and began to discuss the situation over a cup of tea. He was a decent fellow, of an artistic temperament, and I told him wonderful things about the opera in Moscow and elsewhere. We got on well together. I asked him to dine with me, and he consented. Meantime we were speeding on through his territory and getting towards the Oxus; if I could get there by midnight I should be in Turkestan and out of this man's territory, and be free. We sat down to dinner. I selected a very strong Caucasian wine. I asked two or three people, including a Russian missionary, to join us, and we did full justice to the

Caucasian wine. I drank as little as I could, but had to keep the others company. We went on merrily until ten o'clock. I had two other friends with me, both Britons; just at the critical moment, when this man was mellowing under the influence of the wine, these two got up and said they must go to bed—and they went. Our guest's suspicions were aroused. "What are your friends doing?" he asked. I said: "They will be back presently." I apologized for their absence, and with some difficulty kept things going until midnight. When we reached the Oxus my friend staggered out, said he had enjoyed himself immensely, gave me a parting kiss of peace, and sped me on my way, hoping to see me on my return. (Laughter.) In Tashkent I spent some days. I found the Russian officials civil and courteous, and they gave me the run of the place because I was only interested in the civil administration. I wanted to see how their administration compared with ours in India, and, on the whole, it was not unfavourable; but the most striking difference from India was that the whole personnel was Russian, and native agency was scarcely employed at all. It was a rough-and-ready system, but fairly efficient. The Russians enforced criminal justice as a matter of law and order, but as to civil justice they said: "We don't touch it; there is so much perjury and injustice that we prefer the odium should fall on the people themselves. We allow civil justice to be enforced either through religious courts or such other agency as they prefer." In those days Russian rule had been going on for fifteen or twenty years, and had already left its mark. They had good roads and had planted fine avenues of trees. Law and order was very well preserved, but very little had been done to extend irrigation. There was a certain amount of education and a pretence of racial equality. The Russian—as you will have gathered from Major Bailey's remarks—in Turkestan is a colonizer. There are Russian villages side by side with Turcoman villages. You find the Russian *droshtky* or *jarvey* working side by side with the Turcoman, or Uzbeg, or Sart in the towns.* The two races are very much closer together than the French and Algerians or the British and natives of India. Apart from religion, the line of demarcation is slight, and they get on well together. Trade and agriculture were prospering when I was there: there was a great boom in cotton in Ferghana; the country had a prosperous future before it. That was in 1896. Now we have heard what that country has become under Bolshevik rule. Major Bailey has described the blessings of nationalization of land and industries—a blessing with which we are threatened in this country, and has shown the demoralization and depreciation which takes place in everything. I had the pleasure of meeting Major Bailey in February last; he was describing to me the results of the depreciation of the currency.

Among other things he showed me one of the Bolshevik notes for 100 roubles—nominally £10. He wished me to take it as a souvenir. I said: "I cannot take a thing so valuable, but I will buy it." He said: "You are welcome; it is worth four annas"—less than sixpence. (Laughter.)

I was deeply interested, as having had something to do with movements in the North of India at the time he describes, with his account of the Bolshevik outlook on the situation in the Punjab last year and the Afghan war. Major Bailey brought back a most admirable and valuable collection of Bolshevik propaganda literature, and it was really most interesting to note the cleverness with which they seized on some little point and twisted it round to their benefit, and to our discredit—such as the statement that all religious services in mosque and temple had been closed down in India by order of the Government, that being one of the alleged reasons of the rebellion. There was just one little fact which tended to give some foundation for that statement. During the risings in Lahore the rebels had taken possession of the Badshahi Mosque, and had used it for preaching rebellion and revolution. The first thing the military did when they took possession of the city was to close the mosque until they had guarantees that it should only be used for legitimate purposes. It is within the Lahore Fort, and is under the control of the fort commandment. The Sikhs had used it for an arsenal, but its use for Mohammedan worship has been allowed by us since annexation. But that little fact of its temporary closure was probably the foundation of the statement in the Bolshevik papers that all religious ceremonies by Hindus and Mohammedans were prohibited in British India. Here is another curious instance of the way what was happening in the Punjab at the time got known in Central Asia. On a particular day, I think April 13, 1919, the situation in certain parts of the Punjab was very serious. I had to wireless—all other means of communication were cut off—to Simla asking for the proclamation of martial law. The time was very short, and I did not think it necessary to code the message. The message was duly sent, and two days afterwards I received a warning from Meshed that if the situation in the Punjab was very critical, it was just as well not to let the Bolsheviks know of it in Tashkent, as my message, not being in cypher, had been received there. It was very interesting to hear from Major Bailey the Afghan explanation of their invasion of Northern India in May, 1919, as being due to the fact that appeals had been received from the Indian revolutionaries by the Afghans to come and restore freedom to India. That was the very thing we suspected at the time. We heard that such messages had been sent both to the Afghans and to the tribes on the frontier; but some doubt was thrown on our opinions, and this

indirect corroboration received from the Afghans in Central Asia shows that what we suspected was the case. The lecture is not only a most admirable exposure of the working of the Bolshevik system in what was once a prosperous country, but it throws extraordinarily valuable sidelights on the methods of propaganda which the Bolsheviks in Central Asia and elsewhere adopt in their dealing with neighbouring countries—with Afghanistan, Persia, and India. They have used their propaganda with marvellous effect in unsettling and disturbing all neighbouring kingdoms. We on our side lie low, and, confident in our honesty of purpose and good intentions, think it is unnecessary to counter their propaganda; and, meantime, we allow the evil seed which they sow all the world over, and which is especially directed to the destruction of the British Empire, to mature and bear fruit. The one moral to be drawn from Major Bailey's admirable address is that if we want to prevent in Afghanistan and Northern India what has happened in Bokhara and threatens in Persia and Afghanistan, it is time we adopted active measures, not only military, but propagandist, to counteract the Bolshevik designs. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, as no one else seems prepared to make any remarks, I will now on your behalf call for a vote of thanks to Major Bailey for the very interesting lecture we have had to-night. I only regret it was so short; I should have liked to hear a great deal more of his own personal experiences. He has told us a great deal about the Bolsheviks and about other people; but he has told us very little about himself. However, I have no doubt he will have other opportunities of recounting his own personal adventures, if not in this meeting, as they say in Parliament, in another place. (Applause.) I have no doubt this vote of thanks to Major Bailey will be passed unanimously by all here.

The vote of thanks was heartily accorded, and this ended the meeting.

LIEUT.-COL. G. E. LEACHMAN, C.I.E., D.S.O.

Our thoughts seem to have to carry us back fifteen—perhaps more—years to the time when the name of Captain Leachman, of the Royal Sussex Regiment, became known to us as a daring traveller in Arabia, and, speaking for myself, little more was heard of him till, in August, 1920, telegraphic intelligence of his death reached the London papers. We have had many fellow-countrymen of great ability in Arabia and Mesopotamia, but Colonel Leachman was a type *sui generis*, and it is as such that I have sought to get descriptions of him for the "CENTRAL ASIAN JOURNAL." *The Times* of August 20 pays him a very high tribute, and Commander D. G. Hogarth, in the October number of the *Geographical Journal*, records with knowledge and sympathy his remarkable career. But the best picture of the man is that given by "W. A. W."* in *The Near East* of August 26, 1920, and it is upon the lines of that picture that two members of the Central Asian Society have framed their descriptions of Colonel Leachman as they learnt to know him, partly by personal intercourse and partly by Arab report. To these two "appreciations" I have prefixed an extract from the *Baghdad Times* of August 19, 1920.

"DEATH OF COLONEL LEACHMAN.

"We regret to announce the death at Khan Nuqta, on August 12, of Lieut.-Colonel Gerard E. Leachman, C.I.E., D.S.O., Royal Sussex Regiment, attached to the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, aged 40. It appears that he was murdered in cold blood by Khamis, the eldest son of Shaikh Dhari al Mahmud, Chief of the Zoba tribe, in whose tents he had slept the night as a guest. The Arab driver with him was also killed. His body was recovered shortly after in the Khan and taken to Fallujah, and there buried in a military camp. By the death of Lieut.-Colonel Leachman, the Arabs of Mesopotamia have lost a true friend, who had made their interests his own. By six years' continuous service in this country with the Civil Administration in different capacities he had acquired unrivalled knowledge of the country and the people.

"He came out first in April, 1915, and was present in person at the battle of Shuaibah. He accompanied the 6th Division to Amarah,

* A member of the Central Asian Society, to whom the haunts of the Assyrian Christian and of the Kurd have long been familiar.—A. C. Y.

and was Political Officer on the Tigris continuously during 1915, being present at the capture of Amarah, the capture of Kut and the battle of Ctesiphon. He returned to Kut with Townshend's force and left Kut with the Cavalry, a few hours before it was invested. He remained on the Tigris during the period of reconstruction and advanced with them, being present at the capture of Baghdad in 1917. After a brief visit to Egypt, Palestine and the Hedjaz during 1917, he returned to Mesopotamia and took over the Dulaim Division, being present at the capture of Ramadi, Hit and Anah. When during September, 1918, operations on the Tigris recommenced, Lieut.-Colonel Leachman was attached to the 1st Corps as Political Officer, and took a prominent part in the operations leading to the surrender of the Turks at Shergat for which he received a D.S.O. by an immediate award in the field. He was present at the surrender of Mosul by the Turks, and was appointed Political Officer in charge of the Mosul Division, which post he held until he was compelled by sickness to take leave home. On his return he took over the Dulaim Division, which he held with distinction until his death. During the last few months Lieut.-Colonel Leachman performed some remarkable reconnaissances in Central Arabia, where his name is a household word.

"Lieut.-Colonel Leachman was educated at Charterhouse. He entered the Army in 1900; served in South Africa; despatches, Queen's Medal, 4 clasps; King's Medal, 2 clasps. He holds the Gill Memorial Medal of the Geographical Society for travel in N.E. Arabia, and the MacGregor Memorial Medal of the United Service Institution in India for distinguished exploration and survey. Distinguished alike amongst his fellow-countrymen and amongst the people of this country for his energy, courage and determination, and for his unrivalled knowledge of the problems with which he had principally to deal, his death leaves a gap which will not soon be filled. His soldierly qualities and his strong sense of duty were marked characteristics of a very lovable nature. Few men in this country have made more friends or so few enemies."*

"LEACHMAN."

No. I.

I have been asked to write down a few of my personal recollections of the late Colonel G. E. Leachman, C.I.E., D.S.O., during the years I have come in contact with him. I am more than proud to have been one of his friends, and as such to have the privilege of writing these few very inadequate lines to the memory of one who was deservedly admired and esteemed by all, both Britons and Arabs,

*Extract from *Baghdad Times* of August 19, 1920

who had dealings with him. It was at the end of 1904, about November, I think, but I speak from memory only, that Leachman, then Lieutenant in the Royal Sussex Regiment, first made his acquaintance with Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, and I can recall to this day, vividly, being introduced to him by the Captain at the foot of the gangway ladder of the small British-India mail steamer that had brought him from Bombay to Busreh. The usual whisky-soda followed the introduction, he sitting on the ladder and I in my *bellum* (native boat), as I was prohibited from going on board owing to the Turkish quarantine regulations against all arrivals from India. I discovered he was on his way to Baghdad, nominally on language leave to study Arabic, and after he had completed his term of "imprisonment" in the Turkish quarantine station on shore he stopped with me in Busreh for two or three days, pending the departure of the Baghdad river steamer. He was then, as he was to the last, the most excellent and amusing company and a man of extraordinary personality, and it was with much regret that a number of the Busreh residents said "Good-bye" to him on his steamer, which weighed anchor to the accompaniment of an impromptu song and dance by Leachman, while the rest of us performed on the deck of the towing barge lashed alongside. Incidentally, the Captain of the steamer, the s.s. *Mejidiah*, was Charley Cowley, later of Julnah fame and a posthumous V.C.

Leachman was some time up in Baghdad, and I lost sight of him for a period, but in the intervals between then and 1913 I met him on several occasions, sometimes in the least expected places. On one occasion, when I was stationed in Bahrein, a group of Islands off the Arabian Coast in the Persian Gulf, my Persian servant informed me that an Arab wished to see me. Entered a long, cadaverous and altogether filthy-looking "Bedou," who greeted me with, "Hullo, —! got anything to eat?" This was Leachman, just arrived from a six months' trek across Arabia, from Damascus by a hitherto untravelled route. He had intended to continue his overland trek to Muscat, but owing to inter-tribal trouble had been forced to make for Ojeir, on the mainland opposite Bahrein, from whence he had come by native *buggalow*. They had encountered a bad storm and he had consequently spent three days on board this craft practically without food and herded up with a crowd of dirty Arab divers. I gave him what lunch there was left, but discovered him later down in the kitchen with an Arab companion of his who had made the whole journey with him, sitting over a large dish of rice, wolfing into this ravenously and using his fingers in true Arab fashion. I was just off to Busreh by a steamer then in port and sailing almost at once, and as Leachman wanted to get to Bushire he came off with me, still in his Arab clothes. The excellence of his

disguise can be gauged from the fact that, on his attempting to board the steamer by the first-class companion ladder, he was roundly abused by the ship's Chief Officer and told that Arab deck passengers should use the other ladder.

In the same way that his appearances were unexpected and sensational, so were his departures. He would dine with you and say good-night, and that was the last that would be heard or seen of him for perhaps months, when he would suddenly appear again and take up the threads of civilization as if he had never been away. His absences were accountable for by trips into the interior and journeyings among the tribes. It was only with the greatest of difficulty that he could be made to talk about himself or his experiences, and even if he did do so the casual listener would probably not realize a fraction of the dangers and hardships that Leachman had gone through, so modestly did he relate his experiences. The Turks not unnaturally regarded him and his trips with the utmost suspicion and used all efforts to stop and hinder him, and as he could have expected little or no help from the British Politicals, should he have got himself into trouble with the Turks or tribes on his journeys, Leachman was indeed playing the "lone hand" and carrying his life in his hands. He was one of those who could not live without constant risk and adventure. He never attempted to pass himself off as an Arab to his Arab friends, but wore Arab costume to avoid being conspicuous, so that his movements among the tribes should cause as little comment and talk as possible, both in tribal and Turkish circles.

It was during the war, from the beginning of 1915 to end of 1918, that I saw most of Leachman and his works, when he served as a Political Officer to the forces in Mesopotamia. His success in policy with the Arabs was based on their respect for his courage, justice and liberality, combined with a certain fear of his unrelenting hatred of lies and treachery. He could on occasion astonish them by a very cyclone of wrath. Many a shaikh has behaved, under the influence of Leachman, like a gentleman, though he may have been formerly an unmitigated scoundrel. He was essentially a ruler of the tribes, not the townspeople. His methods of action were somewhat forcible, and, therefore, understood and appreciated by the tribes who would not understand other methods. But with all his masterfulness and impulsiveness and the respect, not unmixed with fear, which his name inspired, he was implicitly trusted and popular among them, and a very real friend. Their name for him was "Luchman" and you will find "Luchman" is known through the length and breadth of Mesopotamia, and the news of his death will have been a very real grief to very numerous Arab friends.

I have spoken of Leachman's courage, and I wish it were possible

to quote any special instances; but I think it would be invidious to do so, as his whole service has been one continual test of this. As regards the value of his services during the war, a price was placed by the Turks on Leachman's head, and we know from captured records how great a thorn in their side he was, and to what extent he rendered futile their intrigues with the tribes. His D.S.O. was only granted to him after his Mosul operations towards the end of 1918, and a better earned one never was.

As a man, among his fellow-officers, he was known and respected by all, and loved by his real friends. He was generous to a fault, and would share his last crust, if needed, with anyone, Englishman or Arab. The news of his death by violence will not have caused surprise among those who knew him, in view of the fact that he had been courting such an end and carrying his life in his hands so long.

C. F. M.

No. II.

I first heard of Leachman during my travels in Mesopotamia before the war. He had plotted the desert with his tracks from Damascus to Kuwait and from Jaufr to Armenia. I knew him personally throughout the Mesopotamian campaign, but I never had the privilege of working with him; and a good deal of what I know of his character is derived from Arabs. During the war his chief work lay on the Tigris from Amarah to Baghdad, in the desert south of the Euphrates between Shagrah and Hail, in the Shamingah desert west of Karbalá and Ramadi, whence he penetrated to all kinds of remote watering-places, and in all parts of the Mosul Vilayet. How far he is remembered beyond the confines of Mesopotamia I do not know. A late wazir of Ibn Rashid and the Shaikh of the Dhafir once told me of a great fight between Shammar and Ruwallah at which the women of the defeated Ruwallah deposited their jewels for safe-keeping with a tall Englishman who happened to have arrived at the Ruwallah tents under the protection of a Shammari *raftq*. This Englishman was Leachman, but I do not know in what year before the war the incident took place. As Leachman travelled in Arab outer dress and travelled fast, he would not be known except to the particular Shaikhs with whom he lodged. But in Mesopotamia his name is a household word. Rough tribesmen have been known to name their sons "Luchman" after this astonishing foreigner, and Shaikhs from end to end of the country would enquire always with affection and admiration of their friend "Luchman." He became a "sharaf" to them, the highest honour they could pay. I may be forgiven, in the light of certain misunderstandings in the public mind, for pointing out that a vast distance of desert separates the Jordan

from the Euphrates, so that a man may be known throughout Mesopotamia and unknown in Syria and Palestine. Owing to its distance very little is known in England about the doings of individual British officers in Mesopotamia. How few Englishmen at Home know about Leachman! Yet his name should be famous, as it is famous in Mesopotamia. I think one of the reasons is the loneliness of his activities, this and his real modesty. He did not pose as modest: he simply left you to guess or hear from Arabs the extraordinary nature of his life in the deserts, his fatigues, his dangers, and his escapes.

His particular appeal to the tribes was his magnificent personal courage. He was also the soul of honour, and his moral hold over Arabs was the result of his rigid justice in his dealings with all classes. He was too their best protector, and though a fierce enemy of their duplicity would fight like a tiger to right the wrong, if by unfortunate mistakes, which are bound to occur in military operations, the wrong Arabs sometimes suffered indignities and attacks. At the same time he was not gullible. The Shaikhs knew it, and ordered their behaviour accordingly, and in their illogical way liked him all the better for their inability to deceive him as they have deceived so many. He was essentially virile in his dealings with them. His political successes were not won by lavish gifts of gold nor by large promises of future rewards: they were the outcome of respect for a character which displayed the best qualities of the British officer's traditions. In fact they were not political—I mean not achieved by diplomatic guile—they were personal and moral, the tribute of the Shaikhs and the tribes to the force and fineness of his character. He was quietly generous to individual Arabs in distress; but as he was modest, you will only discover this feature of him from talks with Arabs. Physically he was tireless. Whatever happened, he was up at 4 a.m., and he could outraid the most famous Arab raiders. He moved constantly in the territory of enemy Kurds and Arabs, but he escaped ambush by the rapidity and unexpectedness of his movements. The Shaikhs who did not love him feared him. The Shaikh who is responsible for his murder in circumstances which have blackened his face for ever was the bad leader of a bad tribe. Leachman was the ideal tribesmen's Political Officer, unique and irreplaceable, and his loss to the political staff of Mesopotamia is beyond count. His best epitaph is the one word "Rajúl," as I have heard it spoken of him by many an Arab Shaikh. "'Rajúl'—a man, a brave man, a fine man, a great man: as who should say: 'This was a man.'"

R. M.

In conclusion, I can only express my regret that Lieut.-Colonel G. E. Leachman was not a member of the Central Asian Society.

A. C. YATE.

NOTICE.

It is notified for general information that a certain number of copies of the earlier Nos. of this Journal are available for sale to members desirous of possessing them and of completing their sets. They can be seen at 74, Grosvenor Street. The price, as a rule, ranges from 1/- to 2/- per No. Application for them should be addressed to the Assistant Secretary, 74, Grosvenor Street.

A. C. YATE, Lt.-Col.,

Hon. Sec.

5th December, 1920.

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NOTICE

THE Assistant Secretary will be at 74, Grosvenor Street, W. 1, on Mondays and Wednesdays from 2.30 p.m. to 5.30 p.m.; and on Thursdays from 10.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m., or till the end of the lectures.

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MILITARY MISSION TO NORTH-WEST PERSIA, 1918

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held at 74, Grosvenor Street, W. 1, on Thursday, December 16, 1920, when Major-General L. C. Dunsterville, C.B., C.S.I., read a paper on "The Military Mission to North-West Persia, 1918." Lord Carnock presided.

The CHAIRMAN, in calling on General Dunsterville for his lecture, said that he need not introduce the lecturer to that meeting, as his name was perfectly well known, as also the great services he had done for the Empire; he only wished to say how grateful they all were to General Dunsterville for coming to their meeting and reading his paper.

In order to deal with the subject of to-night's lecture it will be necessary to give a summary of the events that led to the sending of the British Military Mission through North-West Persia in January, 1918.

The Russian revolution broke out in 1917, and by the autumn of that year the whole of the Russian Army on the various fronts had "downed tools" and left the enemy free to work his will in Asia Minor and elsewhere.

Prior to this the right flank of the Mesopotamian Army linked up at Khanikin on the western frontier of Persia, 94 miles east of Baghdad, with the Russian troops, who connected through North-West Persia and the Caucasus with the main Russian western front. Owing to the defection of the Russian troops, the whole area as far as the Caucasus was left undefended and open to the advance of Turkish troops, also permitting German agents to flood Central Asia with anti-Entente propaganda, and enabling them to bring about the long-desired result of chaos in Persia, Turkestan, Bokhara, and Afghanistan, thus stretching out a long arm to reach the seditious movement in India and pressing us at our weakest point.

At this time affairs on all the fronts were too critical for troops to be spared to deal with the situation, and, failing actual troops, it was hoped that a force composed of selected officers and N.C.O.'s despatched to Tiflis might succeed in reorganizing the revolutionary soldiers and putting up a new front against the Turkish troops in

Asia Minor. It was reasonable to hope that the local troops, who were well-trained, would be willing to fight to save their own homes from invasion; but the revolution had taken all spirit out of them, and, judging by later experiences in Baku, it is probable that, had we reached Tiflis, we should have failed in our endeavours to thwart the Turkish advance. As it was, we never reached so far, and the scheme, therefore, was never put to the test.

It was in command of this selected force that I made my first acquaintance with Persia, a land to which my thoughts had turned with longing since my early studies in the Persian language, and my introduction to the inestimable Sadi.

I received my orders at Peshawur, on the North-West Frontier of India, on Christmas Eve, 1917, and by January 18, 1918, was in Baghdad in pursuance of my orders to go to Tiflis.

At Baghdad a delay ensued, owing to the fact that so far none of my officers had reached me, and the enterprise was not one that could be carried out single-handed.

On January 27, having collected a small party of twelve officers and two clerks, I decided to make a start for Enzeli, on the Caspian, 600 miles by road and about 400 miles in a straight line from Baghdad.

We knew of many rocks ahead, but were determined to succeed if success were possible.

Among our future difficulties were bad roads, the Kurds, bad weather, Russian revolutionary soldiers, and the hostile neutrality of the Persians. If we overcame these we should find ourselves at least as far as Kasvin, 140 miles from our port of Enzeli, on the Caspian, but the principal difficulties confronted us in that last lap of our journey.

Our route from Kasvin onwards lay through the country of Kuchik Khan, who announced that we would not be allowed to pass, and if we none the less succeeded in getting through to Enzeli it would remain to be seen what amount of opposition to our farther progress would be offered by the Bolshevik Committee controlling that port.

On January 27 our small column of Ford vans set out from Baghdad in fine weather. The road as far as Khanikin (94 miles), on the Persian frontier, was good enough under the circumstances, but being unmetalled would have been almost impassable if rain had fallen.

On the following day we passed through the low foothills and camped for the night at the foot of the Taki-giri pass. Here we entered Kurdish country, and experienced two of our other foreseen difficulties—bad roads and bad weather.

On January 29 we left at daybreak to ascend the pass which would

take us up on to the Persian plateau. The first few miles of the road are steep and rocky, and we ran immediately into a blinding snow-storm. It took us four and a half hours to push the cars by hand over the first four miles, and at that point farther progress was barred by heavy snowdrifts. An ever-kind Providence provided a shelter in the shape of a ruined sarai at the small village of Surkhadisa, where we camped for the night. Snow continued to fall, and frequent attempts to reach the top of the pass ended in failure. At last, on February 2, we made a moonlight start at 4 a.m., and succeeded in getting over the snow while frozen hard, and reached Harunabad the same evening. On February 3 we reached Kermanshah in fairly good weather, over a road that was just passable while the snow was frozen. Large stretches of this road would become a swamp in a thaw.

We passed through a succession of mountain ridges and cultivated valleys, the road on the former, in spite of boulders and gradients, being preferable to the latter, where after the recent snow no road was visible, and the cars made frequent diversions into the fields. The rocky hills were thinly sprinkled with dwarf oak, the only wild tree we saw in North-West Persia until we reached the Caspian slopes of the Elburz. The climate of North-West Persia, with a very small rainfall, is not favourable to forest growth, but the entire absence of trees may perhaps be more rightly attributed to the absence or ineffectiveness of forest laws.

From Kermanshah we set out on February 4 in the hopes of reaching Hamadan the same day; but we were in for a spell of bad luck, and we actually reached that town only on February 11.

We were up by 3.30 a.m. and got away by 4.30, but before we had gone a mile we had a broken axle that delayed us for one and a half hours. At Bisitun, 21 miles farther on, we passed the wonderful rock inscriptions of Darius. Here we crossed a tributary of the Kara Su by a fine single-arch brick bridge which the retreating Turks had blown up, but failed to destroy entirely. There was just a sufficient width of arch left to get the cars over very carefully, with only an inch or two to spare.

At Sahneh, 38 miles from Kermanshah, we encountered a short but steep pass, over which each car had to be pushed and hauled, taking three hours to get them all over a distance of 1 mile. At Kangavar, 18 miles farther on, we were most hospitably entertained to a hot meal by the Russian detachment.

As night fell it became evident that it would be hopeless to try to reach Hamadan that day, so we tucked ourselves up in a sarai at the foot of the Asadabad pass, hoping to cross early the next day. We were doomed to disappointment, however, as heavy snow fell that night and continued for several days. The pass is 7,600 feet

above sea-level, and the road up is quite a good one, having been put in order by the Russians during the recent fighting. Deep snow-drifts, however, entirely blocked the road, and we were lucky to be able to employ villagers from the neighbourhood in cutting a way through.

On February 14 we left for Kasvin, crossing the Sultan Bulaq pass at the 68th mile and camping for the night at Aveh. The pass is 7,500 feet high, and would have been as badly blocked as the Asadabad pass; but we were now on the well-made Russian road, and had caught up the stream of retiring Russian troops. The latter were not in a mood to allow any obstacles to delay their homeward march, and they cut through the drifts in record time. On February 15 we reached Kasvin, 478 miles from Baghdad.

Up to this point Persian unfriendliness had not shown itself in any very marked manner, though we could hardly expect to be popular. But at Kasvin things looked very threatening. Mass meetings were held in the town and resolutions were passed decreeing our immediate destruction. We also had a final warning that we should be attacked if we attempted to pass through Kuchik Khan's country.

The resolutions for our instant annihilation were not put into effect, and on February 16 we started for Enzeli with our armoured car, which had joined us under Lieutenant Singer at Hamadan, defiantly leading the convoy. An armoured car on a narrow mountain road is not at its best, but it looked very formidable, and in Persia "looks" are more than half the battle.

We crossed the Bikandi pass at the 20th mile. There was plenty of snow on the top, but the Russians had again saved us all trouble by cutting through the drifts, and we reached Menjil, 70 miles from Enzeli, by nightfall.

On February 17 we left Menjil at 6 a.m., and arrived at Enzeli (much to our surprise!) at sunset. It was delightful to run the cars past the wharves and the shipping, and to hope that to-morrow might see us embarked on the Caspian Sea; but there is many a slip twixt the cup and the lip, and I knew that after all the obstacles we had surmounted, the biggest one yet remained. Why Kuchik Khan's men did not open fire on us on the road I have no idea. It was just one of those things that was "not to be," and it is futile to look for material explanation. His braves, heavily armed, lined the road, scowling, with rifle in hand, and every moment I expected the battle to begin, but not a single shot was fired. So far, therefore, we had to congratulate ourselves on having overcome bad roads, bad weather, Persian hostility, Kurdish threats, and Kuchik Khan's defiance. We were now to ascertain the attitude of the Bolshevik Committee.

The 70 miles of road from Menjil to the sea merits a more detailed description.

Leaving Menjil in a westerly direction, at a distance of about 1 mile the Safed Rud is reached. This river, which is unfordable at all times of the year, and in the spring is a very formidable obstacle, brings down the water from the Tabriz area into the Caspian. At about 1 mile from Menjil it passes northwards through a sharp gap in the Elburz range, reaching the sea about 60 miles farther on. The road here crosses by a well-made stone and steel girder bridge to the left bank, which it follows as far as Imamzadeh Hashim, where the mountains end, 25 miles from the sea, and where the road diverges slightly to the west to pass through Resht and reach the port of Enzeli.

At Nagober, about 20 miles from Menjil, the wonderful forest belt of the northern slopes of the Elburz is entered. The contrast after the barren landscape of Persia is most striking. The forest is very dense, and includes many well-known varieties of European trees, such as beech, sycamore, walnut, elm, and ash, while box forms the chief part of the undergrowth. At Imamzadeh Hashim the low country is reached, and the road runs the rest of its length through cultivated lands until the sand-dunes are reached within a mile or two of the port.

I can imagine no more dangerous defile for troops to force in the face of opposition than the 50 miles from Menjil to Resht. The road is in most places cut out of the sheer rock, leaving the heights towering over on the left hand and a steep drop on the right to the torrent below. When the forest is entered the difficulties of attacking troops would be intensified, as an active enemy could approach the road within 20 yards at any point without any possibility of their being observed, and their withdrawal would be similarly aided.

I may say a few words here of Kuchik Khan, our redoubtable opponent. He is a Persian patriot of revolutionary tendencies, who long before the war was noted for his zeal in demanding reform of the Government. I think it is generally admitted among the Persians themselves that he is a high-minded enthusiast who is truly out to do or die for his country, with no ulterior motive of making a bit for himself in the meantime. His cry is "Persia for the Persians"—a very legitimate one—and his aim is therefore to rid Persia of all foreigners and to secure the annulment of all existing treaties and concessions accorded to non-Persians. Like most enthusiasts of his type, he proposes to adopt the line of "direct action" without stopping to consider what the ultimate effect of that action would be. "Persia for the Persians" is a most laudable watchword, but has Kuchik ever considered ways and means of establishing Persia on a basis firm enough to enable her to support herself and resist foreign invasion? The main factors in the problem, which Kuchik Khan has probably overlooked, I will refer to later on.

Persia has to take into consideration the position of Russia on the north (now weak, but eventually to be more powerful than in 1914), Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the east, Arabs and Turks on the west. Truly a lively position for a country with all the elements of national weakness and none of strength. A successful issue of the claim of "Persia for the Persians" would certainly shortly be followed by a general scramble of these lively neighbours for fragments of Persia! I always hoped to meet Kuchik Khan and talk these things over, but no opportunity occurred of realizing this wish.

Kuchik Khan's headquarters were in the wooded country of Gilan, in the neighbourhood of Resht, and he claimed at that time to have 5,000 men under his command. The number may have been exaggerated, but he certainly had a large force. The men were well armed and uniformed, and ammunition from Turkish sources was plentiful. Austrian and Turkish instructors superintended the training of his men.

While on this subject I may say a word as to the neutrality of Persia. Our excuse for entering a neutral country was that two of the other belligerents had made it a common fighting-ground for the last two years without any very marked protest from the Persian Government. Under these circumstances it was not too much to ask that we should pass through on a mission which was a direct outcome of the action of the other two belligerents—Turkey and Russia.

At the same time it is not surprising that the neutrality of Persia was hostility inclined towards ourselves. The Persians had had enough of the Turks and the Russians, and just as they were congratulating themselves on having got rid of these two, up bobbed the British. Enough to exasperate anybody.

Moreover, a nation like Persia, situated as Persia is, needs to be pretty certain that she backs the winning side. And to all appearances in the early months of 1918 the war was all but over and the Germans everywhere triumphant. These legitimate grounds were made the most of by enemy agents and propagandists in Teheran, and the only wonder is that the Persians treated us as well as they did.

Now to return to the narrative of our travels.

On February 17 we arrived at Enzeli at about 5 p.m. There were at that time some 2,000 revolutionary Russian soldiers at the port awaiting embarkation, and the road from Kasvin to Enzeli was thronged with disorderly detachments hastening to shake the dust of Persia off their feet. The Committee controlling the town, under the guidance of Comrade Cheliapin, was Bolshevik, but the soldiers were not in a mood to distinguish between any one kind of revolutionary and any other—they just wanted to get home, and knew little and cared less for any political programme. They were, as Russians

usually are, good-tempered and reasonable, but easily stirred by mob orators.

The entire town turned out to watch our arrival, and a dense throng gathered round the cars, rather impeding our efforts to get everything shipshape for the night, but not intentionally annoying us.

The Committee, however, took up quite another position, and peremptorily demanded my presence at a meeting to explain the reason of our sudden arrival in their midst. Several meetings were held, and at each I noticed an increased tone of severity. It was as if they were trying to nerve themselves for the fairly obvious move of arresting or destroying my ridiculously small contingent.

Moreover, I discovered that the Committee were working together with Kuchik Khan, who himself was a pawn in the hands of the formidable Committee of Union and Progress.

Forward movement was out of the question, as all ships were strongly guarded. Retreat was almost impossible, as it was too much to hope that Kuchik Khan would again let us through his country, this time as an already defeated force. Still, it was worth trying, and anything was better than staying on where we were, with the prospect of any single individual putting a lighted match to the fuse.

So on February 20 we made a rush for it, starting in the dark at 6 a.m., ready for a fight at every turn of the road, but marvellously permitted to pass unscathed the groups of fierce and scowling warriors on the Resht road.

By 6 p.m. we were back in Menjil, hardly believing that we could have come through, after all those threats, without the firing of a single shot, and devoutly thankful to have had so lucky an escape from the Bolshevik-Jangali combine.

On February 22 we returned to Kasvin in a blizzard. The people of Kasvin had shown their dislike of us on the road down; the question was, How were we going to be received on the return journey?

There were rumours in the town that Kuchik Khan had magnanimously allowed us to return, after depriving us of the enormous sums of gold we were supposed, like all Englishmen, to be carrying.

It was unfortunate, too, that the cars were feeling the effect of their rough journey, and we were compelled to stay a whole day in Kasvin for repairs. The populace were threatening, but again there was a reluctance to translate words into deeds, and possibly the continuance of the snowfall helped to damp their ardour.

On February 24 we were back in Hamadan, which remained my headquarters until June, when I moved forward again to Kasvin with a view of keeping closer touch with the Baku situation.

The intervening time was spent in various ways. For the first six weeks, until the arrival of another party of officers and N.C.O.'s

and a platoon of the 1/4 Hampshire Regiment, were spent in a rather tense atmosphere. The town of Hamadan was full of Kuchik Khan's adherents, and a Persian political party styling themselves "Extreme Democrats" passed many resolutions decreeing our immediate destruction.

We found ourselves in the midst of a terrible famine, which we did our best to alleviate by calling on the inhabitants to help in road construction, for which a good wage was paid. The extreme democrats, finding that our famine relief work was adding to our popularity, did their best to undermine our efforts and keep the people in the state of misery and despair which produces the right sort of soil in which to sow the seeds of disorder and revolution.

They engineered an artificial rise in the price of bread, and at one time compelled the bakers to strike; but in one way or another we got over these difficulties, and when our next party under General Byron arrived on April 3, we felt ourselves quite firmly established.

On March 24 we received disquieting news of Kuchik Khan's intention to march on Kasvin. If he put this plan into execution it was certain that there would be no opposition on the part of the Persians, who were prepared to welcome him as the righter of all wrongs, and from Kasvin to Teheran would not be a matter of great difficulty. This would mean the whole of North Persia in a state of revolution and a final closing of the road to the Caspian.

The situation was saved by Colonel Bicherakov with his Cossacks.

Bicherakov is an Ossietin from the North Caucasus who had served with distinction in the war, and had been several times wounded. He was a brave and fearless leader and adored by his men.

When the main Russian Army broke up under the influence of the revolution, a body of about 1,200 Cossacks put themselves under Bicherakov's orders, each signing a document to be true to death to their leader.

At Hamadan we came in touch with Bicherakov and his "partisans," and drew up terms of an agreement to act in mutual support. Under this agreement the "partisans" were despatched with all haste to Kasvin, and arrived there just in time to thwart Kuchik Khan's plans. The latter contented himself with entrenching his troops on the Kasvin side of the Menjil bridge, 70 miles from Kasvin, and declaring the road finally closed.

On March 29 one aeroplane arrived from Baghdad, and greatly added to our prestige in the neighbourhood.

With the arrival of the new party in April we set to work raising levies from the surrounding villages. These levies were useful in police and patrol work, but it was evident from the first that their actual fighting value was nil. This they were able to demonstrate

later when they came up against the Turks on the Tabriz road and promptly took to their heels.

But they were worth their pay to us in many ways, and vastly increased our strength in the exaggerated reports that our enemies were receiving from Persian sources.

By the end of May two more of my parties had arrived, and I was able to push very small and risky detachments farther afield to the north-west towards the Turkish 5th and 6th Divisions, who were investing Urmia. Major Staines commanded the small party at Bijar, 100 miles west of Hamadan, and Major Wagstaff led a party to Zinjan, on the Tabriz road, to see if we could get the formidable Shahsavan tribes to help in keeping the Turks off that road. Both parties met with a considerable amount of success until their weakness was discovered, but by that time they had fulfilled their purpose.

On June 1 I moved my headquarters to Kasvin, and Bicherakov got on the move to attack the Jangalis at Menjil. On June 12 he fought the battle of Menjil bridge, entirely routing the Jangalis, who retired into the forest country and left the road once more open. The Cossacks then continued their march to the port of Enzeli, whence they later embarked for Baku.

Troops had now begun to reach me, and as Bicherakov marched down the road I was able to put my few units in position to keep the road open. The available infantry was two battalions, the 1/4 Hampshire Regiment and the 1/2 Gurkhas. These I put under the command of Colonel Matthews, of the former regiment, with his headquarters at Resht.

Bicherakov sailed from Enzeli on July 3, taking with his "partisans" four of my armoured cars and some staff officers for liaison purposes.

We hoped to meet again later, when I could get over to Baku, but circumstances rendered that impossible, and thus greatly weakened our position there when we moved across in August. By that time Bicherakov had been compelled to retire to the north, in the direction of Petrovsk, and he was not able to take any part in the Baku fighting.

Various raids were made on the road, and on July 20 the Jangalis, under their German leader, von Passchen, made a determined attack on Resht. The attack was beaten off and the enemy suffered severe casualties, as a result of which Kuchik Khan sued for peace, and a treaty with him was signed in August, after which the Jangalis gave us no more trouble.

A change of policy and our impending withdrawal from North Persia have since induced Kuchik Khan to raise again the banner of revolt, and the unfortunate inhabitants of Resht during the last two years have found themselves occasionally under British control,

sometimes in the hands of the Persian Cossacks, who are not really inspired by any enmity against the Jangalis, and more often, as at the present moment, loyal subjects of Kuchik Khan.

I have several times seen references to Kuchik Khan's freebooting tendencies. But I do not think it would be fair to regard these as designed to enrich himself. The money he acquires is, he maintains, merely the revenue necessary to conduct his military operations and to pay the charges of his civil administration. And I think that is a fair statement.

On the question of what right any private individual has to usurp the functions of State, I am afraid that I am not capable of giving an opinion of any value. The world is very much out of joint at present, and we have more glaring examples of a similar situation nearer home. It seems to me that the chief difficulty in any such argument is the fact that the words employed to express ideas on either side are seldom, if ever, capable of exact definition.

To return to the narrative of events.

By the middle of July we got news that the fall of the Bolshevik Government in Baku was imminent. By the end of the month it had fallen and its place had been taken by the Central Caspian Dictatorship, who, as had been foreseen, invited our aid in defending Baku against the Turks.

It was impossible not to respond to the appeal, although, like many incidents in war, it was obvious that the real opportunity had passed before preparations could be made to deal with it. One of our many "ifs" was this, that if we could have got over to Baku in July instead of August, and before the Turk had been allowed, without serious interference, to occupy positions which practically sealed the fate of the town, the saving of Baku would have presented only normal, instead of insuperable, difficulties. But we have to take facts as they are, and a discussion on "ifs" is the most futile of all discussions.

By the end of the first week in August we found ourselves firmly established in Baku and in daily conflict with the Turks. A portion of the 39th Infantry Brigade had reached us, and I was enabled to put a maximum of 900 rifles in the firing-line. A small enough figure for a 20-mile front, but some 8 miles of the front was denied by natural obstacles of cliffs and salt marshes, leaving 12 miles for defence. Our detachments were placed at the critical points, and the intervening spaces were held by the town troops, numbering some 6,000 men. When I say "held" I mean theoretically, because when attacked the town troops seldom "held" their positions, and when the attack fell on our portion of the line they never on any occasion rendered any effective support, with the result in each case of my parties falling to the enemy in spite of heroic resistance.

The strength of the Caucasus Islam Army opposing us was between 12,000 and 15,000 men; but the enemy entirely lacked initiative and hesitated to launch a really determined attack, which must inevitably have resulted in the capture of the town on any day he chose.

The one factor that might give us any hope of success was entirely lacking, and that was a fierce determination on the part of the town troops and the citizens to keep the enemy out. But the chaos of the revolution had deepened the already apathetic and fatalistic tendencies of the people, and they seemed incapable of making any real effort. Their despondency was increased by the smallness of our numbers. I had always warned the Baku authorities that at this stage of the war it was impossible to expect large numbers, but this warning had never reached the people. On the contrary, they had indulged in wild dreams of large British forces pouring into the town and entirely taking over the defence while they stood by and applauded.

We undertook the organizing and training of the local units, and got the arsenal into proper order; but it was late in the day to start this fundamental work, when the enemy were already at the gates and his artillery was within easy range of all parts of the town and the wharves.

On September 1, after a glaring failure on the part of the local troops to support one of my detachments which was being fiercely attacked, I summoned the various revolutionary committees and informed them of my determination to withdraw, giving the obvious reasons outlined above. My remarks were greeted with consternation and dismay, as if, in spite of my repeated warnings, the thought of the possibility of the fall of the town had only now presented itself to their minds for the first time. The Dictator officially forbade my departure, and informed me that the gunboats had orders to fire on and sink any of my vessels endeavouring to leave the port.

The committees took no action on my statement of the case beyond the passing of endless resolutions, and as the Turks still delayed the pressing of their advantages I determined to hold on and continue to hope against hope for some sign of heroism among the doomed population.

Meantime, I kept ready my three steamers, which would suffice for the evacuation of our troops—the *Kruger*, the *Kursk*, and the *Abo*.

Desultory fighting took place during the next fortnight, with the usual results, and at last, on September 14, the Caucasus-Islam Army launched its great attack.

The fighting began an hour before dawn, and soon after daybreak the Turks were already in possession of the outskirts of the town. The British detachments held their own, keeping the Turks back from actual entry into the town, and continuing in action till after

the sun had set—a very fine achievement indeed for young soldiers of the new army.

At nine o'clock in the evening the withdrawal began on lines which had been very carefully and minutely worked out beforehand. The Turks were too exhausted to interfere in any way, and the townspeople never realized our movement till we were all on board. The *Kursk* and the *Abo* had been got away without difficulty with the sick and wounded on board. The *Kruger*, with the fighting men and the guns, was ready to leave the wharf at 10 p.m., when a frantic message arrived from the Government, ordering me to replace my troops at once in their former position in the firing-line. I took no notice of this impossible order, and steamed out of the harbour dead slow with all lights out at about 11 p.m. We passed the guardship within 500 yards, and she opened fire on us, but without effect, and we were soon clear of the harbour.

Behind me came a small steamer, the *Armenian*, in charge of Colonel Rawlinson. This small steamer was loaded up with ammunition and explosives, and received six direct hits from the guardship, which, fortunately, failed to sink her or blow her up. By the next evening the force reassembled on the shore of the Caspian Sea at Enzeli, and the enterprise was at an end.

I have endeavoured to compress an account of our many activities into as small a space as possible, but I fear I have left myself but little time for the subject of Persia herself and Persia as regards the general situation in Central Asia.

It is within the knowledge of all that the treaty of 1907 dividing Persia into a Northern (Russian) sphere of influence, Southern (British), and Central (neutral zone), has recently been annulled. Its place has been taken by a treaty between ourselves and Persia, which is drawn up on indefinite lines, but is probably the best we could do at the present crisis, in which the world is undergoing a process of resorting, the outcome of which the wisest cannot foresee. This later treaty was signed at Teheran on August 9, 1919, but to this day, sixteen months later, has not yet been ratified by the Mejliss. The terms of the treaty are, briefly—

- (1) The assertion of the independence and integrity of Persia.
- (2) A supply of expert advisers.
- (3) Munitions and military experts.
- (4) A very small loan.
- (5) Encouragement of Anglo-Persian enterprise—railways, etc.
- (6) A joint committee to revise the Customs tariff.

Russia, it will be observed, has been left out of the agreement. This was, of course, unavoidable, owing to the present condition of Russia. But, whatever the condition of Russia may be to-day, there cannot be the least doubt that she will arise again on some future

date under some stable form of government which will enable her to fulfil her destiny in Asia. And the first signs of revival of vitality will be the putting of her Asiatic possessions in order, which at once brings her back to the northern frontier of Persia, and the whole series of events begins again.

I do not think it wise to provoke a discussion on this subject; it would probably lead to things being said that would be better unsaid. Let us, therefore, content ourselves with thinking over the various difficult problems involved.

The few facts that remain unalterable are—

The enormous area of Persia.

The large proportion of desert land.

The small population.

The small revenue.

The philosophic and unmilitary temperament of the modern representatives of this very old civilization.

France forms a convenient basis of comparison. The area of Persia is three times that of France. The population is one-fourth of that of France. The revenue of France, on a pre-war estimate, was 140 times that of Persia. (Actual figures: France 207½ millions and Persia 1½ millions sterling.)

So there you have the problem that requires solution. How can a country, not imbued with a warlike feeling, with an area of 680,000 square miles, with frontiers aggregating 4,000 miles in length, surrounded by powerful and ambitious neighbours, with a small population and a totally inadequate revenue, with no railways and scarcely any roads, *defend* itself against aggression?

There is only one answer, and that is, "By an appeal to the League of Nations." Such an appeal has already been made by Persia on purely sentimental grounds, but unfortunately the League of Nations itself is at the present moment little more than a sentimental idea, with no practical method of enforcing its ideas.

So, for the moment, I am afraid that salvation does not lie that way, nor can I offer any other solution. I am a thorough believer in the ideals of the League of Nations, but high ideals will not control the evil forces of a bad world, and until human nature is regenerated one can hope for no application of such noble theories to the hard facts of life.

The question of the stability of Persia is naturally of deep interest to the members of this Society, and that stability is seriously threatened at the present moment. So, without setting ourselves to answer the vast problems of the future set forth above, it behoves us for the present moment to adhere firmly to the terms of the recent treaty and, in the words of Lord Curzon, "see her through" the present crisis. With Turkestan in the hands of the Bolsheviks and

Kuchik Khan within her own borders working on similar lines, Persia, if left unaided, is indeed in a parlous plight.

I have been honoured by being permitted to place my views before you, and I trust I have not trespassed too much on your generosity in putting them at considerable length.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—The account we have just listened to of the experiences of the military mission to Persia has been of absorbing interest, and I think I may say interspersed with passages of the most delightful humour. I was very glad to read in this morning's papers the well-merited eulogy which the Prime Minister delivered in the House of Commons last night on the successful exploits of General Dunsterville and the force under his command.* Among many remarkable phases of the recent Great War, I think that the part which was played by what is now popularly known as the "Dunsterforce" will stand out conspicuously as a most notable achievement. We can, I think, esteem ourselves extremely fortunate at having heard from the leader of that expedition a recital of the events in which the expedition was concerned; and I think we can congratulate the country on the fact that the leadership was entrusted to the distinguished officer who has honoured us with his presence here this evening. Before asking your approval of a motion which I propose shortly to submit, I would invite any observations which anyone here present would desire to make. I do not know if Sir Arnold Wilson, who, I believe, is in the room, would favour us with any views.

Sir ARNOLD WILSON: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I did not expect to be asked to speak to-night. I really have little to add to Major-General Dunsterville's extraordinarily interesting report of his mission. I myself was not at any time with him during that period; I was Chief Political Officer to Sir William Marshall at Baghdad, who was his military chief. There is one point that General Dunsterville has scarcely referred to, and that is the general effect of his mission upon our politics in Persia and our good name in Persia. In that connection I would like to tell you a very short story. One of my officers was sitting in a coffee-shop dressed in the conventional garb of a British officer on active service in summer—revolver, short puttees, and shirt—looking very much like a private

* The Prime Minister said: "Why did we go to Persia? The Turks suddenly developed a great Pan-Turanian mania. So we decided, with such force as we had at our disposal, to send an expedition which would arrest the Turkish advance. It was very successful. It was one of the best bits of work done in the war. That small force resisted the Turkish advance, and had prevented what might have developed into one of the most menacing movements against the British Empire."—*The Times*, December 20.—A. C. Y.

soldier. Nobody thought he knew Persian. Troops were toiling past the coffee-shop up the road. Some pilgrims were discussing politics; one of them, pointing to the troops, said: "It is clear the British are not going to compromise; they will either be beaten or win. If the Turks are beaten bravery will disappear from the world, if the Germans are beaten science will disappear from the world, and if the English are beaten justice will disappear from the world." Then an old man in the corner remarked: "If that is the case the British will never be beaten, for God does not wish justice to disappear from the earth." That was after more than a year's acquaintance with us, and is enough to show that the name of Great Britain abroad did not suffer from closer knowledge of our officers and men. For that we must thank first and foremost General Dunsterville and his staff. (Applause.) What has been said by General Dunsterville regarding the effect that he had on general policy is very much less than I could have wished, but it is too long a subject to enter into to-night. It was one of the decisive factors at a decisive moment in the war, and the dates during which he was having his worst times were just about the dates when we were conquering and finally smashing the Turks. A month more or less would have made the difference to him, as he said. General Dunsterville's force succeeded in attracting one or two divisions from the Syrian and Mesopotamian fronts, where they might have had an effect on our advance to Baku and the Caucasus. (Applause.)

Sir HUGH BARNES: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I do not know that I can add very much to what the last speaker has said. I think you will all agree that we have listened to a most interesting, instructive, and amusing address. I dare say that most of you know that General Dunsterville has written a book, in which the adventures he has described to-night are told in very much greater detail. If you have not got it, I advise you to get it. It is written in the same breezy, humorous way, and with the same light touch as the lecture to which we have listened. I happen to know a little about that part of Persia, because I am Chairman of the Imperial Bank of Persia, and I constantly get reports from our various officers. I hope that General Dunsterville received assistance from our managers at the various places he visited, such as Kirmanshah, Hamadan, Kasvin, and Resht. . . .

The LECTURER: I could not have done without them.

Sir HUGH BARNES: We certainly heard from them a good deal about his doings while he was there; I know they were greatly relieved when they heard of his force coming up, and I am sure they were all very grieved when he departed. I think it is possible that if General Dunsterville had remained in command the Persians would not have lost Resht and Enzeli a second time. We also heard a good

deal about Kuchik Khan and the Jangalis, and not very long ago we had a very interesting report from our manager at Resht, Mr. Butters, who had been invited by Kuchik Khan to visit him in his camp, and had gone there for a few days. A smart guard of honour turned out to meet him and presented arms. He spent two nights in the camp and had several conversations with Kuchik Khan, and his view coincides with that of General Dunsterville—he is of the same opinion that Kuchik Khan is a well-meaning man, an honest fanatic, whose one idea is Persia for the Persians. I am sorry to say that during this last summer Kuchik Khan, unfortunately, has again thrown in his lot with the Bolsheviks, who, as you probably know, had returned to Enzeli. They seized the ships which General Denikin had brought there—and which had been interned—and took Resht. At first Kuchik Khan was against the Bolsheviks, and I think fought them. Ultimately he joined hands with them. At one time there was very serious alarm in Persia that Kuchik Khan, with the Bolsheviks, would succeed in getting through the passes and take Teheran. I understand that the British brigade which was at Hamadan—I suppose under orders from England—was not allowed to move, and the Teheran Government made use of a force which has been entertained for many years at Teheran—a semi-military force known as the Persian Cossacks, which is enlisted from Persians and officered by Russians. It was till lately commanded by a Colonel Stassorelsky, who gained a preliminary success against Kuchik Khan and the Jangalis, but ultimately, on advancing to Resht, was very badly beaten in an attempt to take Enzeli. The Persian Cossacks were more or less demoralized and broken up, and the result has been that the Persian Government has dismissed Colonel Stassorelsky and all the Russian officers, and the reorganization of the Persian Cossacks is to be entrusted, we hope, to Colonel Dickson, who is one of the British officers sent out to reorganize Persian military affairs under the Anglo-Persian agreement. If our officers are allowed to reorganize them, we may be perfectly sure that the force will become very much more efficient than it has ever been. I understand under the Russian arrangements they were paid for by contract, so that the officer commanding was able to keep anything he could save. Therefore it was not his interest to keep the force efficient and up to strength. At the present moment Persia is, I think, faced with a very serious crisis; everything depends just now upon what will be the decision of the Mejliss—*i.e.*, the Persian Parliament—as to the acceptance or otherwise of the Anglo-Persian agreement. You will remember the agreement which was arranged about a year and a half ago. In accordance with it our Government sent out certain officers to assist in forming the nucleus of a Persian Army. They also sent out Mr. Armitage Smith as financial adviser. But the

Ministry which negotiated the agreement fell; a new Government came into power, and they decided they could not confirm the Anglo-Persian agreement until it was approved by the Persian Parliament. So all the officers were put into cold storage, and everything agreed upon has been kept in abeyance until this event should take place. There has been very great delay in calling the Persian Mejliss, but I am told it was to meet last Sunday; we have all been looking forward with great interest to see what would happen when it met. So far we have had no telegrams, and nothing has appeared in any of the newspapers as to what the results of the first meetings of that body have been. The future of Persia will depend very largely on the decision arrived at. If the Anglo-Persian agreement goes through, and our officers are able to remain there, and the financial adviser goes back—at present he is in England—there is every hope that in time things in Persia may so far improve that we shall be able to withdraw our troops. Persia ought to be able to stand on her own feet, as soon as our officers have had sufficient time to organize for them a force that will enable them to hold their own frontiers. If, on the other hand, the Persian Mejliss turns down the Anglo-Persian agreement, I suppose the British Government will have no option except to withdraw their troops, and then no one can tell what will happen. I imagine the probable result will be a Bolshevik advance, joining with Kuchik Khan from Resht. If the Bolsheviks do advance, Persia has neither the money nor the men to face them, and the probability is that the whole of Northern Persia will fall more or less into a state of chaos. You will no doubt look with interest to your newspapers during the next few days to see what the result of the meeting of the Persian Parliament is. The British Government desires—I am sure every Englishman desires—that the independence and integrity of Persia may be maintained. We all hope that Persia, with her magnificent past, will again rise in the world, and prove able to hold her own without outside assistance. But I am afraid there is very little chance, that she will succeed in doing this, unless for a short time, a year or two at any rate, she takes the hand held out to her by the British Government. I trust, and I am sure you will all hope, that the decision of the Persian Parliament will be a wise one. (Applause.)

Colonel C. E. YATE, M.P.: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—We have had a most interesting lecture to-day on one of those curious derringdoes that the British Army takes up from time to time. When we consider where the British soldier has found himself during these years of war, in all the odd places where we never expected to find him, I think one of them is that extraordinary expedition of 600 miles across Persia, and then up the Caspian Sea to Baku. If we leave out all the other countries and only take Russia, think what the British soldier has done. Think as to that one battalion—a garrison

battalion, mind you—of the Middlesex Regiment under the command of Colonel John Ward, which went out from France, went to the Cape, went to India, Rangoon, Singapore—where they put down a mutiny—went on to China, and then to Vladivostok; and after that they joined General Koltchak throughout Siberia. Other battalions went to Murmansk and Archangel. Here we have the account to-day of this third expedition through Persia to the Caucasus, and we have seen General Dunsterville's illustrations of the great difficulties that had to be got over when passing up through Western Persia in mid-winter. The commanding position we might have held on the Caspian has always interested me very much. The Caspian Sea always seemed to me to be the real vital point in those regions. I remember when I first wrote to the Defence Committee, and suggested to them the advisability of getting a naval force on to the Caspian, I had before me the idea of what had been done on Lake Tanganyika in East Africa. There we sent a naval detachment, we got a gun on to Lake Tanganyika, sank the German ships there, and got entire command of the lake. It seemed to me the same thing might be done on the Caspian. It was done. We had a magnificent naval force there, and my one regret is that when we had got the ships and the guns, and had supreme command of the whole Caspian, we went and handed over all the ships and all the guns to General Denikin. He was a broken reed. He failed in the end. Had we retained our own naval force on the Caspian and kept those ships in our own hands we should not have had the terrible catastrophe when all those ships—after General Denikin's defeat—were eventually taken over by the Bolshevik forces. Had that naval force and those ships remained in our hands we might have had command of the Caspian to the present day. Then think what General Dunsterville has told us about Persia. One of the heartrending things he has mentioned is the famine there. I think we shall all agree that the most extraordinary thing, when we think of all the governors, rulers, and upper and merchant classes in Persia, is how absolutely apathetic and callous they were to all forms of human suffering in the people committed to their charge. General Dunsterville has told us here—and in his book you will read it—how not a single Persian Governor seemed to care a bit as to the sufferings of the people under him. The only idea that seems to occupy a Persian Governor's mind is how much money he can make out of the situation. I remember some thirty years or so ago there was a great famine in Persia. There was a Mansion House fund and enormous sums of money were subscribed. We did our best to save life in Persia, but I do not think I ever heard a word of thanks given for that. The only thing I ever heard was that the Persians thought we had some subtle idea of our own to benefit ourselves by doing this. We were out for humanity, and I

must say that from the ruling class of Persia the very idea of humanity seems to be entirely absent. General Dunsterville has told us also of the extraordinarily unmilitary temperament of the Persians; I think all who know Persia must thoroughly realize that. The Persian "Sarbaz" as I have seen him is a hopeless soldier. I do not know a single man in the whole Persian Army who would risk his life for the sake of his country. Patriotism seems to be entirely wanting in the ordinary Persian—I am not talking of the tribesmen; you find brave men amongst them. The Persian idea of patriotism is to boast of their antiquity, their poets, and their writers. They are extraordinarily clever, witty, amusing men, the best of companions; but when it comes to fighting—well, General Dunsterville has shown us what happened at Baku, and you find the same thing in Persia. The Baku troops would not go to the front, and that is the difficulty we have before us in Persia at the present time. Whether the British officers who have now gone to Teheran will be able to get up a really strong and reliable Persian force remains to be seen. We have seen how the Persian Cossacks, who had been trained for years under Russian officers, broke at the very first attempt they made to oppose the Russian Bolsheviks at Resht; and whether we shall be able to raise a reliable force or not in their place has yet to be proved by experience. A hundred years ago Lindsay and other English officers did great things with the Persian Army; let us hope great things may be done there again. As to the present condition of Persia, no one can say what will happen. The Prime Minister told us last night that the small force of 3,600 men that now holds Kasvin, and is the only reliable defence against a Bolshevik advance upon Teheran, is to be withdrawn under any circumstances in the early spring when the roads are open. What decision the Persians will come to in the meantime we cannot say; we can only hope they will realize the seriousness of the situation; and we must look to the papers, as Sir Hugh Barnes has told us, for the next few days to see what the decision is.*

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I am sure you will concur

* The latest news from Teheran indicates that the new Persian Government that is being formed by Sayad Ziá-ud-din, supported by the Cossack force under Riza Khan, will not proceed further either with the Anglo-Persian or Russo-Persian Agreements. A Finance Commission, consisting of Persian, British, and Belgian officials, has been appointed to control expenditure. A new army is at once to be organised, with the assistance of foreign officers, for national defence. The proclamation issued at the end of February by the new Prime Minister is stated by *The Times* correspondent, telegraphing on February 28, 1921, to have "made a good impression on all Europeans here, especially the British." It is understood that the small British force at Kasvin will be withdrawn as soon as the passes via Hamadan and Kirmanshah are open.—A. C. Y., March 5, 1921.

with me in voting to General Dunsterville our warmest and most grateful thanks for the most entertaining, instructive, and interesting paper which he has been good enough to read to us, and for his having devoted an hour or two of his most occupied time in coming here this evening.

The vote of thanks was unanimously and warmly accorded.

MEMBERS of the Central Asian Society are recommended to correspond, except under special circumstances, about Lecture tickets, this Journal, and the election of new Members, direct with the Assistant Secretary at 74, Grosvenor Street, and not with Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Yate, who is mostly away in Shropshire. By doing this, both time and postage will be saved.

A. C. YATE, *Lieutenant-Colonel*
(*Hon. Sec., C.A.S.*).

COMMUNICATIONS BY AIR IN THE EAST

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held at 74, Grosvenor Street, London, W. 1, on Thursday, January 20, 1921, when Captain P. D. Acland read a paper on "Communications in the East: Their Expansion by Means of Aircraft." Lord Carnock presided.

The CHAIRMAN, in opening the proceedings, said: Ladies and Gentlemen,—It is my pleasing duty to introduce to you Captain Acland, who has been good enough to come here this afternoon to read us a paper on "Communications in the East: Their Expansion by Means of Aircraft." Captain Acland is a well-known authority on the subject with which he proposes to deal, so I think we can look forward confidently to hearing a very interesting and instructive lecture.

Captain ACLAND: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I had to recast this lecture at the last moment, because I found that Lord Montagu of Beaulieu was giving a lecture from a commercial point of view, so I took the liberty of cutting out any figures I had put in in order to avoid any confusion. We get very confused when we start talking about figures, because most of us take very different angles, and you don't get very much farther. You will have an opportunity of seeing what Lord Montagu had to say on the subject of figures to-morrow, from which you will be able to draw conclusions.

I should like to say how honoured I feel at being asked to give this lecture to-day before so august a Society and so well-known a gathering. I feel that the time is at hand when the advent of aviation is very close to us—indeed, everything points to this fact. If we look back over the last hundred years, we find that progress in communication, advancing year by year, has been leading up to the stage when a man must needs have himself transferred, body and soul, to the place he desires. We have gone forward step by step from the written message sent by cable or wireless telegraphy to wireless telephony, by which means the voice can be carried for vast distances; all these, however, are only subterfuges in really urgent and vital affairs of State, or business, or war, where the presence of perhaps one man decides the day. We all know how much personality counts—States are ruled by it, businesses are run by it, the war was won by it. The transference of a man's personality may mean a decision that will turn a seeming defeat into a victory; he may be the means

of stopping a revolution, or perhaps turning what seems a trivial affair into a sanguinary civil war. Thousands of such cases could be produced, all proving the same thing—namely, that the fact of being able to arrange for the presence of a certain man or men at a certain place on a certain day is the consummation of human need. And apart from the individual, it will mean that close linking up of nations we all long for, leading to better relationship, harmony, and peace.

The development of aerial transport signifies all this. Before long we shall be able to say with certainty to America, "We shall be with you to-morrow"; to India and South Africa, "The day after to-morrow"; to Australia, "In five days." The uttermost ends of the earth will be as near to us then as Egypt is to-day.

The progress of the world depends upon the advancement of aircraft.

In drawing up this paper to present to you I was faced with a difficulty as to what method would be most likely to lead to a discussion, which, to my mind, is the chief value of meetings of this description, where there is such a wealth of experience and talent represented. It occurred to me, therefore, that by setting out certain facts showing what has been done up to the present, and by indicating a few conclusions based upon experience, an opportunity would be given for those who have specialized in certain aspects of Government service, and aviation, to base their views on what they have heard and express an opinion as to how they consider their duties in the past, and the duties of those of to-day and in the future, would be facilitated by making the fullest use of this new means of transport and human intercourse.

Perhaps it will not be considered out of place if some consideration is given to the stages of development of our science up to the present time.

PROGRESS.

The very rapid advance made in aviation was due to the necessities of the war, together with a complete disregard of expense so long as definite results in the direction of obtaining aerial supremacy over the common enemy in all phases of aerial warfare were attained. For instance, at the commencement of operations in 1914 the majority of aeroplanes were fitted with power units of 70 h.p., with quite a number of 63 h.p., whereas the Germans had successfully attained 100 h.p. These conditions obtained for the first few months of the war. In November, 1918, however, a few British machines were operating with 150 h.p. motors, a very large number of single-seater machines with 200 h.p., heavy bombing machines with 700 h.p., while in England a type was being evolved and tested of 1,400 h.p.,

and yet another of approximately 5,000 h.p. being "drawn out." It seems almost miraculous that this evolution could be brought about in so short a time.

WAR TO PEACE.

It has been one of the constructors' great difficulties since the war—and I may add disappointments—that they have not been able, for economic reasons, to continue their experiments and research on a similar scale. However, a vast mass of most valuable data was collected which gave us the means of studying departures in design which might fulfil commercial conditions. You will, I am sure, excuse me mentioning machines designed and produced by ourselves, but it is simpler for me to illustrate the Vickers-Vimy, which is a good example of one of the methods adopted for rapid turn-over to peace conditions. The war machine had a capacity of about 100 cubic feet, whereas our adaptation of this machine for commercial purposes—such as *The Times* aeroplane which flew from London to Tabora, and that named the "City of London," operated by Messrs. Instone and Co. between London and Paris—has a capacity of 300 cubic feet or sixteen passengers, the actual load in pounds to be carried remaining the same (approximately $1\frac{1}{4}$ tons dead weight).

The war types can be generally classified as follows:

- (a) *Single-seater* machines for scouting and offensive work, which have their prototype in civil life in sporting machines;
- (b) *Two-seater* machines used for reconnaissance and artillery spotting, and in their heavier forms for day-bombing; and
- (c) *Heavy bombing* machines, of which the Vickers-Vimy, Gotha, etc., are examples.

For the change-over to peace the machines on which designers chiefly centred were—

- (a) Single-engined reconnaissance, and
- (b) Twin-engined heavy bombing types,

the reason for this being that there was more scope with these of effecting modifications to existing machines, as opposed to building and testing a completely new design, to enable a commercial load to be carried in anything like attractive quantities, time being an all-important factor. Good examples of the single-engined type were the Bristol two-seater fighter, converted to the Bristol tourer, and the evolution and new design of the D.H.4 and D.H.9, from which was eventually evolved the D.H.16 and later the D.H.18; and, finally, in the twin-engined heavy bombing type, the Vickers-Vimy bomber, from which was evolved the Vimy commercial.

I propose leaving this aspect here with the sole remark that out of war types craft have been evolved which are doing very good work

in service, but at the same time sufficient data have not been collected to make it possible for a really practical specification to be got out as to what is ultimately needed. We cannot expect in these, the early days, to be able to make exact statements of what is required in the same way as engineers of a railway or controllers of shipping interests can issue specifications of material to be used by them in their operations.

CIVIL USES.

Since the Armistice, and particularly during the last nine months, aircraft have been operating to a considerable extent in various parts of Europe. The technical results of all of these services have shown more than promising regularity and freedom from serious accidents, as is shown below:

Period, May, 1919, to September, 1920 (17 Months).

Flying accidents resulting in death to one or more occupants of machine ...	7
Flying accidents not involving injury to personnel	19
Third party killed ...	1
Third party injured (propeller accident) ...	1
Machine miles per flying accident (not necessarily fatal) ...	31,400
Passengers killed per 1,000 carried, or 1 in 12,500 ...	0.08

Period, October, 1919, to September, 1920 (12 Months).

(These figures include Continental Services.)

Total number of machine flights made ...	27,229
Total number of passengers carried ...	42,153
Total weight of goods carried ...	112 tons
Total number of miles flown ...	921,174

I particularly want to draw attention to the last half-yearly results which have been published in Germany, and were also issued in the half-yearly report of the Controller-General of Civil Aviation published in December last. These results are all the more remarkable as they show very great determination on the part of the Germans to compete seriously, and to entertain the running of aerial transport services. At the same time one cannot refrain from respecting the initiative shown when one considers the very great restrictions which were placed upon them in all matters connected with the air.

In spite of the restrictions imposed by the Peace Treaty and petrol shortage, the results achieved by Germany in the first six months of commercial aviation are approximately 50 per cent. of those achieved by the British. Over a third of a million miles were flown, 1,574 passengers carried, and over 81 tons of mails, parcels, etc., carried,

while the regularity of scheduled flights shows an efficiency of 93.3. Six new designs have been passed as "civil" by the Inter-Allied Commission of Control; permission for manufacture, however, has not been granted so far. The trading companies have formed an association which is officially recognized, and now appears to have assumed responsibility for the control of aerodromes, meteorological stations, and signals. There are daily services connecting Berlin and Copenhagen, Berlin and Bremen, Berlin and Wangerooze, and three times weekly from Berlin to Amsterdam.

It is of considerable interest that the trading Aerial Transport Companies have associated themselves with the Hamburg-Amerika Line and the Norddeutscher Lloyd.

Representatives of the German industry are investigating the opportunities for exploiting German machines in North and South America, especially the former, with a view to inaugurating a Transatlantic Airship Service.

This should serve as a warning that the potentialities of the air are not being lost sight of by the Germans—a fact which I urge should be pondered on most particularly in reference to some of our long and sparsely defended frontiers in distant lands.

SUBSIDIES.

You will doubtless have made a mental note that I have said nothing up to the present on the finance of aerial traffic.

The story of aerial transport has been somewhat disappointing to date. We have seen that several enterprising concerns have ceased operations altogether, while others are carrying on with restricted services. This state of affairs is not surprising when one recalls that the services were experimental, the conditions under which they were working extremely difficult, financially as well as physically, the flying taking place over one of the most difficult aerial routes in the world—namely, a circle of about 250 miles radius of London—whilst in the early stages of organization. Almost every day this organization is being improved by the extension of wireless installations, aerial lighthouses, creating machinery to speed up the notification of meteorological conditions, etc., but this all takes time and, incidentally, spells expense. Again, firms directly interested in the construction of aircraft were the first to undertake transport, and, at a time when finance was necessary to nurse their new development, they were working under grave difficulties in that their whole business was disorganized through the cancellation of Government contracts and turning over their factories from war to peace, which is, of course, a difficult and embarrassing operation. The travelling public, on the other hand, had not developed the "air sense," and were naturally awaiting signs of a large volume of regular traffic before they were

prepared to trust themselves and their goods to this new, rapid, and little known means of transport.

You may have noticed in a letter to *The Times* of last Tuesday from Major-General Brancker, that reference was made to the report that Fokker machines are to be used in a London-Berlin service. Unfortunately, the British firm who made the preliminary negotiations for this service has now gone into liquidation, leaving the field open to Mr. Fokker, a Dutch designer of acknowledged achievement. It remains to be seen whether such conditions will receive official sanction.

We have just heard that Sir Frederick Sykes has at last been able to overcome one of his many cardinal difficulties in the shape of obtaining a subsidy for aircraft on approved routes, subject to final sanction. This is a matter for very sincere congratulation. I fancy it has not been the easiest project he has seen through. The effect of this should be good. One of the great dangers, as I saw it, was that owing to insufficient data financial and transportation interests were unable to see their way sufficiently clear to embark on something entirely new at this difficult time, the result being that the aircraft industry, from which the machines emanate, stood in danger of having no outlet for their new designs and sale of products, thus losing some of their best brains. This danger, I hope, is now past.

NOTES ON CAIRO-KARACHI ROUTE.

I now venture to approach the territory in which this Society is interested, and suggest that we keep in mind the aerial junction at Cairo with a view of linking up with Karachi, Damascus, etc.

First of all I want to say that my personal experience of transportation in the East has been that of an ordinary member of an Indian cavalry regiment. I am hoping that the proposed route will form a useful basis of discussion from several aspects. We want to benefit by the experience and advice of the distinguished members of this Society to aid us in promoting our art in this territory—for it is always the man on the spot, and the practical man, whose views are essential when endeavouring to urge forward the latest development of our Western civilization in the new territory.

Sir Frederick Skyes in February last, in speaking before the Royal Geographical Society on Imperial Air Routes, described Egypt as the hub of aviation in general and Great Britain in particular. I think the slide now to be shown makes this quite clear.

London to Cairo, of course, is not "all red" as we see it; on the other hand, it is a suitable and obvious first stop for an airship radiating from our capital in an easterly direction.

Here I think it is advisable to make myself very clear on the

method of setting out an Empire aerial organization based on Cairo. We require airships, aeroplanes, amphibians, and—though open to discussion—flying-boats as our full complement of craft, each to be used in its own sphere. Thus the airship, as we all know, is distinguished for its non-stop passages of 2,000 to 3,000 miles. A demonstration service is now being worked out by Sir Frederick Sykes.

Surplus airships left over from the war are to be operated by the Department of Civil Aviation, whose object is to experiment with them in practical service on a commercial basis, an undertaking impossible for private enterprise at the present time.

The part to be played by the heavier-than-air craft—that is to say, the aeroplane, amphibian, or flying-boat—is to link up points not touched by the airship, and to operate the shorter distances from the airship stopping-places—for example, aeroplanes from Cairo to Basra, say, thereafter transferring to seacraft until Karachi is reached. Up to the present time the prevalent view is that for heavier-than-air craft distances approximating 250 to 300 miles in one flight are economical for general purposes.

To operate from Cairo and to maintain a civilian aerial organization seems to me to be something which is of direct benefit to our great Empire.

The political conditions in Egypt and the awakening of national thought there seem to point to a progressive aerial policy, with as little militarism as possible in its elements—that is to say, intercommunication having to be kept free and open under all circumstances, considered decisions can be given in the shortest time on accurate information obtained from men on the spot. This can be done most easily by personal intercourse and exchange of views. Again, if the part replacement of troops by aircraft for security can be safely achieved, this will be of definite service, an outstanding example of this being the operations against the Mad Mullah a short time ago.

The present convulsions and disturbances in the Near East have retarded progress very considerably in laying out a Cairo-Karachi route, which perhaps is not altogether to be deplored, since the resultant economy in the working of the Department of Civil Aviation has made it possible for a sum to be set aside for the commercial enterprises nearer home, whereas the R.A.F. in the Near East have been doing all that is possible to extend their sphere of usefulness and obtain experience of flying conditions which in due course will be made available for their friends in commerce. But even so, generally speaking, wireless stations have been opened every 300 miles between Cairo and Karachi. This is a first step, and a vital one; without a complete wireless organization aerial transport is gravely handicapped, for by early and accurate notification of meteorological conditions a

regular service can be maintained. I go so far as to say that if wireless is necessary for shipping it is a hundred times more so for aircraft.

Doubtless there will be some delightfully intricate problems to be solved by our friends at the Air Ministry and Foreign Office in making suitable arrangements for aerial intercourse over the many and varied territories, mandatory and otherwise, which one now finds on the map in the Middle East. These will take time and patience to solve, and until the situation is clear politically there can be no question of private enterprise stepping in to organize and exploit this route.

METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS.

I am indebted to the Air Ministry for the following notes of the meteorological conditions existent on the Cairo-Karachi route, and I think you will agree that the pilots who contribute so largely in maintaining an average of 85 per cent. efficiency on the English-Continental services, notorious for the rapid variations in weather conditions, would have little difficulty in negotiating the average weather encountered in Egypt, Persia, and Mesopotamia.

The weather conditions in Northern Egypt are very stable. During the winter (November to February) cloudy weather with occasional rain prevails, the wind being usually south-west. March and April are the transition months to the summer season, and are usually very hot, with dusty south winds. From May to September there is a prevailing north wind, increasing to a fresh or moderate breeze in the afternoon, and falling by the evening. October is the transition month to winter conditions.

Over the portion of the route between Lower Egypt and the Persian Gulf, via Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, the prevailing winds to a considerable height are westerly, and gales are rare, except at the equinox. The greater part of this area is arid and almost rainless, though subject to thunderstorms; hot winds of a sirocco type occur. The mean cloudiness is small; the coastal region of Syria is, however, subject in midwinter to gales and rain, and snow falls every winter on the Syrian mountains.

The Persian Gulf is subject in winter to strong winds of the north-westerly (Shamal) type, with occasional gales and squally heavy rains and thunder; the alternative wind from the south-east also brings similar weather in that season. There is seldom bad weather between mid-April and mid-October, but the damp heat becomes excessive and visibility is often bad.

From Bandar Abbas to Karachi the route enters the monsoon region. The rainfall is uncertain. During the winter months the north-west wind and bad weather prevail, as in the Persian Gulf. On the north of the Gulf of Omar such weather, though alternative with

frequent calms, may be experienced at any time of the year. The south-west monsoon prevails in summer, especially towards Karachi. Inland the mountains cause erratic conditions; on the delta of the Indus storms are rare.

CONCLUSIONS.

What police, militia, or military forces will be necessary to guard aerodromes, etc., is a problem which does not come within my province—except as a taxpayer; this has to be decided by our military advisers, but, granted political co-operation, this should not be a serious matter, and certainly less difficult and hazardous than securing a long line of railway—say the Bagdad Railway, with its many tunnels and bridges, etc.

The necessity for quicker transport and communications seems to become daily, almost hourly, more important; the control and administration of the world's affairs appears to be more and more centralized in fixed places as time goes on, and less freedom of action is given to the man on the spot, as was the rule and necessity in pre-telegraph and railway days. This is a factor which has to be faced, and I do feel that at the present time, with few exceptions, sufficient use is not being made of the air. The military and—may I whisper—naval problems are being examined; yes: but do you not think that a vast field remains unexplored in the maintenance of direct contact between our outposts and their respective headquarters, thus cementing further the link of the Empire?

Consider the difference in speed (apart from travelling under infinitely more comfortable conditions) of the aeroplane, with a cruising speed of 90 to 100 miles an hour, and that of the camel with his 2 miles an hour, the steamer anywhere from 4 to 16 knots, and the railway averaging, say, 25 miles an hour.

In many cases men administering vast tracts of territory are cut off by hundreds of miles geographically and months in point of time from civilization, when frequent and speedy communications would be something more than a godsend. I think of the tragedy of General Charles Gordon and what might have been done to assist him had there been aircraft in those days. It is possible that similar situations may arise in the future. Equally important uses in the field of commerce—the early stages of surveying a new railway, exploration of new fields of enterprise—occur to one. Take, for instance, a journey from Cairo to Mosul (assuming the oil to be there) by sea, etc.; it takes some three to four weeks, whereas by air it is a matter of about eight hours.

Now, having spoken for so long about the possible uses of aircraft, I am, naturally, asked, "What is the best application of aircraft?" The answer is simple: Mails for one thing and competition for quick

intercourse for another. I feel the means by which this can be carried out are worthy of our very serious consideration. Should aviation compete with railways by land and ships by sea? The answers appears to be, No. Aerial travel is an addition to the present means of transport, not a competitor. Should it happen that in the distant future the main carrying of the world's commerce is through the air, well and good. May it not be analogous to the advent of the railway replacing the stage-coach, the steamer, the sailing ship? which was, after all, the process of steady evolution keeping pace with scientific achievement. In the meantime it is too early to speak of such things except with reserve; progress must be made step by step on sound lines commercially and technically with the means now at our disposal, using each to the best of our ability for the benefit of humanity, and not fearing to take advantage of this attractive infant prodigy—aviation.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—Being, I fear, a very ignorant layman with regard to these matters that have been treated of this afternoon, I would not dream of occupying your time by any observations of my own on the most excellent paper to which we have just listened; but I understand that there are in this audience several gentlemen who are most admirably qualified to speak on the subject, and I am sure we should be very grateful if they would favour us with their views. I would, in the first place, ask Sir Frederick Sykes if he would kindly give us any observations he may wish to make.

Major-General Sir FREDERICK SYKES, Controller-General of Civil Aviation: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—Captain Acland has surveyed such a wide area that it is a little difficult for me to take up any points and amplify them; but I will try to do so. He mentioned the point in regard to turning from a war to a peace basis, which of course is a very difficult matter in the air, as it has been in many other directions. It is perhaps even more difficult in air matters than in others, because the whole development of the air was brought to a head by means of war objects, so that really we had nothing to go on. We sat down at the end of the war to think out the directions in which this great movement could best be used. The machines had all been developed for war purposes; the special attributes had been speed and manœuvrability and weight-carrying capacity for bombing purposes. Those attributes had in some cases to be diverted—that is to say, in the commercial machine great speed and manœuvrability were not so essential. Weight-carrying was very desirable, but safety and reliability were the most important factors. To gain the confidence of the public reliability and safety had to be put before everything. Whether it was from the point of view of the public subscribing capital for companies which might be

promoted, or from the point of view of their being carried themselves, or their mails or their goods, it all came to the same thing: reliability and safety had to be considered first. The aircraft constructors at once took up this line and did what they could as a temporary measure to modify existing types; and Captain Acland has described the great results which have been achieved by the Vickers-Vimy in its modified peace form. I think it is a matter of great credit to the company that they have been able to do so much with a machine which was originally designed for war purposes. It has flown over a large part of the world. Other machines have also been modified, but to put commercial flying on a sound basis it is recognized that we must really design and build for definite commercial use. This naturally means a very large outlay of money. Also, although design is the heart and core of the whole of the movement, new and improved designs are of no value unless the resultant machines can be used. Therefore air transport, in my opinion, is the great object which we should have in view in order to develop aviation in peace. Service aviation can only, under the restricted conditions of finance, be carried up to a certain point. Design for war purposes must of course continue; but civil design, commercial design, can also greatly help forward war design, and, if it develops to the extent we hope, can maintain a large industry, both in regard to construction and the operation of the machines turned out by the constructors and designers. As Captain Acland has shown you, this was progressing during last year very rapidly when we consider the adverse conditions under which it had to start. We hope that the Government agreement to subsidize will help to hasten forward this movement, as I feel quite certain it will. Turning to minor points, Captain Acland has mentioned the genesis this year of a successful type of amphibian. In my opinion the amphibian is one of the most important developments which has occurred in air matters for a very long time; you have only to think of the advantage of using a machine which is equally suitable for water or land work to appreciate the extraordinary advance which is made over a machine which can only use one element. To take one small instance, if you can get a machine which can fly in a direct stage to Malta, and in a second stage to Egypt, instead of pursuing a tortuous course via Lyons, Italy, the Straits of Otranto, and possibly Greece and Suda Bay in Crete—the route we had to take during the war to get some of our machines out to Egypt—the difference in relative distances is very great. If we intend to develop aviation on an Imperial basis, we must concentrate on reaching Egypt in two direct stages via Malta, for, although our French and Italian friends are prepared to render us every assistance, I am sure you will agree that we must use every effort to establish an all-red route to Egypt to connect this country with the hub from which

our other two red routes, to South Africa, India, and Australia, radiate. The amphibian will help us enormously in that direction. In regard to airships, the main difficulties which confront us are their great cost, problems connected with their design, and the fact that their development, compared with that of the aeroplane, was not pushed forward during the war. But I think that we shall be able to develop the airship to a certain extent within the necessarily limited finances at our disposal.

It is our intention to put the airship station at Pulham, which is now to be run by my department, on a commercial basis, so that we can demonstrate in a practical way that the operation of airships is commercially sound, and offer any company which may be formed in the future to take them over the results of the experience gained in a really tangible form. The mooring mast is one of the most important factors in the operation of the airship. I was up a mooring mast yesterday at Pulham, and I can assure you it is not as easy as it appears to put up the girder arrangement, such as you have seen on the screen, and tie up an airship to it. But we have very good brains working out the problem, and I think we are moving in the direction of success. What we wish to prove is that the mooring mast will be effective whether it is situated close to the airship sheds or at a temporary base in Egypt, Malta, or elsewhere. R24 did some very useful work at a light mooring mast, but of course she was a comparatively small airship.

Although the flights across the Atlantic—both by aeroplane and airship—the flights to South Africa and Australia, all had enormous value in showing what can be done, it must be recognized that commercial flying day in and day out on a reliable, safe, and regular basis, is a very different thing. That is what we—constructors, Government Department, and everybody else concerned—have got to prove out. That is what we are steadily working at now; and I am quite certain that, whether this year, next year, or in the years to come, that result will be achieved. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: Will Dr. Chalmers Mitchell say something?

Dr. CHALMERS MITCHELL, F.R.S.: Lord Carnock, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I really came here to do myself the pleasure of hearing Captain Acland speak, not with the least intention of speaking myself. However, as you have kindly asked me, there are one or two things I should like to say. First I should like to join with General Sir Frederick Sykes in congratulating Captain Acland and his associates in the Vickers Company on the marvellous success of their adaptation of the war type to the Vickers-Vimy commercial type. My own practical experience is not great, but it is something. I believe that the Vickers commercial type is just as comfortable a way of travelling as it is possible to have. It is certainly very much more comfortable

than a fast express train. For instance, I was able to write practically the whole time without any trouble at all, whereas I dare say you know, if you try to write with a stylograph even in a smooth-running express train, you find considerable difficulty. It is really more comfortable than an express train, and a great deal more comfortable than a fast steamer, except in the very best weather. I should like, your lordship, to say that I had the pleasure of a short trip in that very interesting new invention the amphibian, and that I agree with General Sir Frederick Sykes that it has a future of very great promise indeed. But so far as concerns the actual route from London to Cairo: I am rather more inclined to be interested in the very great experiment that General Sykes is going to introduce now, because it seems to me between London and Cairo, if we are to expect, as I think one must expect, that Cairo is going to be the aviation hub of the British Empire—almost of world aviation—in the future, I think it stands to reason that there is going to be rather heavy constant traffic between London and Cairo; traffic heavy enough and constant enough to carry the cost of a big flying-ship. I am therefore looking with very great interest to the experiments to be started presently, the attempts to try to use a flying-ship commercially between this country and Cairo. There will always be more passengers from London to Cairo than from London to the Cape, or Cairo to India. Again, one has to realize that the weather conditions between London and Cairo are usually difficult, and much more suited to the flying-ship, which can make a long non-stop run. For a very long time yet aeroplanes will be very much safer and more comfortable for passengers where there is the opportunity of breaking the journey every 500 or 600 miles at most. You have a very difficult route between London and Cairo, especially with regard to aerodromes suitable for the landing of an aeroplane. I should expect, therefore, that one of the earliest stages in the flying of the future will be airship transport between London and Cairo, taking a large number of passengers with a fair quantity of baggage on a non-stop journey—where they can sleep, dine, and have most of the comforts of modern travel—and by aeroplanes from Cairo onwards in each direction; from Cairo towards Mesopotamia and India; and from Cairo southwards to the Cape and south-westwards across to Nigeria, the latter, I think, being probably also a route of the future. I think all these are routes for which aeroplanes are most suitable. For one thing, they are routes where very mountainous regions have to be traversed, and an aeroplane has very great advantages over an airship in rising and falling over high mountains. I do not want to detain you any more; I want simply to say, as at least a middle-aged person, that I am quite certain that flying is going in a way in which a middle-aged person can travel for decently long journeys with very

much greater comfort than by any other method. I myself am a convinced believer, not only in the remote future, but in the immediate future of aerial transport for passengers. (Applause.)

Major-General E. D. SWINTON: Lord Carnock, Ladies and Gentlemen,—There is little I can add to the able lecture delivered by Captain Acland and to the remarks made by Sir Frederick Sykes and Dr. Chalmers Mitchell. One point, I think, in regard to the subject we have been hearing about this afternoon, which has special reference to the portion of the world with which the Society is connected, and which, though obvious, is sometimes lost to sight, is the fact that aerial roadways are ready made and free to all. In parts of the world as yet undeveloped, such as Central Asia, where roads are difficult to construct, railways more so, and both very expensive, this is a very important factor. From the commercial point of view the actual volume of traffic, of course, will depend on the demand, and this is true of all parts of the world. But the necessity for establishing communication through the air, apart from the volume of traffic, is greater in the less civilized parts of the world, because there we find the most marked absence of communication on the ground. The time factor also, in undeveloped countries, carries greater weight, because air transport gives a comparatively greater advantage over any other form of transport other than rail. In regard to development, roads and railways have in the past sometimes been a great assistance to the settlement of a country by the flow of the mass of traffic, either of passengers or merchandise. This I do not think will apply to air communications, which will be useful for connecting together existing centres of population, etc., otherwise separated by many days of travel across impassable country. In point of time and in point of experience the solution of the transport problem over the wilder portions of the earth's surface seems to lie in the air. Captain Acland referred to a quotation from one of Sir Frederick Sykes's speeches to the effect that Cairo would be the air hub of the world. Only this afternoon I was looking at a German pamphlet in which international air traffic in the future was discussed, and the argument of the writer was that Germany would be the centre of European air traffic owing to her geographical position, but he at the same time admitted that in the future the British Empire would be Germany's greatest competitor in the air owing to the worldwide extent of the British Empire. I do not think I have any more to say; the ground has been so well covered already.

The CHAIRMAN: Captain Sheppard, if he is here, or Sir Arnold Wilson.

Sir ARNOLD T. WILSON: My Lord Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—My only title to speak is that of practical experience of flying as a passenger in the Middle East. It has been my good fortune to

fly for over three hundred hours in the past two or three years—from Bagdad to Cairo, Aleppo to Cairo, Hamadan, Basrah, Bushire, Koweit; and I was only accidentally prevented from going down to Bahrein. I have had a good many crashes, due not to any lack of skill on the part of the pilots, but due entirely to the fact that pioneer travel and unknown aerodromes involve unknown conditions. But I remain a convinced optimist. The air makes one optimistic—perhaps unduly so. None of the previous speakers has referred to what we might describe as the ground conditions; at the present moment the ground conditions in the Middle East are distinctly more unfavourable than atmospheric conditions. I am not so afraid when flying of what is in the air as of what is on the ground, and I fear that is likely to be accentuated in the near future. There is nothing a pilot is more afraid of than what is known as drift. Drift is the motion imparted to an aeroplane by a side wind of unknown velocity, and it is dangerous because while the machine appears to be moving in one direction it is actually going in another direction. There is such a thing as drift in politics; we have it frequently at the present moment, especially in the Middle East, and if we do not make some allowance for the unfavourable winds which are now blowing there, we shall have a crash, and a very bad one. Turning to subjects more within the scope of this lecture, we have had a certain amount of experience of using aeroplanes in connection with Government purposes in Mesopotamia for surveys. We found we could get surveys completed sufficiently satisfactory for ordinary purposes at two-fifths of the cost and in one-fifth of the time—a very satisfactory result. I do not suggest that it is equally applicable to all countries and all sorts of surveys, but within limits the aeroplane has exceptional value for survey work. My own experience is that future air routes will be hampered not so much by climatic conditions, which, as the chart showed, are normally good in the Middle East, but by the absence of good communication. Aerodromes require very considerable quantities of petrol, spare parts, hangars, and the like, and these have to be transported by rail or road. To maintain an aerodrome at Hamadan in Persia at an altitude of 6,000 feet, and with a thermometer going down to approximately zero for two or three months at nights in the winter; to maintain a hangar at Bagdad, only 300 miles away, with a thermometer going up to 160° in the sun for three months during the summer, with nothing between them except very indifferent road, and a people who have become accustomed to regard the aeroplane as an enemy rather than a friend—and who cannot resist the temptation of shooting at the bird—involves difficult problems which we have to face. We have not failed to do so, but they involve risks which a commercial company cannot be expected to take on at the moment. The traffic is there, both mails and

passengers, but the ground conditions are not such as to give immediate hope. Most countries that we know have been through somewhat similar conditions to those now prevalent, and I can only express the pious hope that before long satisfactory conditions will reign in the Middle East. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: I think, ladies and gentlemen, we are very fortunate in having had the advantage of listening to the remarks from the distinguished gentlemen who have been good enough to address us, and I think I shall be interpreting your wishes if I move a very hearty vote of thanks to Captain Acland for the very interesting lecture which he has been kind enough to deliver to us.

The vote of thanks was most cordially given to the lecturer.

SARACENIC ARCHITECTURE AND THE CRUSADERS

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society took place on the afternoon of Thursday, February 17, 1921, with Colonel Sir Francis Young-husband, K.C.S.I., in the chair, the principal business being to listen to an address by Mr. M. S. Briggs, F.R.I.B.A., on Saracenic Architecture.

The CHAIRMAN: The Honorary Secretary will read the names of the members who have been elected to-day.

The HON. SECRETARY (Colonel A. C. YATE): We have to-day elected nineteen new members: Mr. Henry Wellcome (donor of the Wellcome Tropical Research Laboratories, Khartoum); Brigadier-General M. E. Willoughby, C.B., C.M.G., C.S.I.; Dr. Patrick Alfred Buxton, Trinity College, Cambridge; Lieutenant-Colonel P. C. Joyce, C.B.E., M.C.; Mr. H. E. Bowman, C.B.E., Director of Education, Jerusalem; Captain W. J. M. Watson-Armstrong; Mr. G. Monteath, I.C.S.; Major J. R. L. Weir; Major C. G. Lloyd, C.I.E., M.C.; Major M. Hiles, O.B.E.; Captain R. Horsfield; Captain L. Gard Matthews; Captain G. H. Shellswell; Captain W. F. Webb; Captain L. C. R. Wilkinson, R.A.; Captain H. Prichard Thomas, of the 126th Baluchistan Regiment; the Rev. R. A. Young; Mr. G. Antonius; and Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. Thornton, C.M.G.

I have to mention that in the last number of the JOURNAL we invited members to contribute anything they thought would be acceptable to the library or, possibly in the future, museum of the Central Asian Society. Major Henry Lawrence Haughton, of the 36th Sikhs, responded at once with a Chinese currency note of the reign of the Emperor Hung-Wu, the first ruler of the Ming Dynasty. The date is the second half of the fourteenth century. I confess for myself that I am no authority whatever on Chinese antiquities, but we can imagine this a thing of very considerable value. We are indebted to Mr. Alexander for a terrestrial globe. My brother, Colonel Sir Charles Yate, has presented two books, of which he is the author, viz., "Khurasan and Sistan" and "Northern Afghanistan," the latter being a record of his experiences on the Afghan Boundary Commission of 1884-1886. Then we have received from Baghdad—from the High Commissioner—a considerable number of official publications connected with the administration of the pro-

vince. Mr. Banerjee has presented us with "Hellenism in Ancient India," a book that I know has attracted a good deal of interest and attention, and which Sir Richard Temple kindly consented to review for us, but unfortunately his health prevented that. Mr. A. L. P. Tucker has given us his Memoir on Sir Robert Sandeman. When I came back from the Afghan Boundary Commission in 1885, the *Pioneer*, whose correspondent I had been on that Commission, in a very sporting spirit, printed off fifty copies of the letters which I contributed during my year with the Boundary Commission, and gave them to me. Most of them have long ago been distributed, but I still have two or three, and I venture to offer one to this Society. For the moment that constitutes what I may call the commencement of the library of the Central Asian Society; but I venture again to ask all who are here present to remember that we shall be glad to receive books. Most people have books that they don't want. Naturally, we want books that deal with our subject, which is Asia. I am going to say one more word, as I am on my feet, and that is regarding the increase of the membership of this Society. I tell you from my experience, which now has been a pretty close one of three years, that, if you want your friends to become members, you must suggest it to them. I will not use a stronger word than "suggest." Many men do not know that the Society exists; many think they have not the qualifications for it. But the fact is we want members. We want strength and we want money; otherwise we cannot carry on. As you all know, expenses are heavy in these days. Therefore I appeal to you all not to go about as if your sole interest in connection with this Society was to come to its meetings and read its JOURNAL. You should know that we want another five hundred members at least, and I think that, when we have got that five hundred, we shall want another five, if we are going to adequately represent British interests, which are vast, in the Middle East. If this Society ever numbers two thousand, it will be none too strong for the work before it. At present we are 400 against 130 at the time of the Armistice. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I thoroughly endorse all that our very energetic and persevering Honorary Secretary has said, and I hope we shall all do our best to bring in an increased membership. I would like to bring to your notice this little book by Mr. Tucker on Sir Robert Sandeman. It is a very good book on that eminent Indian administrator. I will now introduce Mr. Briggs, an able authority on Saracenic architecture. (Applause.)

SARACENIC ARCHITECTURE AND THE CRUSADERS.

As the lecture was practically identical with one entitled "Saracenic Architecture in Egypt and Palestine," given before the

R.I.B.A. on December 13, 1920, and reported in the journal of that Association dated January 8, 1921, as also in the *Architects' Journal* of December 15, 1920, it has not been considered necessary to reproduce it here. The lecture was listened to by the assembled audience with close attention, and when Major the Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, M.P., said in the subsequent discussion that it really was a relief to turn from everlasting politics to art, the audience promptly evinced its sympathy with that sentiment. Mr. Briggs illustrated his lecture with excellent lantern-slides, and the vote of thanks to him, proposed from the chair, was most willingly and warmly accorded. For the information of those who desire to pursue further the subject of Mr. Briggs' lecture, I may mention that there is also an article by him in the *Burlington Art Magazine* for January, 1921, entitled "The Architecture of Saladin and the Influence of the Crusades (A.D. 1171—1250)."—A. C. Y.

The CHAIRMAN: It has been very pleasant to have a change to art from the usual lectures on the politics of Central Asia. But of course the Society deals not only with politics, but with art. Sir Reginald Wingate was here, but I am sorry to say he has had to leave; we should have been very glad indeed to have had the result of his experience of so many years in Egypt. I do not know if Major Ormsby-Gore is still here.

Major the Hon. W. G. A. ORMSBY-GORE: I was extremely interested in Mr. Briggs' most admirable paper. I think I have seen all the buildings that he showed us, and, like him, have been a humble student of architecture in the Middle East. He invited us to express opinions as to whether we should call it "Arab," "Saracenic," or "Mohammedan." I hope he will stick to "Arab," and for this reason: that I think scholarship tends to prove that the great Mohammedan buildings, such as the mosque of Ibn Tulun and the mosque at Samara, of which we were shown photographs, the earliest great Moslem monuments, owe their origins to pre-Islamic Arab art. The most notable building of that pre-Islamic Arab civilization that still remains to us is the great palace of Okhaidr, near Kerbela and Nejef, west of the Euphrates. You will find admirable photographs in Miss Bell's "Amurath to Amurath," and her great monograph published by the Clarendon Press on that building. That is near the Euphrates. Similarly, east of Jordan, on the edge of the desert there, you will find the beginnings of the new style of architecture breaking away from the Roman and Greek tradition, which eventually evolved into the Arab architecture, dating from pre-Islamic times—notably in Rabbath Ammon and other places east of the Jordan along the edge of the desert. There is still a good deal of further research needed, although Dieulafoy, the great student of Persian building,

drew attention to them. There is another point in connection with Mr. Briggs' paper—that is, the interaction of the Crusader with his Western architecture on Saracenic, and Saracenic architecture on Western. I do not know if he knows—probably he does, and others know also—the most extraordinarily interesting essays on that subject by Phené Spiers, which show the enormous importance of the architecture of the island of Sicily in this connection. In Sicily you find that extraordinary blend of the Saracenic, Byzantine, and Norman under the Norman Sovereigns of Sicily in the eleventh century—under King Roger and King Robert—and they are the most interesting monuments for studying the interaction of East and West. Mr. Spiers makes out that most of the Crusading churches in Palestine, such, for instance, as the church of Abu Gosh, were made by Sicilian masons who accompanied the Crusaders. They had the pointed arch and took it back to Palestine, having got it before we got it in France and England, from the Saracens in Sicily. Undoubtedly the pointed arch—that is to say, the structural and architectural use of the pointed arch—seems to come from Southern Persia and Mesopotamia about the time of the rise of Islam in the seventh century of our era. As the lecturer said, you see it fully developed in that magnificent example, the wonderful mosque of Ibn Tulun in Cairo, of the ninth century, than which nothing is grander in the whole period of Moslem architecture. But it was carried West in the seventh and eighth centuries, and the interest in Persia arises as to the origin of that stalactite. The lecturer talked about the first example known to him being in the twelfth-century mosque of Al Achma in Cairo. My impression is that you get earlier stalactites in Sicily than you do in Cairo, and earlier still in Mesopotamia. There is a great dispute as to the tomb of Zobeida outside Baghdad, of the ninth century, as to whether its stalactite is original or not. There is the Saracenic palace of La Ziza outside Palermo. I have seen it. It is undoubtedly of the tenth century A.D., and stalactite vaulting is developed on the Norman architecture of the eleventh century in Sicily in the most splendid examples. The Capella Palatina at Palermo is probably one of the finest examples of stalactite vaulting. I think this interaction of East and West most interesting. I think probably the pointed arch was brought to the West, and the Crusaders in some way restored its purity by their influence in Palestine during their hundred years' rule. That tower at Ramleh was close to General Allenby's General Headquarters; I used to see it every day in the summer of 1918—it was built shortly after the close of the Crusades. I do not think it was built by Bibars. I remember trying to transcribe the inscription of the Mameluke Sultan who built it. The date is about 1340, as far as I remember. It shows the effect of the Western Crusaders on the sort of archaistic

revival which took place in Syria and Palestine under the Mameluke Sultans. One can go very wide, because Islam carried this pointed arch and their special conception of architecture, which I think the lecturer very well dealt with—namely, this tremendous feeling for unity and a great congregational enclosure for simplicity and dignity, that is the first impression of the mosques—it carried it far and wide; to India, Central Asia, Syria, North Africa, and across to Spain and Sicily. Undoubtedly Islam carried the impulse, the origin of which I think you will find in the Arab and Semitic civilizations which came before the actual rise of Mohammed. I think Mr. March Phillips knew extraordinarily little about the architecture of the Middle East, or about the Arabs (Hear, hear)—both the men and the buildings. To attempt to judge Saracenic architecture from Spain is most unfortunate. He might even have gone to North Africa, say to Tlemcen, on the borders of Algeria and Morocco, where you find something a good deal finer than anything in Spain—something that has the spirit of the desert and the better aspect of the East still in it. I am not quite sure that this Society will share my views that a paper of this kind helps to bring us into touch with the history and character of the East to an extraordinary degree, and that we are very glad to get away from politics on to the creations of beauty which have been produced by Arab civilization in those parts of the world. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: We are very grateful to Major Ormsby-Gore for his interesting remarks. He has already dealt with the proposal for a Middle Eastern Department. If and when he is directly connected with that Department, we hope he will bear in mind the lecturer's recommendation that special care should be taken to preserve the Saracenic or Arab art of the Middle East. Before I ask you to give a vote of thanks to the lecturer, I should like to make some observations on a remark that he made as to this Saracenic or Arab architecture being expressive of the character of the people. Some of us have had experience of the way in which these buildings—whether they are mosques, tombs, or domestic architecture—are actually brought into being. How it comes about is this: Either the chief or some notable man, whoever it is, who wishes to construct a building, gets together his friends and some experts in building. They have many conclaves, and discuss the whole project in all its bearings, and gradually the idea of the building takes shape. Many opinions are expressed; there are very close discussions—very much in the same way, although on a larger scale and more frequent, as we see in the discussions about war memorials in this country. There are also great differences of opinion, as there have been over those war memorials. Anyhow the whole matter is most thoroughly discussed, and then, as the building rises, everybody gives his opinion about it,

HOW SIR RICHMOND SHAKESPEAR SET FREE THE RUSSIAN SLAVES AT KHIVA

AFTER the occupation of Kabul by the forces of the Government of India in 1839, Major D'Arcy Todd, Bengal Artillery, was despatched on a special mission to Herat. With him, among others, went Lieutenants James Abbott and Richmond Shakespear, both of the Bengal Artillery. Major Todd, on his own initiative, sent Lieutenant Abbott to Khiva, to attempt to persuade the Khan to release the Russian subjects who were held as slaves in his dominions, and thereby remove the only just ground of offence against Khiva on the part of Russia.*

Lieutenant Abbott was at Khiva from January 19 to early in March, 1840, and then set out for St. Petersburg, carrying with him a letter from the Khan to the Czar, promising that all the Russian prisoners should be released, provided that the Czar would release the Khivan subjects detained in Russia. The Khan was very suspicious of the Russians, and it required much skill and patience on the part of Lieutenant Abbott to obtain this letter. On his way to the Caspian, Lieutenant Abbott met with many troubles, being attacked by Cossacks, and severely wounded, but, nevertheless, he delivered the letter, and from information received in Calcutta, it appears that his efforts would have been successful, but as it turned out, the Khan of Khiva had released the Russian captives before there was time for Abbott's mission to bear fruit.†

Shortly after Lieutenant Abbott had left Herat, Major Todd received some instructions from Sir William McNaughten, the British Envoy at Kabul, and decided to send Lieutenant Shakespear to Khiva, to give them effect. Lieutenant Shakespear reached Khiva on June 12, 1840. He had much difficulty in persuading the Khan to release the Russian subjects, but eventually did so, and also obtained the order published herewith. Lieutenant Shakespear, after much patient work, collected all the Russian subjects, and set out with them, 416 in number, men, women, and

* "Kaye's Lives of Indian Officers," Major D'Arcy Todd, p. 356.

† Appendix A to "Journey from Herat to Khiva, Moscow, and St. Petersburg," third edition, by Captain James Abbott.

Translation of Rescript of the King of Khwárazm (Khiva), written at the beginning of Jumáda ii, A.H. 1256 [= July 31, 1840.]

Abu'l-Muzaffar Wa'l-Mansúr Abú'l-Ghází Khwárazm-sháh.

OUR WORD :

The Royal and Most High Order to the Wise Governors of the Metropolis of Khwárazm [Khiva], festive as Paradise, to its Lords and Captains, to the doughty Warriors and Chiefs of the Yemút and Chúdar (?) Tribes, to the brave Chiefs of Qázzag (Cossacks) and Quara-galpá (Black-caps) Peoples, and to all Peoples under our rule,

Know that on the first day of the month of the second *Jumáda*, in the year one thousand two hundred and fifty-six of the Flight of His Holiness the Prophet (may God bless and salute him), and in the year of the Mouse, it was that WE began to be on friendly and familiar terms with the Most Great Emperor, the King of the Russian domains, and to pursue peace and friendship with him.

Therefore on becoming aware of, and acquainted with, the purpose of this high command, let no one make raids into the Russian territories, nor buy Russian captives. And whosoever shall act contrary to the purport of this high command, and shall perpetrate such raids, or purchase such captives, shall be deserving of the Royal Punishment.

This Royal, most august, sacred, and sublime command received honourable issue A.H. 1256 [=A.D. 1840.]

EDWARD G. BROWNE, M.A., F.B.A.,
Adams Professor of Arabic, Cambridge.
November 14, 1920.

children, and on September 15 handed them all over safely to the Commandant of Nova Alexandroff, the Russian fort on the eastern shore of the Caspian.

The Russian Government in return released 640 Khivan subjects, so that the immediate result of Major Todd's sending Abbott and Shakespear was the release of over 1,000 persons from lifelong slavery. It also contributed largely to the postponement of the conquest of Khiva by Russia till 1873.

Lieutenant Abbott's visit had paved the way for Lieutenant Shakespear, but Abbott has left on record his opinion that "had any officer of less genius, prudence, and engaging manners than Captain Shakespear been sent after me to Khiva, the negotiations might have had a result very different from the brilliant conclusion to which his prompt and judicious mediation brought them."*

Lieutenant Shakespear proceeded to St. Petersburg, and thence to England, where his services were rewarded with the honour of Knighthood.

An account of Sir Richmond Shakespear's journey was published in *Blackwood's Magazine*, June, 1842, and some letters of his written during the journey were published in *Bengal, Past and Present*, October-December, 1910, the journal of the Calcutta Historical Society.

J. SHAKESPEAR.

* Quoted from "Journey from Herat to Khiva, Moscow, and St. Petersburg," third edition, by Captain James Abbott.

LIST OF MEMBERS
OF
THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

CORRECTED TO MARCH, 1921

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL FOR 1920-21

Hon. President:

THE RT. HON. EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON, P.C., K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.,
F.R.S., ETC.

Chairman of Council:

1920. THE RT. HON. LORD CARNOCK, P.C., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,
K.C.I.E.

Vice-Presidents:

1918. H.E. THE EARL OF RONALDSHAY, G.C.I.E.

1917. THE RT. HON. SIR MORTIMER DURAND, P.C., G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I.,
K.C.I.E.

1919. SIR FREDERIC FRYER, K.C.S.I.

1919. SIR EVAN JAMES, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

1920. LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.

1920. GENERAL SIR EDMUND BARROW, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.

Hon. Treasurer:

1920. SIR EDWARD PENTON, K.B.E.

Hon. Secretary:

1918. LIEUT.-COLONEL A. C. YATE.

Members of the Council:

1918. SIR HUGH BARNES, K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O.

1918. LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR A. H. MCMAHON, G.C.V.O., G.C.M.G., K.C.I.E.,
C.S.I., F.S.A.

1919. LIEUT.-COLONEL H. P. R. PICOT.

1919. COLONEL SIR CHARLES YATE, BART., C.S.I., C.M.G., M.P., D.L.

1920. GENERAL SIR REGINALD WINGATE, BART., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., G.B.E.,
K.C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.L.

1920. CAPTAIN THE HON. W. G. A. ORMSBY-GORE, M.P., D.L.

1920. E. R. P. MOON, ESQ.

1920. A. L. P. TUCKER, ESQ., C.I.E.

1920. THE RT. HON. SIR MAURICE W. E. DE BUNSEN, BART., P.C.,
G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., C.B.

1921. CAPTAIN G. C. STEPHENSON.

Assistant Secretary:

MISS M. N. KENNEDY.

OFFICES: 74, GROSVENOR ST., W. 1.

LIST OF MEMBERS

The names marked with an asterisk are of those who have served on the Council. The names in capitals are those of present Members of Council. Names in italics are those of Councillors resident in India. The names marked with a dagger are those of original Members.

A

- 1910. Sir Abdul Qaiyum, Khan Bahadur Sahibzada, K.C.I.E., Assistant Political Officer, Khaiber, Peshawar, N.W.F. Province.
- 1921. Acland, Captain P. Dyke, attd. Aviation Dept., Vickers Ltd., Vickers' House, Broadway, Westminster, S.W. 1.
- 1920. Adye, Maj.-Gen. Sir J. K., K.C.M.G., C.B., etc., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
- †Aglionby, Captain A., Junior Naval and Military Club, 96, Piccadilly, W. 1.
- 1916. Ainscough, T. M., McLeod House, Off. of H. M. Trade Commissioner, Post Box 683, Calcutta.
- 1919. Alexander, Y. Patrick, F.R.G.S., 2, Whitehall Court, S.W.1.
- 1919. Allahabad, University of, History Department.
- 1920. Allechin, Geoffrey C., Oxford and Cambridge Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
- 1920. Allen, W. E. D., Commonwood House, Chipperfield, Herts.
- 10** 1920. Allenby, Field Marshal the Rt. Hon. Viscount, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., etc., Cairo, Egypt.
- 1921. Antonius, George, The Union Club, Alexandria.
- 1920. Ashton, Captain F. T., Glendower, Pinner, Middlesex.
- 1920. Austin, Lieut. A. P. M., c/o Coutts and Co., 440, Strand, W.C.

B

- 1920. Bacon, Captain S. F., Windcliffe, Grove Road, Sutton.
- 1908. *Baddeley, J. F., 34, Bruton Street, W. 1.
- 1917. Bahrein, The Political Agent, Persian Gulf.
- 1910. Bailey, Major F. M., C.I.E., 7, Drummond Place, Edinburgh, N.B.
- 1914. Baillie, J. R., 1, Akenside Road, Hampstead, N.W.
- 1906. *Bailward, Brig.-Gen. A. C., R.A. (ret.), 1, Prince's Mansions, Victoria Street, S.W. 1.
- 20** 1920. Balfour, Lt.-Col. F. C. C., C.I.E., M.C., Caledonian Club, Charles Street, S.W. 1.
- 1920. Ballard, Mrs. C. R., Hadborn Mill, Much Hadborn, Herts.
- 1916. Baluchistan, The Hon. the Agent to the Governor-General and Chief Commissioner, Quetta.
- 1918. Banks, Mrs. M. M., Hornton Cottage, Hornton Street, W. 8.

1920. Bannerjee, Gauranga Nath, M.A., Ph.D., B.L., (Professor of Ancient History, Calcutta University), 107/11, Mechua Bazar Street, Calcutta.
1920. Barman, Maharaj Kumar J. C. Deb, Comilla, Tipperah.
1920. Barman, Col. Thakur Mohin Chandra Deb, Agartala, Tripura State, Bengal.
1905. *BARNES, Sir Hugh Shakespear, K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., 29, Campden House Court, W. 8. M. of C.
1913. BARROW, General Sir Edmund, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., India Office, S.W. 1., and 7, Lansdowne Crescent, W. 11. M. of C.
- 30 1920. Barstow, Captain A. E., M.C., 15th Sikhs, Mesopotamia.
1920. Base, Edward H., 5, Station Road, Lowestoft.
1919. Bateman, H. G., F.R.G.S.
1920. Beale, Captain C. T., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1910. Beauclerk, Lord Osborne de Vere, Brooks's Club, 4, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.
1920. Bell, B. H., Law Courts, Baghdad.
- Bell, James, 107, Godolphin Road, Shepherd's Bush. W.
1907. Benn, Colonel R. A. E., C.I.E., Resident, Jeypore, Rajputana, India.
- *†BENNETT, Sir T. J., C.I.E., Harwarton House, Speldhurst, Kent.
1918. Beresford-Lovett, Major-Gen., C.B., C.S.I., Hillside, Harvey Road, Guildford, Surrey.
1916. Bernière, Col. H. J. de, 115, Jermyn Street, S.W. 1., and United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
- 40 1921. Birch, Lt.-Col. J. M., D.S.O., 20, Bina Gardens, S.W.
1910. Bigg-Wither, Captain F., I.A., Deputy Commr., c/o Messrs. A. Scott and Co., Rangoon, Burma.
1920. Blacker, Major L. W. S., Queen Victoria's Own Corps of Guides, Junior Naval and Military Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.
1916. Bombay, Sec. to Govt. Political Dept., Bombay, India.
1919. Bone, H. Peters, 5, Hamilton Mansions, Kings Gardens, Hove, Sussex.
- Bosanquet, Sir O. V., K.C.I.E., 1, Vicarage Gardens, Kensington, W. 8.
1921. Bowman, H. E., C.B.E., Director of Education, Jerusalem.
1920. Bray, Major F. E., M.C., 21, Evelyn Gardens, S.W. 7.
1920. Bray, Major, N. N. E., M.C., Political Dept., Govt. of India, c/o Political Secretary, India Office, S.W. 1.
1921. Bridcut, Lieut.-Ccl. S. H., O.B.E., 20, Pelham Crescent, S.W. 7.
- 50 1920. Bros, Major H. Alwyn (R. of O.) Travellers' Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
1920. Browne, Claude M., 10, Queensberry Place, S.W. 7.
1916. †Bruce, Brig.-Gen. C. D., Army and Navy Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
1920. Brunskill, Major J. S., 135, Sloane Street, S.W.
1920. Buchanan, Sir G. C., K.C.I.E., Kt., 16, Victoria Street, S.W.
- †Buchanan, W. A., The Cottage, Knebworth, Herts.

- 1919. BUNSEN, The Rt. Hon. Sir Maurice de, P.C., G.C.M.G., Old Lodge, Taplow, Bucks. M. of C.
- 1919. Burdwan, The Hon. Sir Bijay Chand Mahtab, K.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., T.O.M., Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of, The Palace, Bardwan, Bengal, India.
- 1914. Bury, C. Howard, Bath Club, Dover Street, W. 1.
- 1920. Busk, H. Gould, F.R.G.S., Dodnash Lodge, East Bergholt, Suffolk.
- 60** 1920. Buxton, Leland W. W., 45, Kensington Park Gardens, W.
- 1921. Buxton, Dr. P. A., Trinity College, Cambridge.

C

- 1919. Calcutta Imperial Library (Journal subs.).
- 1920. Cameron, Major G. S., M.C., Dept. Director of Agriculture, Lower Baghdad, Mesopotamia.
- 1918. Campbell, John MacLeod, Glen Saddell, Carradale, Argyll.
- 1907. †Carey, A. D., I.C.S., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
- 1920. Carey, Lieut.-Col. A. B., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.E., c/o Director of Public Works, Baghdad, and 52, The Close, Norwich.
- 1920. Carleton, Col. the Hon. Dudley, 21, Upper Berkeley Street, W. 1.
- 1919. CARNOCK, The Rt. Hon. Lord, P.C., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., 53, Cadogan Gardens, S.W. 3. Chairman of C.
- 1920. Chakravati, Professor Nilmani, M.A., 18, Sitaram Ghosh Street, Calcutta.
- 70** 1920. Charge, H. L., Oakwood, Roundhay, Leeds.
- 1923. Chatterjee, K. N., B.A., 12, Madan Mohan Chatterjee Lane, Calcutta.
- 1920. Chesney, G. M., 69, Courtfield Gardens, S.W. 5.
- 1920. Childs, W. J., The Quadrangle, Foreign Office, Whitehall, S.W.
- 1903. *CHIROL, Sir Valentine, Kt., 34, Carlyle Square, Chelsea, S.W. 3.
- 1920. Chitty, Christopher, 2, East Heath Road, Hampstead, N.W.
- 1920. Chondhurry, R. G. K., M.A., B.L., Zemindar, Tako, 24, Parganaks Dt., Calcutta.
- 1918. Christie, Miss A., 40, Ovington Street, S.W. 3.
- 1920. Christie, Miss E. R., F.R.G.S., Cowden Castle, Dollar, N.B.
- 1920. Clayton, Brig.-Gen. Sir Gilbert F., K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., Ministry of Interior, Cairo.
- 80** 1920. Clayton, Brig.-Gen. W. W., Director Special Section, Public Security Dept., War Office, Cairo.
- 1919. Coales, Oliver R., H.B.M., Consulate General, Shanghai, China; R. Societies Club, St. James's Street.
- 1920. Cobbe, Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. S., V.C., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O., India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
- 1920. Cole, Major J. J. B., F.R.G.S., Rifle Brigade, Brit. Section Allied Military Committee of Versailles, 22, rue de l'Elysée, Paris, and Travellers' Club, Pall Mall.

1918. Collis, Mrs., 17, Hamlet Gardens, Ravenscourt Park, W. 6 ;
The Ladies' Army and Navy Club, Burlington Gardens,
W. 1.
1920. Connal-Rowan, Major J. F. Meiklewood, Gargunnoch,
Stirlingshire ; Bath Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.
1920. Cooke, Captain R. S., Dalnottarhill, Old Kilpatrick, N.B.
1920. Cornwallis, Col. Kinahan, C.B.E., D.S.O., F.R.G.S., Director
of the Arab Bureau, Cairo ; Carlton Club, Pall Mall,
S.W. 1.
1920. Costello, Brig.-Gen. E. W., V.C., C.M.G., D.S.O., 12, Cardinal
Mansions, S.W. 1.
1920. Costello, Mrs. E. W., 12, Cardinal Mansions, S.W. 1.
- 90** 1919. Cowell, Mrs. M., 26, St. George's Court, Queen's Gate, S.W. 7.
1908. Cox, Lieut.-Col. Sir Percy Z., G.C.I.E., K.C.M.G., K.C.S.I.,
High Commissioner, Baghdad.
1920. Craufurd-Stuart, Major C. Kennedy, D.S.O., Government
House, Simla, India.
1920. Crawford, Lt.-Commander C., R.N., c/o L.D.D., Admiralty,
Whitehall, S.W. 1.
1914. Crewdson, Major W. T. O., R.F.A., Queen Anne's Mansions,
S.W. 1.
1907. Cunningham, Sir William J., K.C.S.I., I.C.S. (ret.), East India
United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1907. *CURZON OF KEDLESTON, The Rt. Hon. Earl, P.C., G.C.S.I.,
G.C.I.E., Hackwood, near Basingstoke, Hants,
1, Carlton House Terrace, S.W. 1. Hon. President.

D

1919. Dane, Sir Richard Morris, K.C.I.E., Morden Grange,
Betchworth, Surrey ; East India United Service Club,
16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1908. Daukes, Major C. T., C.I.E., 3 E, The Mansions, Bramham
Gardens, S.W. 5.
1921. Davies, R., Standard Oil Company of New York, Rue
Rakovska, 127, Sofia. (Journal subscriber.)
- 100** 1906. Davis, W. S., Greyhounds, Burford, Oxon.
1918. Davis, Mrs., 46, Sussex Gardens, Hyde Park, W.
1920. Deedes, Lt.-Col. W. H., C.M.G., D.S.O., Civil Sec. Palestine
Govt., Government House, Jerusalem.
1919. Digby, Bassett, F.R.G.S., 49, Elm Park Mansions, Park
Walk, Chelsea, S.W.
1906. Dobbs, Sir H. R. C., K.C.I.E., C.S.I., I.C.S., Agent to the
Governor-General and Chief Commissioner, Quetta,
Baluchistan.
1903. *Donoughmore, The Earl of, 5, Chesterfield Gardens, W. 1.
1910. Douglas, Captain H. A.
1920. Douglas, Major-Gen. J. A., C.M.G., C.I.E., 16, Park
Mansions, Knightsbridge.
1910. Drummond, Miss, Kensington Palace Mansions, W. 8.
1920. Dunsterville, Col. K. S., C.B., 12, Oakwood Court, Kensington,
W.

- 110** 1920. Dunsterville, Major-Gen. L. C., C.B., The Cronk, Port St. Mary, Isle of Man.
 1903. *†Durand, Colonel A. G. A., C.B., C.I.E., 31, Park Lane, W. 1.
 1907. *DURAND, The Right Hon. Sir H. Mortimer, P.C., G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Penmayne House, Rock, Wadebridge, Cornwall. Vice-President.
 1920. Dyer, Brig.-Gen. R. E. H., 22, Ryder St., St. James's, S.W.

E

1920. Egerton, Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. G., K.C.B., K.C.I.E., 43, Cheyne Court, S.W. 3.
 †Elphinstone, Lord, Carlton Club, 94, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1920. Empson, C., 1, Driffeld Terrace, The Mount, York.
 1911. Etherton, Lieut.-Colonel P., British Consulate Kashgar.
 1918. Evans, T. Herbert, St. David's, Lisvane, Glam.

F

1920. Fardell, Mrs. H. A., 16, Brechin Place, S.W. 7.
120 1919. FitzHugh, Capt. J. C., D.S.O., M.V.O., c/o Messrs. Cox & Co., 16, Charing Cross.
 1920. FitzGibbon, Captain H. D. C., M.C., 13th Hussars, White's Club, St. James's Street, S.W.
 1915. Flower, Hon. E., Durrow Castle, Durrow, Queen's County, Ireland.
 1920. Forbes, Mrs. Muriel, Naval and Military Club, Harrington Road, S.W.
 1920. Forbes, Mrs. Rosita, 69, Curzon Street, W. 1.
 1920. Fowle, Captain T. C., I.A., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
 1916. Forbes, Sir George Stuart, K.C.S.I., The Athenæum Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1921. Fraser, Commander Bruce A., R.N., Whitecroft, Nailsworth, Glos.
 1921. Fraser, Captain B. de M. S., Political Dept. Govt. of India, c/o H. S. King & Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.
 1920. Fraser, E., 14, Chester Street, S.W. 1.
130 1915. Fraser, George, Imperial Institute, S. Kensington, S.W. 7.
 1920. Fraser, M. F. A., F.R.G.S., Beaufort, Knaphill, Nr. Woking.
 1916. Fraser, The Hon. Sir Stuart M., K.C.I.E., C.S.I., c/o H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.
 1906. *FRYER, Sir Frederic, K.C.S.I., 23, Elvaston Place, Queen's Gate, S.W. 7. Vice-President.
 1920. Fuller, N. B., M.B.E., Cavendish Club, 119, Piccadilly, W. 1.

G

1908. Gabriel, Lieut.-Colonel Vivian, C.V.O., C.S.I., The Marlborough Club, 52, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.

1920. Ganguly, Manomohan B. E., M.R.A.S., 50, Raja Raj Bulbul Street, Calcutta.
1919. Garbett, C. C., c/o Messrs. Grindlay & Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
1920. Garbett, Captain R. B. L., c/o High Commissioner, Baghdad, c/o The Eastern Bank, Crosby Square, E.C. 3.
1920. Garland, Major Herbert, O.B.E., M.A., Agent for Mesopotamia, The Residency, Cairo.
- 140** 1913. Garrard, S. H., Cavalry Club, and Welton Place, Daventry, Northants.
1920. Gaster, Dr. M., 193, Maida Vale, W. 9.
1919. Gaulter, Mrs., 152, Earl's Court Road, S.W. 5.
1909. Gearon, Miss S., Ladies' Empire Club, 69, Grosvenor Street, W. 1.
1920. Geden, Rev. A. S., Royapettah, Harpenden, Herts.
1919. Goold-Adams, Col. Sir H. E. F., K.B.E., C.M.G., Jamesbrook, Middleton, Co. Cork. United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1920. Gorbald, Captain Roland, R.A.O.C., c/o Sir C. R. McGrigor, Bart., & Co., 39, Panton Street, Haymarket.
1920. Gordon, Lieut.-Col. P. J., O.B.E., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1920. Gourlay, W. R., Government House, Calcutta.
1920. Gowan, Captain C. H., M.C., 13th Hussars, Cavalry Club, Piccadilly.
- 150** 1920. Graham, Col. R. J. D., Dunalastair, North Inch, Perth.
1919. Grant, H. D., F.R.G.S., F.R.A.S., Automobile Club, S.W. 1.
1920. Gregson, Lieut.-Col. E. G., C.M.G., C.I.E., Buncrana, Rake, Liss, Hants.
1920. Grey, Lieut.-Col. W. George, Solars, Chiddingfold, Surrey.
1920. Grieve, Captain A. McLeod, 3rd Black Watch, 21, Queen's Crescent, Edinburgh.
1920. Griffin, Captain A. C., O.B.E., R.E., c/o H. S. King & Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.
1921. Grove White, Major M. FitzG., D.S.O., O.B.E., R.E., War Office, Whitehall, S.W.

H

1920. Hadow, Major H. R., 15th Sikhs, United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
1920. Hall, Captain A. H., Annfield, Rothesay, Scotland.
1918. Harford, Frederic Dundas, C.V.O., 49, Egerton Gardens, Chelsea, S.W. 3.
- 160** 1920. Harapvasad, Mahamohopadhyaya, Shastri, C.I.E., F.A.S.B., 26, Pataldanga Street, Calcutta.
1920. Hardinge, The Rt. Hon. Sir A., G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Coldharbour, West Hoathley, Sussex.
1920. Houghton, Major H. L., 36th Sikhs, c/o Grindlay & Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
1920. Hay, Captain W. R., Jacolines, Southern Hill, Reading.
1920. Headley, R. Hollowell, India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.

1920. Hendley, Major-Gen., M.B., C.S.I., Hon. Surgeon to H.M. the King, Caxton, near Cambridge.
1921. Hiles, Major M., O.B.E., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
1919. Hill, Lt. H. Brian, F.R.G.S., c/o Messrs. King, Hamilton & Co., Calcutta, India.
1921. Hodgkin, R. Howard, 20, Bradmore Road, Oxford.
- *†HOLDICH, Colonel Sir Thomas H., K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E., C.B. 41, Courtfield Road, S.W. 7.
- 170** 1919. Hope, Miss T. M., Crix, Hatfield Peverel, Witham, Essex.
1921. Horsfield, Captain R., c/o Director of Railways, Baghdad.
1920. Houstoun, G. L., The Farm, Kyrenia, Cyprus.
1908. Howell, Lieut.-Col. E. B., C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1920. Hubbard, Lieut.-Col., Royal Aero Club, 3, Clifford Street, W. 1.
1920. Hunter-Weston, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Aylmer, K.C.B., D.S.O., D.L., M.P., 2, Culford Gardens, S.W. 3, and Hunsterton, West Kilbride, N.B.
1918. Hunter, Mrs., 81, Holland Park, W. 11.

I

1916. India, Foreign and Political Department of Government, Delhi.
1906. India, Secretary of State for, India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
1915. Ingram, Captain M. B., the Foreign Office, Whitehall, S. W., and Cavendish Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.
- 180** 1919. Inman, Miss H. M., 12, Sloane Terrace Mansions, S.W. 1. (Journal subscriber.)

J

1920. Jacob, Col. H. F., C.S.I., Holly Cottage, Consley Wood, Wadhurst, Sussex.
- *†JAMES, Sir Evan, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Glenshee, Cambridge Park, Twickenham. Vice-President.
- †Jardine, Mrs., 25, Nevern Place, S.W. 5.
- *†Jardine, W. E., C.I.E., I.C.S., The Residency, Gwalior, Central India.
1919. Jeejeebhoy, Lieut. J. P. B., F.R.G.S., Pedder Road, Bombay.
1920. Jeffreys, Major J. F. D., I.A., Political Officer, Kut-el-Amarah, Mesopotamia.
1920. Jhalawar, H. H. Maharaj Rana Sri Bhawani, Sahib Bahadur of, K.C.I.E., Jhalrapatan, Rajputana.
1921. Joyce, Lieut.-Col. P. C., C.B.E., D.S.O., Army and Navy Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.

K

1920. Kay, Professor D. M., Marine Hotel, St. Andrew's, Fife, N.B.
- 190** 1920. Keeling, Capt. E. H., M.C., United University Club, 1, Suffolk Street, S.W. 1.

- 1907.†*Kelly, Col. J. G., C.B., 1, West Cromwell Road, Kensington, S.W. 5.
 1913. Kemp, Miss, 26, Harley House, Regent's Park, N.W. 1.
 1920. Kettlewell, Captain L., D.S.O., Stourpaine Vicarage, Blandford.
 †King, Sir H. Seymour, K.C.I.E., 25, Cornwall Gardens, S.W. 7.
 1920. Knox-Niven, Lt.-Col. H. W., 74, Grosvenor Street, W. 1.
 1918. Kuwait, The Political Agent, Persian Gulf.

L

1920. Laithwaite, John E., 39, Bryanston Street, Portman Square W. 1.
 1904.†*LAMINGTON, The Rt. Hon. Lord G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., 26, Wilton Crescent, S.W. 1.
 1920. Lane, D. A., Peterhouse, Cambridge.
 200 1920. Lang, Commander G. H., D.S.O., R.N., 13, Abbey Court, Abbey Road, N.W.
 1920. Law, Bunara Charan, M.A., 24, Sukea's Street, Calcutta.
 1920. Law, Narendra Nath, M.A., B.L., P.R.S., 96, Amherst Street, Calcutta.
 1920. Lees, Captain G. Martin, M.C., D.F.C., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
 1920. Léon, M. Henri M., Ph.D., L.L.D., 8, Taviton Street, Gordon Square, W.C.
 1921. Leslie, Lieut. L., Shropshire L.I., The Barracks, Shrewsbury.
 1920. Leveson-Gower, Col. C., C.M.G., C.B.E., 13, Cottesmore Gardens, Kensington, W. 8.
 1921. Lloyd, Major C. G., C.I.E., M.C., Bath Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.
 1908. *Lloyd, H.E., Capt. Sir George A., D.S.O., Government House, Bombay.
 1912. Loch, Capt. P. G., 97th Infantry, c/o Messrs. Cox & Co., Bombay, India.
 210 1908. Lockhart, Lady, C.I., 187, Queen's Gate, S.W. 7.
 1920. Longrigg, Major S. H., Political Officer, Kirkuk, Mesopotamia.
 1920. Lowis, Lieut. H. R., I.A., Underhill, London Road, Camberley.
 1909. Lyall, Major, R.A., I.A., 3rd Kashmir Rifles, E.E.F., c/o Messrs. Grindlay & Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.

M

1909. MACARTNEY, Sir George, K.C.I.E., Les Vaux, St. Saviour's, Jersey, Channel Isles. M. of C.
 1920. Macgregor, Lady, Hampton Court Palace, Hampton Court.
 1920. Mackenzie, Lady M. M. Owen, 6, Chesham Street, S.W. 1.; Brantham Court, Suffolk.
 1920. Mackie, Captain J. B., Castle Cary, Somerset.
 1920. Macpherson, C. F., c/o Gray Mackenzie, Basra.
 1903. Malcolm, Brigadier-General Neill, D.S.O.

- 220** 1920. Marling, Sir Charles, K.C.M.G., British Legation, Copenhagen.
1920. Marrs, Major R., C.I.E., c/o Messrs. Grindlay & Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
1920. Massy, Col. P. H. Hamon, C.B.E., United Service Club, Pall Mall.
1921. Mathews, Captain L. Gard, Arab Levies, 2, Napier Terrace, Plymouth.
1920. Mathews, Captain L. S., 2nd Euphrates Levy, c/o Eastern Bank, Ltd., Baghdad.
1920. Mathieson, Wilfred, Minchinhampton, Glos.
1920. May, Major W. R. S., C.I.E., Twyford House, Alnmouth.
1915. McCoy, Mrs., c/o Messrs. Glyn, Mills, and Co., 67, Lombard Street, E.C. 3.
1906. McMAHON, Lieut.-Colonel Sir H., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., 59, Pont Street, S.W. 1. M. of C.
1920. McNearnie, Captain H. D., c/o High Commissioner, Baghdad.
- 230** 1920. McRobert, Sir Alexr., Douneside, Tarland, Aberdeenshire.
1912. Medicott, Captain H., Cavalry Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1920. Mellor, Donald, 180, The Grove, Wandsworth, S.W. 18.
1920. Meston, The Right Hon. Lord, K.C.S.I., etc., Hurst, Cookham Dene, Berks.
1920. Michell, Roland, 22, Lansdowne Crescent, W. 11.
1920. Millard, W. S., c/o Grindlay & Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W.
1921. Minchin, Captain A. C. Stephens, I.A., Gorsedene, Farnham, Surrey.
1920. Mocatta, Major V. E., O.B.E., 14th Hussars, 31, Great Cumberland Place, W.
1920. Molony, Wm. O'Sullivan, Christ Church, Oxford.
1920. Monteath, D. Taylor, O.B.E., India Office, Whitehall, S.W.
- 240** 1921. Monteath, G., I.C.S., Buckerell Lodge, Honiton, Devon.
1920. Mookerji, Dr. Radhakumad, M.A., Ph.D., Professor, Mysore University, Mysore.
1903. Moon, E. R. P., 6, Onslow Gardens, S.W. 7. M. of C.
1920. More, Major J. C., D.S.O., 51st Sikhs (F.F.), Political Agency, Kuwait, Persian Gulf.
1920. Morison, Sir Theodor, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Overdale, Lindisfarne Road, Newcastle-on-Tyne.
1920. Morrison's (Dr. G. E.) Library, Mitsubishi Buildings, Marounushi, Tokyo, Japan. (Journal subscription.)
1920. Mukhopadhyaya, Panchanana (Hon. Presidency Magistrate), 46, Bechu Chatterji Street, Calcutta.
1920. Mules, Sir Chas., C.S.I., M.V.O., O.B.E., c/o Messrs. H. King & Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W., 1.
1920. Mumm, Arnold L., F.R.G.S., 112, Gloucester Terrace, W. 2.
1920. Murchison, C. K., M.P., Hargrave Hall, near Kimbolton, Huntingdon.
- 250** †Murray, John, M.A., D.L., J.P., F.S.A., 50A, Albemarle Street, Piccadilly, W. 1.

1920. Murray, Major S. G. C., C.I.E., I.A., c/o High Commissioner, Baghdad.
 1920. Mylles, Captain C. C., M.C., H.L.I., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
 1915. Mylne, Miss Nina, 14, Old Square, Lincoln's Inn, W.C. 2.
 1916. Mysore, The Hon. the Resident, Bangalore, S. India.

N

1920. Napier, Major A. Harper, I.M.S., c/o Marshall, Terne, N. Queensferry, N.B.
 1919. New York, The Library, American Museum of Natural History, 77th Street, Central Park West, U.S.A.
 1920. Noel, Major E., C.I.E., D.S.O. (Political Dept. Govt. of India), Travellers' Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1920. Noel, Major J. B. L., M.G.C., 7, Crawford Mansions, W. 1.
 1920. Noone, H. V. V., c/o R. G. Shaw & Co., Winchester House, Old Broad Street, E.C. 3.
260 1916. North-West Frontier Province. The Hon. the Chief Commissioner, Peshawar, India.

O

1920. O'Connor, Captain K. K. O., M.C., 14th Sikhs, c/o Deputy Commissioner, Abbotabad.
 1906. O'Connor, Major W. F. T., R.A., C.I.E., H.B.M. Consul, Shiraz, Persia.
 1920. O'Dwyer, Sir Michael F., G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., 26, Brechin Place, S.W. 7.
 1905. Oliver, Captain D. G., 67th Punjabis, Junior United Service Club, Charles Street, S.W. 1.
 1920. Orgill, Captain T. C., 2, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge.
 1920. ORMSBY-GORE, Major the Hon. W. G. A., M.P., J.P., D.L., F.R.G.S., 5, Mansfield Street, Cavendish Square, W. 1. M. of C.
 1921. Outlaw, Captain W. H., 40, Charles Street, Berkhamstead.

P

1920. Parker, Lieut.-Col. A. C., D.S.O., Governor of Sinai Peninsula, Arish, Sinai.
 1920. Parr, E. Robert, Black Birches, Hadnall, Shrewsbury.
270 1918. Patel, F. B., 208, Upper Clapton Road, E. 5.
 1920. Patranavis, S. C., B.A., Sub-Registrar, Kendna P.O., Dt. Mymensingh, Bengal.
 1908. Payne, Mrs. Wood, 101, Philbeach Gardens, S.W. 5.
 1920. Pearce, Captain M. Channing, Cintra, Swanage, Dorset.
 †Peel, The Viscount, 52, Grosvenor Street, W. 1.
 1907. Pemberton, Col. E. St. Clair, R.E. (ret.), Pyrland Hall, Taunton.
 *†PENTON, Sir E., K.B.E., 2, Cambridge Terrace, Regent's Park, N.W. 1. Hon. Treasurer.
 1920. Peralta, Miss Louise, 45, Powis Square, W. 11.
 †Perowne, Lieut.-Col. J. T. Woolrych, 82, Lowndes Square, S.W.

1921. Perry, Miss C. E., 185, Clarence Gate Gardens, N.W. 1.
280 1919. Philby, H. St. John, C.I.E., I.C.S., Baghdad.
 1921. Phillips, Miss L. B., 9, Rosslyn Mansions, S. Hampstead, N.W. 3.
 1908. Phipson, H., 10, Hyde Park Mansions, N.W. 1.
 1920. Pickthall, Captain C. M., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
 1920. Pickthall, Mrs. W. M., c/o Ladies' Army and Navy Club, Burlington Gardens, W. 1.
 *†Pricot, Lieut.-Colonel H. P., Indian Army (ret.), 86, Ebury Street, S.W. 1, Junior United Service Club. M. of C.
 1920. Platt, T. Comyn, 47, Cadogan Place, S.W. 1.
 1920. Popham, Lieut.-Col. E. Leyborne, D.S.O., 2, Marlborough Buildings, Bath.

R

1910. Raines, Lady, 46, Sussex Gardens, Hyde Park, W. 2.
 1916. Rajputana, The Hon. the Agent to the Governor-General, The Residency, Mount Abu, Rajputana, India.
290 1920. Rawlinson, General The Lord, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., C.M.G., Commander-in-Chief, India.
 1920. Reynardson, Capt. H. Birch, 1st Oxford and Bucks L.I., 14, Lancaster Gate Terrace, W. 2.
 1912. Richmond, Mrs. Bruce, 3, Sumner Place, S.W.
 1919. Ridgeway, Col. R. Kirby, V.C., C.B., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1920. Robinson, Captain F. A., M.C., R.A.M.C., The Vicarage, Holme on Spalding Moor, Yorks.
 1920. Rodd, Major W. J. P., D.S.O., R.A.O.C., 55, Queen's Gardens, W. 2.
 *†RONALDS HAY, H.E. THE EARL OF, Governor of Bengal, Government House, Calcutta, India. Vice-President.
 1920. Rooker, S. K., 63, St. James's Street, S.W.
 1914. Rose, Archibald, C.I.E., 46, Abingdon Villas, Kensington, W. 8.
 1920. Rundle, Gen. Sir H. M. Leslie, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., etc., Travellers' Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
300 1921. Rundle, Captain C. A. Grant, M.C., c/o Henry S. King & Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.
 1920. Rynd, Major F. F., D.S.O., R.A., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.

S

1918. Salvati, Signor M. N., Via Lamarmora 41, Torino, Italy.
 1920. Sammadar, J. N., F.R.E.S., Patna College, Patna, India.
 †Sandbach, General A. E., D.S.O., R.E., Naval and Military Club, 94, Piccadilly, W. 1.
 1918. Shah, Sirdar Ikbal Ali, c/o T. Cook & Son, Kashmir Gate, Delhi.
 1920. Shakespear, †Lieut.-Col. J., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., 15, Alexandra Court, W. 9.

1920. Shakespear, Col. L. Waterfield, C.B., C.I.E., Deputy Inspector-General, Assam Rifles, Shillong, Assam.
1920. Shastri, Professor Ashutosh, 23/1, Beniatola Lane, Calcutta.
1921. Shelswell, Captain G. H., Albards, Stork, Ingatestone, Essex.
- 310** 1921. Shepherd, Miss E., 66, Queen's Gate, S.W. 7.
1920. Sheppard, Captain E. W., O.B.E., M.C., War Office, Whitehall, S.W.
1919. Silberrad, C. A., I.C.S., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1920. Simpson, J. Alexr., India Office, Whitehall, S.W.
1920. Sircar, Ganapati, 69, Beliaghata Main Rd., Calcutta.
1920. Skrine, F. H., C.S.I., 147, Victoria Street, S.W.
1920. Slater, Captain A., I.A.R.O., c/o Messrs. Cox & Co., Charing Cross.
1920. Slater, Mrs. E. M., 13, Dawson Place, W. 2.
1920. Smith, A. A. F., M.V.O., Education Dept., Baghdad.
1920. Smith, Captain Godwin, c/o Messrs. Richards, Thynne & Co., 130, Tooley Street, S.E.
- 320** 1920. South Manchuria Railway Co., 1, Itchome, Yurakucho, Tokyo, Japan.
1916. Spranger, John Alfred, 2nd. Lieut. R.E., 4, Via Michele, Florence, Italy.
1912. Stainton, B. W., c/o Messrs. Hickie, Borman, Grant & Co., 14, Waterloo Place, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1920. Stanham, Major H. F., R.A., Western Command, Cairo.
1917. H.M. Stationery Office, Princes Street, S.W. 1 (Journal subscriber).
1919. Stebbing, E. P., Hawthornden Castle, Lasswade, Midlothian.
1909. Stein, Sir Aurel, K.C.I.E., Ph.D., D.Litt., D.Sc. Superintendent Arch. Survey, Frontier Circle, N.W.F. Province, India.
1920. STEPHENSON, Captain G. C., 199, Inverness Terrace, W. 2. M. of C.
1920. Stewart, C. W., 3, Newburgh Place, Acton.
1920. Stewart, G., M.P., House of Commons, Westminster; Whiteholme, Hoylelake, Cheshire.
- 330** 1920. Stirling, Lieut.-Col. W. F., D.S.O., The Residency, Jaffa, Palestine.
1907. Stokes, Colonel C. B., 3rd Skinner's Horse.
1903. Stoner, J. J., 19, Kensington Court, W. 8.
1920. Swettenham, Sir F. A., G.C.M.G., C.B., 43, Seymour Street, W. 1.
1920. Sydenham, The Rt. Hon. Lord, of Combe, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., etc., The Priory, Lamberhurst, Kent.
1920. Sykes, Lady, Sledmere, Malton.
- †Sykes, Miss Ella E., 26, St. George's Court, S.W. 7.
1905. Sykes, Miss Ethel R., 29, Trevor Square, Knightsbridge, S.W. 7.
1904. Sykes, H. R., Lydham Manor, Bishop's Castle, Shropshire.
1907. Sykes, Brigadier-General Sir Percy, K.C.I.E., C.M.G., Elcombs, Lyndhurst, Hants.

T

- 340** 1920. Tagore, Kahitindra Nath, 6/1, Dwarkanath Tagore Lane, East Gate, Jorasanka, Jerusalem.
1920. Tagore, Profulla Nath, 1, Durpondrian Tagore Street, Calcutta.
1920. Talbot, Colonel the Hon. G. Milo, C.B., Bifrons, Canterbury.
1903. Tanner, Miss S., Cavendish Place, Bath.
1920. Tatton, R. Grey, 2, Somers Place, Hyde Park, W. 2.
1908. Taylor, Arthur Boddam, c/o Mesopotamia Persia Corp., Teheran, Persia.
1919. Teague-Jones, Major R., 80, Philbeach Gardens, S.W. 5.
1919. Teichman, Eric, Sitka, Chislehurst, Kent.
1920. Temple, Lt.-Col. Sir Richard, C.B., C.I.E., F.S.A., The Nash, Worcester.
- 350** 1905. Thomas, F. W., Ph.D., India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
1921. Thomas, Captain H. Prichard, 126th Baluchistan Regt., c/o Cox & Co., Charing Cross.
1920. Thomson, J. S., I.C.S., c/o Commercial Bank of Scotland, 62, Lombard St., E.C.
1919. Thorburn, Major H. Hay, c/o Messrs. Grindlay & Co., Bombay.
1921. Thornton, Lieut.-Col. C. E., C.M.G., 16th Cavalry, I.A. (ret.), 31, Sydney Street, Chelsea, S.W. 1.
1908. Tod, Colonel J. K., C.M.G., Standlynch, Four Marks, Hants.
1920. Tokyo, Japan, S. Manchuria Railway Co., 1, Itchome Yurokucho. (Journal subscription.)
1920. Trench, Rev. A. C., M.C., Chaplain's Office, Bolarun, Deccan, India.
1920. Trott, Captain A. C., 5th Devon Regt., St. John's College, Cambridge.
1919. Trotter, Lady, 18, Eaton Place, S.W. 1.
1920. Tudor Pole, Major W., 61, St. James's Street, S.W.
- 360** 1908. *TUCKER, A. L. P., C.I.E., Hayes, Northiam, Sussex. M. of C.
1920. Tyler, H. H. F., C.I.E., I.C.S., Limavady, Co. Londonderry, Ireland.

V

1905. Vanderbyl, P. B., B4, The Albany, Piccadilly, W. 1.
1919. Van Ness, Major W. Waters, c/o T. Bowen Reese, Smyrna, Asia Minor.
1920. Varma, Raj Kumar N. Chandra Deb, Comilla, Tipperah, India.
1920. Vasu, Rai Sahib Nagendra N., Prachyavadya Maharnara, 9, Visvakosha Lane, Bagbazar, Calcutta.
1920. Vidyabhusan, Amulya Charon, Professor, Vidyashagar College, 82, Maniktola Street, Calcutta.

W

1920. Waller, Major A. G., I.A., c/o Cox & Co., Indian Dept., Charing Cross.

1911. Waller, Miss D., 32, Knightsbridge, S.W. 1.
 1911. Waller-Sawyer, Mrs., 32, Knightsbridge, S.W., and Moystown House, Belmont, King's Co., Ireland.
- 370** †Walton, Sir Joseph, M.P., Reform Club, 104, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1920. Ward, Captain W. Kingdon, E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
 1920. Ward, W. R., O.B.E., Union Club, Trafalgar Square, and c/o Imperial Bank of Persia, 25, Abchurch Lane, E.C.
 1905. Watson, Lt. Col. John William, I.M.S., c/o Messrs. Grindlay, Groome and Co., Bombay.
 1921. Watson-Armstrong, Captain W. J. M., The Thatched Cottage, Bushey Park, Hampton Wick.
 1920. Watson, Sir Logie P., c/o Messrs. Cooper, Allen & Co., Cawnpore, India.
 1921. Webb, Captain W. F., att'd. Indian Political Dept., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
 1920. Webb-Ware, Lieut.-Col., C.I.E., F.R.G.S., Fort Anne Hotel, Douglas, Isle of Man.
 1921. Weir, Major J. L. R., Indian Political Dept., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
 1921. Wellcome, Henry S., 6, Gloucester Gate, Regent's Park, N.W., and Khartoum.
- 380** 1920. Wheatley, H., Govt. Quinine Factory, Naduvatam, India.
 1920. Whitehorne, Captain Cecil, M.C., The Welch Regiment, Junior United Service Club, Charles Street, S.W.
 †Whitbred, S. H., 11, Mansfield Street, W. 1.
 1920. Wigram, Rev. Dr. W. A., Watling House, St. Albans.
 1920. Willingdon, H. E. Lord, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Government House, Madras.
 1921. Willoughby, Brig.-Gen. M. E., C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
 1921. Wilkinson, Captain L. C. R., R.A., c/o Cox & Co. (R.A. Branch), Charing Cross, S.W.
 1920. Wilson, Lieut.-Col. Sir Arnold T., K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
 1920. Wilson, Major W. C. F., I.A., Mesopotamian C. S., c/o Grindlay & Co., 54, Parliament St., S.W. 1.
 1916. Wilson, Lieut.-Colonel James Alban, D.S.O., 8th Gurkhas, c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament St., S.W.
- 390** 1919. Wilson, Johnstone, Lieut.-Colonel W. E., C.I.E., D.S.O., c/o War Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
 1920. WINGATE, Sir Reginald, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., G.B.E., etc., Knockenhair, Dunbar. M. of C.
 1912. Woods, H. C., 171, Victoria Street, S.W. 1.
 1918. Worthington, A. B. Bayley, Town Thorns, Rugby.

Y

*†YATE, Lieut.-Colonel Arthur C., Beckbury Hall, Shifnal, Shropshire. Hon. Sec.

1905. *YATE, Colonel Sir Charles E., Bart., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.L.,
M.P., 17, Prince of Wales Terrace, W. 8. M. of C.
1916. Yorke, Mrs. R. F., F.R.G.S., M.R.I., F.R.S.A. Ladies'
Imperial Club, 17, Dover Street, W. 1, and Hotel
Cecil, Western Parade, Southsea.
- *†YOUNGHUSBAND, Lieut. - Col. Sir Francis E., K.C.S.I.,
K.C.I.E., 3, Buckingham Gate, S.W. 1. M. of C.
1918. Young, Mrs. Henry, Galgorm Castle, Ballymena, Co. Antrim,
Ireland.
1921. Young, Rev. R. A., 20, Great Peter Street, Westminster.

The following sixteen ladies and gentlemen were elected
Members of the Society on March 17th, 1921:

- Mr. P. E. Bartlett.
- Mr. R. W. Bulland, C.I.E., E.I.U.S. Club, St. James's Square, S.W.
- Captain E. Castells, 6th Gurkha Rifles, c/o Cox and Co. (Indian
Branch), Charing Cross.
- Mr. George Colvin, 38, The Ridgeway, Wimbledon.
- Mrs. George Colvin, 38, The Ridgeway, Wimbledon.
- Mr. C. E. Duggan, South Persia Rifles.
- Mr. J. A. Hughes, 19, Bedford Place, W.C. 1.
- Mr. B. J. Hardman, 25, FitzGeorge Avenue, W. 14.
- Captain R. K. Markant.
- General Sir Charles Carmichael Monro, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G.,
A.D.C.Gen., 181, Queen's Gate, S.W. 7.
- Major F. P. Norbury, D.S.O., I.A., c/o H. S. King and Co., Pall
Mall, S.W. 1.
- Mr. Algar Robertson, 26, Porchester Terrace, W. 2.
- Miss V. Robertson, 26, Porchester Terrace, W. 2.
- Miss R. Robertson, 26, Porchester Terrace, W. 2.
- Lieut.-Col. R. C. F. Schomberg, D.S.O., Seaforth Highlanders,
Caledonian Club, S.W.
- Lieut.-Col. K. L. Stevenson, R.A.O.C., G.H.Q., Baghdad.

RULES

OF

THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

1. THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY was founded in 1901 for the encouragement of interest in Central Asia by means of lectures, the reading of papers, and discussions.

2. Persons who desire to join the Society shall be proposed by one Member and seconded by another, and shall then be balloted for by the Council. Ladies are admissible.

3. The Secretary shall in all cases inform Members of their election.

4. The Annual Subscription of Members shall be £1.

5. The Council shall have power to remit subscriptions in special cases in which such remission shall appear expedient.

6. All subscriptions are due on election, and thereafter annually, but if the election takes place in November or December, the second annual payment will not become due till the expiration of the succeeding year; thus if a person be elected in November, his second subscription will not be due till the second January following.

7. Every person elected a Member of the Society shall make the payment due thereon within two calendar months after the date of election, or if abroad within six months after election; otherwise the election shall be void unless the Council in any particular case shall extend the period within which such payments are to be made.

8. Annual subscriptions shall be due on the tenth day of January in each year; and in case the same shall not be paid by the end of the month, the Treasurer or Secretary shall be authorized to demand the same. If any subscriptions remain unpaid at the Anniversary Meeting of the Society, the Treasurer shall apply by letter to those Members who are in arrear. If the arrears be not discharged by the 1st of January following such application the Member's name as a defaulter shall be suspended in the meeting room, and due notice be given to the Member in question of the same. The name shall remain suspended, unless in the interval the arrears be discharged, until the Anniversary Meeting next ensuing, when, if the subscription be not paid, the defaulter will cease to be a Member of the Society.

9. A Member, who is not in arrears, may at any time resign his

membership by notice in writing, but such notice of resignation must reach the Secretary before the 1st of January, otherwise the subscription for the current year will be payable.

10. A Member's resignation shall not be valid, save by a resolution of the Council, until he has paid up all his arrears of subscription; failing this he will be considered as a defaulter, and dealt with in accordance with Rule 8.

11. The Officers of the Society shall be: (1) The Honorary President, (2) the Chairman of the Council, (3) six Vice-Presidents, (4) the Honorary Treasurer, and (5) the Honorary Secretary, all of whom must be Members of the Society. In addition to these there shall be an Assistant Secretary.

12. The Chairman shall be elected by the Council, and shall hold office for one year from the date of his election. He shall be eligible for re-election on the expiration of his tenure of office.

13. The Honorary President shall be elected by the Council, and shall hold office for five years, and shall be eligible for re-election. The Vice-Presidents shall be elected by the Council, and shall hold office for four years. Two shall retire annually by rotation, and not be eligible for re-election as such until after the expiration of one year. They are eligible on retirement for re-election on the Council.

13a. The Honorary Treasurer and the Honorary Secretary shall be elected at the Anniversary Meeting, on the nomination of the Council, for two years, and are eligible for re-election.

14. The Assistant Secretary shall hold office during the pleasure of the Council.

15. The Chairman, as head of the Society, shall have the general supervision of its affairs. He will preside at Meetings of the Council, conduct the proceedings, give effect to resolutions passed, and cause the Rules of the Society to be put in force. He shall, ex officio, be a Member of the Council and of all Committees, and may at any time summon a Meeting of the Council.

16. The Honorary Treasurer shall receive all moneys, and shall account for them. He shall not make any payments (other than current and petty cash expenses) without the previous order of the Council. He shall, ex officio, be a Member of the Council and of all Committees. He shall exercise a general supervision over the expenditure of the Society, and shall prepare and submit to the Auditors at the expiration of each year a statement showing the receipts and expenditure of the Society for the period in question. All cheques must be signed by him, or in his absence by any Member of the Council acting for him.

17. The Honorary Secretary shall, in the absence of the Chairman,

exercise a general control over the affairs of the Society, and shall, *ex officio*, be a Member of Council and of all Committees.

18. The Honorary Secretary shall attend the Meetings of the Society and of the Council and record their proceedings. He shall conduct the correspondence and attend to the general business of the Society, and shall attend at the Rooms of the Society at such times as the Council may direct. He shall superintend the persons employed by the Society, subject to the general control of the Council. He shall be competent on his own responsibility to discharge small bills, but any account exceeding the amount of Five Pounds shall, except in cases of great urgency, be submitted for approval to the Council before payment. He shall have the charge, under the general direction of the Council, of printing and publishing the Transactions of the Society.

19. The Assistant Secretary shall act generally under the orders of the Hon. Secretary, and if at any time the latter is prevented by illness or any other cause from attending to the duties of his office, the Assistant Secretary shall act in his absence; but in the case of prolonged absence the Council shall have power to make such special arrangements as may at the time be considered expedient.

20. There shall be a Council consisting of the Vice-Presidents and twelve Members of the Society, exclusive of the Chairman but inclusive of the Honorary Officers of the Society.

21. The Members of Council as aforesaid shall be elected at the Anniversary Meeting on the nomination of the Chairman in Council, subject to any amendment of which due notice has been given, as provided in Rule 23.

22. There shall be prepared and forwarded to every Member in Great Britain, together with the notice as to the Anniversary Meeting, a list containing the names of persons so nominated to serve on the Council for the ensuing year, together with any other names, should they be proposed and seconded by other Members, a week's notice being given to the Secretary. The List of Members nominated as aforesaid shall be first put to the Meeting, and, if carried, the amendments (if any) shall not be put.

23. Of the Members of Council other than those referred to in Rules 12 and 13—*i.e.*, the Officers—three shall retire annually by seniority. They shall be eligible for re-election.

24. Should any vacancy occur among the Honorary Officers or other Members of Council during the interval between two Anniversary Meetings, such vacancy may be filled up by the Council.

25. The Ordinary Meetings of Council shall be held not less than once a month from November to June inclusive.

26. Special Meetings of Council may be summoned under the

sanction of the Chairman, or in his absence by a circular letter from the Secretary.

27. Three Members of the Council shall constitute a quorum.

28. At Meetings of Council the Chair shall be taken by the Chairman, and in his absence the Senior Member present shall take the Chair. The decision of any matter shall rest with the majority, and in case of an equality of votes the Chairman shall have the casting vote in addition to his ordinary vote.

29. Committees may be appointed by the Council to report on specific questions, and unless otherwise stated three shall form a quorum. Such Committees shall be authorized to consult persons not members of the Society.

30. Ordinary General Meetings are for hearing and discussing papers and for addresses, but no resolutions other than votes of thanks for papers read shall be passed at such meetings except by permission of the Chairman.


31. Special General Meetings are for considering and dealing with matters of importance, such as the making or amendment of its Rules, or questions seriously affecting its management and constitution. No business shall be transacted at such meetings except that for which they are summoned, and of which notice has been given.

32. The Anniversary Meeting for receiving and considering the Annual Report of the Council and Auditors, and dealing with the recommendations contained therein for the appointment of Members of the Council and Officers for the ensuing year, and for hearing the President's Address (if any), and deliberating generally on the affairs of the Society, shall be held in June of each year. But no resolution seriously affecting the management or position of the Society, or altering its Rules, shall be passed unless due notice shall have been given in the manner prescribed for Special General Meetings.

33. Ordinary Meetings shall be convened by notice issued to accessible Members, and as a general rule they shall be held on the third Thursday in each month from November to May, both inclusive, the Wednesday of Easter, Whitsuntide, and Christmas weeks being excepted. At such meetings, and also at the Anniversary Meeting, but not at special General Meetings, each Member of the Society shall have the privilege of introducing, either personally or by card, two visitors.

34. Ten Members shall form a quorum.

The Accounts shall be audited annually by an Auditor nominated by the Council. The employment of a professional Auditor shall be permissible. The Report presented by the Auditor shall be read at the next ensuing Anniversary Meeting.



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74, GROSVENOR STREET, W. 1.

NOTICES

THE Assistant Secretary will be at 74, Grosvenor Street, W. 1, on Mondays and Wednesdays from 2.30 p.m. to 5.30 p.m. ; and on Thursdays from 10.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m , or till the end of the lectures.

Members of the Central Asian Society are recommended to correspond, except under special circumstances, about Lecture tickets, this Journal, and the election of new Members, direct with the Assistant Secretary at 74, Grosvenor Street, and not with Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Yate, who is mostly away in Shropshire. By doing this, both time and postage will be saved.

A. C. YATE, *Lieutenant-Colonel*
(*Hon. Sec., C.A.S.*)

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CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held at 74, Grosvenor Street, Bond Street, W. 1, on Thursday, March 17, 1921, the principal business being to hear and discuss a paper by Mr. Robert Wilton entitled "The Outlook in Siberia." The Right Hon. Lord Carnock, P.C., etc., presided.

In opening the proceedings, the chairman said: Ladies and Gentlemen, there are sixteen new members since the last meeting, so the total number is now a little over four hundred. We hope no effort will be spared to secure as many more as possible to enable the finances to be put on a more stable footing. The next lecture, by Sir Arnold Wilson, will be held in the room of the Royal Society in Burlington House. I now beg leave to introduce Mr. Wilton, who has come to give us a lecture on the outlook in Siberia. A lengthy and very intimate acquaintance with Russia and the Russian people give him very full authority to speak on any subject connected with that country.

THE OUTLOOK IN SIBERIA

BY ROBERT WILTON.

My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—Current events lend an interest to the subject of my paper that seemed, only a few weeks ago, to be remote. The present revolt against Bolshevism and the Anglo-Soviet agreement must react upon the conditions prevailing in Siberia, and, indeed, upon the adjacent countries of Asia and of Europe.

I shall briefly relate my experiences under the Kolchak régime, and give you a glimpse of Siberian conditions before and after the Allied intervention. Many valuable lessons were to be learned then.

In the autumn of 1918 I left England on a journalistic mission to Siberia. It had been freed from Bolshevist rule by the combined action of the Czechs and the Whites. The Allied position in regard to Russia was dominated by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, whereby the Bolsheviks had recognized their subserviency to Berlin. The Allied task was (1) to close the White Sea to German submarines; (2) to place a barrier to Bolshevist propaganda in the south of Russia; and

(3) to hold the Trans-Siberian Railway open for supplies to the Czechs and Whites. Unfortunately this programme was not adhered to, but was in every case exceeded. The Armistice introduced a new issue. Had the Allied troops gone to Berlin, the Russian, and consequently the Siberian, situation would have been modified beyond recognition. Probably the Bolsheviks would have been overthrown. In any case, the task of the Allies would have been materially lightened. The Armistice both placed us in a false position in Russia and stimulated the Reds to turn on their German masters. But the old relationship was quickly readjusted. And so the Reds remained a German machine, used alternately to frighten or to entrap us. Will the agreement with Moscow help us or help the Germans and their Red agents?

Admiral Kolchak was made "Dictator" as a consequence of the signature of the Armistice. There appears to be no other explanation for it. This act was the beginning of the Siberian adventure. At that time (November, 1918) the anti-Red front in the Urals was being held by the Pinks and Russian Whites under the auspices of the Socialist Revolutionary (or Pink) Directorate at Omsk. The Allies had no proper justification for encouraging or supporting a *coup d'état* unless they were prepared to recognize the new Government. This they were not prepared to do. I had satisfied myself on this point while in Washington. But they also had to reckon with the uncompromising opposition of the Pink Czechs, who claimed with good reason to be the saviours of Siberia, and therefore entitled to a voice in the government. Moreover, the treasure of Kazan, over 600,000,000 gold roubles (at present rates worth about one hundred millions of pounds), had been taken from the Bolsheviks and removed to Omsk, largely thanks to the intervention of the Czechs. We shall see later how the Czechs sent Kolchak to his death and dealt with this same treasure. From the day when Kolchak overturned the Directorate the Czechs ceased to fight the Red Army or to recognize the authority of the Omsk Government. A Czech officer named Gaida, who had received an important command in the Russian service, helped the *coup d'état*. For this he was repudiated by his countrymen, and became reconciled with them only after he had betrayed Kolchak by heading a revolt, later on, in Vladivostok. The *coup d'état* was carried out by Siberian Cossacks and Monarchist officers with the concurrence of certain members of the Socialist Directorate. We did not oppose, but rather connived at the plot.

It was a bitterly cold day in January, 1919, when the volunteer fleet steamer landed me in Vladivostok. I had left Russian territory at the other extreme of the Empire in September, 1917. The flotsam and jetsam of the revolution had rolled from the Baltic to the Pacific. Vladivostok was so crowded with refugees and foreign troops and

missions that I could find no room. Mr. Hodgson, H.M. Consul, and Colonel Blair, of the British Military Mission, most kindly gave me hospitality till I could get a train westward. Mr. Hodgson was a perfect mine of information, as he had been at this post for many years and was most popular with all sections of the population.

The Soviet was still holding secret sittings in the town, while Red bands scoured the countryside. Kolchak's authority was a fiction. The only people who seemed to be thoroughly at home were the Chinese. Business in the Chinese quarter proceeded undisturbed. The market was thronged with Chinese pedlars and coolies. Japanese troops paraded the streets, muffled in furs.

I was favoured with a place in the express to Omsk. We covered the 3,000 miles in a week. It was a record. For a long period no express trains had travelled. The journey was unmarred by any incidents, except that near Krasnoiarsk we made ready to repel an attack. At this stage the line is bordered by heights and woods convenient for sniping, and both sides of the permanent way were then and long afterwards littered with wrecked carriages. A score of British officers going up the line as instructors or interpreters longed for the threatened attack to materialize, but we were disappointed. Many of the second-class passengers were Georgians, unmistakable cutthroats.

The dismal impression that I brought to Omsk was intensified by my visit to the capital. Kolchak's anti-Monarchist Ministers were an eyesore to the plotters who had placed him in power. Rumours of Monarchist plots against these Ministers kept the town in a constant panic. The presence of British troops alone held things together. Not long before my arrival the Reds had started an uprising across the river among the workmen at the Kulomzino flour-mill and the railway. Loyal troops had made short work of them. Nobody seemed satisfied or secure. I saw Kolchak. He appeared to be in a highly nervous state of mind, especially about the prospects of recognition by the Allies. He realized quite clearly that without recognition his task would be wellnigh hopeless.

Falling a victim to the prevailing epidemic of influenza, I hastened to return to Vladivostok, intending to seek warmth in Japan. The same express train conveyed me eastward. I found the same Georgians in the dining-car. They had smuggled saccharine. This time they were taking opium, brought from Turkestan, to be smuggled into Manchuria. Among the passengers was Rasputin's daughter, Matrena, whose husband, Soloviev, figures in the dossier of the Tsar's murder as a German agent. She was going to rejoin her husband in Vladivostok.

On arrival at the coast I found beautiful mild weather (end of March). My friend General Diterichs was there. He had brought

the relics of the imperial family for shipment to England. They were handed over to Commodore Edwards, of *H.M.S. Kent*. I returned with Diterichs. We travelled slowly, making frequent stoppages. Seldom have travellers such an opportunity to study Siberia and its people.

It was borne in upon me that between the Pacific and the Urals there are four countries, and if we include Manchuria five, each marked by such differences of altitude, soil, climate, and vegetation, and by ethnographical peculiarities, that it is entirely misleading to speak of Siberia as if it were in any way uniform.

We made a long halt at Harbin, while Generals and Atamans conferred with a view to joining hands to support Kolchak, with whom the Atamans had quarrelled. Here I saw the redoubtable Semenov, a semi-Mongol, and his humbler rival of Habarovsk, Kalmykof, whose name spoke of his origin. These Cossack chieftains had adopted the Japanese "orientation," because they could not get support from the other Allies. These conferences helped to bring about a reconciliation between Semenov and Kolchak, which bore fruit too late to save Siberia.

The curiously jagged hills of Eastern Manchuria, recalling those of Ussuri and of Japan, tell us that this part of the world has remained untouched by glaciers. They afford excellent cover for guerilla bands and for wild animals. After the broad sweep of the Manchurian plain, which contains the richest and thickest loam in the world, one re-enters the Hinghan Mountains, skirting the sandy dunes of Mongolia and climbing to the dismal tableland of Transbaikalia. Here Nature is in an ugly mood. In some parts veritable glaciers have been formed underground. During the summer heats water is squeezed up through the soil, flooding the country for miles. Cultivation is impossible. The railway-line has to be carefully watched. It is a sinister land, shunned by man, the haunt of wild pig and of tiger. The Cossack of the Ussuri had given place to swarms of Chinese farmers and coolies, then came the Mongols with their shaggy camels, and now we entered Dauria, the birthplace of Genghis, whence he began his career of world conquest, with the help of ancestors of the Mongolo-Buriat horsemen now serving under Semenov's General, Ungern-Sternberg. Past the holy lake Baikal, by the marvellous tunnelled railway we entered another domain, that of the Taiga or Siberian jungle, a mighty land of forest, of great rivers and mountains, ranging from the sun-kissed valleys of the Altai to the frozen wastes of the Lena, realms of gold and treasure, sparsely inhabited by a mixed population of Mongol and Aryan stock, Russian and Yakout, fast blending into one. Lastly, at Novo-Nikolaievsk, on the mighty Ob, we entered the greatest prairie in the world, watered by the mighty tributaries of the Ob, extending a thousand miles towards

Cheliabinsk, and as far again north to south, from Tobolsk, past Petropavlovsk and Kurgan, to the Kirghiz steppe, the most wonderful granary and dairy-farm, a land literally flowing with milk and honey, a land already settled by Russians.

Before leaving Manchuria we laid in provisions of all sorts. Prices had risen enormously since the Reds had come and gone. For instance, 100 eggs cost 7s., whereas formerly they fetched about 1s. In Omsk they already cost 10s. per dozen. Siberian butter at Novo-Nikolaievsk cost then already 1s. per pound—i.e., exactly what it used to fetch on the London market. The peasants had begun to curtail production, as there was no export. Had we known it, these prices would have seemed ridiculously small as compared with those of a few months later. We had not then learned that Siberia cannot be served by the Eastern gateway alone.

We had seen and spoken to a great many people on the way. We had with us some men who knew Siberia inside out. Diterichs himself was an inexhaustible fund of information. He had led the Czech echelons across Russia and Siberia, and had captured Vladivostok from the Reds, while the Czech rearguard, under the able guidance of Ushakov, repulsed an unprovoked attack by the Reds, officered by Germans and recruited from German prisoners and escaped convicts. Then the Czech politicians decided that the command should be exercised by a Czech, and selected Gaida. Ushakov having been murdered, his exploits were attributed to Gaida. Diterichs marched his Czechs to the relief of the rearguard, then handed over to Gaida. He was summoned to take the command in the Urals under the Directorate. He did not approve the *coup d'état* of November 18, 1918, and lost his command. He was certainly not a reactionary, but neither was he a Socialist or an ally of the Jews, nor did he speak or act against his conscience. He was the only soldier of experience in important commands, yet at such a critical stage of affairs he had been superseded by mere amateurs and adventurers.

I saw Kolchak for the second time. He seemed more and more depressed. He said literally: "Yes, I am badly served, but I cannot help it. I have to choose between honest incompetents or rogues who can do the work!" The quip was an exaggeration. The fact was he could not find decent people to work with the gang that had got him in its toils. He was not a free agent.

April came. The White armies were advancing rapidly towards the Volga. Nobody cared very much what happened in Omsk or in Siberia, let alone Vladivostok. The hundreds of thousands of refugees who crowded Omsk and other towns, and the huge bureaucratic army that far outnumbered the army at the front, were preparing to go soon to Moscow.

One of Kolchak's Ministers had arranged to provide his particular

party—the S.R.*—with a propaganda fund. He did it very simply. The grain requisitioned from the peasants was handed over to the co-operatives and resold for many times the price paid to the villagers. Some of the difference, a trifle of 65 million roubles (then worth £1,500,000), found its way into the S.R. treasure-chest, and enabled them to organize a propaganda against Kolchak. This led to a scandalous exposure and dismissal of the Minister, and to an equal expenditure of money for counter-propaganda, the upshot of this incident being that the Pink influence in the Government waned, while the Germanophile element acquired strength.

It was not safe to discuss these matters openly. A Russian friend who naively imagined that he could venture to do so was summarily arrested by Kolchak's agents or masters and expelled from the country, glad to escape with his life.

Before Nemesis overtook the Siberian adventure I had spent some eventful months in the Urals, watching the unravelling of the inquiry into the murder of the Romanofs. That the truth about this awful crime has come to light we owe largely to Kolchak. I think that it was the only positive gain of the Dictatorship, but that is saying much, for in the searching investigation of that and other Bolshevik crimes Kolchak rendered a great service to Russia and to humanity.

On arrival at Ekaterinburg I called on General Gaida at the Staff of the Siberian army. He struck me as being an amiable overgrown schoolboy, who was trying to pose as a Napoleon. He had just returned from the front. Three horses had sunk in the snow under him. His men were going to take Glazov, and then go on to Viatka. Thence it would be easy, after junction with the Archangel force, to get Moscow. He offered me a ticket for Moscow. The Red army no longer existed. Such was Gaida's view in April, 1919. Yet in May the position was already desperate. Diterichs was reinstated, and urged evacuation.

The truth about conditions at the front was obviously unobtainable, but much interesting information reached me from the Staff regarding Red rule in the Urals. The advance of the Whites—too late to save the hapless Tsar and his family—had given the Reds no time to remove all compromising evidence. I thus received photographs of the Red chieftains and of their handiwork. I will spare your feelings. Most of these pictures are too horrible. A characteristic snapshot shows the interior of the Cheka† at Perm, decorated with inscriptions in Hebrew characters, hailing the Third International and bidding the Proletariat of all countries joyfully unite. Under this inspiring motto, cheered by the revered presentments of Leiba Trotsky, Mordecai Marx, and Yankel Sverdlov, and the shabesgoy

* Socialist Revolutionary.

† Extraordinary Commission (the Red Inquisition).

Lenin, framed above the inquisition-table, innumerable citizens of Perm and its environs had been done to death. The instruments of torture—thumb-screws and nail-extractors—were found in the room. A group of the Red army Staff was also found. Among them is Isai Goloshchekin, the Jew who superintended the murder of the Romanovs. At the time of the murder he was military commissary at Ekaterinburg and confidential representative of the Moscow Central Executive, in the person of Sverdlov, its president. A portrait of this amiable person also came to light. He is wearing the red pentagramme, the emblem of Sovietdom and of Jewry. After he had arranged the murder by order from Moscow through another Jew named Yurovsky, he continued to represent the Moscow Executive on the Staff of the Red army—an additional proof, if any be needed, that the Moscow Soviet thoroughly approved of the crime.

Accompanying the new Commander-in-Chief, I went to the Volga front, going almost within sight of Ufa. The condition of the troops was pitiable in the extreme. They had just the clothes in which they stood. No change of linen, no spare boots, no overcoats. The nights were cold and rainy. In the absence of tents or blankets it was almost impossible to live out of doors. So the front so-called was merely a line of villages, which changed with the fortune of war. Thus, while a goodly part of the town-dwellers in the distant rear were clothed in comfortable garments or uniforms supplied by the Allies, the men who were fighting had been forgotten. They had not even any soap; they had food, because there was plenty in this wonderfully rich province, the old home of the Bashkirs and other Tatar tribes. But these men were real soldiers. They scorned the raw recruits sent to them and drove them home as a useless encumbrance. They perished, not at the hands of the Reds, but by typhus, the awful disease—due to lack of linen and soap—that was to sweep through Siberia in the autumn.

Travelling on the railways within the fighting zone had its exciting points. One was never quite sure whence the Reds might turn up. Twice within my experience the enemy appeared almost in our midst. The Staffs had to live in railway carriages, ready to move at a moment's notice. Accidents, often deliberately caused, were of daily occurrence. Our horses naturally travelled with us, so did the motor-cars.

On July 14, 1919, we evacuated Ekaterinburg. We had already bidden good-bye to Perm, where the Russian sailors, aided by a party from *H.M.S. Kent* and *Suffolk*, had striven valiantly to stem the Red tide. It was sad to witness the departure of British troops from Ekaterinburg. They had done so much to help, and they were forbidden to do more.

Midway to Omsk the Staff halted at Ishim, the heart of Siberia's

granary. It was the glorious summer in the steppe. We used to ride to the Kirghiz camps in the early morning through the flower-covered prairies to drink koumiss. Strange people, these descendants of the former owners of the land, who still wield a very far-reaching influence. They are up-to-date nomads, passing the winter in towns, and going with their herd of sorry horses into camp in summer. The peasants of Western Siberia use the Kirghiz shepherds as a protection against Kirghiz cattle thieves. The Kirghiz have an uncanny way of communicating with each other by signals passed across the boundless prairies, where nothing escapes their eagle eyes. I always suspected them of being in touch with the Reds. They disappeared one day, having, no doubt, ascertained from Bolshevik agents that the Red army was advancing. Events have proved that they had accepted a Red bribe. It cost nothing to the Bolsheviks to sacrifice the bourgeois peasant in favour of the Kirghiz horseman. The Kirghiz republic holds temporary sway over the southern steppe and provides cavalry for the Reds. The Bashkirs, another nomad Tatar tribe, have been similarly bribed for service.

Myriads of wild-fowl were already migrating over this sportsman's paradise when we abandoned Ishim and the exhausted Whites to the north and south began to retire upon the Irtysh. Meanwhile Kolchak's hopes hung upon the Cossacks, the same Cossacks who had placed him in power. The Orenburg Cossacks had been overwhelmed. Doutof, their leader, had reached Omsk. A grand mobilization of the Siberian Cossacks was agreed. They were to put 8,000 horsemen in the field and ride the Reds back beyond the Urals. Everything was done to please the Cossacks. All the cloth, leather, fur, and munitions that remained in Omsk were handed over to them. Each man received Rs. 10,000.

I visited the Cossack villages during the mobilization. They appeared to be more concerned over their differences with the Russian newcomers settled in their vicinity than with fighting the Reds. Visits to Cossack and other villages—they look alike as two peas—revealed an acute enmity between three different sections of Siberian farmers—the Cossacks, the old settlers, and the newcomers. The Cossacks, being first—they came three centuries ago—had taken the best places, including the banks of the great river. The old settlers had gradually taken up the lands on the lesser streams. The newcomers, swarming into this fertile region in later and quite recent times, had found the Cossacks and old settlers unwilling to take them in or share the riverside with them. The fact that other unsettled lands were extremely fertile did not reconcile them to their lot. Moreover, many of these later arrivals were Little Russians, a proverbially obstinate and pugnacious lot. Unbeknown to the wisacres in Omsk or Vladivostok, the rural population of the most thickly

inhabited portion of Siberia were engaged in a lively feud, which the Red propaganda easily fanned into flames. Thus, although there were no landlords in Siberia and few industries, the Socialist mischief-maker had combustible material to work upon.

An old Cossack, who was evidently the orator of his stanitsa, said to me: "Supposing we go to fight the Reds, who is going to defend us from the Hohol?" Hohol is a nickname for Little Russian. "Why, they are preparing to rush our stanitsas the moment our men leave!" Soon afterwards the Cossack council insisted that only 5,000 horsemen could be spared. But even they had their minds more on the stanitsa than on the Reds. With the greatest difficulty they were persuaded to take the field. It would have been easy for them to ride all round the enemy and go to Moscow if they had so chosen. The Reds could not have stopped them. But they rode out and rode home again without firing a shot, stampeded by the rumour that their stanitsas were being raided. Thus went the last hope of saving Omsk.

Before the end came, one of our officers died. I refer to Colonel Steel, R.A., who was in charge of the British guns supplied to a special artillery brigade. He contracted typhus, which was rife at Omsk, being constantly introduced by refugees and wounded. The whole garrison turned out to bury him. It was a remarkable expression of the public appreciation of what our soldiers had done to help them. The Middlesex battalion, under Colonel Ward, and the Hampshire battalion, under Colonel Johnson, will ever evoke a grateful remembrance among all who passed through the Siberian adventure. Refugees from the Urals and West were crossing the Irtysh in August.

Diterichs had urged Kolchak to begin the evacuation of Omsk then and there. The "Dictator's" entourage preferred to enjoy the delights of their "capital." Even after the Cossack débâcle they insisted on remaining. Diterichs had to resign. The evacuation broke down completely. One hundred and forty trains blocked the eastward track, their occupants doomed to freeze or starve. Official trains used the westward track. We sped past the doomed echelons. Death and desolation were abroad. I saw hundreds of refugees travelling along the high road back to the Urals. They had covered thousands of miles back and forth. Their splendid horses were still fit, but how long would they and their masters endure under the gathering blizzards of a Siberian winter? I will not enlarge upon the horror of that retreat. It requires a book to itself. And assuredly the winter march of Kapel's troops—the remnant of Kolchak's armies—through Siberia to Chita is an exploit worthy of Suvorov's campaign in the Alps.

Kolchak would not be parted from his gold, the sinews of war. But he had left Omsk too late. The Czechs settled their score with him near Irkutsk. He was handed over to the Reds, the order being

signed by General Janin, who combined in his person the offices of chief of the French military mission and of Commander-in-Chief of the Czechs, Poles, and other levies in Siberia. This act of treachery was accounted for on the ground that the Reds would have cut off the coal-supply to the Allied trains. Kolchak was shot and the treasure was ransacked. As Semenov's troops who had tried to rescue Kolchak had slaughtered a number of Red prisoners, an equal number of Kolchak's followers were despatched by the Reds.

Transbaikalia is the real eastern gateway into Siberia. The Amur, the Manchurian, and the Mongolian avenues converge in the valley of the Selenga. An American regiment was quartered at Verkhneudinsk, to make sure the free exit of the Czechs. Transbaikalia afforded an ideal ground for intercepting communications. Semenov, a Cossack officer, here began to fight the Reds. The natural advantages of the country enabled him to continue the struggle even after Kolchak's downfall. He held Chita till last July. Then his Mongol troops went to Urga, while the Kolchak remnant crossed into Ussuri, where they remain, waiting, like Wrangel's men, for a chance to return to Russia.

Within the past two years the Russian territories east of Baikal have been passing through a succession of political changes, largely due to the influence of foreign Powers. First the Reds were in the ascendant. They had the support of German prisoners of war. The local reaction under the Atamans could not cope with this combination. Then the Czechs appeared and drove out the Reds. A Pink Directorate was accepted in Siberia, but did not please the Cossacks or the Monarchist refugees. Allied intervention initiated during the war to facilitate the transfer of the Czechs to France assumed conflicting aspects after the Armistice. The intervening Powers were at odds with each other and often with themselves. Japan supported the Atamans because they were regarded as a reliable screen against the Reds. The United States favoured the Pinks, but occasionally did not discriminate between the Pinks and the Reds. At that time the Americans had not been awakened to the real character of Bolshevism, and in the train of American organizations had come a host of revolutionary Russian Jews.

Gaida's attempt to capture Vladivostok for the Pinks in November, 1919, failed because the Japanese interfered. In January, 1920, I witnessed a reversal of the process. The Pinks came in with the help of the Americans. Then, the Czechs having been evacuated, the Americans went away and the Pinks again retired.

Two important events had intervened. The Reds organized a strike among the Russian railway workers in Harbin. The Chinese took advantage of it to evict the Russian management and to disband the remnants of the Russian railway guard. Russian influence

in Manchuria disappeared. The Reds formally surrendered all Russia's rights and all the rights of Russians throughout China. The Harbin strike and its consequences showed very clearly that the Red Government was anti-Russian. However, their poor dupes in the Far East actually believed that the strike was an act of patriotic protest against Horvat and the bourgeois exploiters of the Chinese eastern railway. The Chinese inhabitants remained indifferent. They celebrated their new year and went about their business. The banging of huge Chinese fire-crackers lent a sarcastic accompaniment to this latest Russian revolution.

From Irkutsk the Reds had stirred up trouble on the Amur, which had remained a favourite haunt of the bands of escaped convicts officered by Germans. They concentrated upon Nikolaievsk, at the mouth of the river. This fishing town had a population of about 6,000 Russians and 500 Japanese. The Reds represented their movement as a patriotic attempt to rid the soil of the Fatherland of the Japanese "invader." Exactly a twelvemonth ago they suddenly swooped down on defenceless Nikolaievsk, burned and sacked the town, murdered every Japanese, including the Consul and his family, who were roasted alive in their house, and murdered four or five thousand Russians. The ringleaders of this atrocity are depicted in a photograph of which a copy has reached me. The heroine boasted that she had at different times shot with her own hand 400 Russian officers. News of the massacre aroused great indignation in Japan. A military demonstration was made in Vladivostok in April, and the Pink troops were disbanded.

The Japanese were heartily tired of intervention. Siberian to them is not a promised land. It is unsuitable for Japanese colonization. It is important only for its fisheries and for its opportunities for trade or mining investments. But of course, as it is, so to speak, next door to them by its proximity to Corea, they cannot be indifferent to Siberian politics. So, after firing off their big guns in Vladivostok, as a salute for their dead as well as a menace to the Reds, they agreed to recognize a Pink Government at Chita, on the condition that no Reds were admitted. The Pinks have not been able to keep their word. The Japanese did not imagine they would. A respectable force of Japanese troops guards the railway between Harbin and Vladivostok, to prevent the ingress of Red propaganda. The trains are running once more from Harbin to Chita and beyond.

It would seem, then, that the reopening of trade with Siberia were already feasible. Yes and no. Trade with the Baikal region and perhaps a little beyond is unquestionably possible, and I have no doubt is actually proceeding. The Chita Government—in reality Red, not Pink—has even invited American banks to open branches there. The invitation explains that Communism cannot—so experi-

ence has shown—be introduced all at once, and meanwhile the services of American banks would be welcomed. The agreement accepted by the Reds—objectionable though it be—serves to emphasize the downfall of Communism.

But I have endeavoured to show in this paper that Siberia must be dealt with as a consumer or exporter through its western approaches. It is west of Baikal that the bulk of the population and the wealth of Siberia lie, and it is into Europe and not into Asia that her principal trade routes must trend.

The population of Siberia does not exceed 15 millions, of whom roughly one-third are non-Aryan; one-half the remainder are Cossacks and old settlers. The recent immigration is thus equal to the influx of the preceding three centuries. Western Siberia is either pure Slav or Kirghiz; Central Siberia, on the other hand, is pure Slav in the recently settled Altai, but largely half-breed in the north, with a marked tendency to Yakout type. In Transbaikalia the Cossacks and older settlers are strongly permeated with Mongol-Buriat blood. The Amur and Ussuri population is more recent and more Aryan. As the Chinese do not intermarry, it is probable that, owing to the rapid decline of the Buriats and other native tribes east of Baikal, the Russian strain will not be much diluted. But owing to the tremendous growth of Chinese settlement in the valleys of the Amur and its tributaries, it is doubtful if the Russian settlers will be able to do more than hold their own; certainly not unless Russia is able in the future to exercise a countervailing pressure, which appears to be doubtful and unprofitable.

She will prefer to concentrate her energies, not upon Vladivostok, which is not the real gate of Siberia, but upon the approaches to the Baikal region. The redoubtable mountain barrier south and south-west of the great lake will keep out the Yellow tide should it sweep north through Mongolia.

There has been much talk of a railway connecting the Sea of Okhotsk at Port Ayan with the valley of the Lena and circling Baikal from the north. It is even spoken of as the nucleus of an all-land route between Asia and America. I think that if and when built it will justify itself simply and solely as a means of developing the Siberian Klondyke.

A very much more important project is the linking up of the Siberian, or rather the Altai, line with Central Asia (Semipalatinsk-Vernoie). This extension will have an enormous effect upon the economics of the Empire. Altai wheat will enable Turkestan to grow more cotton. Siberia will receive fruit from Central Asia, which had to come from enormous distances. The dearest thing in Omsk is an apple.

In the olden times trade with Siberia followed the track of the

precious sable and silver fox. At present only Kamtchatka retains that primitive condition. In Siberia the trapper is still an important person, but he has to give precedence to the husbandman and even to the miner. Agriculture represents the potential and actual wealth of the country. The great question is, How can Siberia export this wealth? It has been established by experience that the existing railway is insufficient to cope with normal traffic. There is only one method of solving the problem—to develop rail and waterways between Western Siberia and the White and Black Seas. One of the great enterprises in Russia will be to dig the Volga-Don Canal. Waterborne trade will then be carried to and from the Urals. The northern Kara Sea route to the Ob and Enisei is a valuable adjunct, but is only open fitfully during a few weeks in the year, and can never replace traffic to ports west of the Kara gates.

The outlook in Siberia depends, of course, upon the situation in European Russia, politically as well as economically. Communism is on its last legs. Siberia is not and will not be for a long time to come a manufacturing country. It must depend upon Russia for manufactured goods, Russian or imported, and depends upon Russia also for an outlet to its wealth. To talk of the independence of Siberia is absurd.

Siberia interests us directly in a variety of ways. We require cheap dairy produce. Formerly it came to us from Western Siberia through Danish hands. The Danish agents in Siberia, of course, helped Danish trade. There is no reason why we should not do this ourselves. There is also the enormous mineral wealth of Siberia. British capital is largely interested in copper and coal mines in the Kirghiz steppes and other mines in the Altai. The large number of Britishers who served in Siberia or Russia during the war should be called upon to extend our commercial relations there in the peaceful times that are bound to follow. Siberia will be a good customer, and it will be a long time before Russian industries can satisfy all requirements. The co-operatives have been ruined by the Reds, but they will yet play a part in the new Siberia, though, speaking from personal observation, I should say to the British business man: "Do your own business through your own people!" We must not forget that the Americans were there in large numbers both before and during the war; also that tens of thousands of German prisoners thoroughly spied out the land. Let us not neglect our opportunities.

The Far Eastern problem, as it is called, compelled my personal notice. I left the car that had been my home—it had reached Siberia from Central Asia—after a bewildering succession of "allied" revolutions. At Mukden I heard much of the redoubtable Chantsolin, ex-leader of brigands and still illiterate, but Commander-in-Chief and virtual ruler of Manchuria. This astute genius managed to be on the

best of terms with the Japanese and do what he liked with the Peking Government. At Harbin I had seen the Chinese farmers meeting their wives and families from Shantung, and joyously escorting them to their new homes in the villages. My impression was and is that no Power can oust the Chinese where they have once settled down. Certainly the Japanese cannot hope to do so, even if they could stand the climate. To my mind the Far Eastern problem is one of Chinese immigration, and it seems to me, for a variety of reasons, that the wave of Chinese settlement will not go beyond the Amur and Mongolia. The rivalry between Japan and the United States cannot go beyond a commercial one. Japanese railway influence stops short at Chan-chung, and may easily be counterbalanced by American banks and the Chinese boycott. Then there is the Kalgan Railway, another aid to Chinese emigration, and a diversion of the Manchurian route into Siberia. So, it seems to me, conflict in the Far East cannot go beyond peaceful methods without danger to all concerned. For this reason I consider the outlook in Siberia with no small measure of hope and confidence.

The CHAIRMAN: We have listened to an interesting paper, and we are grateful to Mr. Wilton for having given us an opportunity this evening to enjoy the fruits of his observations and experiences.

Brigadier-General C. D. BRUCE: Lord Carnock, Ladies and Gentlemen, my friend Mr. Wilton covered such an extraordinarily wide area in his most interesting lecture this evening that I find it very difficult to concentrate on a particular part of it. There are, of course, the military, the economic, the geographical, and other side-issues; and I think to most of us perhaps the most poignant part of the lecture was what he told us about the late Tsar. Again, I think many of us would prefer to leave that side of life for the moment and turn to the future—the more happy aspect of the economic resources of Siberia and Manchuria. There are those, I have no doubt many in this room, who have been over the ground, as I have myself; and to them the lecture will bring back memories of the peaceful days before the dreadful world-war took place. Mr. Wilton talked of Moscow and Tomsk in the present war. For myself, I came in there seven or eight years ago for the first time, having travelled from Tashkend and Baku, then up the Irtysh River into Tomsk, where nobody could imagine that in six years' time hell would be let loose. There are many questions I would like to ask the lecturer. One is why the Czechs—if one may be political for a moment—why the Czechs should have taken up the attitude they did? Mr. Wilton explained it in a way, but not enough, to my mind, to make it quite clear. Perhaps I might ask him, with your approval, why did they turn against Kolchak like that?

The LECTURER: They considered that the Directorate which they were supporting, which was a Socialist Directorate—it must be remem-

bered that the Czechs were Socialists—was loyally combating the Reds, and they regarded this *coup d'état* which brought Kolchak into the Dictatorship as quite uncalled for. It was indeed, from their point of view, nothing more nor less than a reactionary plot. They declared their unqualified opposition to it. They never recognized it. They immediately withdrew from the front, and they were slacking all the time and even encouraging opposition to Kolchak. That is to my mind the only palliation to the terrible, the awful treachery to which Kolchak fell a victim. In other words, they regarded Kolchak as a traitor, and they blamed him not only for the breakdown of the resistance to the Bolsheviks, but also for the loss of the treasure which they had helped to save.

Colonel JOHN WARD, M.P.: Mr. Chairman, unfortunately I was not able to hear the whole of the lecture, but the part I listened to revived many memories of the time when I was in Siberia. The last statement which the lecturer has made in answer to the question is interesting to me, because I remember the whole of the circumstances of the *coup d'état* which placed Kolchak in supreme authority. I do not think the Czech soldiers themselves—I am certain that General Guída and the military people had no intention whatever of withholding their support from Admiral Kolchak. I believe they saw, so far as the military side was concerned, the absolute necessity of the change from the Directorate to a more centralized condition of military action, if there was to be any effective combating of the Red propaganda and the Red military power whose guns were then thundering along the Urals. But it was unfortunate for the Czechs that at this critical moment they were not guided by their military chiefs—perhaps now I am treading on very controversial ground, but I may as well say what I think, because if I do not say it now I shall most likely say it at some time when it will be just as much criticized as now—it is a fatal mistake for an army or military chiefs on the actual field of battle to be controlled by politicians, either near or far. (Applause.) They are all very well in the council chamber, and they are all very well for their purpose—for either diplomacy, politics, or administration—but when it comes to the actual military situation in a great war and in a great contest like that, politics are not only in the way, but they are a positive nuisance to everybody concerned. The Czech army was unfortunately controlled by a political committee which sat at Ekaterinburg, and this political committee was entirely Socialist, as the lecturer has said; and it was this political committee that directed the army against the efforts of Admiral Kolchak to reconstruct what I do not describe as the White line as against the Reds, but the Constitutionalists as against the Terrorist forces. Guída was so certain of the necessity of the *coup d'état* which put Kolchak at the head of Russian affairs, that, in spite of the

Czech's political committee, he, with his guard, arrested the members of the political council of Ekaterinburg. These may be interesting secrets connected with the affair, but of course I was there, and personally interested in almost every one of the movements. I do not agree with the lecturer on two or three things, but those are speculative things. Where he has described the situation and the facts I absolutely agree with every statement he has made; but where he ventures opinions I also have opinions on the subject. I do not believe the Japanese would have ever entered the country unless they went with the deliberate intention of taking over the Transbaikalian provinces. I believe they are holding as much as they can at the present time, that they have no intention whatever to allow those provinces to go back into a great Russian community—when Russia has settled down as a great nation, as it must sooner or later—unless that new Russia is capable of driving Japan out by force. That is my positive opinion. I think also that the American political and military men on the spot and Government generally understood that that was the situation, and that was largely the reason why they would not allow their troops to go forward beyond the Baikal, because their lines of communication, and the whole position of their forces, depended on the amount of confidence they had in the Japanese forces behind. They went just as far as the Japanese—no farther. When the Japanese retired, they retired. Eventually they retired altogether, leaving the Japanese in practical possession, and, so far as the situation in Siberia is concerned, already the Japanese have their outposts as far north as Kamtchatka. They have got partial possession of the country between Alaska and North-Eastern Siberia. They have got absolute possession practically to-day of the Ossiuri Provinces, and I should think that it is stretching one's imagination and knowledge of the world generally if one does not see in the circumstances that prevail in the North Pacific Ocean at the present moment the germ of very severe friction between the two Great Powers whose interests are predominant in that part of the world. I think a few years will show that, unless Japan modifies her demands—unless she is more considerate and less active in continuing the difficulty that she has created there by her policy. My friend the lecturer has referred to Semianov—there may be friends of Semianov here. When Admiral Kolchak was appointed supreme Governor; when General Dutov, the Commander of the Orenburg Cossacks, sent in his submission and agreement to work with the Government at Omsk; when General Denikin sent in a similar message; when the Murmansk Government on the north also sent their message; when the whole body of Russian opinion outside the Soviet power at Moscow had become concentrated and agreed on Admiral Kolchak being the man to represent their authority; when there was every prospect of

our success, the Japanese subsidized General Semianov, placed him in position at Chita, and absolutely refused to allow Admiral Kolchak's orders to proceed farther east than Chita. There was a long delay caused to army supplies and goods going forward, so that it was only possible to get goods forward on condition that there was a British or other Allied guard on the train, often with a Union Jack painted on the waggon, so that it could not be touched without possible international complications. Semianov was generally assisting the Japanese in their policy of making it impossible for the Russians under the Kolchak Government to pull themselves together in that part of the world; hence, when I saw in the newspaper the other day that he was marching with some considerable body of men from Siberia towards the Urals to take part in what I hope is the final struggle, I wondered whether he was still doing it under Japanese auspices and in Japanese pay, or whether he was really working for Russia at last. Gentlemen, all I have to say in conclusion is this: Siberia is a wonderful country. Its possibilities are illimitable. No one who has not been there and travelled far can even contemplate for a moment the wonderful possibilities of that country. I should think myself it is so enormous geographically that it could be self-contained; that it might make itself into an independent empire if it had the genius necessary for administration applied to the problem. It is extensive enough. It could house, I should think, almost all the people in the world if fully and properly developed. It is enormous in territory, and has possibilities, I should say, quite illimitable. But all I wish to say in conclusion as to the ups and down of this Russian business is that I was in the country a very long time, and got to be intimate friends with them and to sympathize with them; and I am as certain as that the sun will rise to-morrow that sooner or later Russia is bound to secure her sanity again and become a great nation. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure we are most grateful to the two last speakers for the very interesting and instructive observations they have made—especially Colonel Ward. (Applause.) We know the great service he rendered, but I think at this hour I will not call for any further observations, but will ask you all to tender a hearty vote of thanks to the lecturer for the very interesting paper he has been good enough to read to us. (Applause.)

MESOPOTAMIA, 1914-1921

LECTURE BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR ARNOLD WILSON, K.C.I.E.,
C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O.

Recently Acting Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia, and Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf, April 15, 1921

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held in the rooms of the Royal Society at Burlington House, London, W., on Friday, April 15, for the purpose of hearing a paper read entitled "Mesopotamia, 1914-1921," by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Arnold Wilson, K.C.I.E., late Civil Commissioner at Baghdad. The lecture was well illustrated by photographic views, many of which were taken from the air. The Right Hon. Lord Carnock, P.C., presided.

The CHAIRMAN opened the proceedings by calling on the Hon. Secretary (Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Yate) to make a report to the meeting of the members recently admitted, and of gifts presented to the Society.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. YATE: I have to announce first of all that at the last meeting we elected sixteen members, among them being the late Commander-in-Chief in India, General Sir Charles Monro, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., and Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour. The present Commander-in-Chief in India, Lord Rawlinson, is also a member, and it is with pride that the Central Asian Society sees the name of Rawlinson on its books.

To-day we have elected nineteen new members: The Dowager Lady Forbes, Mr. Ian Colvin, Captain T. Denis Daly, Royal Welch Fusiliers, Mr. J. A. L. Duncan, Mrs. Duncan, Captain H. I. Lloyd, Mr. H. C. Minchin, Captain R. L. O'Connor, Sir Wilfred Peek, Bart., D.S.O., Colonel Sir W. M. Thomson, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.C., Seaforth Highlanders, the Hon. C. C. Farrer, Mr. O. Allen Harker, Mr. J. B. L. Harris, O.B.E., Mr. J. E. B. Hotson, Mr. H. J. Coleridge Mackarness, Captain J. H. Moore, Mr. H. G. Warburton, I.C.S. (ret.), Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. Tainsh, and Captain S. W. Weldon. We are specially indebted to Mrs. Waller-Sawyer for her recent success in adding new members to the roll of the Society.

I have further to announce a most generous and valuable contribution to the library which, since the commencement of the current session, we have begun to form. This contribution appeals to all of us, and especially to the older members of the Society, who knew the late Colonel Sir Henry Trotter as a traveller and able soldier and

administrator, and later as Member and Chairman of Council of the Society. Lady Trotter makes to us this gift of her husband's Asiatic library in the conviction that such a disposal of it would be entirely in harmony with what would have been his own wish. He took the keenest interest, as I and others well know, in the progress and welfare of this Society. The books which thus come into our possession are most valuable, and, indeed, form the nucleus of a library of which our Society may one day hope to be proud. The gift for which we are indebted to Sir Henry and Lady Trotter numbers from one hundred and fifty to two hundred volumes, if not more, and among them are numbered some of the really standard works on Central Asia, and all in excellent condition. (Applause.) Lady Trotter has given us a book-case capable of holding most of these volumes. The difficulty we have at this moment is, in our very limited accommodation at Grosvenor Street, to find a place to put them in; but we shall, I trust, be able to do so later. We are also indebted to Sir Percy Sykes, who has presented us with several most valuable books, including some volumes of Sir Henry Howorth's "History of the Mongols"; again, to Colonel Woolrych Perowne, who has sent us his own book entitled "Russian Hosts and English Guests in Central Asia," and a particularly interesting copy of Dr. Joseph Wolff's "A Mission to Bokhara, 1843-45," which bears the author's own autograph. I may mention, for the information of those who have not got Central Asian history at their fingers' ends, that after the grievous death of Colonel Stoddart and Captain Arthur Conolly at Bokhara, Dr. Wolff (the father of Sir Henry Drummond Wolff) went out at great risk of his own life to Bokhara and endeavoured by every possible means to ascertain the nature of their imprisonment and death. That story, one of the saddest, has never been cleared up.

The CHAIRMAN: I will now ask Sir Arnold Wilson to read the paper which he has kindly promised for to-day. During the period it covers very considerable events have occurred, and I am sure we shall all be very anxious to hear what Sir Arnold has to say in connection with them.

LECTURE.

AN enterprising London paper recently offered a prize of £1,000 for the best exposition of the Einstein theory, limited to 3,000 words.

In undertaking to lecture for an hour on Mesopotamia, I have undertaken a scarcely less difficult task.

The Einstein theory is a logical deduction from ascertained facts, and from theories which have been tested by the best brains of the world. Our policy in the Middle East is exactly the opposite in every respect, and is consequently less easy to define and more difficult to understand.

In awarding the prize for the best essay on the Einstein theory, the editor was careful to explain that he was guided less by what the competitors wrote than by what they omitted; I would ask you to judge me by this test this afternoon.

From the welter of conflicting announcements, promises, and agreements which disfigure the diplomatic record of the Allies in the Middle East and have hung like a millstone round the neck of its representatives abroad, there emerged Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles, whereby we virtually undertook to create and maintain an independent Arab Government in Mesopotamia.

Neither the Versailles Treaty nor the already obsolescent Treaty of Sèvres says this in so many words, but, stripped of their internal contradictions and of their almost meaningless reserves, this is what the Treaties imply, and H.M. Government have repeatedly reaffirmed this to be our intention.

I do not propose to ask you to consider whether or not such a policy is practicable.

My object is to assist you in forming your own opinions on the problem, and to suggest ways in which the British people collectively can assist in making our present policy a success. Euclid, not content with demonstrating the truth of a proposition, was at pains to show that the converse was absurd, and for this reason I will conclude by a brief reference to the probable effect of an abandonment of the mandate or of failure on our part to give effect to it thoroughly.

POPULATION.—I will begin by describing briefly the population of Mesopotamia, according to a very rough census made in 1919.

The table on p. 147 gives the main figures in a convenient form.

It will be seen that there are a quarter of a million Kurds to consider, and nearly as many Jews and Christians.

There are more Jews in Mesopotamia than in Palestine, and they are, moreover, a more prosperous and more contented community.

Jews and Christians alike have some reason to fear that under a full-blooded Arab administration they will receive from minor Arab officials less tolerant treatment than they received from the Turks, who, whatever they did elsewhere, refrained from massacres in Mesopotamia. As in Palestine, so in Mesopotamia, it is one of our responsibilities under the mandate to provide safeguards against this tendency.

The division of Mohammedans in the above table into Shiahs and Sunnis requires some explanation. This religious line of cleavage is so deep as to be almost like a racial difference in its effect. The problem of government in Mesopotamia is mainly the problem of bringing the two together. Rather more than half the rural population, nomads and cultivators alike, are Shiah. Kadhimain, Karbala, and Najaf, with an exclusively Shiah population, are the strongholds

ESTIMATED POPULATION OF MESOPOTAMIA (EXCLUDING SULAIMANIYAH).

Division.	Sunni.	Shiah.	Jewish.	Christian.	Other Religions.	Total.	Wilayah.
Baghdad ...	130,000	54,000	50,000	15,000	1,000	250,000	Baghdad 1,360,304
Samarra ...	66,455	14,215	300	—	—	80,970	
Diyalah ...	54,953	46,097	1,689	397	900	104,036	
Kut-al-Amarah ...	8,578	98,712	381	127	—	107,798	
Diwanayah ...	1,000	192,300	6,000	5,000	200	204,500	
Shamiyah ...	445	189,000	530	20	5	190,000	
Hillah ...	15,983	155,897	1,065	27	28	173,000	
Dulaim ...	247,000	200	2,600	200	—	250,000	
	524,414	750,421	62,565	20,771	2,133	1,360,304	
Basrah ...	24,408	130,494	6,928	2,221	1,549	165,600	Basrah 785,600
Amarah ...	7,000	284,700	3,000	300	5,000	300,000	
Muntafiq ...	11,150	306,220	160	30	2,440	320,000	
	42,558	721,414	10,088	2,551	8,989	785,600	
Mosul ...	244,713	17,130	7,635	50,670	30,180	350,378	Mosul 548,378
Arbil ...	96,100	—	4,800	4,100	1,000	106,000	
Kirkuk ...	85,000	5,000	1,400	600	—	92,000	
	425,813	22,180	13,835	55,370	31,180	548,378	
Total ...	992,785	1,494,015	86,488	78,692	42,302	2,694,282	

of their faith. Samarra, though a place of pilgrimage for Shiah, is in Sunni hands, a source of constant complaint from Shiah pilgrims, who suffer many indignities at the hands of the Sunni guardians.

At Najaf and Karbala the mujtahids hold sway. They are the high-priests of the faith, in whom alone, according to Shiah law, is vested spiritual power. The chief mujtahid is the representative of God on earth; the other mujtahids are "proofs of Islam," alone empowered to give final decisions under Mohammedan law, for which reason they also claim a large measure of temporal power. Even when H.I.M. the Shah visited Karbala the chief mujtahid would not go forward to receive him, and efforts were made by a trick to induce the Shah to call on the chief mujtahid.

These mujtahids are very old men, who have seldom left the four holy cities, except, in one or two cases, to go to Mecca. They are arch-conservatives, their views and methods those of the early Middle Ages. They exercise great influence, and those whose principal concern is the maintenance of law and order may be pardoned if they reflect on the difficulties experienced, with, perhaps, less justification, by a certain English King in his dealings with Thomas à Becket.

The Shiah population is much more homogeneous than the Sunni, owing to the habit of pilgrimages to the Holy Places several times a

year. Townsmen hate to leave the towns, but the tribesmen go up often several times yearly to the Sacred Places, and are easily influenced then by extratribal agencies.

The Shiahs took the lead in recent disturbances. They alone declared that the rising was a "jihad," and in their action they had the support, sometimes passive, sometimes active, of their religious leaders.

Psychologically they differ from Arabs elsewhere; gloomily they reflect on their age-long wrongs at the hands of the majority of Sunnis, and annually, in real distress of mind, they commemorate by self-inflicted blows, and even wounds, the martyrdom of their saints, Ali and Husain, who died by treachery at the hands of men of the same fickle race and faith as those who now inhabit the Euphrates Valley. "The curse of Husain is still on us," said one of them to me, as his sole explanation of certain acts of his compatriots in the recent rising.

Not for the past fifty years has the Shiah religion in Mesopotamia experienced such a revival as it has during the past three. Freed from Sunni domination, Shiah tribesmen flocked to the Holy Places in unparalleled numbers, and, forgetting what they had suffered at the hands of their former masters, turned, at a favourable moment, against their liberators, against whom, as is now generally admitted, the people at large had but one grievance—viz., that they were "Christians."

The Sunni is very different. The supreme secular and spiritual authority to him has always been vested in the State. There is no priesthood; religious officials are appointed and paid by the State, in whom vests all religious property; no man can intercede with his Maker for another; crimes cannot be condoned by the payment of money to priests or to shrines.

The difference between Sunni and Shiah is thus profound, and it extends to every activity of their lives, and it has induced an hereditary difference of outlook which it is impossible to ignore. It is from the Sunnis that the vast bulk of Government officials were drawn by the Turks, and are necessarily still drawn; it is they who fill the schools and the courts of law, as teachers and pupils, litigants and judges. The Shiah, warned by his priests that it is unlawful to serve a foreign Government, and that secular Governments, mandated or otherwise, lack Divine authority, has hitherto held aloof, and no Shiah holds high office in the present Arab Government. They are as a class peculiarly prone to be led astray by cross-currents of thought, and are in Mesopotamia, as always, promising soil for antisocial and revolutionary ideas, owing to their tendency to question the validity of secular authority.

I have not yet referred to the Kurds, of whom we have about a quarter of a million in Mesopotamia; dwellers in the hills, a few

nomadic but the great majority settled cultivators, with their own language and customs, they are members of a race which differs as much from Arabs as do the latter from Indians, and they seldom intermarry except with Persians or Turks. Representative institutions on Western lines are wholly foreign to them, as, indeed, they are to Arabs. Small isolated communities more easily fall a prey to individual tyranny than large groups, and in Kurdistan, more than in Mesopotamia, the social organization is little able to resist the tyranny of a powerful and unscrupulous individual, who, with armed men in his pay and sometimes, but not always, with the added prestige of a saintly ancestry, can force a whole countryside to do his bidding and commit atrocities as great as those of historic tyrants. For this reason Kurds, even more than Arabs, require an external Government, such as that, bad as it was, provided by the Turks.

Lastly, we have the Turkish-speaking populations of Mosul, Arbil, and Kirkuk, the offspring of early Turkish colonists and of generations of Turkish officials from Seljuk times onwards. They are a valuable element in the population. They are on the whole pro-Turkish in sympathies, as is natural, but it is to be hoped that the Arab State will be able in the future to draw extensively on them for its official needs.

PRE-WAR GOVERNMENT.—All these discordant and irreconcilable elements were loosely governed and prevented from falling into more serious and extensive forms of anarchy by the Turks—an alien Government, but Islamic in structure and in traditions, with the prestige and authority of 200 years behind it in Mesopotamia, and a continuous military record in Asia of much greater antiquity.

It was a bureaucratic Government by design and necessity (there is, indeed, no other possible form of Government for a community which has any pretence to civilization), but it was an Oriental bureaucracy. It was a national Government, but the nationality was Turkish. Turkish was the official language, and the officials were nearly all Turks. It was a bad Government from many points of view, and it was on its last legs when the war broke out; but my belief is that were a plebiscite to be taken to-day in Iraq on the issue of Turkish *v.* Arab Government there would be a large majority in favour of the return of the Turk. Black as their record is, it has already been forgotten by the crowd, in whom Arab national feeling exists, but not yet as a unifying factor.

But the Turks will not come back, and we must foster the new Arab Government, however difficult the task. When we realize the difficulties before us we shall be less disappointed at our preliminary failures.

ECONOMIC ASPECTS.—I have already shown you how the total of 2½ million population for Mesopotamia is reached. To this total may

be added another quarter of a million who reside beyond our administrative boundaries, but trade with or through Iraq.

This population of 3 millions is scattered over 125,000 square miles, but resides for the most part within ten miles of the two great rivers and their major tributaries, the Diala, the Greater and Lesser Zab, and the Gharraf, a cross-channel running from Kut to near Nasiriyah.

The country has no manufactures; its exports are agricultural and pastoral produce, the figures for 1919 being—Imports, 18 million, exports, 11 million pounds sterling.

The principal exports were—Dates, 2 million pounds; grain, $\frac{1}{4}$ million pounds; wool, $\frac{1}{4}$ million pounds; gum, carpets, etc., from Persia, $\frac{1}{2}$ million pounds sterling.

Land revenue for 1919 was, at the present price of the rupee, about 10 shillings a head, a low figure considering the high current values of agricultural produce.

The value of the dates exported from Basrah is from $1\frac{1}{2}$ million to 2 million pounds sterling annually, one-half to the United Kingdom, one-quarter to India, and one-quarter to the United States. This figure could be doubled in ten years. The water and the land are there, and for this purpose, once the canals have been made with the assistance of dredgers, labour for the rest of the work can be obtained. But we must find fresh markets for dates; we must teach the Arab to grow them better, and we must ourselves learn to pack them better. This is a great chance for British enterprise, on which those firms who have specialized in the past can concentrate with the assurance that skill and energy wisely applied will in due course bear fruit.

The average quantity of cereals exported before the war in a good year was about 100,000 tons from an annually cultivated area of about half a million acres; but it was a poor class of cereal that was exported, and had a bad name on the market—the barley because it was mixed with dirt, and the wheat because it was mixed with barley. I do not doubt that the Agricultural Department, which has already done much, could double the value of the output of existing acreage if given a free hand, by selecting the best local varieties, importing and acclimatizing others.

And we must encourage other crops. Oranges, I fear, we cannot export till the railway reaches the Persian highlands, when the two countries, whose inhabitants are fond of fruit, will exchange large quantities of fruit and vegetables. Cotton has made a very good beginning; flax has been proved to do well; the silkworm formerly flourished, and sugar-beet is a possibility. The Agricultural Department deserves all support; it is to the country's produce, animal and vegetable, what the Public Health Department is to its people.

Wool to the value of 250,000 pounds sterling is exported. This,

too, can be improved, as also hides, but the better plan will be to start a local leather and woollen industry, and I hope that this may come to pass before long.

Oil I have not referred to. There is oil in Mesopotamia, at Hit, near Mosul, and near Khaniqin: the difficulty is to get it out. It is at present almost inaccessible from the coast. A 500-mile pipe-line will be needed, and that requires stable conditions and the certainty of large amounts of oil, and these are things for which we must wait, perhaps a long time. So it will be wise for all concerned not to bank too much on oil as the solution of Mesopotamia's financial difficulties.

Mesopotamia will progress in material comfort only by the hard work of its inhabitants, wisely directed by skilled advice into channels for which international commerce will have to find outlets. Unfortunately, in this world of ours people do not work as hard as they can, but as hard as they care to, and the Mesopotamian will have to be furnished with a fresh set of ideals—he will have, in fact, to be imbued with the idea of progress—before he can be induced to work much harder or more intelligently than he does.

This, again, is one of the tasks before us as mandatory Power. British commercial enterprise must create new wants, in order that the Arab, in his desire to meet them, may voluntarily work harder and better than he does now. That way lies progress, as we conceive it.

Why not immigration? you may ask. I see no solution, but only fresh problems in such a policy. The people of Central Asia and Persia, Turkey, and Syria, will not forsake their present way of life to labour in the plains of Mesopotamia, swept in alternate seasons by bitterly cold and scorching winds. They belong to other races, and the traditions of thousands of years against such a change.

As for immigration from India, I believe that India itself offers greater attractions to the stalwart Mohammedan cultivator, who alone could make a successful settler. There is a national prejudice in the minds of Arabs in Mesopotamia, as in Palestine, against any alien who seeks to settle in his ancestral acres, and it is only the best land that would attract Indians. Immigration might have been possible before the war, but not now. There are also other objections, to which I need not allude here.

Given a large, industrious, and peaceable population, Mesopotamia could become the granary of Asia; but without law and order and communications and some measure of Western civilization the population cannot increase much beyond its present limit, which is all that the country will sustain in a state of disorder, without an organized Government, without canals, railways, hospitals, etc.

To provide these is our duty under the mandate, and we have admitted as much in the Anglo-French Declaration of November,

1918. It would have been relatively easy to do so before the war, but now it is difficult.

The great length of vital lines of communication by river, rail, and road in Mesopotamia is the bane of the soldier and a source of constant anxiety to the local Government. In 1919 we had some 900 miles of railway-line, of which 525 represented the main Basrah-Baghdad-Khaniqin line. River communications fit for cargo steamers total another 800 miles, and vital trade routes fit for lorries, connecting the main towns with rail and river, come to 1,200 miles or so. All these lines have to be protected against raiders from without and robbers from within, and this obligation is, perhaps, the heaviest that the new Government must assume; it cannot contract out of its obligations by paying "blackmail" to tribes in the form of subsidies. The ridiculously lavish scale on which we bribed tribes on the other side of Arabia with hard gold during the war has spoiled the market for many years to come.

The lesson that the Arabs and some others have learnt from the war is that violence pays, if you use enough of it, and for long enough. This doctrine accords well with what some of them believe to be the teaching of the Koran and with their national characteristics for thousands of years.

The boundaries of Mesopotamia are almost as difficult to guard as its communications. The boundary-line totals almost 2,000 miles—nowhere does it follow a natural frontier. The high hills and the stony rocks of the desert are a refuge, not an obstacle, to their inhabitants. To the forces of law and order, be they Arab or British, they form an almost impassable barrier. The aeroplane alone can and does rise triumphant to the occasion, and enables us to attack the denizens of the desert and the hills in their lairs.

To the east of us lies Persia, to the north Kurdistan, to the north-west Syria, to the west and south Arabia, each of them a historic home of disorder, each tenanted by a more virile people than are the plains of Iraq, and by people whose custom it has been from time immemorial to raid their neighbours in the plains; whereas the Mesopotamian Arab has, with rare exceptions, been content to raid his fellow-countrymen; they will seldom wander far from their beloved rivers.

NATIONAL DEFENCE.—On the question of boundaries depends that of national defence. It will be readily agreed that external armed aggression is a less serious menace to the new State than internal dissension. The smaller the country, the more dangerous are intrigues. The religious racial differences already described offer unequalled facilities to foreign intrigue to get a footing within the body politic, and the natural addiction of large sections of the people to internecine feuds makes such intrigues especially dangerous. Many

are the proverbs, which are always on the Arabs' lips, as to the addiction to intrigue of Mesopotamians.

The Turks never applied compulsory service to Mesopotamia before the war, and even during the war they applied it sparingly with a view rather to obtaining cash in lieu of service from town-dwellers than recruits. Nevertheless, they raised some 20,000 men in all from Mesopotamia. They were not good material; they deserted freely and were captured willingly. "Safely captured," one of them telegraphed his friends soon after he reached the prisoners of war camp at Basrah, and that was typical of many. The Turks would not trust the Arabs, whether Sunni or Shiah, and Shiahs in particular they distrusted.

We have reversed their policy; we have trusted our Arab levies, and we have not been disappointed. Those Arab officers who were promoted from the ranks stood firm, along with their men, against every form of religious and other argument, so long as they had with them their British officers, whom they knew and trusted; with them they fought and died.

I am sorry to say that the "Effendi," the ex-Turkish officer of Arab race, of good birth, had a much less satisfactory record than his more humble-minded compatriot.

Whilst, therefore, there is no ground to be pessimistic as to the future of the Arab Army, it is necessary to sound a note of caution. A national force cannot be created at short notice. Compulsory service may be necessary in order to obtain the number of men needed, and this may not be easily applied, even by a "national Government," and such a force may, owing to racial and religious difficulties, be a broken reed in time of internal strife.

Some external force will therefore, in my judgment, be needed for years to come to keep the Arab Government in its seat and to support its authority, and that force should, in my opinion, be mainly supplied by the R.A.F., who alone can reinforce Mesopotamia rapidly, and afford adequate support to local forces at a distance from the centre in case of need.

FOREIGN RELATIONS.—From national defence we are led by a natural sequence of thought to foreign relations. If the Arab Government is to be "independent," as the Treaty declares it to be, then it must have charge of its own foreign relations; but until it can exist without the assistance of armed force supplied by the mandatory Power, it must be content to entrust foreign relations to that mandatory Power, and it can scarcely be doubted that this is the best in the interest of peace and economy.

What will be the status of a Mesopotamian abroad? The point is of great importance, for the Mesopotamian is a great traveller. Is he to have the good offices, as of right or of courtesy, of our consulates

and embassies abroad? I hope so. It is well that those who travel—and they are an influential section of the community—should realize that the mandate has other advantages than those that appear to the eye in the country itself, but the matter will need delicate handling, particularly in Mohammedan countries.

I have, I think, said enough to show you the difficulty of the task before us—that there is a solution I do not doubt, but I fear that many blind alleys must be explored before we find a way out of the maze.

I have purposely said nothing as to the choice of a ruler for Mesopotamia, but I feel bound to record my belief that both in Syria and in Mesopotamia, and to some extent even amongst the different divisions of the people in Mesopotamia, the desire is rather for a local and indigenous Government and ruler than for a ruler, however well qualified, who is not one of themselves. If a ruler is set up, he must have force behind him, and that force for some time to come must be supplied by us.

What alternative is there to such a policy? There is now but one—namely, to abandon the mandate, and this is virtually the policy which by inference is favoured by the greater part of the English Press to-day.

What would the result be? Admittedly, I think, both in Palestine and Mesopotamia, and therefore in Syria, anarchy in the Arab-speaking countries on a scale which has not been witnessed for some centuries; and this anarchy, which would spread rapidly, would before long need greater forces to prevent its spread to India and Egypt than are now required in Mesopotamia and Palestine.

Never was there a time when the maintenance of adequate force at the disposal of the civil power was more necessary in the interest of internal and international peace than now; no easy gift of independence or autonomy or the rights of self-determination will absolve us from the necessity of maintaining force to secure peace.

No Government can be formed in the Middle East in these days without our support and assistance. Were we to abandon the mandate, the Arabic-speaking world, already suspicious, would finally, perhaps for a century, turn definitely against us, and we should deserve it. With anarchy would come loss of trade; and in a short time civilization in these regions would be submerged, as it was in the Sudan when the British Government abandoned that country in deference to much the same complaints as we hear now. We went back to the Sudan ten years or so later to find the population reduced by two-thirds by famine and the sword.

However much we may be tempted to do so, we cannot ignore the obligation that lies on us to promote civilization and progress in these lands; we cannot neglect the needs and interests of the inhabitants, who still trust us, and abandon our liabilities, holding on only to those

portions, such as Basrah, which we vainly imagine we can hold without much expense, though without honour or justification. Such a policy would sap the very foundation on which we base our claim to exercise power, and on which actually depends our ability to do so.

I assume, therefore, that Parliament will ratify the acceptance of the mandate for Mesopotamia by Great Britain; it remains for me to suggest ways in which those outside Government can help in making the mandate a success.

First and foremost I put commercial enterprise. The duty which we, above all other people, owe to Mesopotamia, as we have accepted the mandate, is to promote trade—not merely the exchange of goods, though that is in itself good, but to raise the standard of living and material comfort, to encourage the spread of education, which is possible only if the standard of living is raised, and to foster the growth of individual freedom and of aspiration to “succeed” in life which is a product of the first two. This is what we understand as civilization, and progress lies in the changes of structure in the social organism which entail such consequences; a belief in the existence of such a thing is our secular creed, and to promote it all over the world is our secular mission.*

The Oriental doubts the existence of possibility of progress, but we have, I believe, gone far towards concerting him. We must persevere. The Arab State will not for long wish to be burdened with State-managed railways and State electrical supply, which Mesopotamia now has; nor will it wish to start State woollen mills, State tanneries, and State factories. Yet all these things are essential to progress; statesmen, thinkers, and officials will labour in vain unless commerce assists in this way. We must provide public needs by commercial enterprise on a fair basis. Money thus spent will never yield a large profit, but it should be possible to secure that there will be no loss. The “profit” will simply be dividends to persons, many of them, I hope, Mesopotamians, who lend their accumulated savings to build railways and factories, and expect a return. The rate will vary as the risk, and there is some risk.

Next I would place restraint on public utterance, written or spoken—in the Lords and the Commons, in the Press and in periodicals. Our task was made far more difficult than it need have been in Mesopotamia last year by the orgy of ill-informed criticism that poured on us from the United Kingdom, much of which was duly reproduced in the Arabic papers.

At this point, ladies and gentlemen, what I have to say diverges from my manuscript notes. When preparing this lecture I had amused myself by making some comments on this subject, which you also might have been amused to hear, but on further reflection I came

* See “The Idea of Progress.” J. B. Bury.

to the conclusion that it was incumbent upon me to practise what I preach, and that I could not suitably urge restraint in public utterances on others, and myself indulge in recrimination or repartee at the expense of those whose activities I have just deprecated, so I will pass over this subject in silence, and trust that you will realize that it is not because there is nothing to be said on the other side.

Before I leave this topic I should like to mention, in case you are not aware of it, that since the Armistice until a few weeks ago not a single newspaper has thought it worth while to depute a special correspondent to study conditions in Mesopotamia. *The Times* correspondent in the Middle East once spared us a week from the more congenial climate of Persia, but that was on his way to Teheran. If public opinion is to be guided by the Press rather than by Government, and Government has done but little to guide it, the Press have on them, it seems to me, an added obligation to explore a subject thoroughly before committing itself to an extreme view or to extreme criticism.

Ladies and gentlemen, before the discussion, which I hope will be more interesting than this lecture has been, begins, I would ask your permission to make a personal explanation regarding the motives which have induced me to apply for permission to retire, with a view to taking up employment of another, but I hope not less useful, sort in Persia, the Persian Gulf, and Mesopotamia. I should not trouble you with this statement were it not for the fact that the question of the propriety of the action I have taken has been raised in Parliament. A point of public policy is involved, and the matter is of perhaps more than personal interest.

I should like to explain that it is not the prospect of earning higher pay, but the prospect of responsible constructive work in a region to which I have devoted the best years of my life, that attracts me.

I hold that it is the duty of us all to serve civilization in general and our country in particular as best we can, and if a man believes he can do more useful work for the community in some other sphere than Government service he should be free to do so, unless for grave reasons of public policy or in a national emergency.

I believe that, owing to circumstances beyond my control, Government cannot offer me continued responsible employment of the kind for which my previous training and experience fits me, and for this reason, and for this reason only, I look elsewhere for employment. I go where I can be of most use. I hope to play a humble part in assisting in the development of these countries, by the creation of wealth, either from fresh or existing sources, which can, I believe, best be done on commercial lines by commercial firms. Governments have tried to undertake this, and have failed, because the machinery of Government has been designed for an entirely different purpose.

I go to join an all-British Company with a record of enterprise, of industry, and tenacity, of which Great Britain and Persia may well be proud. I believe that I am serving my country and the countries in which I shall be working better thus than as a Government official.

I am not ashamed of my motives, and I do not think that they will be misunderstood in the countries in which I have served.

The CHAIRMAN said the meeting would be happy to have any observations from gentlemen in the room, some of whom had considerable experience of the regions of which Sir Arnold had treated.

General Sir EDMUND BARROW, G.C.B., etc. : As the Chairman has called upon me to address a few remarks, I suppose I must comply; not that I am at all attracted by that blessed word "Mesopotamia," as it is one which has some unpleasant recollections for me, for both I and the lecturer have suffered in connection with Mesopotamia at the hands of the Press. I am sure that all here fully sympathize with him regarding the attacks that have recently been made upon him in the chief organs of this country. (Hear, hear.) I really cannot venture to address you at all on the subject of Mesopotamia, because I am perfectly certain there are other people here—I can see one or two—who have been intimately connected with the history of our operations in Mesopotamia in recent years, and they will no doubt be able to give you more interesting matter than I could possibly do, but there is one remark I would like to make. It is that the lecturer is, if he will permit me to say so, a really notable example of a great characteristic of our race. He has shown by his own actions, and by the history of the last few years, that the habit of leading and ruling—I will not say inferior races, because somebody here might be hurt by that description—but of leading and ruling people not on the same plane of civilization as ourselves with the greatest success. (Applause.) I only regret that that attribute which he possesses to such a marked degree can no longer be utilized in Government service, although he has given us in his final remarks some sound reasons for transferring his energies elsewhere. It is also a great satisfaction, it must be to all of us, to think that the present generation of young men—young administrators and soldiers—are so capable and energetic, and show by the feats they have performed that the British race has not lost the power of governing and ruling. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN said that Sir Edmund Barrow had alluded to two or three gentlemen present as being intimately acquainted with Mesopotamia. The meeting would be very happy if those gentlemen would say a few words.

Sir FREDERIC G. KENYON, K.C.B., etc. : I do not think I ought to say anything after so many eminent people have practically refused your mandate. I am the least appropriate person in the room to

speak in general with reference to this paper. The Mesopotamia we have been hearing about this evening is the Mesopotamia of the last few years and the coming years; the Mesopotamia in which I am particularly interested is, say, two thousand to six thousand years older. (Laughter.) At the same time, it is not wholly out of place, because I should like to add to Sir Arnold Wilson's paper this, that during his service in Mesopotamia he rendered very considerable help to the service of antiquities. He realized, as some others in Mesopotamia have, and some have not, the responsibilities of, first, our army, and then our civil administration, for the care of antiquities in that province. That is the one point to which I should like to allude. There is a great deal that might be said if this were the time to say it. I should like to say that if we take up the responsibility for a country like Mesopotamia or Palestine, we assume a responsibility for its past history as well as its present and future. We have heard sometimes in the past of the difficulties of pursuing the study of history, archæology, and antiquities in those countries under Turkish dominion. Well, it is our business now to see that conditions are made better, and that we do introduce a civilized administration of antiquities in those countries. We are responsible, as I have said, for their history, for their past as well as the present, and that is what we hope to do. When the British Army advanced up the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, we at the British Museum got permission to send out an archæologist to be attached to the military forces, to give any advice that might be wanted with regard to the care of antiquities and the avoidance of damage to them, and, incidentally, see what possibilities there were of pursuing inquiries there. I should like to say we always had the fullest possible assistance from the army, and also from Sir Arnold Wilson when he was responsible for the civil administration; and I may say that, so far as our work was concerned, in actual investigation and excavation we achieved some very interesting results, dealing with this period of about six thousand years ago which lies at the back of the history of Mesopotamia. During the last year or two, naturally, conditions in the country have not made it possible to pursue that work; but I hope the arrangements that may now be come to for the government of Mesopotamia will allow of resumed work this next autumn, or as soon as possible after that. I want to say this: We museums are sometimes considered by individuals, even by Government departments, to be purely predatory organizations; it is supposed that our sole motive in going to a country like Mesopotamia is to take away any antiquities and treasures which belong to the natives of the country. As far as the natives are concerned—and I believe Sir Arnold Wilson will bear me out—their main wish is to be allowed to exploit and sell the antiquities. But if you are looking at the higher interest of the natives, and

the desirability of making them understand their own history and antiquities, I am quite sure there are enough antiquities in Mesopotamia to furnish every museum that may be established out there; to educate every Arab or person of other nationality in the antiquities of the country to the fullest extent to which he is capable; and, at the same time, to allow the export of antiquities to Europe and America, to allow the progress of science, the study of past history, and the advance of scholarship—and that is the enlightened way of dealing with the matter. Have a Department of Antiquities which will consider the interest of the country up to the fullest extent; keep there all that can profitably be kept there; but don't go beyond that and say nothing is to be taken away from the country. If you do you encourage smuggling, lead to the destruction of great quantities of antiquities, and obstruct the progress of science and knowledge. (Applause.) I must apologize for having taken up so much time on a subject rather alien to the main purpose of the paper. As an ordinary member of the public I thank Sir Arnold most heartily for his paper, and express the appreciation which, at any rate, some members of the British public have for the work he has done. (Applause.)

Major EDWARD WARREN, F.S.A., F.R.I.B.A.: I should like to say a word or two. When I was in Baghdad in the early days of last year, I constantly owed to Sir Arnold Wilson a debt of gratitude for his assistance, his direction as to things I wanted to see—books and information about the country. I strongly endorse what Sir Frederic Kenyon said as to the extreme desirability of local museums in Mesopotamia; but, further, as to the legalized exportation to centres of civilization like London, Paris, and New York, I thoroughly endorse what Sir Arnold said that only one-tenth or so of the valuable, fruitful exploration and excavation possible has been undertaken in Mesopotamia. The surface has been merely scratched. Layard, Rawlinson and the Germans have left an enormous lot untouched. My avocations in Mesopotamia did not allow me very much time for research, but a good deal for observation; and I was astonished at the amount of what I seriously consider fine architecture still existing in Mesopotamia—a great deal in a ruinous condition. I trust one of the cares of the British-Arab administration of the future will be to guard the monuments of Mesopotamia from the ruin and demolition which is rapidly overtaking one after the other, sweeping away remains of such enormous interest. I take this opportunity publicly to express my gratitude to Sir Arnold Wilson for what he did at Baghdad, and for his charming lecture this afternoon.

Sir MICHAEL O'DWYER, G.C.I.E., etc.: I know little of Mesopotamia, and I would like to add my tribute of praise to the lecturer for what he has done to enlighten us on this thorny subject. A lec-

ture has been defined as excellent if it complies with the following definition: Somebody said it should be like a lady's dress, long enough to cover the subject and short enough to interest and attract. (Laughter.) I am sure everyone here will agree with me that the lecture we have just listened to has admirably fulfilled those conditions. Most of us have hitherto gathered such information as we have about Mesopotamia from the vague and conflicting accounts of certain sections of the Press; we have had very little first-hand enlightenment on the subject. At one time we were told Mesopotamia was an El Dorado, which would revive the ancient glories of Babylon and Baghdad; a few years more and the cold fit comes on, and we are told that Mesopotamia is a millstone round our necks, and that we must clear out at the first moment. Sir Arnold has indicated the *via media* which the Government should pursue; that is to say, we have taken up obligations, and it would be cowardly and mean to renounce those obligations. We have, as a mandatory Power, taken certain races under our protection; we have assumed certain obligations to civilization; and it would be unworthy of our traditions as an imperial race—particularly unworthy of our traditions in the East—now to repudiate those obligations. Speaking as one who has some knowledge of India, I know that our policy in Mesopotamia has been followed very closely by the people of India. If they see we are false to our trust there, and try to shake off the burden which we have solemnly undertaken, their opinion of us will be very considerably lowered. We cannot afford at the present day to have our prestige in the East lowered. I was therefore particularly glad to hear from Sir Arnold that he at least had not thrown off the white man's burden; that though he has renounced the service of Government he has assumed responsibilities in Mesopotamia and the East, the discharge of which we know from his past record will confer further benefits, both on Mesopotamia, for which he has already done so much, and on the Empire of which he is so distinguished a servant. (Applause.)

The LECTURER: I have to thank Sir Michael O'Dwyer for what he said, and to say that the best proof of my confidence in Mesopotamia and the Middle East is the fact that I am prepared to assume fresh responsibilities and liabilities in the same sphere, though in a new capacity. Nowhere else would I have done so. Otherwise it might be said that I was leaving a sinking ship. Far from that, I am going back to the ship as a passenger; that is the best possible proof I can give of my confidence. As regards the remarks of Sir Edmund Barrow with regard to the quality of junior administrative officers abroad, I can say of my own officers, as was said of the Golden Bough: *Uno aulso non deficit alter aureus*.* Out of an average strength of from 100 to 200 executive officers, between thirty and forty have been

* When one was torn away, there was not lacking yet another, also gold.

killed during the last six years, or died by disease, and fifteen or sixteen were killed during the twelve months ending in September, 1920; never once did I find anything but eagerness on the part of others to take the place of those killed. No man ever left his post until he was summarily ordered to do so, or forced back by actual hostilities. On one occasion, when an aeroplane was sent to take away two officers whose lives were undoubtedly in jeopardy, I learned from the pilot, who carried a peremptory order from me to them to leave, that they spent some time discussing whether they should obey it before finally complying. That indicates their spirit.

I thank the speakers for their kind reference to myself, and you, ladies and gentlemen, for the patience with which you have listened to me.

The CHAIRMAN: Before we separate I should like your permission to pass a very hearty motion of thanks to Sir Arnold Wilson for the most interesting lecture which he has given us; also to thank him for the very beautiful photographs with which his paper was illustrated. I think we should all be grateful to those gentlemen who have kindly taken part in the all too short discussion. I had hoped we should have had one or two others here, but I suppose the Parliamentary duties of Major Ormsby Gore and others have prevented them. I hope you will allow me to convey to Sir Arnold Wilson our most sincere thanks. (Applause.)

This ended the meeting.

CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY ACCOUNTS, 1920

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REGINALD WINGATE.
G. C. STEPHENSON.

APPENDIX

SLAVE TRADE BETWEEN THE SUDAN AND ARABIA

THE Governor of the Sudan, Colonel Sir Lee Stack, in a letter dated "The Palace, Khartoum, April 9, 1921," has drawn attention to a passage (p. 119) in Mr. Philby's article in Vol. VII., Part IV., of the Central Asian Society's *Journal* for 1920, which touches upon the question of slave-kidnapping in the Sudan. Under cover of that letter Sir Lee Stack forwards a "Note" which states very clearly the careful measures adopted to check the slave traffic. The Chairman of the Council has directed that Sir Lee Stack's "Note" should be inserted in the next number of the *Journal*. It is accordingly here published.

NOTE.

1. All pilgrims from the Sudan embark for Arabia at Suakin by steamer or dhow. Each pilgrim has to have a passport made out giving thereon his description, etc., and in the case of a family a description of each member of the family, wives, children, servants, etc., is entered on the passport.

No one is allowed to embark without such a passport, and the procedure is checked by the British Inspector at Suakin, assisted by his officials and the Province and the Customs Police.

On the return of a pilgrim he is checked with the passport record, and in the case of his having left with a family and returned with less than the number he embarked with, he is subjected to a close cross-examination as to the reason of the deficiency. The invariable reason is given as death, and other pilgrims are examined as to whether they can corroborate the statement of the pilgrim concerned. Suspicious cases are retained for further investigation.

At Port Sudan, Suakin, and Tokar, there are trustworthy and responsible Fellata Sheikhs who are paid Government servants, and who quickly report any suspicious case.

The Suakin Sheikh is present when the passports are issued, and he is constantly moving among the West African pilgrims waiting to embark. These Fellata form the great majority of pilgrims from the Sudan.

In cases where an Arab pilgrim has any black servants or small children with him, careful inquiries are made from all the latter before a passport is issued.

It is extraordinarily difficult for an Arab to take a native man or child away against his will. Each person embarking is seen by competent officials. It would be exceedingly difficult for a slave to be hidden in Suakin and smuggled on board a dhow or steamer; also the unwilling slave would, even if only a small child, inform the official who examines him if anything was wrong.

2. As regards Arabs smuggling natives across to Arabia for sale as slaves.

The check against this is a system of Mounted Camel Police patrols along the coast, which is patrolled from the Egyptian to the Eritrean frontier; in addition there are permanent Mounted Police posts on the main wells.

It is not possible to state that these patrols absolutely prevent anyone being smuggled on board a dhow lying off the coast, but they make it very difficult; the places on the coast where dhows can come close in are known and watched. A dhow, owing to the flat nature of the coast, can be seen from a long distance by the Police patrols, and any anchored dhow is carefully watched. There are also secret agents who work in connection with the police.

In the opinion of the Governor of the Red Sea Province, there is, as a result of these measures, very little slave-trading indeed, either by pilgrims or otherwise.

N.B.—This "Note" was received so late that it could only be inserted as an Appendix.—A. C. Y.

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NOTICES.

THE Assistant Secretary will be at 74, Grosvenor Street, W. 1, on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday mornings, and on Monday, Wednesday, and Thursday afternoons. The office will be shut for August and September.

Members of the Central Asian Society are recommended to correspond, except under special circumstances, about Lecture tickets, this Journal, and the election of new Members, direct with the Assistant Secretary at 74, Grosvenor Street, and not with Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Yate, who is mostly away in Shropshire. By doing this, both time and postage will be saved.

All Members home from abroad are asked to notify the Assistant Secretary of their change of address.

The telephone number of the Society is *Mayfair*, 4025.

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CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held in the rooms of the Royal Society at Burlington House, Piccadilly, London, W., on Wednesday, May 18, 1921, the Rt. Hon. Lord Carnock, P.C., etc., presiding. A paper was read by Mrs. Rosita Forbes on "The Senussi as a Factor in North African Development."

The CHAIRMAN: Before we begin I should like to remind the members of the Central Asian Society that the general meeting will be held at the Royal Astronomical Society's rooms, just across the courtyard, at three o'clock on June 15; that a lecture by Sir Michael O'Dwyer will take place at 4.15, and that the annual dinner will take place in the evening at a quarter to eight. Those Members of the Society who wish to attend the dinner are earnestly requested to send in an application for tickets to the Secretary at 74, Grosvenor Street. I will now ask Colonel Yate to read the list of members who have been elected since our last meeting.

The HON. SECRETARY (Colonel Yate): Twenty members have been elected since our last meeting: The Right Honourable Winston Spencer Churchill, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies; as you know he is the head of the new Middle East Department of the Colonial Office. I may mention that on his return from Cairo he was invited to join the Society and accepted. Field-Marshal Sir A. A. Barrett, G.C.B., Major A. B. W. Bentinck, Coldstream Guards, Captain F. W. Chardin, Mrs. Carver, Captain Leslie L. Bright, Mr. Allan Cheeseman, Mr. M. Courtier Forster, Mr. Rea Davies, Mr. K. H. C. Badger, Captain H. M. J. MacIntyre, R.A., Captain J. H. Moore, Major H. C. Pulley, Captain H. G. Rivett-Carnac, Mr. P. H. J. Tozer, Captain H. I. Todd, Mr. A. J. Tomlinson, Mr. Douglas W. Gumbly, Mr. J. Horridge, and Captain D'Arcy Bingham.

The CHAIRMAN: I omitted to say that the principal guest at the dinner on June 15 will be Lord Chelmsford, late Viceroy of India. Now, ladies and gentlemen, I am sure I am expressing the wishes of all those present in offering a very warm welcome to that intrepid traveller Mrs. Rosita Forbes (applause) on her safe return to this country. I think we should all have been glad to have heard from her own lips the narrative of that adventurous journey which she undertook to Kufra, in which, if I may be permitted to say so, she displayed

most magnificent fortitude and endurance. But, unfortunately, another Society had already obtained her consent to give the history of her journey; and so, naturally, we were precluded from having that great advantage. At the same time, I think that the subject on which she has been kind enough to say she will address us this afternoon is one of great importance to our interests, not only in North Africa and Egypt, but I daresay still farther afield, as I do not think it possible to predict with any precision the limits to which the influence of this Moslem Confraternity may subtly and gradually extend. I have no doubt that from the knowledge which she has derived from her recent experiences, Mrs. Rosita Forbes will be able to give us this afternoon some very valuable views, and also much useful information in regard to the subject which she has kindly undertaken to deal with. I will now ask Mrs. Rosita Forbes if she will kindly read her lecture. (Applause.)

THE SENUSSI AS A FACTOR IN NORTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

BY MRS. ROSITA FORBES.

THE present political position in Tripoli and Cyrenaica appears to mark a definite stage in the history of the Senussi confraternity and to offer a point from which may be examined the past history of that curious brotherhood, its present situation, and future prospects with which, more especially in Cyrenaica, are bound up the fortunes of Italian colonization.

The order is of comparatively recent inauguration. Sidi Mohammed ben Ali es Senussi was born in Algeria in 1787, of a Berber tribe, yet a descendant of the Prophet through Idris, founder of the Moroccan dynasty.

He studied at Fez at the Karuim university at a time when Morocco was the nursery of many religious confraternities. During the seven or eight years he spent in that most beautiful city of the world, he won some renown as an ascetic who wished to amalgamate every Moslem sect on a basis of pure and simple Islam, in strict conformance with the teaching of the Koran, but shorn of every modern digression and addition.

It appears to have been during his course of study at this university that his doctrine, based on the strictest interpretation of the letter of the Koran, took the definite form of opposition to all innovation, whether by Mohammedans or Christians.

Except in his teaching against Turk and Christian alike, there was no striking novelty in his ideas, which appear to have gained their

force rather from the earnestness of his preaching than from any generally felt desire for improvement, or any public expression of dissatisfaction with the current affairs in Islam.

They consequently found a readier audience amongst the uncontrolled Beduins, to whom Turk and Christians were equally hateful, than among the town dwellers of settled occupation.

To clear the religion of all scholastic accretions, to rid it of all sophistical interpretations, and to secure a return to the pure theocracy of Mohammed's days was his fundamental teaching, to which he added a mysticism in his personal conduct and a resolute detachment from the daily routine of life.

No exalted or historical ritual was then, or later, imposed on his disciples, nor was any outward or visible sign denoting membership of the order insisted on, either by him or by his successors.

Sidi ben Ali returned to Algeria in 1829, and taught grammar and jurisprudence at Laquat. He left the country on the eve of the French occupation and, undoubtedly, his fanaticism was strengthened by the sight of his native land in the hands of unbelievers.

Having wandered along North Africa preaching his mystic doctrine of a purer Islam till he reached Cairo, he proposed to continue his studies at the El Azhar university. Here, however, his asceticism, intolerance and hatred of innovation made him many enemies among the Ulema and his teachings were condemned by one of the most famous Sheikhs. He therefore went on to Mecca, where he became the pupil of a famous theologian, Sidi Ahmed ibn Idris el Fasi, head of the confraternity of El Khadria, of much influence in Morocco. Here at last he found a mind akin to his own.

Master and pupil travelled together to the Yemen, during which missionary journey the former died, having left instructions to his followers to transfer their allegiance to his favourite pupil, who thus found himself the head of a definite group of fervent ascetics.

Therefore, when the opposition of the older Sheikhs, who expressed a doubt as to his orthodoxy, forced him to leave Mecca in 1838, he definitely formulated the Senussi policy of keeping away from all centres of civilization and, thus, avoiding contact with those countries which were under European rule or protection, while uniting the various Beduin tribes in an immense religious organization, which should eventually include the Negroid races of the South and stretch in an unbroken line from the Hejaz to the Tuat Oases.

The Senussi are sometimes wrongly spoken of as a sect, but at no time have they been other than an ascetic confraternity, opposed to all form of luxury or of ceremonial, intolerant of any intercourse with Jew, Christian, or infidel.

Since spiritual and temporal power in Islam are inevitably synonymous, Sidi ben Ali towards the end of his life was looked upon

as the actual ruler of the Cyrenaican hinterland, but his aim probably did not go further than a Moslem freemasonry, primarily religious, but depending for its wealth and political power on the mercantile organization of the ancient Saharan trade routes by which the commerce of the Sudan came north to the Mediterranean Ports.

Thus his Zawias were always built at strategic points where passing caravans must stop at the wells. While camels were watered, the merchants were entertained by the Senussi Sheikh, who was thus afforded the best possible opportunity for propaganda. The Zawias, which were colleges and marts at the same time, gave three days' hospitality free to any traveller and, gradually, as the fame of the Senussi spread among the tribes, Ekhwan were appointed to accompany the more important caravans to prevent attacks from Beduins.

Thus the doctrine of Sidi ben Ali was eventually carried to Kanem and Borku, to the Comalis and Senegambia without the existence of any written dogma. There is, in fact, no special Senussi ritual, nor have I heard any unusual prayer or rite used in their mosques. The use of gold or jewels or any form of luxury was forbidden, as was tobacco and any alcoholic stimulant.

Women were allowed to adorn themselves in order to retain the affection of their lords, thus ensuring a large progeny to Islam, but the only other exception was made in favour of the sword hilt, which could be studded with gems, as it might serve in a holy war against the infidel. Coffee was forbidden and also sugar, because the latter might have been refined with substances containing the bones of animals killed by non-Moslems.

In 1856, Sidi ben Ali retired to Jaghabub. Doubtless this was a precautionary measure, in accordance with his habitual policy of avoiding any open conflict with existing governments, for Turkey was growing nervous with regard to the Senussi power in Africa. At first she had supported the order, according it important privileges, such as grants of land and exemption of the Zawias from taxation.

Sidi ben Ali, however, was not to be won over from his condemnation of Turkish unorthodoxy and, in 1852, he had excommunicated the Sultan. It was, therefore, obviously necessary for him to remove his headquarters from the territory nominally under Ottoman jurisdiction.

Undoubtedly while Sidi ben Ali was in residence at Jaghabub, he made the little oasis on the edge of the Libyan Desert into a centre of political propaganda and mercantile activity, but it is hard to believe that it ever had the importance ascribed to it by Henri Duveyrier, who, in 1880, described it as arsenal, factory and barracks, as well as college and court.

About 1857, a deputation of Zouias visited the Senussi Sheikh at Jaghabub, and offered him the allegiance of their tribe, which had recently conquered the Tebu in the desert oases of Kufara, then

known as Tazerr. Sidi ben Ali must have realized the strategic importance of Kufara as a basis of propaganda from the Sudan to Lake Chad, for he instantly despatched Ekhwan to disseminate his doctrine through the four oases.

It is probable that he contemplated a further withdrawal from the zone of Turkish activity, but his death occurred suddenly in 1859, before he had been able to realize his project.

He was succeeded by his son, Mohammed el Mahdi, then a boy of fourteen. At this time there were thirty-eight Zawias in Cyrenaica and Sirte and eighteen in Tripolitania. Others were sown broadcast through Algeria, Tunis and the Fezzan, but in Morocco there were only five, probably due to the opposition of other great religious orders.

By way of the Western Sahara and Timbuctoo, the Senussi Ekhwan had penetrated Senegal, where they must have found fertile soil for their doctrine, as in 1879 Senegalese pilgrims travelled 4,500 kilometres across Africa to visit the Mahdi at Jaghabub and returned to their own country without troubling to continue the pilgrimage to Mecca.

From Air to Gonda, from Lake Chad to Wajanga, as well as among the three millions in Wadai, it may be supposed that the Senussi influence was preponderant.

The Sultan of Wadai had been wont to entrust his north-bound caravans to the care of his brother and "fellow-ruler," Sidi ben Ali, and immense gifts of slaves and ivory cemented the friendship between the two potentates.

In Egypt the influence of the confraternity was never very strong, though in 1882 there were fifteen Zawias within its borders exclusive of the mother house of Jaghabub. At the same date there were Zawias at Jedda, Mecca and Taif and, at least, nine others in the Hejaz and Yemen. Duveyrier estimates the number of brothers of the order as anything between one and a half and three millions at the time when the Mahdi's minority was ended.

Each of these Ekhwan was a more or less active missionary agent, and each was ready at the bidding of his superiors to turn himself into a soldier to fight the hated infidel. Thus the power given into the hands of the young Mohammed el Mahdi was great.

An ancient prophecy foretold that the Mahdi, who would reconquer the world for Islam, would attain his majority on the first day of Moharram in 1300 Hegire, November 12, 1882. The son of Sidi ben Ali, having fulfilled this condition, might have declared a holy war and had as amazing and meteoric a career as the humble carpenter of Abba Island in the Nile, but he preferred to strengthen his position at Jaghabub, and to carry on his father's policy of holding aloof from centres of civilization and avoiding open rupture with European Powers.

Two opposing and mutually destructive forces faced Mohammed el

Mahdi throughout his life—the one the pull away from civilization, the Khalifat and its traditions; the other the push towards civilization, to which, by the extension of his domain, he was slowly but inevitably forced.

As his career proceeded, it will be seen how, on more than one occasion, the guiding rules of his father influenced his actions, but, consciously or not, from the day of his accession, he began to destroy the basic elements of the foundation of the order. The selection of Jaghabub as the mother Zawia was emblematical of the founder's desire for detachment from the affairs of the world, and even if it be true that he so far abandoned his standpoint of opposition to the Ottoman Sultan and all that he stood for as to secure the grant of this territory by political intrigue at the "Sublime Porte," the intrigue was only employed to secure a refuge far removed from all contact with civilization, whether Islam or Christian, and the excommunication of the Sultan in 1852 may have well rehabilitated the founder in his own eyes and those of his followers.

The Senussi organization was obviously capable of indefinite expansion and, for the peculiar circumstances in which this order was working, admirably designed to give the best and quickest results. The missionaries who were despatched amongst the Beduin tribes first made good their ground on a purely religious footing, and then swiftly acquired the temporal power, which, in a Mohammedan community, must accrue to the dispenser of the law.

Doubtless Sidi ben Ali had been responsible for the stubborn resistance of Laghuat in Algeria in 1852, when the French were obliged to fight their way, literally from tree to tree, among the palm gardens of the oases, as well as for much of the opposition to the French occupation of Nigeria and Senegambia, but it is doubtful whether he would ever have cared to come into open conflict with European Powers.

In this his son followed his example.

It is possible that the Mahdi had in view, if not an empire, at least a sphere of influence among the Negroid races between Wadai and Lake Chad, for which reason he was prepared secretly to oppose the French advance into Borku, but in his withdrawal to Kufara in 1894 is seen his determination to avoid any declared hostility.

Mohammed el Mahdi was the great figure of the confraternity, and under his rule the Senussi attained the zenith of their power. Since the acceptance of his tenets meant the payment of tithes, the leader of the confraternity had by this time considerable wealth at his disposal.

Having established a profitable trade in slaves and arms between South and North Africa, he also possessed the nucleus of a Negroid army, yet the Mahdi aimed at peaceful penetration rather than

military occupation. His Zawias were neutral meeting-places, where difficulties—tribal, commercial, legal, or religious—could be settled by unbiassed authority. His Ekhwan were judges as well as missionaries. They defined tribal areas, settled water and grazing rights, as well as meting out the justice of the Koran to those who infringed the stern code of Islam.

In view of the undoubted influence and prestige of such a confraternity, it is not to be wondered at that wholly exaggerated ideas of its importance were brought to Europe by rare travellers, who, impressed by the dangers they had escaped from, overlooked the fact that the order must necessarily lack cohesion, disseminated as it was through countries differing in race, tongue, custom, and form of government, and hemmed in on every side by gradually encroaching European Powers.

This gospel of fear is the prevailing note of all travellers' reports between the years 1850-1890 and colour was lent to these by the successful revolt of the Sudan Mahdi, with which the son of Sidi ben Ali refused to have anything to do, though approached on more than one occasion by envoys from the Sudan. It is to be remarked, however, that the writers of this period can seldom have been in a position to inform themselves exactly on the situation, being dependent for their facts either upon the ignorant intolerance of the Turks or the fanatical arrogance of those in whose domain they were such unwelcome and suspected wayfarers.

It is only of recent years that opportunities of studying undisturbed the problem at first hand, and in the light of recent developments of modern warfare, have enabled a more exact and proportionate estimate to be made of this supposed threat to the world's peace, and of the future prospects in the general scheme of things of a most extraordinary confraternity.

The second period of Senussi history is initiated by the move of the Mahdi to Kufara, which isolated him in an almost impregnable position, where he could command the trade routes of half a continent. From this date the growth of the mercantile power of the order was assured. Kufara, under the rule of the Zouias, a noted warrior tribe coming originally from the Fezzan, had been the most formidable centre of brigandage in the Sahara. Mohammed el Mahdi substituted a regular system of customs duty on all merchandise passing through. He built the towns of Jof and Taj, each with a large Zawia and, in the course of a few years, developed the oasis into an entirely self-supporting centre of civilization and the headquarters of the confraternity, visited by large numbers of "brethren" from all parts of Africa. Nevertheless, he had to acknowledge that temporarily the North offered no further field of expansion for his teachings. Any open trial of strength with France, Turkey, or Egypt could have but one issue. Therefore,

he concentrated his energies on Borku, Wadai, Kanem, and the Western Sudan. He sent his Ekhwan throughout these districts with instructions to settle disputes between the tribes, thus inducing them to acknowledge Senussi authority, and to build Zawias in such places as would control the wells and markets.

In 1899 he himself went south to Ghiru, from where he directed the opposition to the French advance from Lake Chad. This step was notable, because it was in direct contravention of the policy initiated by Sidi ben Ali and previously adhered to by the Mahdi.

At no time a military power, the Senussi depended for their wealth and influence upon the stability of their mercantile organization. The French were the first Europeans who seriously imperilled their profitable trade in slaves and arms. The latter merchandise came from Constantinople and was disembarked at Tobruk or Benghazi. Since its principal markets were between Darfur and Kanem it was essential that France should not advance further towards Wadai. Tuareg rebels, flying North from Nigeria, came in touch with the Senussi at Kanem, were converted to their tenets, and joined with Arabs from Kufara in opposing French penetration, while the Zawia at Bir Allahi became a definite centre of opposition until it was taken in January, 1902.

By this open aggression, Mohammed el Mahdi apparently pledged himself to a definite campaign against the French, yet he had no regular army. His policy was to unite the tribes against the Christian, himself supplying arms, money, and ammunition. Borku was virtually under his rule. He had a Wazir in Wadai and Zawias in Nigeria and the Cameroons.

Mohammed es Sunni, one of the most famous Senussi Ekhwan, was adviser to the Sultan of Wadai, for whom he had obtained the financial support of the Tripolitanian merchants. The extent, therefore, of the confraternity's influence in the South can hardly be over-estimated.

The sudden death of the Mahdi, in 1902, removed the motive force of the order.

From all that can be learned, this great leader of the Senussi was a man of considerable ability, who is entitled to full credit of the progress made by the confraternity under his guidance. He used to the full the fanatical devotion of his followers, while at the same time he guided them wisely according to his policy. He wrapped his personality in a cloak of mystery, which appealed to the ignorant, but he was none the less accessible to those who required his direction. It must be counted to his judgment and restraint that he trusted so largely to the religious hold he had over his people, and until the last year of his life did not force the issue by seeking a verdict through the trial of arms.

— He is reported by Sidi Ahmed Tahiat, whom we met at Taj, to have warned his successor never to enter a contest against the English, who would beat him with their machines.

— As his sons were minors at school at the time of his death, he was succeeded by his nephew, the famous Sayed Ahmed es Sherif. The new Sheikh of the Senussi remained at Ghiru, from where he continued to oppose the French advance, until a bad defeat, in December, 1902, decided him to retire.

For some years he moved his headquarters between Jaghabub and Kufara, so that he was able to keep in touch with his northern Zawias without relinquishing the hold gained by the Mahdi on the Negroid races in the South.

Since the Anglo-French Treaty of 1904 ceded the Zinder-Chad route to France, the advance of the latter Power has inevitably involved the ebb of Senussi influence throughout the occupied districts.

The years preceding the winter of 1913-1914 were notable for a series of defeats, eventually culminating in the occupation of Abeshe, while Senussi propaganda was finally put an end to by the French advance into Tibesti and Borku in the spring of 1914.

Meanwhile, Cyrenaica and Tripoli having been acknowledged an Italian sphere of influence, Sayed Ahmed was fully occupied in the North. When the Italians landed in Libia in 1911, there existed a kingdom within a kingdom and the Turks were only masters in name. They were almost as much despised as the Christians, by the ascetic confraternity of Sidi ben Ali, who held themselves entirely aloof from the Ottoman Government. Therefore, when Sayed Ahmed definitely allied himself with Turkey, he departed from the fundamental principle of his order. The personal influence of a clever and unscrupulous Turk in a few months swept away what remained to him of prudence, principle, and devotion to his original tenets. From this day the confraternity came out into the light of day, submitted its cause to the judgment of the world, and stood to win or lose on its merits as a fighting machine.

As a religious community, by amalgamation with the Turks, whose Calif had been excommunicated as an unbeliever in 1852 by their own chief, the Senussi withdrew at once from the standpoint that Turks and Christians were alike "outside the pale."

Sayed Ahmed was persuaded by Enver Pasha to allow the tribes of the Interior to take part, under Turkish leadership, in the long-drawn-out guerrilla warfare, which was so successfully carried out, that in 1914 Italy was left in possession of the coast towns of Tripoli and Cyrenaica only, while the Interior was in the hands of the Senussi.

The principle of religious detachment, for which the order had originally stood, had disappeared, and the confraternity had resolved itself into a political weapon in the hands of Turkey.

From this standpoint it was but a short step to the declaration of war on Egypt.

At no period was Sayed Ahmed really anti-British, because he knew that Britain had no interests to serve in Libia. Moreover, she facilitated his trade with Egypt, a vital point for the welfare of the Beduin, for the Cyrenaican ports were already closed to them. Bribed by Germany, Sayed Ahmed's most trusted counsellors built upon his fanaticism and his superstitions. His principal confidant went so far as to relate a dream, in which he had met the prophet Mohammed, who offered only his left hand, saying that his right was with Germany and Turkey.

Mannisman and Nouri Pasha, German and Turkish agents respectively, provided arms, ammunition, and money, while holding before the Senussi Sheikh the idea that the Egyptian Beduins would all join him and that he would be the ruler of Egypt.

Yet in spite of Teuton organization and of a widely preached Jihad, it is doubtful if the Senussi could ever have put in the field more than 4,000 men.

The history of the war is well known, but it may be briefly recapitulated. Sayed Ahmed established his headquarters at Bir Waer and the Egyptian coastguards were persuaded by religious fanaticism to join him. Jaafer Pasha, a keen and capable soldier, an Arab from Baghdad, trained in German methods, was in command of his troops. On Christmas Eve at Medwa began a series of defeats, which resulted in the reoccupation of Sollum on March 14. The following day the Duke of Westminster made his famous dash to Bir Hakim on the Tobruk-Jaghabub route, some sixty miles inland, and 120 miles from Sollum, to rescue the heroic Tara prisoners.

Sayed Ahmed retired through Siwa to Dakhla, while the remaining portion of his force went to Baharia. Kharga was immediately evacuated by the British, and then, with a successful army occupying the coast, a beaten enemy practically cut off from all supplies in two isolated desert oases, a disaffected and half-starved Cyrenaica heartily tired of its ruler's policy and already turning to Mohammed Idris, whose pro-British attitude was obvious from the beginning—then was continued the scheme for fortifying Egypt at an expense of many million sterling against an enemy which possibly numbered 2,000 men.

The whole of the summer of 1916 was spent in fortifying the line of the Nile Valley and, in October, the Senussi were driven out of Dakhla and Baharia by camel corps and light car patrols and Sayed Ahmed retired to Siwa. In February, 1917, after a sharp engagement at Girba, where, east of Munasib Pass, some twenty armoured cars performed the amazing feat of sustaining a twenty-four hours enfilade from 800 of the enemy hidden in the rocks above them, the Senussi were finally driven out of Egyptian territory.

For eighteen months Sayed Ahmed spent a precarious existence in the hinterland of Cyrenaica and, in August, 1918, retired to Constantinople by submarine.

Meanwhile, in 1916, an Italo-British Mission under General (then Colonel) the Marchese di Vita and Colonel Talbot had approached Sidi Mohammed Idris es Senussi at Tobruk and Zuetina with a view to arranging a *modus vivendi* in Cyrenaica.

Sayed Idris had taken no part in his cousin's campaign against Egypt. On the contrary, he threw all his influence as the son of the Mahdi into the opposing scale.

As soon as Sayed Ahmed decided to attack, the younger Senussi retired to Jedabia with his brother Sayed Rida, writing to General Maxwell to say that he did not support his cousin's policy.

He continued firmly in this course, though when Sayed Ahmed was defeated, Mannisman came West, with some Turks and Egyptian coastguards, to try and persuade him to continue the war. Sayed Idris refused and Mannisman was killed on his way to Tripoli, a journey he had undertaken in direct opposition to the Senussi's advice.

It was thus natural that both Cyrenaica and Italy should turn to the eldest son of the Mahdi for help in the work of reorganization, necessitated by Sayed Ahmed's disastrous policy.

A dual agreement was drawn up in 1917 between the British and Italian Governments on the one side and Sayed Mohammed Idris as the head of the confraternity on the other, by which it was agreed that:

- A. The Italian Government will retain the coast towns, and certain already occupied posts a short distance inland but will create no new posts.
- B. Commerce is to be unrestricted between the Interior and Bengazi, Tobruk, and Derna.
- C. Courts according to Sharia Law and schools for the education of natives will be built and maintained by the Italians, who will also restore Zawias and Zawia property not still required for military purposes, and be responsible for the salaries of Sheikhs el Zawia appointed by Sidi Idris.
- D. Material assistance will be rendered to Mohammed Idris by the Italian Government supplying him with arms, ammunition, equipment, and food for a limited number of men. For the moment 4,000 is the number fixed. These are to be used partly against the enemy and partly for the purpose of maintaining public security in the interior of Cyrenaica.
- E. Personal allowances to certain members of the Senussi family are to be paid monthly.
- F. In return for this Mohammed Idris will make himself responsible for the maintenance of peace in the Interior, but will

form no new posts, will gradually disarm the population, will place no obstacles in the way of the Italian Government for the forcible disarmament of hostile groups, will allow Italian delegates to enter the Interior for the settlement of affairs with his local representative, while the Italian Government may at any time send a representative to discuss matters with him in person.

Since then an excellent understanding has been arrived at, chiefly owing to the personal influences of H. E. the Governor of Cyrenaica, Senator de Martino and Sayed Mohammed Idris, and Cyrenaica bids fair to have a prosperous commercial and agricultural future.

By the accord of Regima in November, 1920, Italy and the Senussi ratified the Italo-British Agreement before quoted.

Sayed Idris was given the hereditary title of Emir with jurisdiction as "an independent ruler on behalf of Italy" over the oases of Kufara, Jaghabub, Jalo, Aujela and Jedabia. He is to disband his karakols and armed camps in Cyrenaica and the Italians are to find employment, in a regular police force, for the men thus left unemployed. The terms of the new constitution granted to Cyrenaica provide that five members out of the forty-four constituting the legislative assembly shall be elected from the oases of the Interior. It is expected that a port will be built at Zuetina and that the Trans-Saharan trade from Wadai and Darfur will pass through Kufara, Jalo and Jedabia on its way to this Mediterranean outlet.

It will not be difficult to realize the problems inherent in such an agreement, which relies for its success not only on the mutual goodwill of the two parties, but also on Mohammed Idris having a commanding position in the eyes of his followers. In Cyrenaica, to a large extent, mutual goodwill is present and confidence exists, but if the new Emir becomes strong and sure of himself, he is regarded with apprehension by the Italians. If he remains weak and dependent upon them, he can never acquire a predominant position among the Beduins. For the Italian people the situation is a diminution of their sovereign rights. For the Senussi confraternity it is the complete negation of that for which it originally stood.

It is idle now to wonder whether any other solution of the problem could have been found, but the future provides interesting ground for speculation.

In the Senussi War our victory was decisive, but the ease with which it was won perhaps blinded us to the fact that at no time were we fighting an organized revolt of the whole, shall we say, Senussi sphere of influence. To begin with, as Sayed Ahmed was not the son of the Senussi saint, Sidi el Mahdi, he had much less influence than was generally believed, and he still further diminished his prestige when he allied himself with the hitherto despised Ottoman Govern-

ment. Moreover, the wealthy merchants of the Interior refused to countenance a war which must of necessity annihilate their trade. Thus the Senussi campaign really resolved itself into a series of encounters with those lawless elements among the tribes who looked upon any fighting as an excellent chance of looting, and who ran away when it was obvious that they could not benefit their greed.

Nevertheless the war did prove that as a serious military peril the Senussi do not exist. From that standpoint, however, it is a very long step to the idea that they have no political influence. With the destruction of their Egyptian Zawias, officialdom is inclined to believe that it has uprooted the power of the confraternity. If you destroyed the masonic halls in England would you put an end to freemasonry? On the contrary, would you not merely force it to act secretly in channels where its activities could not be observed, rather than openly, where a watch could be kept on its movements? I first came in contact with the Senussi Tarika in Fez, and next in El Oued in the French Sahara, yet I have repeatedly been assured that it does not exist west of Tripoli to-day. I made exhaustive enquiries in the Sudan, and found that the number of "brothers" there was considerable. When I reached Egypt on my return from Kufara, there was no need to enquire. The news that I had been to their sacred oasis made many Ekhwan come to me. At first they used merely to ask for news of friends and relatives, but very soon out came the Senussi oath, "By the truth of Sidi el Mahdi," changing now to "By the faith of Idris," and I learned that the Senussi influence still exists in Western Egypt. I am convinced that the confraternity has also a considerable following in the Hejaz.

Up to the time of the war we overestimated its power. Now I think we are likely to underestimate it.

We have said that, as a military force, the Senussi do not exist. At no time could they put more than a few thousand men in the field—the whole population of the Kufara group of oases is not more than three or four thousand Zouias, exclusive of the negro slaves.

In Cyrenaica the tribes have had their lesson. It is exceedingly doubtful if they would ever care to engage in another struggle with Egypt, the last one having resulted in their almost complete starvation, for the hinterland is not self-supporting and the Beduins must depend for many of their stores on the Egyptian market.

On the other hand, as a mercantile and political influence, the Senussi undoubtedly rank among the most powerful in North Africa. Kufara is the spider at the heart of the web of the trans-Saharan trade routes. South to Wadai and Dufur, east across the dunes to Faraffa, north by the new route which we discovered to Jaghabub, north-west to Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, west to the Fezzan, the caravan routes go forth. On all these routes the Zouias, the most fanatical Senussi

tribe, are the only trusted guides. It is undoubted that these guides and camel-drivers spread the doctrines of their leader throughout the countries they visit.

Before the war the chief product of Cyrenaica was hides, and the greater part of those hides came via Kufara from the Western Sudan. There was also a large trade in ivory, feathers, and sandalwood. When it is remembered that ivory costs 10 francs a pound in Darfur and that a completely tanned and scarlet-dyed goatskin can be bought for 14s. in Kufara, the possibility of trade in these goods will be easily understood.

Kufara is likely to remain long in the hands of the Senussi. With the existing means of modern warfare it would be almost impossible to organize a military expedition capable of taking it. The group of oases is practically self-supporting. It is protected by a barrier of immense dunes, roughly 100 miles wide, which would prevent the approach of light car patrols. Beyond this, again, is a stretch of waterless desert, varying from 200 to 350 miles in length. Without reliable guides, it would be impossible to discover the few wells which exist at the edge of this appalling waste, and these guides would of necessity be Zouias, whose loathing of the stranger is an inherent part of their religion.

At the same time much might be done to develop the trade routes of the region. At the moment the sentiment of the confraternity is entirely pro-British.

They deprecate Sayed Ahmed's action in making war on England and enthusiastically support the modern and enlightened policy of the present Emir, who is known to be an enthusiastic friend of the British.

The Senussi are typically merchants. Their livelihood depends upon their trade. At Jalo we used to spend hours sitting on mats, drinking coffee and discussing the possibility of new routes to Egypt. Before the war all European stores and stuffs came direct by camel through Siwa and the cost was infinitesimal compared to the freight and customs duties which must now be paid on Egyptian goods travelling by sea to Bengazi and thence inland.

It is natural, therefore, that all the more progressive Sheikhs look with enthusiasm to the resumption of overland trade with Egypt. The destruction, however, of all the Senussi Zawias within Egyptian territory has made this very difficult. The Zawia was not only a college, remember, it was a resting-place for the merchants, a mart and a general meeting-ground. In view of this drastic policy, it is not to be wondered at that the Senussi traders view with doubt and some distrust any incursion on their part into the country through which they used to travel so freely.

It will be interesting to observe in what direction the confraternity

will develop in the future. Beginning as an isolated religious confraternity, it has expanded by way of mercantile and political influence into a dynastic entity, whose desire for civilization must necessarily force it along lines widely divergent from those contemplated by its founder.

It is certain that the Emir Idris will have the whole-hearted support of the country in whatever course he chooses to pursue and, with the present sympathetic co-operation of the Italian Government, it is probable that he will lead the van of Arab progress in North Africa. How far are we likely to be concerned with this progress?

At present England is like the bad tailor who cuts his cloth without regard to the shape of his coat, so that at the last moment he has to snip off a little bit here and add on a little bit there till his original conception of the garment is entirely lost.

England was the first to conceive the possibility of helping the development of the smaller nations and peoples until they could stand alone. Eight years ago, England's name throughout the Middle East stood for the highest qualities that the minds of its races could grasp. To-day, owing to the disastrous policy of the last few years, we, and the world in general, have lost sight of our original attitude. We talk of reducing our liabilities, but the little bit we have tried to add on in Mesopotamia is costing us dear and the little bit we have cut off in Libia may cost us even more! The Senussi influence is felt from the Western Sudan to the Mediterranean, but it is strongest in Libia, and Libia lies on the borders of an Egypt anxious for self-expression and self-determination. Not all the Beduin tribes of the Western deserts would be in favour of submission to a national government in Cairo and never, since the days of Mohammed Ali, who subsidized the tribe of the Aulad Ali for that purpose, has Egypt guarded her own frontiers. Beyond the Western deserts is Italy, whose eyes must ever be turned to Egypt. In Alexandria more Italian is spoken than Arabic. Inter-marriage between the two races is the rule, not the exception. Commercially and socially Italy has already penetrated, if not permeated, Egypt. When Cairo can dictate her own foreign policy it is not difficult to prophecy an Italo-Egyptian alliance which might be awkward to British interests in the Middle East. The present political situation, therefore, affords infinite possibilities for expansion on the part of the Senussi, and surely it behoves England to keep on friendly terms with the Emir Idris, a neighbour who is paramount in Libia, whose sentiments are notably pro-British, and whose interests must always be bound up with the commercial prosperity of Egypt. We talk of the lack of unity in Islam, and insist on considering every part of it as a separate problem, yet Kufara takes as much interest in the doings of Damascus as London does in those of Melbourne or Ottawa and, unlike the British Empire, Islam

has one common meeting-ground where, for several uninterrupted weeks, delegates from every Continent and every people discuss in a secrecy beyond the possibility of being betrayed or overheard, the affairs of its world—I mean the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, the one window that must ever remain blind in our house of knowledge.

NOTE.—A considerable portion of the information given in this paper is quoted from Egyptian Government files dealing with the subject, and I am particularly indebted to officials of the Frontier District Administration for the loan of their documents. To the generous assistance of H.E. Senator de Martina, Governor of Cyrenaica, are due the details concerning the Italo-British and Italian treaties with the Senussi.—R. F.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, we have the pleasure of having among the audience Captain Gwatkin-Williams, who was, as I daresay some of you know, a captive in the hands of that confraternity in regard to which Mrs. Rosita Forbes has given us so interesting an account. If he will kindly give us a few of his experiences, we shall be very glad.

Captain R. S. GWATKIN-WILLIAMS, R.N.: Ladies and Gentlemen, if you had asked me about seven years ago what the Senussi were I am afraid I should not have known whether they were a patent medicine, a new disease, or what they were. Fools rush in where angels fear to tread. In this case we have already had the angel who did not fear to tread—Mrs. Rosita Forbes—but we have not had any of her adventures. I was one of the unfortunate fools pitchforked amongst the Senussi. I was in 1914 in command of a little warship called the *Tara*. We were torpedoed, and the submarine made us prisoners, and took us into a secret base he had got there in the Senussi territory, and turned us over to the Senussi. I and another hundred British sailors spent five months of terrible captivity amongst the Senussi. They marched us about 130 miles into the Libyan desert. I will tell you some of my adventures, it will help you to realize what Mrs. Rosita Forbes has gone through. To start with, we were very hungry; I know some of the things we have eaten. I know we had to live on a camel once that had been dead three or four days down a well. We had had no meat for three or four weeks. We had a great craving for meat. I went down the well and swam round in the dark until I found the camel's foot sticking up. We pulled it to the top—a hundred prisoners standing around hoping for a feed. We stuck a knife in, and such an aroma came out that we realized the camel had been dead for three or four days. At first we buried the camel, but, later on, at night, we thought better of it, and dug up the camel and lived on it for four days. We had it fried and boiled; we had camel soup and camel liver. If anyone has not tasted camel and wonders what it is like, he should go to the Zoo and smell the live animal, and that will give him an idea.

We were marched in by an Egyptian traitor called Achmed—a hundred unfortunate sailors. The sailor is not a very great walker as a rule; you see him in London in a taxicab or a 'bus, he is not a great walker. We had a hundred men, some of them sixty, and one of them nearly seventy years old. Others were boys of sixteen or seventeen. We suddenly found we had to march thirty or forty miles a day across the desert. One man ran away, and because of this the Egyptian traitor who was marching us in resolved to punish us all. He soon found an excuse. He found one of the sailors trying to destroy his rice because he did not want to carry it with him all day—he foolishly tried to burn it. So we were marched two days and two nights without food or water—that was under a blazing sun, but what we suffered from most was the cold at night. Everywhere in the North African desert in the winter months it is most bitterly cold at night; the temperature comes down to freezing-point, and we had nothing to cover us. There were sea fogs and bitter winds. The first day we managed to get along somehow without food or water; the second day we were beaten or flogged along. They had a ready way when anyone fainted; a Senussi guard would come up and jab him so hard in the ribs with a rifle that the pain was so exquisite that unless the man was at death's door he would stagger on again. At the end of the second evening, when we fell down in the mass, and none could go farther, Achmed let us have some food. We had some water. If you had a bucket of water and washed your potatoes and scrubbed your house out and so on with it, that would be a good bit cleaner than the water we had to drink in the desert. It came out of a stinking mud hole to start with. It was bright green, half salt, and full of hair and dirt. It had been carried about a hundred miles on a camel's back. We had one wineglassful each, but I have never had anything so nice as that water. In the same way with the rice which we had rather despised. We had had nothing for two days, and had been eating snails to keep us alive. At last they gave us a half cupful of rice each. I have had excellent dinners. I once dined with our late friend the Kaiser, but I never had anything so nice as the rice. For the first time for some weeks we sang and were absolutely happy. When you have heard Mrs. Forbes' story you will realize the awful discomfort of living among the Senussi. They are like children in some ways. Children are apt to be cruel at first; you know they cut off caterpillars' and insects' heads. The Senussi are cruel at first, but no one can be kinder to you than they are in their own way after they have got used to you. I had unfortunately got a gold tooth, and they are such a poverty-stricken race that several times they seriously threatened to cut off my head as being the easiest way to get this valuable gold. The only way I could persuade them that it was not worth while doing so was by telling them that it was not gold but brass. They believed that; for

they could not believe that anyone was so wealthy as to have gold in his head. We were marched to an awful place called Bir Hakkim Abbyat. It is in a desert of rock and stone called the Red Desert; there is no sand there at all. For fourteen days we were marched into the interior of this Red Desert; there we were put to a kind of well at a place called Bir Hakkim Abbyat—one of those old Roman wells they have got dug all over the country. There we were under the Egyptian traitor and an old priest in charge of the well called Osman. We knew him as Holy Joe. He had a whip of rhinoceros hide in his hand. We were a kind of slaves, and he used to drive us out to work excavating other wells. That was in 1915, when the Senussi had started to invade Egypt and the country was blockaded.

The Senussi are used to privations; at any time what would starve your cat at home the Beduin would get fat on. Those were the people keeping us, and I am certain we did not get nearly so much food as they—for the first two months a little more than half a pound of rice a day, and nothing else at all. We managed to keep alive to a certain extent because there were a great many snails about. There are snails in the desert who can go a year without water. We used to eat great quantities. In the ordinary way we would throw them into the fire. As soon as the snail got hot enough a steam would escape and it would whistle—it was like a patent egg-boiler. When the whistling stopped the snail was cooked. Later on we got much more epicures and used to boil them. We had an old kind of baking-tin that would accommodate a thousand snails. We used to call them Libyan "Lilywhites" because of their colour. The recipe was—boil brilliantly for twenty minutes, but if hard-boiled snail is preferred a shorter time will suffice. We put the snails in a pan in some water on the fire. The first ten minutes was an anxious time because the snail would spend most of his time trying to walk out; but after the first ten minutes they were very quiet, and after twenty minutes you poured away the water—green and slimy it was then—and you had your 500 or 600 green, horrible, grisly snails lying at the bottom of the pan. That was the dinner we most of us had, and on Christmas Day most of the men had nothing else. Some of the men got quite fond of the snails, and one, who was called the Snail King, was supposed to eat 500 a day. We ate every snail within ten miles of the camp and every root there was. Then I managed to make my escape. I had made a little, rough map of the country, and had to go about a hundred miles across the desert. I got away quite easily from the Senussi—they were not great at guarding us—and got half way to the Egyptian frontier, but ran into a Beduin camp at dawn and was recaptured. Their ways are very drastic—I think Mrs. Forbes told you their punishments are exceedingly drastic. For mere smoking or drinking you get the amputation of the hand. Any casual stranger found in

the country, they usually kill him instantly. They intended to kill me; but there were so many robbers about that they took to fighting among themselves as to who should possess me, until I fell in with two Turkish soldiers. With them I was marched two hundred miles across the desert and taken back once more to our hideous prison camp of Bir Hakkim. We lived in the orthodox Beduin way; we had no food for our two hundred miles journey, but we robbed passing travellers of their sheep. We generally gave them a receipt for the sheep and drove them off with the guns that my two Turkish guards had. I had not had any meat myself at all for three months then; but the Turkish soldiers and myself—there were five of us altogether—ate three complete sheep within thirty-six hours. Anyway, I got back to the camp, and there I was met by Holy Joe, the old black priest, who flogged me into camp on Leap Year's Day, 1916. On that day the last of us gave up our hope of life. We were getting very weak. The last of the rice had run out, the last of the snails had been eaten, and we were living on a quarter-pound of goat's flesh a day. Four men had already died of starvation, and it seemed in two or three weeks more we should all die in the same way as they. If the Senussi had wished to help us, they could not have done it, because we were so weak that we could not cover five miles a day as a body. At that time the British, quite unknown to us, were having a campaign with the Senussi in the west of Egypt, and had two or three hard fought fights. Of these the most dramatic was the Duke of Westminster's action at Azais on March 14. He had only nine armoured cars, with thirty-two officers and men. That was his complete force; but he fell on the whole Turko-Senussi army of five thousand armed with artillery, machine-guns, and everything complete. He took them completely by surprise, wiped them off the face of the desert, scattered them in every direction, and captured the whole of their artillery and everything they had got. (Applause.) That was not helping us really, because nobody at that time knew where the unfortunate *Tara's* crew was. We had disappeared from the face of the earth. But on the way to the battle one of the Duke of Westminster's cars, under Major Amphlett, broke down; and at the very spot where it broke down he found a broken-down Turkish car within twenty yards of him. Major Amphlett took the opportunity to search the Turkish car. At first he could not find anything, but as he was about to start, his repairs having been made good, he saw a bit of paper. He pulled it out, and to his great astonishment found it was a letter written in the French language. It was a letter that I myself had written nearly six weeks before to the Turkish Colonel, and that was the first news the British got that the *Tara's* crew was still alive. But also note a very remarkable thing: that letter was the only one ever written which gave the name of our camp.

The country west of Egypt had, however, not been visited by white men practically since the last Romans were turned out in the year 609. Nobody had any idea where our camp was, it was marked on no map, and none of the seventy or eighty prisoners they had taken had any idea at all; and then luck followed the British once more, because two Senussi came and gave themselves up. One of them was a one-eyed man, and the one-eyed man said that thirty years before, when he was a little boy, he thought he had been to a place called Bir Hakkim, the name of our camp. He did not think that he could remember the way after all those thirty years; he had been there only as a boy. But he volunteered to try and guide the British, and with that guide only the Duke of Westminster took his armoured motor-car and all the other motor vehicles available. They went 120 miles into the trackless desert without sighting a single landmark, and were half-way through the petrol; everybody had given up hope. They could not find the one landmark they were looking for—a fig-tree growing by itself—the only tree for hundreds of miles. They were off the map, absolutely lost, but the Duke of Westminster determined not to give up as long as the guide would give him the least hope of ever getting through. Then, at the critical moment, when they had given up all hope, the guide threw himself off the car—they were going full speed—and rolled in the sand. At first people thought he was a treacherous Senussi who had led them into an ambush, and were going to fire on him; but the guide got up and began to point. With his one eye the guide had seen what no one else had seen, he had sighted the landmark of the fig-tree. He went up to the fig-tree, fell on his knees there, and gave thanks to Allah, the giver of all good. Then he scraped away the sand below the tree where he was kneeling, and exposed the stone coping of one of those ancient Roman wells. That well, he said, was the “well of sweet waters” where he used to water his father’s flocks as a little boy thirty years before. He said, “It is all choked now and useless, but it tells me exactly where we are. We are no longer lost, and are quite close to the prisoners’ camp at Bir Hakkim.” That was St. Patrick’s Day, 1916. We prisoners were crawling about on our hands and knees from weakness, and thought we had at best but three or four days to live, when suddenly one of our men came in and said, “There is a motor-car in sight.” We did not believe him—a motor-car a hundred and thirty miles from anywhere in the Red Desert! We used very unparliamentary language, and were just going to throw stones at him when I looked up, and there was no question about it; there *was* a motor-car. We were all mad. It was a car the Duke had sent ahead; they had sighted our camp and it looked in the mirage like a fortified place. We were very excited, those who could only crawl about before managed to stand up, and we gave the best kind of cheer we could—a

feeble weak thing, but it reached the leading car. Even then we never for a second guessed it was a British car. We all thought it was a Turkish car, but that at any rate it meant good news. When the car heard that cheer, the people in it for the first time realized that we were British. Until then they thought we were Arabs; for we had long hair, black faces, were in rags and covered from head to foot with vermin. Nobody could possibly have recognized us as Englishmen. But they heard the cheer and passed it back to the other cars, and in a few minutes, not one car only but forty-three came rushing forward at the highest speed. (Applause.) We were fed, and were soon very happily on our way back. I do not want to tell you more of my own story, but I want you to realize the terrible times that Mrs. Forbes has gone through. I had five months with the Senussi, and had a hundred men with me who had the same experiences; and I am absolutely positive there is not one of us in our senses who would for one second have attempted to go through and do what Mrs. Forbes did. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: I think, Ladies and Gentlemen, we have had, perhaps, the most enjoyable and instructive afternoon at which it has been my lot to be present at the meetings of this Society. (Applause.) We have had the admirable lecture which Mrs. Rosita Forbes was good enough to give us, which I think from every point of view was worthy of the reputation which she has already achieved, both as a traveller, and I may say also an author, and very nearly, I think, as a statesman too. Captain Gwatkin-Williams has thrilled us, I am quite sure, with that simple graphic narrative which he has given us of those dreadful sufferings which he and his companions passed through when they were captured by the Senussi. I suggest we pass a very warm tribute of thanks to both of them for having given us an opportunity of spending such very interesting and enjoyable hours.

ANNIVERSARY MEETING

THE Anniversary Meeting of the Central Asian Society was held at Burlington House, Piccadilly, London, W., on Wednesday, June 15, 1921, the Right Hon. Lord Carnock presiding.

The CHAIRMAN: I will first call upon Colonel Yate to read his report for the past session.

REPORT FOR 1920-1921.

The HON. SECRETARY (Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate): Before I read the report I will just mention that we have to-day elected twenty-five additional new members. I do not think it is necessary to read out the names, unless you particularly so desire. They will all be incorporated in the Roll of Members in due course.

Although the report laid before the Anniversary Meeting of June 23, 1920, showed satisfactory signs of progress, the concluding paragraph indicated that the Council of the Society was still face to face with no small anxieties. Even our very successes have had their own drawbacks. With a tiny room which we share with another Society, our Assistant Secretary has no adequate space for records, and as for housing the rich contribution towards a Middle Eastern Library, for which we are indebted to Lady Trotter's munificence, it is useless at present to think of it. Again, the rapidly increasing membership of the Society and the growing popularity of our Lectures have forced us to look abroad for larger lecture halls. From the Dunsterville and Bailey lectures scores went away, unable to squeeze in anywhere, and the comparatively spacious hall of the Royal Society in Burlington House was crowded to hear Sir Arnold Wilson and Mrs. Rosita Forbes. Last year, when I made my report, I paid my humble tribute to the admirable way in which Miss Phillips carried out her duties, and the same sense impels me to now record what Miss Kennedy has done during the past six months to keep pace with the steadily growing demands upon her time and energies. Very few members of this Society have visited that little box on the third floor of 74, Grosvenor Street, immured in which she sends out hundreds of journals, cards, notices, *et hoc genus omne*. Occasional intimations of cards and journals not being received have reached me. I can only say that I personally am very thankful that it is not my destiny to send out all that she does, and that if proof of her devotion to the

interests of the Society be sought, it is to be found in the work which she silently and unobtrusively performs there.

For some years past the Central Asian Society has been steadily advancing into its Middle Eastern stage, and to-day the "Middle East" with which we deal extends from the eastern frontiers of Europe to the confines of China, and from the land-line of the Trans-Siberian Railway on the north to the Great Ocean Route—nay! and beyond it—on the south which connects the *Near* with the *Far* East. This extension and the responsibility which it entailed the Society was bound to justify; and I think that, on the whole, its justification may be sought in the record of the past. We have not yet shaken off anxieties about finance, but we have held them at arm's length, and that without raising one penny of that subscription of £1 a year which was fixed twenty-one years ago, and though printing and every other expense has been trebled or quadrupled.

The Society owes more than it knows to its Honorary Treasurers. In my opinion, now that the Society has clearly before it a great career, now that it counts amongst its members two Secretaries of State and what I may almost call the pick of the great administrators and soldiers of the Empire, and also the élite of that younger generation which holds the future destinies of that Empire in its hands, the Society owes it to itself to require a higher subscription at any rate from its new members, and clearly more commodious quarters are needed.

It was before this Society that, eighteen months ago, Mr. Ormsby Gore outlined his scheme of a Middle East Department. It has pleased His Majesty's Government to assign that department to the Colonial Office, and recently, on his return from Cairo, the Secretary of State for the Colonies joined this Society.

I think it most desirable at this juncture to repeat what our Honorary President, Earl Curzon of Kedleston, said in his speech at the Society's Annual dinner on October 12, 1920, viz.:

"I hope that this Society will regard itself as existing not only to read papers, examine problems, and display knowledge, but also as a Society which trains men and inspires men with the ardour and ambition to support the interests of our Empire in Central Asia, and to help its countries to a peaceful solution of the very intricate problems with which they are confronted. It has been a great pleasure to me to see some of the younger members of this Society justifying its existence by work of this kind. Lord Ronaldshay in Bengal, Sir George Lloyd in Bombay: these are men who have been brought up in the spirit and under the inspiration of this Society, and their careers provide an example and incentive to others. Long may this Society flourish to carry on the great work which assuredly lies before it." So far Lord Curzon.

It is as well, I think, that we should assure our Honorary President that we realize the truth of his counsel. We have ambitions and we will work for them. The Middle East is an essential link in the union of our Empire, and we will work to strengthen and maintain that link which at present is threatened by many and serious dangers. Our Journals record the ability, prowess, courage, resource and endurance of men, and occasionally of women, who are an example and incentive to those who will come after them. We are proud, and with good reason, of those who have placed at our disposal the results of their travels, studies, and adventurous exploits—exploits which have, some of them, been perilous in the extreme.

The list of lectures, during the session which terminates to-day, is as follows :

1920.

October 21.—"Some Military Aspects of the Mesopotamian Problem," by Captain E. Shepherd.

November 10.—"Federation of the Central Asian States under the Kabul Government," by Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah.

November 18.—"Turkestan under the Bolsheviks," by Major F. M. Bailey, C.I.E.

December 16.—"The Military Mission to North-West Persia in 1918," by Major-General L. C. Dunsterville, C.B.

1921.

January 20.—"Communications in the East: Their Expansion by Means of Aircraft," by Captain P. D. Acland.

February 17.—"Saracenic Architecture and the Crusaders," by Mr. Martin Briggs.

March 17.—"The Siberian Outlook," by Mr. Robert Wilton.

April 15.—"Mesopotamia, 1914-1921," by Sir Arnold T. Wilson, K.C.I.E.

May 16.—"The Senussi as a Factor in North African Development," by Mrs. Rosita Forbes.

June 15.—"India's Influence on her Mohammedan Neighbours," by Sir Michael O'Dwyer.

These lectures have spoken for themselves, and those who did not hear them are the losers. Major Bailey's life among the Bolsheviks of Russian Turkestan is still a mystery to us. The very night before General Dunsterville gave us his lecture, the Prime Minister in the House of Commons spoke of the performances of "Dunsterforce" as "one of the finest bits of work in the War." It was magnificent, marvellous bluff, and some of us, I think, feel that the cool humour which animated that bluff was reproduced in the lecture to which we listened.

Captain Shepherd showed us the value of Mesopotamia as a strategical base, while Sir Arnold Wilson demonstrated that, although hurried evacuation was not to be thought of, the prolonged British occupation of that base would suit neither the British taxpayer nor the indigenous Arab. Captain Acland reminded us that the point of junction of the Asian and African Continents is the aeronautical centre of the Eastern World, and thus it may possibly strike us as curious that, when in the autumn of last year an English lady sought her way from the Mediterranean coast to Kufra, it was a camel and not an aeroplane that was her instrument of travel. Circumstances deprived us of two valuable lectures, one by Sir Charles Greenway on "The Oil Resources of Mesopotamia and Persia," owing to ill-health, and the other by Colonel Claud Stokes on "Transcaucasia" under the Foreign Office veto. I am myself of opinion that the practical aims of this Society call upon it to associate itself with the industrial, commercial, and financial interests of the Middle East. I hope, therefore, that we shall still hear Sir Charles Greenway.

Since the last Annual General Meeting we have added 250 new members to the Society. We have lost by death two members: Sir Arthur Trevor, K.C.S.I., and Captain J. S. Mann, who was killed in Mesopotamia on July 21, 1920. We have also lost by resignation five members—viz.: Sir Louis Dane, Mr. and Mrs. R. N. Fraser, Mr. Harley, and Mr. Footman.

Captain J. C. Stephenson has this year, even more than last, merited the Society's gratitude for the deftness with which he has piloted new members into the "Central Asian" fold, and with his name I wish also to couple those of Mrs. Waller-Sawyer and Brigadier-General Sir Gilbert Clayton. Mrs. Waller-Sawyer, taking a fortnight's holiday from that distressful country, Ireland, in that brief time spent in London added ten members. I have only had two letters in the year from Sir Gilbert Clayton. In each he gave seven names, and almost all have now become members. *The upshot is that in the year we have more than doubled the membership.*

The CHAIRMAN: I think we can thank Colonel Yate for the very comprehensive and interesting report he has laid before us. I am sure I heartily endorse for my part all that he has said as to Miss Kennedy's valuable services. (Applause.) It is very inconvenient to have to work under such conditions, but this I hope we shall be able to ameliorate in the near future. I also endorse what he said as to what Captain Stephenson and Mrs. Waller-Sawyer have done. (Applause.) He omitted to state that we very largely owe this most satisfactory increase in the number of our members to Colonel Yate's own action; and not only as regards increased members, but for having taken immense pains to find out and discover lecturers who, as you know, during the past session have read to us such interesting papers. 1

think we all owe a great debt of gratitude to Colonel Yate for his activities. (Applause.) I now propose an amendment to Rule 11. Rule 11 says the officers of the Society shall be the Honorary President, the Chairman of the Council, six vice-presidents, and so on. I think Colonel Yate has explained to you the reasons why the Council are going to submit to you that instead of "six vice-presidents" it should read "eight vice-presidents." They are elected for four years, two retiring annually. I think it will be a little more symmetrical to have eight instead of six; also I think the very large increase in the number of members fully justifies the amendment I venture to put before the meeting. Will any gentleman second the motion that instead of six vice-presidents it should be eight?

Sir FREDERIC FRYER: I will second that.

The CHAIRMAN: If anybody has any objections to raise will they kindly raise their hands? As nobody does, I think we can say that it is carried unanimously.

The alteration of the rule was thus agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Then I would submit, as we are now entitled to elect four, Colonel Sir Charles Yate and Sir Hugh Barnes—long connected with the Society and retiring from the post of Member of Council. I think we owe it also to Colonel A. C. Yate to appoint him vice-president in some recognition of his services; and Sir Edward Penton, who has been our most admirable Treasurer, and has taken enormous pains in regard to our accounts, and also, I may add, in organizing this evening's dinner. I think we cannot do less than show some appreciation of his services by proposing he should be the fourth vice-president.

The four gentlemen recommended were adopted without dissent.

The CHAIRMAN: There are also the Honorary Secretaries, as Colonel Yate reminds me. Colonel A. C. Yate and Captain Stephenson are proposed as Joint Hon. Secretaries, as Colonel Yate has kindly stated that he would continue his work, but that as he lives in the country he would find it more convenient if he could get some able coadjutor living in London. I do not think he could find a better one than Captain Stephenson, and although Colonel Yate's activity is almost ubiquitous I think it would assist him if he had someone in London to help him in the work. I therefore propose as Joint Hon. Secretaries Colonel Yate and Captain Stephenson.

The resolution was unanimously adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Colonel Yate has read out to you the names of the three gentlemen and one lady whom we recommend as Members of the Council. I think it is right, especially considering the number of ladies we have as members, that we should have one of them, at any rate, to represent the Society on the Council. (Applause.) And I do not think we can make a better choice than that very competent traveller, Miss

Ella Sykes. (Renewed applause.) Then I take it the meeting approves these nominations.

The resolution was unanimously adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not know that I ought to say anything about myself. I must say that I find with increasing years and diminishing activity that I hardly make as vigorous a Chairman as I ought to be, but I will do my best for you during the coming year. (Applause.) I think that terminates our proceedings. There is the lecture at four o'clock. I am sorry I cannot be present; Sir Frederic Fryer is kindly going to take the chair.

THE MOHAMMEDANS OF INDIA AND INDIA'S MOHAMMEDAN NEIGHBOURS.

BY SIR MICHAEL O'DWYER, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

THE anniversary meeting was followed by a lecture by Sir Michael O'Dwyer, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., the subject being "The Mohammedans of India and India's Mohammedan Neighbours." The chair was occupied by Sir Frederic Fryer, K.C.S.I.

THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, in the absence of Lord Carnock, who much regrets that he is unable to take the chair this afternoon, I have been asked to take his place; and it is my pleasing duty to introduce to you Sir Michael O'Dwyer, the distinguished ex-Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. (Applause.) He has kindly undertaken to read a paper on "Mohammedan India and their Influence on neighbouring Mohammedans." I am sure there is no one better qualified than he is to deal with such a subject, and any remarks of mine are quite uncalled for. I will therefore ask Sir Michael O'Dwyer to read his paper.

THE LECTURER: I wish I did possess the qualifications which the Chairman, in his kindness of heart, has credited me with. I should then be able to face the subject, and you, with more confidence. I cannot lay claim to any inner knowledge of the great issues which are now agitating the minds of the Mohammedans in many countries, or of the policy of our Government in regard to them. But twenty years' service in the Mohammedan Provinces of the Punjab (including the period of war) and the North-West Frontier, and two years in the premier Mohammedan State of Hyderabad, brought me into close relation with Mohammedans of all classes, and may help me to throw some sidelights on the attitude of Indian Mohammedans in recent years, and the manner in which it has influenced and been influenced by India's Moslem neighbours. The first point to note is, that though in India the Mohammedans form only one-fifth of the population, their number is between sixty and seventy millions, and far exceeds that under any other Mohammedan Power. The Indian Mohammedans, though as a rule behind their Hindu neighbours in wealth and education, still preserve the traditions of the great Islamic Empires which dominated all or most of India from the twelfth to the eighteenth century; and they are probably not inferior morally or materially to their co-religionists in any other country. Their connec-

tion with the Moslem countries of the Middle East is many-sided—historical and racial, as well as religious and cultural. The successive invasions of the conquering Arabs, Turks, Afghans, Moghuls, and Persians, have all left a distinct impress on India—very marked on the north-west, where the invading hordes after pouring in through the mountain passes spread themselves over the fertile plains, but less marked towards the south, where the Hindu races were but little affected by the tide of invasion.

Each of these invasions left behind it a very strong racial residuum. To one or other of them may be traced not only the great dynasties which have passed away, but also the Mohammedan States, with a population of about twenty millions, still in existence; a few like Maler Kotla in the Punjab date back to the Afghan conquest of Northern India before the Moghul era; many, like Hyderabad and Bhopal, arose during the decline of the Moghul Empire, when the great feudatories gradually assumed independent power though obtaining confirmation of their titles from Delhi; while others were carved out by Arab marauders or Biluch and Afghan freebooters when the Moghul Empire was tottering to its fall. Most of these States still pride themselves on their extra-Indian origin, and endeavour to maintain some connection with the parent stock. When in Peshawar fifteen years ago, I was asked by the Ruler of a State in Central India to find a suitable wife for one of the sons from a high Afghan family, and believe I succeeded in discharging that delicate commission to the satisfaction of all parties.

Again, the aristocracy, both in the Native States and in British India, is largely of foreign origin, Persian, Arab, Afghan, or Moghul, and many of the literary and priestly classes, the Saiyida, Kazis, Maulvis, also lay claim to an origin outside India. It is natural therefore that political events in Moslem countries should be followed with keen interest by educated Indian Mohammedans.

I remember an after-dinner discussion thirteen years ago with the late Nizam of Hyderabad and his nobles on the newly established Majlis or Parliament in Persia. His Highness summed up the discussion by saying "the Persian Majlis will be a Majlis of 'minas' (chattering birds)." A few years later, when I asked him his opinion of the newly formed Committee of Union and Progress in Turkey, his comment was, "They will begin by ruining the power of the Sultan and end by ruining the Turkish Empire." In both cases His Highness showed remarkable prescience.

The Mohammedan masses, small landowners, cultivators, artisans, and menial classes, are usually converts from Hinduism. Their conversion, whether voluntary or forced, has been proceeding from the seventh century up to the present day, when Islam is still receiving a steady flow of recruits from the Lower Hindu castes and the aborigines.

But, just as in England it is the fashion to claim descent from an ancestor who came over with William of Normandy, so in India there is a marked tendency among well-to-do Mohammedans to trace back their ancestry to an extra-Indian source.

This tendency is ridiculed in the Punjabi proverb, "Last year I was a Mochi; this year I am a Sheikh; next year, if the crops are good, please God, I shall be a Saiyid."

The Ghakhars of the North Punjab are perhaps the most famous of the martial Indian Rajput tribes that barred the way of many a Mohammedan invader. They became converts to Islam centuries ago, but they still retain some Hindu customs, and their leading men style themselves Rajas. And yet the late head of the tribe, Raja Jahandad Khan, a most cultured gentleman, would spend hours in persuading me that his tribe was of Arab origin and had reached the North Punjab nine centuries ago, after circuitous marches through Central Asia, Kashmir, etc., in comparison with which the wanderings of the Israelites in the desert were but a pleasant week-end trip.

The historical and racial ties with the centres of Islam were further strengthened by the close religious connections that unite the various branches of Islam into one brotherhood. Every sect and form of Islam known in Islamic countries—Sunni, Shiah, Wahabi—is found flourishing in India (besides some forms, *e.g.*, the Kadianis peculiar to India itself), and its Indian adherents maintain, by pilgrimage and religious offerings, close relations with the Holy Places outside India—the Sunnis with Mecca, Medina, and the tomb of Abdul Kadir at Baghdad; the Shiahs with Kerbela, Najaf, and Kazimain. In fact, the Indian Mohammedans, perhaps owing to their being a minority among unbelievers, have often shown themselves more uncompromising, more rigidly orthodox, and more exclusive than their brethren in purely Islamic countries. This tendency has often been, and even now is being, exploited by unscrupulous men to arouse the fanaticism of the ignorant masses against the British Government and in favour of Islamic countries when at war with us, such as Afghanistan and Turkey.

Pride of race and religious feeling are the two emotions that can be, and are, most successfully appealed to in the case of the Indian Moslems. While the weak descendants of the Great Moghul could lay claim even to the shadow of sovereignty, the seat of Empire at Delhi satisfied both those feelings. For, in Mohammedan eyes, from Delhi the native rulers, and even the British Government, had derived their titles. The Mutiny of 1857 failed to restore the substance, and thereafter even the shadow of the Moghul Empire passed away, and the Mohammedans, whether responsible for the Mutiny or not, suffered most by it. Muslim India was then left without a visible head or rallying-point, and for a generation sank into sullen apathy, while

Hindu India was quick to take advantage of the growing opportunities offered by a stable and enlightened rule. The progress of the once subject Hindu, under the new régime, made it no more acceptable to the sterner Mussulmans who were still imbued with the old spirit of racial and religious ascendancy. They brooded in silence; but their thoughts in regard to those who had wrought the change are well expressed in Sir Alfred Lyall's description of a Maulvi looking on at a game of badminton played by a few English people, close to the garden where Nicholson sleeps outside the historic Mori Gate at Delhi.

Near me a Mussulman, civil and mild,
Watched as the shuttlecocks rose and fell;
And he said, as he counted his beads and smiled,
"God smite their souls to the depths of hell."

This period of isolation and lethargy lasted for about a generation. Moslem India was aroused from it by that great patriot and statesman Sir Saiyid Ahmad, who convinced his co-religionists that the path to progress lay, not in isolation, but in close co-operation with the British Government. His work was crowned by the opening, in 1882, of the great Aligarh College, which united the Islamic and Western cultures. Under his wise guidance Mussulman India began to realize that its future was linked with the British Empire; and the British Government in India, in its turn, showed its desire to assist the community to make up the ground that they had lost. Among the measures to promote its progress may be instanced the aid given to the Aligarh College and special educational facilities to Mohammedans in backward areas, the passing in 1901 of the Punjab Land Alienation Act to prevent the further exploitation of the Punjab peasantry, and especially the Mohammedans, by the Hindu Urban classes, and finally, the partition in 1905 of the unwieldy province of Bengal in which Hindu influence was dominant, and the creation of a separate province of Eastern Bengal in which the Mohammedans formed the great majority. Those measures, which were carried out by Lord Curzon's Government, went far to satisfy reasonable Mohammedan aspirations. But they aroused fierce resentment among the more advanced Hindus, especially in Bengal. A violent agitation to revoke the partition was at once set on foot, under cover of which revolutionary propaganda and methods soon came into operation. Meantime Mohammedan feeling was being organized by the new Moslem League, established in 1907, to defend Mohammedan interests. But since the death of Sir Saiyid Ahmad in 1897, the community has had no capable or recognized leader, and disruptive tendencies began to make themselves felt as one ambitious aspirant succeeded another, each endeavouring to gain popularity by appeals to racial or religious feeling rather than to the sober sense of the community.

The spread of the new Pan-Islamic doctrines from Constantinople, which was so cleverly initiated by the late Sultan Abdul Hamid to strengthen his shaky throne, appealed to the megalomania of only a small section of Islam in India. Many Mohammedans, even among the Sunnis, hesitated to accept a theory of the Khalifat, which had never been recognized by the most orthodox Moghul Emperors; and the deposition of the legitimate Turkish sovereign, Abdul Hamid, in 1909 by the Committee of Union and Progress, a body naturally suspect to orthodox Mohammedans, made it more difficult to press any such claim on behalf of his successor.

But the steady decline of many historic Mohammedan States, Morocco, Tunis, Persia, under the pressure of the European Powers, and the peril to Turkey from the Tripoli and Balkan wars (1909-12), made the Indian Moslems realize that the kingdoms of Islam were crumbling, and aroused a natural sentiment of sympathy and Islamic brotherhood. Some of the Mohammedan agitators were quick to take advantage of this feeling. They proceeded under cover of the Red Crescent Fund, opened in 1912 by Dr. Ansari of Delhi, ostensibly to afford medical aid to the Turkish forces, and the society of Servants of the Kaaba (Holy places of Mecca) founded a few months later by one of the Ali brothers, to start an anti-Christian movement in parts of India, and even to hint at a Jihad or Holy War. Certain indiscreet utterances of British Ministers at the time, in regard to the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, played into their hands. But the confidence of the great mass of Mohammedans in the British Government remained unshaken till the annulment of the partition of Bengal at the end of 1911. That revocation, in deference to Hindu agitation, of what the Secretary of State had solemnly declared to be a "settled fact," fell upon them as a thunderbolt, and drove them to the conclusion that if they were not to become a depressed minority in India, they must resort to political agitation on the Congress lines. Thenceforward the advanced wing became even more hostile to the British Government than the extremist Hindus, and every incident, such as the Cawnpore Mosque case of 1913, which could be utilized to arouse an anti-British spirit, was quickly seized upon. The protagonists in this campaign were, and are, the Ali brothers, Abu Kalam, Zaffar Ali Khan, editor of the *Zemindar*, and certain so-called religious leaders who were in close touch with the Pan-Islamic movement in Turkey and elsewhere. But in 1913 their influence for evil, though already apparent, was much less than it is to-day. In that year the politically minded Mohammedans got control of the Moslem League, and following closely the Congress model adopted a new constitution of which the objects were thus defined, "the promotion among Indians of loyalty to the British Crown, the protection of the rights of the Mohammedans, and without detriment to the foregoing objects, the

attainment of a system of self-government suitable to India." The self-government clause which, read with the context, embodied a quite legitimate aspiration, excited heated discussion, as many were apprehensive that it would involve Hindu domination, and it led to the withdrawal from the League of several of its most influential members. Such was in brief the Mohammedan situation at the outburst of the war in 1914. On the surface it appeared threatening enough, but those who understand Indian conditions realize the truth of the saying, "The shallows murmur, but the deeps are dumb."

They knew that the rural Mohammedans, including the fighting races, were little, if at all, affected by the clamour of a few noisy agitators, whose pretensions to represent Islam were then not accepted; and they had observed that up to 1915 not a single Indian Mohammedan had been convicted of complicity in any of the revolutionary plots which were tarnishing the fair name of Hindu India.

The outbreak of the war found the great mass of Indian Mohammedans loyal to the King-Emperor and his cause. The long-studied pose of the German Emperor as the champion of Islam deceived but few; and after the Allies had declared that the integrity of Turkey, if she remained neutral, would be maintained, many influential Mohammedans endeavoured to dissuade Turkey from taking up arms, under German pressure, against her traditional ally and friend. The Sultan's declarations of Jihad, even when they became known in India, fell flat; for all honest Mussulmans realized that the issue was not a religious one. To this fact the Nizam of Hyderabad gave timely and valuable testimony in the public declaration he issued on Turkey's entrance into the war; while the declaration of the British Government that the Holy places of Islam would be scrupulously respected further reassured Mohammedan feeling.

The matters which caused anxiety to those of us who had to deal with the situation in India after Turkey had joined our foes were these: Firstly, there was a comparatively small but well-organized section eager to take advantage of the situation to overthrow the British Government, and for that purpose to ally itself with our enemies within and without India—namely, the Hindu revolutionaries, Turkey, Afghanistan, the Frontier Tribes, with all of which it was already in, or in a position to establish, close relations. Secondly, though the great mass of Mohammedans were loyal, and actively so in the Punjab, where their political and military importance is most marked, there was some doubt as to their willingness to participate in a war, which for them would be waged mainly against Turkey and in lands hitherto Turkish.

To the second question the Mohammedans soon gave a reassuring answer. Though forming only one-fifth of the population of India, they furnished over one-third of the 700,000 combatants raised in India

during the war. The Mohammedans of the Punjab, though numbering less than 4 per cent. of the population of India, furnished 170,000 recruits or 25 per cent. of India's total; and the tribes of the North-West Frontier, forming only 1 per cent. of the population, furnished over 30,000 men. These two Provinces, containing one-fifth of the Mohammedan population, supplied five-sixths of the Mohammedan recruits. In spite of many insidious attempts to sap their loyalty, the Mohammedan troops from British India remained true to their salt. They played a great part, not only on the Western Front in 1914-15, but later in the expulsion of the Turks from Egypt, Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia. Such cases of desertion or treachery as came to light were nearly all among the Mohammedans recruited from the untrustworthy transfrontier Tribes.

It is noteworthy that the strictly orthodox Mohammedans of the Punjab and North-West Frontier who are closest to the anti-British movements emanating from Turkey, Persia, and Kabul, and most exposed to the seditious influences operating from within and without India, remained throughout the war our firmest supporters. The tens of thousands who fought in Mesopotamia and Palestine realized that the Turks were not fighting for the Faith; many were, indeed, shocked by the Turkish laxity in religious matters, and the Mohammedans who had been taken prisoners by the Turks in Kut and elsewhere were full of resentment at the barbarous treatment they had received. A striking contrast is furnished by the history of the thousands of Turkish prisoners brought to Burmah and India. Those were so contented with their lot, that before repatriation many of them begged to be allowed to stay on in India.

But while the war strengthened the loyalty of the Mohammedan fighting races, it furnished the opportunity to the small seditious section in India, and the Mohammedan revolutionaries working abroad in league with our enemies, to stir up trouble by appeals to ignorance and fanaticism.

The intrigues of declared Indian rebels such as Barkat Ullah, Obeid Ullah, Hafiz and others in Berlin and Kabul, where they joined forces with the Hindu revolutionaries, Mahendra Partab, Herdyaal, and the Ghadr agents, were linked up with the more covert anti-British movements in India. At the end of 1915 a strong mission of Germans, Turks, and revolutionary Indians arrived in Kabul. They brought the Sultan's Jihad proclamations and endeavoured to induce the late Amir Habibullah to join in a Holy War against the Allies, promising German help and a cession of North-West India in the event of success. Mahendra Partab and Barkat Ullah were also the bearers of letters, some of which I have seen, signed by the German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, which made similar overtures to the Princes of India; but these letters never reached their destination.

The then Amir, though staunch to his alliance with us, found it advisable to temporize with the mission; and, if rumour is true, he put them off by saying he would consider their offer when he saw 100,000 German and Turkish troops on his frontier. After some fruitless negotiations the German officers quarrelled with the Afghans and left Kabul in 1916. The Turks and Indian revolutionaries remained and took, and are still taking, an active part in fomenting anti-British risings among the frontier tribes, and in stirring up rebellion in India. They found useful auxiliaries in a body of some twenty Mohammedan students, many of them sons of loyal men of good position, from the Lahore Colleges and frontier schools, who in 1915, as the result of the visit of the Ali brothers and Abu Kalam to the Punjab, had fled to Kabul to offer their services to our enemies there.

The arch-conspirators at Kabul, Barkat Ullah and Mahendra Partab, in 1916 concocted a series of operations against the British Government in India. When the German mission left, they despatched messages to the Russian Governor of Turkestan and to the Tzar himself, urging the latter to join with Germany and Turkey (with the Rulers and Government of both which Mahendra Partab professed to be in close relations) in overthrowing the British Empire in India, and thereby gain the friendship of Afghanistan and liberated India. It may be noted here that similar overtures were made in 1919, and are now being repeated by the Ali brothers to Kabul.

The mission to Russia was turned back by the Russian authorities in Turkestan, and the conspirators then made their next move. This was embodied in the far-reaching Pan-Islamic conspiracy, better known as "the Silk Letter plot," as some of the documents which fell into our hands had been written by Obeidullah at Kabul on yellow silk. The object was to combine all the forces of Islam in a great effort against the British Empire in India. Among others, the Sharif of Mecca was expected to play a big part in the scheme, and certain influential Indian Mohammedans had been sent to the Hejaz to win him over. But the Sharif, like another distinguished statesman nearer home, was thinking of making a career of his own, and his revolt against Turkey in the summer of 1916 upset the plans. By a happy series of accidents, the silk letters fell into the hands of the Punjab Government, and gave a clue to the leading conspirators. It was interesting to find that their scheme for the Provisional Government of India divided the authority between the Mohammedan Barkat Ullah and the Hindu Mahendra Partab. But the latter when questioned in Bokhara in 1920 by a British officer, disguised as a hostile agent, as to the reasons for the failure of the enterprise, said that at the last moment the Hindu revolutionary party took alarm at the risk of establishing Mohammedan dominion in India. It is significant to find a close analogy at the present time, when a leading Hindu

extremist (not Gandhi) has taken alarm at the prospect of an Afghan invasion, ostensibly for the liberation of India, and has been good enough, he assures us, to remonstrate with the Afghan emissaries against any such project.

The Sharif's revolt, the adherence of the late Amir to his treaty obligations, and the early disclosure of the plot, prevented the Silk Letter conspiracy from becoming a serious menace at a critical period of the war. It never passed into the stage of action, and, by the time it was exposed, had acquired but few adherents in India. No action, beyond mild preventive measures, was taken against the promoters in India. It now appears probable that the movement, which no doubt had its ridiculous side, was treated too lightly.

For subsequent events show that the central organization, with its combination of Bolsheviks, Turks, Afghans, and Indians, hostile to the British Government, has been maintained intact in Kabul, and, especially since the murder of our staunch ally, the late Amir, has been dangerously active.

The Sharif's revolt was most opportune in preventing a Mohammedan combination against Great Britain and her Allies in 1916. But at the time it caused considerable, and perhaps undue, anxiety to the authorities in India. No doubt the Sharif's action was unpopular with the small section of Pan-Islamist Indians. But these had, and perhaps still have, but little influence outside the towns, and a plain announcement that Government would not tolerate any attacks on our Arab ally soon silenced their agitation. The great mass of the Sunnis, whatever they may have thought of the Sharif's action, accepted the *fait accompli* with characteristic Oriental fatalism; while the Shiabs, as a body, showed cordial approval.

Thereafter, though anti-British intrigues were steadily carried on by some Mohammedan revolutionaries, they were only successful in keeping alive the ferment among the small circle of Mohammedan seditionists and also among the unruly Frontier tribes; they obtained no serious results in India itself. The fall of Baghdad in March, 1917, and the capture of Jerusalem in the following December, in both of which campaigns our Indian Mohammedan troops played a prominent part, impressed the Oriental imagination, always ready to worship success, with the might of the British Empire; and the fact that both those Holy Cities were captured without bloodshed reassured genuine Mohammedan feeling. The brilliant success of our arms in Asia more than counterbalanced the set-back on the Western Front in the spring of 1918, and the feeling of Indian Mohammedans, as a body, was never more active on our side than in the closing year of the war.

The suddenness and completeness of the Allied triumph in November, 1918, aroused genuine enthusiasm in the loyal majority, but determined the anti-British minority to make another rebellious

effort. Germany having for the time collapsed, they now turned to Bolshevik Russia which was rapidly overrunning Asia and had its agents in Persia and Kabul, where they at once joined forces with the Indian revolutionaries established there since 1915. Bolshevik Russia, since its rise has realized that the British Empire in India is the most serious obstacle to its domination of Asia, and has, therefore, set itself to combine all the forces hostile to that Empire throughout Asia to compass its downfall. This furnishes the explanation of most of our troubles with revolutionary India, with the Frontier Tribes, Afghanistan, Angora and Turkey, and perhaps in Persia, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Egypt to a lesser extent. But in 1919, without the active help of Afghanistan, rebellion in India and a general rising of the Frontier Tribes were out of the question. While the Amir Habibullah was in power, Afghan help would not be forthcoming. The Amir was murdered at Jalalabad in February, 1919, many think at Bolshevik instigation. His successor, the present Amir, soon came under the Bolshevik and anti-British influences, which were now so firmly established in Kabul, and which his father-in-law, the Turcophile Mahmud Tarzi, now Foreign Minister, had throughout the war sedulously fostered by his paper, the *Siraj-ul-Akbar*.

The Amir's murder was the signal for the seditious party in India to redouble their activities. The Rowlatt Bill furnished the pretext. That Bill was intended to arm Government with the powers necessary to cope with anarchic and revolutionary crime after the special war measures had lapsed. If it became law and was brought into operation, it would be a potent weapon for crushing sedition. The Indian revolutionaries, Hindu and Mohammedan, were quick to realize this. Hence both sections united in an agitation of unprecedented violence, headed by the notorious Gandhi, to prevent it becoming law. Some of them did not even hesitate to invoke the aid of foreign enemies. The campaign gave cover to every anti-British movement and tendency, all being combined under the magic influence of Gandhi's name. Intimidation was rampant, and even those Indians who admitted in private the necessity of the measure had not the moral courage to support it in public. The Bill was passed into law in March, 1919, by the official majority in the Council, all the Indian members voting against it or abstaining. What followed is a matter of history. The campaign of race-hatred led to violent explosions, to murders of British non-officials and Indian officials in several parts of India, to open rebellion in the Central Punjab, which was repressed by drastic military measures only a few days before the Amir began hostilities.

The rebellion in India was meant by the conspirators to synchronize with the Afghan invasion and a general rising of the Frontier tribes. The new Amir's agent in India had been instructed by his master to keep in close communication with the extremist agitators and the

extremist Press. Indeed, the Amir himself and the tribes made no secret of the fact that they had been invited by the agitators to intervene by force on behalf of "oppressed" Indians generally and of their own Indian co-religionists, whose rights and religious liberties were said to be at stake. In these overtures the Ali brothers played an important part. They had already been restricted, owing to their disloyal propaganda during the war, and they were now placed in confinement for treasonous correspondence with our Afghan enemies. The Afghans and the hostile tribes, urged on from behind by Bolshevik influence, and encouraged by the overtures from India and the reports of general disorders there, expected to find the door to Northern India open to them. But the disorders had been speedily repressed, and when the enemy invaded our borders early in May he found an army of 200,000 barring his way. The invasion was speedily hurled back, Jallalabad and Kabul were bombed, and the misguided Amir, now thoroughly alarmed as to his safety and his throne, was compelled to sue for peace. Unfortunately, the clemency so promptly shown to the foreign enemy, as well as to the internal rebels, was in both cases mistaken for weakness. Afghanistan was allowed full independence in her external relations, and the Amir was thus able to show to the world that he had won what he was fighting for, while we were unable to point to any tangible evidence of our victory.

In the same way the speedy amnesty of nearly all the criminals convicted of complicity in the Punjab rebellion, though doubtless dictated by the laudable desire to create a favourable atmosphere for the new reforms, enabled the rebel leaders and their supporters to pose as injured innocents, who had committed no crime and had been merely the victims of tyranny and oppression. In these circumstances it is not surprising to find the Afghans, the hostile tribes, and the revolutionary party in India promptly resuming their campaign.

But before coming to that final phase, it is instructive to consider the attitude of the Mohammedans of Northern India towards the Punjab rebellion and the Afghan aggression. The Mohammedans of the Punjab, in those critical months of April and May, 1919, remained as staunchly loyal as during the war, and rallied to the support of the authorities in repressing internal disorder and repelling the Afghan menace. Even those few tribes in the Western Punjab who had been hostile to recruiting during the war now promptly came forward with the offer of their services.

On May 12, 1919, a few weeks after the rebellious outbreaks had been repressed, and just after the Afghan aggression had started, the prominent Mohammedans of the Punjab presented an address to the Government which contained the following reference to those events :

"The Province has enjoyed complete internal tranquillity and peace throughout the period of the war, and has seen a remarkable diminu-

tion in the figures of crime. Although recently the enemies of law and order, as a result of organized conspiracy, *which may be the outcome of foreign influences*, succeeded in deluding a section of the people into riots and disturbances, yet the situation was soon got well in hand by using the speedy and effective methods of martial law; and peaceful life is once more possible to the law-abiding citizens of our chief towns. Generally, the village communities who came forward to serve the King-Emperor during the war have not been directly concerned in these disturbances, and thus the backbone of the Province may be said to be sound; similarly the Army, which is recruited mostly out of the said classes, has remained loyal. . . .

"We, the Moslems, whose welfare and interests are indissolubly bound up with the interests and welfare of the British Government, and who deem it a religious duty to obey their sovereign, take this opportunity of openly dissociating ourselves from the passive resistance movement, as well as from that section which has shown its hostility to the Government and to law and order."

On the same occasion the representative of the Punjab Mohammedans in the Imperial Council expressed on their behalf "our emphatic condemnation of the suicidal folly committed by Amir Amanullah in his utterly unjustifiable and unprovoked encroachment on British territory," and went on to "assure the Government of the abiding devotion of the Muslim community to the British Throne, and of our whole-hearted and loyal co-operation with Government in bringing this Afghan war to a successful conclusion." This was followed a fortnight later by an address from all the influential Pirs or Mohammedan religious leaders, in which they expressed, on behalf of themselves and their followers, their steadfast loyalty to the Government, their detestation of the Amir's aggressive action, and their belief that the British Government might be trusted to secure an equitable settlement of the Turkish question.

Those two public declarations are a striking testimony to the attitude of the Punjab Mohammedans at a most critical period and to their reasonable outlook on the Khalifat question.

But within the two years that have since elapsed much has happened to shake their confidence. The agitation so cleverly engineered by Gandhi and the extremists to conceal the nefarious designs which had brought about the rebellion and encouraged the Afghan invasion, the release of nearly all the chief criminals including the Ali brothers, the unconditional return to India of such dangerous revolutionaries as Lajpat Rai, the pardon of many of the Ghadr conspirators of 1914-16, the failure to follow up our victory over the Afghans, our withdrawal from Persia before the Bolsheviks, the great delay over the Turkish peace settlement—all these measures, the policy or necessity of which is not a matter of discussion here, were taken by

India and her Mohammedan neighbours as indications that the British power had been exhausted by the war, and could no longer pursue what they regard as a clear and firm policy. The forces of disorder, encouraged by the apparent hesitation of Government, rallied from their defeat, and the campaign of race-hatred and covert or overt rebellion was at once renewed by the old leaders, under cover of agitation in regard to the so-called Punjab atrocities and the Turkish Peace Treaty.

A campaign of calumny and misrepresentation, if skilfully conducted and meeting with no opposition, is bound to succeed with the credulous and fanatical masses to whom the agitators now mainly appeal, and who construe the silence and inaction of the authorities as a proof that they have no defence to offer and are equally incapable to punish or protect. The propaganda has been widely accepted in India and even by many people at home, who are ignorant of the unscrupulous methods of Oriental revolutionaries. Moreover, there is a certain section of the Press which will always see to it that the anti-British view is kept before the British public.

The Khalifat propaganda has hitherto been most successful among the fanatical Mohammedans of the towns. Last year it led 30,000 poor and ignorant Mohammedans to sell up their worldly goods and abandon their old homes in the land of the infidel to seek shelter among their Moslem "brethren" in Afghanistan. The movement was promoted by the Ali brothers and Gandhi, and at the start was encouraged by the Afghan authorities as a means of enhancing their influence with the discontented elements in India. The unfortunate emigrants to Afghanistan suffered untold hardships. It is believed that about 5,000 found only a grave where they had hoped to find shelter. The rest, after being harried and plundered by the Afghans and the Frontier Tribes, gradually drifted back to India, penniless and starving, and had to appeal to the Government, whose protection they had so lightly abandoned, to reinstate them in their old homes. We read little in this country of that criminal enterprise; and while the Press in India and England still rings with denunciations of the military action, involving the loss of about 400 lives, taken to repress the 1919 rebellion in the Punjab, there has been no condemnation of those who in the name of religion, but in reality for a criminal political end, lured 30,000 ignorant dupes to death and disaster.

Again, in 1920 as in 1919, the promoters of this movement, the risks of which they, of course, had not shared, succeeded in concealing their own guilt by appeals to revolutionary as well as religious feeling, and by demanding immediate Svraj or independence as the only remedy for the ills of India.

The unholy alliance between Gandhi and the Ali brothers continues, with this difference. Gandhi does not openly advocate violence against

the "Satanic" Government, which, on his own showing, he is endeavouring to overthrow by more insidious methods. The Ali brothers make no secret of their desire to resort to force and foreign aid to expel the hated British, and their programme finds favour with many of Gandhi's nominal adherents.

Gandhi has said publicly that he would prefer Bolshevik rule to British rule. Recently, though confronted with the murders and outrages resulting from his movement, he again stated that he views anarchy with equanimity. In regard to an Afghan invasion his published views as given in the Allahabad telegram of May 11 to the *Daily Telegraph* are as follows: "Mr. Gandhi, speaking at a district conference, declared that if the Ali brothers had sent a message to the Amir, they had done nothing wrong. He also would have sent one, if he could, to inform the Amir that if he came to India no Indian, as long as he, Mr. Gandhi, could help it, would assist the Government to drive him back. He knew that many Indians would not help the Government against the Amir as long as it would not grant Swaraj and redress the Punjab and Khalifat wrongs."

The telegram goes on: "Lajpat Rai, too, declared that he would not co-operate with Government in any manner in repelling Mohammedan invasion, and said he would prefer Muslim domination to domination from an outside power across the seas." Another notorious Hindu revolutionary, Mahendra Partab, was not prepared to take that view fifteen months ago, but may have altered his opinion since.

But the Ali brothers have to reckon with the growing alarm of those extremist Hindus, who, while eager enough to drive out the British or render them powerless, are not eager to see Mohammedan dominion established in their place. It is interesting to observe how Mohammed Ali in his advocacy of rebellion deals with this difficulty. The telegram of May 13 to the *Daily Telegraph* reproduces his speech as president of the recent Conference at Allahabad as follows:

"He would not ask the Amir at Kabul to supplement their fighting strength. If they implored the Amir to rescue them from the British yoke they were not fit to be made free. He denied that the Ali brothers contemplated establishing a Moslem Empire in India. All he had said regarding Afghanistan was, that if the Amir attacked India with the intention of subjugating it he would oppose him; if the Amir declared a Jihad against the British Government, which had occupied the holy places of Islam, he would help him. He would not be true to the religious teachings of the Koran if he did not help in that Jihad. If the Afghans came to the frontier, he would first ascertain their intention and then decide whether to join them or not."

Gandhi, it may be noted, made no such reservation.

Mohammed Ali is a man of no real influence and has no claim to speak for Mohammedan India. He has forced himself into the lime-

light by frenzied appeals to race-hatred, and keeps himself there by allying himself with the fanatical Hindu Gandhi, and by openly siding with the enemies of England. His acceptance here as a representative of Indian Mussulmans, to plead the cause of Turkey before the Peace Conference and the Prime Minister, has given him a fictitious importance, but his real aim, and that of his fellow-conspirators, is not to benefit Islam or Turkey, but to overthrow the British Government.

The Ali brothers when recently threatened with a prosecution for speeches of the above nature at once made a public declaration that "we never intended to incite to violence. We express our regret for the unnecessary *heat* of some of the passages of these speeches," and so on. That is rather a lame and weak apology for persistent rebellious incitements. But it is something gained, and one wishes that the action had been taken sooner, for these bubbles are easily pricked. The apology ends, however, by reiterating their adherence to the non-co-operation policy, which as worked by them and Gandhi is more insidious and far reaching than open rebellion. Mohammed Ali has made that clear.

Speaking at Madras, Mohammed Ali, in a public meeting, said: "The English did not bring any forces with them when they first landed in India. They came in like thieves, and they should send the thief out by the same aperture through which he entered their house. Indians at that time co-operated with the English and non-co-operated with their own countrymen. Now it was their turn to non-co-operate with the English and to co-operate with their countrymen. In the siege of Arcot, Madras sepoys, to help 200 British soldiers, gave up their rice and drank conjee water. Now Indians were not prepared to give the English even water. The Indian nation wanted, for the success of their cause, men, money, and munitions. A crore of rupees and a crore of members for the Congress were needed within the next three months. They should approach the Indian troops, the Indian police, and the Indian Civil Service and draw them out." That is Mohammed Ali's scheme of non-co-operation which he still adheres to.

The Punjab and Khalifat agitations are but specious pretexts to serve that purpose. That fact was made clear by Mr. Fazl-ul-Hakk, till recently one of the most prominent Mohammedan extremists. He said in a speech at Decca in December last:

"Most of the leaders of the non-co-operation movement are notoriously irresponsible agitators of questionable antecedents, the sincerity of whose motives there is every reason to question. There are some who have frankly and openly confessed to me that they do not care a brass farthing for the Khalifat, but that their whole object is to bring back the days of anarchist outrages and thereby pave the way for a revolution in India."

It is now well known that the Nationalists of Egypt and Turkey

threw ridicule on Mohammed Ali's recent attempts to enlist them under his Jihad banner, and suggested that he should join with them in raising the standard of Nationalism. The above quotations expose his unscrupulous attempt to combine the two.

When that view was put forward by those who had to deal with the rebellion of 1919 and the intrigues of the rebels with our external enemies it failed to find acceptance. Now, perhaps, it will be believed. Unfortunately, the proofs of its correctness are only too manifest. The fanatical murder of a district magistrate in Oudh in August last, and the recent barbarous murder and burning of police officers at Malegaon in Bombay by fanatical mobs are but a few of the results of the Khalifat agitation, and many people, both British and Indian, fear that these are but the prelude to more widespread disorders if the authority of the Government is not vindicated. It may be noted here that the Rowlatt Act, which was passed to deal with such a situation, has not yet been brought into operation.

But the agitation is not only undermining the peace and security of India; it is tying our hands in our dealings with the various Mohammedan countries connected with India. Afghanistan, which till two years ago had no dealings with foreign Powers except through the British Government, has now been quick to make use of the abolition of that restriction to start intriguing in India itself, and to enter into engagements with Bolshevik Russia and with the Kemalists of Angora. Those engagements *inter alia* provide for furnishing Afghanistan with subsidies, arms, and military instructors, the object of which cannot be in doubt.

How significant is the fact that the recent treaty, offensive and defensive, between Afghanistan and Angora was signed on April 25 last at Moscow. In the preamble the future welfare of the whole East is stated to be one of its objects, and in Article 5 Angora undertakes to lend Afghanistan military officers and instructors for periods of five years. This treaty coincides with Angora's repudiation of the draft treaty with France, and with its hostile attitude to the Allied Powers generally, and especially to Britain.

The same policy is embodied in the recent treaty between Angora and the Soviet Government, the first article of which guarantees "mutual aid for the emancipation of the peoples of the East and their absolute right to determine their own destinies."

There is good reason to believe that the secret treaty between the Soviet Government and Afghanistan follows the same principle of hostility to Great Britain, and we have recently heard of similar negotiations between Angora and Persia under Soviet auspices. In fact we have Bolshevik Russia uniting all the forces of Mohammedan Asia in a league against us.

Meantime we are in the ignoble position of having had a mission

in Kabul for the last six months, which so far has not succeeded in negotiating a treaty with the Afghans. The latter, apparently relying on the support of the Bolsheviks, the Kemalists, Constantinople, and on the intrigues of the disloyal Mohammedans of India—a small but dangerous section—now seek to dictate terms to us, according to a telegram in the *Daily Telegraph* of yesterday (June 18). So that within two and a half years of the overthrow of Germany and Turkey, and two years of the defeat of Afghanistan and the Frontier tribes, our position in India and the East generally is practically that of the vanquished party.

India is the base of our power in the East; while we are weak there we can speak with no authority in Asia. Once we strengthen our position there by squarely facing and resolutely solving our problems, the problems of adjoining Mohammedan countries will present but little difficulty. The seditious Mohammedan agitation in India is the first question to be tackled. Its extent and importance, though they have steadily grown under the policy of inaction, have been much exaggerated. The great majority of Indian Mohammedans are still actively loyal, and the Khalifat agitation appeals only to some of the ignorant mob whose fanaticism is aroused by the persistent campaign of calumny, which since the war we have done little to restrain or counteract. Once we make it clear that we intend to do what it is the duty of every Government, democratic or autocratic, to do—namely, to enforce the law impartially against all law-breakers, whether fanatics, ascetics, or mere seditious adventurers—we shall rally all loyal and law-abiding classes, who are disgusted and alarmed at the growing lawlessness, to our side, and can afford to disregard any spurious clamour that may be raised against so-called repressive action.

Our greatest title to the support and loyal obedience of the Indian masses has been our even-handed justice; but in recent years there has been a dangerous tendency to subordinate the orderly process of justice to a hasty political opportunism. That has shaken the confidence of the public and opened the door to the intrigues in which certain classes of political adventurers are so expert. If we stick to the law, all classes will know how they stand, and none will be able to gain an undue advantage over another.

In India as elsewhere the alternatives are "govern or go." Not one Indian in a hundred, not one Indian Mohammedan in a thousand, wants us to go; but in the opinion of loyal Indians we are *not* governing. To them it is no use quoting "self-determination" in justification of our present policy. A year ago in India, when I tried that argument with some of the leading Mohammedans of the Punjab, they bluntly said that while the British Government was in India they expected it to govern; if we were not prepared to do so, we should clear out and leave them to apply the principle of self-determination in their own

way. We know what that would be. Rudyard Kipling depicted it with rare humour and marvellous foresight in his ballad, "What happened"—i.e., what would happen at the repeal of the Arms Act which was then being demanded at the first Indian Congress as the first step to self-determination. I will read you a few lines :

" But the Indian Government, always keen to please,
Alas gave permission to horrid men like these,
Yar Mahomad, Yusufzai, down to kill or steal,
Chimbu Singh from Bikaneer, Tantia the Bhil,

" Killan Khan, the Marri chief, Sowar Singh the Sikh,
Nabhi Bakhsh, Punjabi Jat, Abdul Hak Rafey,
He was a Wahahi ; last, little Boh Hla Oo
Took advantage of the Act—took a Snider too.

" With a unanimity dear to patriot hearts
All those fiery gentlemen out of foreign parts
Said : ' The good old days are back—let us go to war.'
Swaggered down the Grand Trunk Road into Bow Bazar.

* * * *

" What became of Mookerji ? Ask Mahomed Yar,
Prodding Siva's sacred bull down the Bow Bazar.
Speak to placid Nabhi Bakhsh—question land and sea,
Ask the Indian Congress men—only don't ask me."

These verses make us laugh, but it is no longer a laughing matter. We have been in the last year, we are to-day, much nearer to the menace than most people imagine. If we have escaped so far—and the disorder is steadily spreading—we have to thank the Arms Act, the Indian Army, and the classes from which it is raised. But we cannot go on counting on those classes whether Mohammedan, Hindu, or Sikh, unless we make it clear that, whatever changes there may be in the form or the machinery of administration, it is controlled by a Government that means to govern. Everyone who has the well-being of India at heart must therefore welcome the recent public assurance of the Government of India "that they will enforce the law relating to offenders against the State, *as and when they may think fit*, against any persons who have committed breaches of it." The assurance would perhaps have carried more weight but for the qualifying words, "*as and when they may think fit*."

After checking sedition in India by impartially enforcing the law, the settlement of the Turkish question comes next in order of urgency. The delay in that settlement has provided the opportunity for the spurious pro-Turkish agitation by those Indian Mohammedans, who for selfish and traitorous objects pose as more Turkish than the Turks, and who have the audacity to dictate peace terms, such as the restoration of Thrace and Syria to Turkey and the forms of administra-

tion to be established in Palestine and Mesopotamia, which the Turks themselves had never claimed. It was, and is, wise and just to take into account the sentiments of *loyal* Indian Mohammedans in the Turkish peace settlement; but having done that, we should make it clear that we see through the impudent designs of those who desire, not so much the good of Turkey or of Islam, as the weakening or the ruin of Great Britain.

The settlement of the Turkish question will conduce not only to the improvement of the internal situation in India; it will also help to purge the Afghans of their megalomania and dispose them to a treaty on reasonable lines. Those should, of course, include the strict enforcement of the provisions, embodied in the Trade agreement with Soviet Russia, against Afghanistan being used as a bridge for the passage to India of Bolshevist agents and propaganda. It would be interesting to know whether such intrigues have ceased since the signature of the Trade agreement. We have at our disposal many potent means for bringing the Afghans to reason; an economic blockade would perhaps be as effective as any, for Afghanistan is dependent on India for many of the necessities of life.*

The restoration of friendly relations with Kabul would at once react favourably on our relations with the Frontier tribes. Every hostile act on their part in recent years has been inspired directly by Kabul or by agents from Kabul, such as the notorious Haji Abdul Razak and Colonel Daud Shah, whose actions the Amir's Government accepts or repudiates as may suit it at the time.

The above suggestions may be criticized as humdrum and uninspiring. But there is no royal road to success in these matters. Everything turns on our having a clear policy and agents capable of carrying it out. The British Government has never lacked the agents; it has sometimes lacked the policy. Given those conditions we can overcome the present difficulties, restore stability to India, promote the progress and prosperity of our 70,000,000 Mohammedan fellow-subjects there, and enable them to play a part commensurate with their great past and their political importance in the movement

* *Daily Telegraph*, June 14, 1921: "There does not seem to be any improvement in the relations between Afghanistan and the Indian Government. Accurate information is now to hand as to the far-reaching demands made from Kabul as a condition of the signing of a new Treaty. These terms, evidently inspired by the Amir's Bolshevist and Kemalist advisers, are the following:

"1. The right to use an Indian harbour as a free port for Afghan foreign trade.

"2. The right to import arms, with unrestricted transit over the Indian railways.

"3. The return of Waziristan in the North-Western Province.

"4. The withdrawal of the protest against Russian Consulates on the Indian border."

towards self-government in India. Without those conditions, unrest, seditious intrigue, and anarchy will spread, and our Indian Mohammedans, who have been so loyal to us in the past and were such a source of strength to us in the late wars, will become a source of weakness to us and of strength to our enemies.

The CHAIRMAN : Ladies and Gentlemen, I am sure we have all listened with great interest to Sir Michael O'Dwyer's paper, and are much obliged to him for reading it. I think it is encouraging to us to know that, at all events up to the present, whenever there has been an emergency, the Mohammedans of India have stood by us. They have stood by us in the war, and have even been willing to fight against their co-religionists. They have been with us in the troubles that have followed the war. There are, of course, many malicious and harmful individuals who endeavour to stir up the Mohammedans against us; but of one thing I feel certain, and that is that their efforts will never be finally successful, because Hindoos and Mohammedans can never really act together. As soon as they gained any advantage the question would arise between them whether the advantage was to go to the Mohammedans or Hindoos, and there would certainly never be any willingness on the part of either Mohammedans or Hindoos to submit themselves to their pseudo-friends and partners. I am sure that if the Government would only deal firmly with the authors of the sedition, and put a stop to the seditious and violent speeches that have been made by both sides alike, Hindoos and Mohammedans—(Applause)—and especially deal with those seditious leaders, the Ali brothers, that we should have no more unrest in India; because the Indian, if he respects anything, respects strength. If you refrain from dealing with open sedition the Indians always put it down to fear. They think that you are afraid to deal with it, and I suppose, as a matter of fact, that is very much the case. But if you once show them that you are resolved to act firmly and to put down sedition, there is no doubt they will respect the Government, and, except amongst the most fanatical, any seditious attempt will come to an end. I should like to know whether any gentleman would like to make any remarks on the paper that has been read.

Sir EDMUND BARROW : Apart from the great debt of gratitude we owe to Sir Michael O'Dwyer, there is one observation I should like to make, which is that you should not place too much reliance on what you see in the Press. (Hear, hear.) Sir Michael quoted just now from the *Daily Telegraph* a statement regarding the conditions that the Amir was laying down for our acceptance. The *Daily Telegraph* might possibly have had some justification for believing those statements, but I do not think anyone else need be alarmed by them. Probably the information that we have had in London is

of more recent date than that of the *Daily Telegraph* on this matter. I need say no more about the subject, but I should be sorry if you all went away with the impression that we were in a hopeless position; and I also have some hope that really—I must be careful what I am saying—that really our position *vis-à-vis* the Afghans is no worse than that of the Bolsheviks, and perhaps a good deal better. (Applause.)

Colonel Sir CHARLES YATE: I think we must all be very glad indeed to hear from Sir Edmund Barrow that reassuring statement about the demands of the Amir of Afghanistan which are now being threshed out at Kabul. Our mission has been there since the commencement of this year; they have had six months at it and, so far as we, the outside public, know, they have not got any forwarder. I am sure it will be great news for everybody to learn that Sir Edmund Barrow, who is behind the scenes, takes a hopeful view of the situation. I have followed the address of Sir Michael O'Dwyer with very great interest. It is difficult to say anything because I so thoroughly agree with what he has said. In the lecture the first remark that struck me was that the peril to Turkey made the Indian Moslems realize that the kingdoms of Islam were crumbling away. That has often been brought forcibly home to me, especially when travelling in Afghanistan. Sitting over the fire talking with Mohammedans—I can remember especially with the Afghan Commander-in-Chief of Herat—how he would say to me that the Mohammedan kingdoms were going one after another, and that he did not know what was to be the end of it all. I realize what Sir Michael said, how strongly that is felt by all Mohammedans, especially throughout the East. The next point that struck me was the mention made by Sir Michael of the use of Mohammedan troops during the late war. He said that in spite of many insidious attempts to sap their loyalty, such acts of desertion as came to light were nearly all amongst the Mohammedans recruited from the untrustworthy trans-frontier tribes. I think we must all realize that there is a spirit in the frontier tribes, and in the Afghans as well—a very great spirit, too—of allegiance to Turkey; and I think it is one of the most marvellous things that all our Indian Mohammedans throughout the war should have gone and fought for us against the Turks in the way they did. (Applause.) The cases of desertion that did occur were, as Sir Michael O'Dwyer said, nearly all amongst the frontier and trans-frontier tribes. Those are a particularly fanatical lot, and had the officers at Army Headquarters in Simla known anything whatsoever of the idiosyncracies of Indian troops, I do not think they would have sent some of the regiments they did to fight directly against the Turks. If those men had been sent against Germans, or to East Africa, they would have been perfectly true and loyal; but any desertion or trouble that occurred was mainly caused by sending them to Mesopotamia and other places

where they had directly to fight Turks. This had no effect on Indian Mohammedans, but it affected trans-frontier and Punjab border men. Of all such men it is well known how much they look to the Khalif and Sultan of Rum as their head. To my mind it was a very unwise and very unfair thing to put such a test to those men, and they ought, I think, to have been used in other theatres of the war. I think that for whatever trouble did occur it was our own Army Headquarters in India that are to be blamed for it as much as anything else. (Applause.)

Thirdly, Sir Michael O'Dwyer dwelt on the very mistaken clemency shown after the Punjab rebellion of 1919. Nothing could have been worse than that. I do not think anything could have stirred up trouble in India more than that mistaken clemency. When we defeated the Afghans in the war, the terms of peace ought to have been dictated by the General in command on Afghan territory. Instead of that the Government of India brought the representatives of Afghanistan over to Rawal Pindi, and spent two or three months fooling about with them there, while all the time Afghan agents were stirring up the Frontier tribesmen to unite together in opposing us. Tremendous trouble was thus caused; in fact, the whole Frontier was set in a blaze. Had the British General dictated his terms of peace in Dacca or anywhere else in Afghan territory, and insisted on carrying them out there and then, a great deal of the subsequent trouble would never have arisen. (Applause.)

That was entirely due, I think, to mistaken clemency to the Afghans. We ought to have taken up our position on the Frontier and to have remained there. The opportunity should have been taken to annex and hold all the jumping-off places the Afghans used when they invaded India, so as to prevent them doing anything of the sort again. We ought to have put the fear of God into them, and said: "You will not do this again." (Applause.)

There has been a great deal of what Sir Michael O'Dwyer called political opportunism in India. Instead of boldly attacking rebellion in India we have seen the Government of India pandering to rebels day after day. Instead of using the strength of government, they have pandered to one rebel after another. They allowed the Rowlatt Bill agitation to come to a head, and have gone on to the present day pandering to rebels. Pandering to rebels is no good whatever, and if you once put a man in gaol, in my opinion, you ought never to let him out again until you are first perfectly satisfied he can do no further harm. All those rebels who were convicted and sentenced ought never, I think, to have been let out again unless it was absolutely certain that they would be harmless in future. We have seen the result in the trouble going on at the present time, and I can only hope the present Government of India will show more strength of character than the late one did, and pluck up courage to stop the agitators now preaching sedition all over India. We have a tremendously dangerous

time before us. We see great anxiety amongst all outlying Europeans throughout the whole country for fear of risings which may come at any moment. All that will be put a stop to once you suppress the agitators. The moment Mohammed Ali and his brother got news that the Government were going to take action against them they wrote an apology. If such action had been taken two years ago they would have done the same thing then. It is no good pandering to these men—you must lock them up; and I hope sincerely the real question of the locking up of these agitators will be taken in hand at once, and that there will be no more pandering to agitation. Finally, we all know, with regard to the mission at Kabul, what the advantage is of having a peaceful Afghanistan on our side. We all know that the Frontier tribal troubles are mainly caused by agitation in Afghanistan, and by having Afghanistan to go back to. They make a raid into British India, and get a refuge back in Afghanistan. We must stop that. If we can get a friendly Afghanistan, by all means let us do so; if not, we must occupy all the Frontier territory, and say to the people in Afghanistan: "You come and agitate here at your peril." (Applause.)

Mr. MOON: Mr. Chairman, may I be permitted to raise one brief point. I take it the Mohammedan seditious people in India mostly try to make capital out of what I may call a theological point—namely, that the British and Allies were interfering with and damaging the temporal power of the head of the Islamic world. I am under the impression that the theologians in the Islamic world are divided, that a very large portion of them do not recognize the Sultan at Constantinople as Khalifa. We have heard papers read before the Society which lay stress on the claims of the Arab potentate as Islamic chief. Perhaps Sir Michael O'Dwyer would add to his kindness by saying a word or two on that point, and would let us know whether the claims and views of the latter party were entirely overborne by the noisy uproar of the other side?

Lieutenant-General Sir RALEIGH EGERTON: Only one remark I would like to make, referring to the statement with regard to desertions among Mohammedans on Service. To the best of my recollection, the desertions that took place among Mohammedan troops employed first of all in France were entirely trans-border men. There were two occasions, one on which a considerable number of men went over, and another on which a small party of two or three went over; but they were all trans-border men. But when we came to Mesopotamia my own recollection is that there were very few desertions among the Mohammedans. The few I remember were from Mohammedans of the Punjab. There were only two or three—one was an Indian officer. There were also, curiously enough, desertions on the part of Hindoos. I remember a Brahmin deserted; not only once, for when brought

back he deserted again. Goodness knows what became of him; he was never heard of again. In France it was trans-border men, but to the best of my recollection, in Mesopotamia the desertions took place fairly equally from among Trans-border and Punjabi Mohammedans.

Sir PERCY SYKES: One point I might mention: that is, with reference to those letters which the lecturer described as being written by Bethmann-Holweg, the late Chancellor. When I reached Kirman I seized about thirty or forty of them. They were addressed to various Indian princes, with a very fine one for the Amir; all signed, as the lecturer said, by the then German Chancellor. There were also two very fine decorations, "spread-eagles," for the Amir, sent by his great friend the Kaiser, who called himself Hajji Wilhelm. (Laughter.) The Persian Governor-General very kindly offered to make me a gift of one of these "spread-eagles," but the rules of the Service forbade me to take it.

General Sir ROBERT SCALLON: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I think that what we want to do in India is to make the people understand that it not only pays to be loyal, but that it is safe to be loyal. Because at the present moment what we see is that the loyal people have a very poor time. Disloyal people are listened to, and loyal people cannot safely express their own opinions even in their own homes. At the beginning of the war it was extraordinary how in the Punjab the Punjabis came forward to help us. I remember one old gentleman brought four sons: "These are the only lads I have; take them all, sir." The reason why the men in the Punjab came forward was because they knew that under Sir Michael O'Dwyer they had somebody who would always take the part of the loyal, and keep the disloyal in their right place. (Applause.) Those who were in the Punjab in the early days of the war, and remember what happened when the people came back from the Far East, from America, instigated by the Germans—how he dealt with them—will realize how much we owe in the Punjab to what he did in order to maintain the supremacy of the British raj. (Applause.) If Sir Michael O'Dwyer had not done what he did in those early days of the war, not only should we not have obtained the recruits which we did obtain, but many of the troubles we had later on would have come in days when it would have been far more inconvenient to deal with them. It was really extraordinary how that movement grew which took numbers of our misguided Mohammedans over the frontiers into Afghanistan. Before the war, year after year, numbers of people came from the various Mohammedan countries in Asia on their way through India to Mecca; and there is hardly one of them who has not had cause to complain that the only time during his journey when he was subject to discomfort, ill-treatment, and trouble was the time he was traversing the countries under Mussulman rule—Afghanistan and the countries

between the coast and Mecca. As to the opinion of the Mussulmans in India towards the Sultan, I think that when the Young Turkish movement came into being a very large number of the Mussulmans in India felt that the whole character of Constantinople, or Rum, as regards its relations to the Mohammedans generally, had changed. As one of them put it, "They have put the Koran behind their backs"; and I do not think there are very many in India of ordinary Moslems who have any very great regard at the present day for the Mohammedan power in Constantinople. But I should like once more to say that all of us in India owe a very great debt of gratitude for the attitude which Sir Michael O'Dwyer adopted in dealing with the troubles which arose in that country with the beginning of the war. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN : Ladies and Gentlemen, unless any other gentleman would like to make some remarks, I will end the proceedings by offering a cordial vote of thanks to Sir Michael O'Dwyer for the paper he has read to us to-day. I think the remarks that have been made show conclusively that Sir Michael O'Dwyer's argument is quite a correct one, and that to win the respect and loyalty of the people of India we need a firm and just rule, and one that would carry out the law and put a stop to any infringement of it. I propose a cordial vote of thanks to Sir Michael O'Dwyer.

The vote of thanks was given with a round of applause, and this ended the meeting.

ANNUAL DINNER

THE Annual Dinner of the Society was held at the Imperial Restaurant, Regent Street, W., on June 15, with the Right Hon. Lord Carnock in the chair, and the Right Hon. Lord Chelmsford as the guest of the evening.

LORD CARNOCK, proposing the health of the guest of the evening, said that the Society had been progressing most favourably since the last annual dinner, and the number of members was growing in a most satisfactory way. The lectures, he was glad to say, were having increasing notice in the public press, and it was gratifying that so many members had joined who were in India, Mesopotamia, or elsewhere in the East. This was an encouraging feature, and showed that the Journal was a very useful agent in promoting the welfare and disseminating the knowledge of the Society amongst our compatriots abroad. They could congratulate themselves on having with them so distinguished a personage as Lord Chelmsford, who so lately occupied the high and important post of Viceroy of India. They numbered amongst their members many who in the political or military field had filled very onerous and responsible posts in the Indian Empire, and it was entirely appropriate that they should have the ex-Viceroy as their guest. (Cheers.) Lord Carnock went on to speak of the heavy anxieties which had confronted Lord Chelmsford, of the courage and resource with which he had met them, and of his great share in laying the foundations of a reformed system of government.

LORD LAMINGTON, in supporting the toast, said that though his rising was superfluous in view of the admirable terms in which the Chairman had presented the toast, he trusted he would be allowed to pay his tribute of admiration for all that Lord Chelmsford had done during his tenure of high office in India. At no time in the history of our Eastern Empire had there been a crisis more tremendous or events more important than those with which he was confronted. He (the speaker) recalled with some satisfaction that when the question of a selection for the Viceroyalty was under discussion nearly six years ago, he was talking to someone high up in the Government, and said: "Why not send Chelmsford?" He was not saying that thereby he suggested the idea, but he did claim that he had some foresight in seeing what the man would turn out to be, and how he was qualified to accomplish so tremendous a task. Some years before that he was talking to the then Secretary for the Colonies as to a certain action Lord Chelmsford had taken as Governor of Queensland, when he had to consider some

very critical episode and to differ from his responsible advisers. Lord Crewe said: "Yes, Chelmsford is an excellent man for a Dominion Governorship, for he is not afraid to act on his own judgment instead of always cabling home for advice as to what he should do." His selection, when he was serving in the war as the officer of a Territorial regiment, showed a very wise judgment. In studying Central Asian affairs they had always to bear in mind that events which occurred, even in the extremes of Asia, were bound to have their repercussion in India.

Thus, the oppressive terms of the Sévres Treaty only formulated long after the Armistice was signed, have aroused great indignation in the Moslem world, and must have generated a feeling that would cause anxiety to Lord Chelmsford when holding sway over so many millions of Mohammedans.

Lord CHELMSFORD, who was received with great applause, said he deeply appreciated the honour which had been given him by the Society in inviting him to be their guest that night. But in accepting the invitation he was not unmindful that it carried with it the corollary of making a speech, and throughout his life he had avoided making speeches except under duress of *force majeure*, and on this occasion he was surrounded by men who had been distinguished in the diplomatic sphere in India and elsewhere in the East. There was never a time in the varied history of our country when so many urgent problems called for solution, and the general public, vexed and perplexed by their multiplicity and their complexity, seemed unable to take any interest in any problems which did not come immediately under their eyes and affect their comfort. It was natural that the general public should be interested in the coal strike, should be fairly interested in the state of Ireland, and, *longo intervallo*, in the difficulties between the Allies with regard to the Silesian problem. But as one who had spent nearly all the fifteen years since 1905 out of England, he was puzzled by the extraordinary calm—he might almost say indifference and perhaps apathy—with which the general public seemed to treat all those momentous problems which were facing our statesmen here at the present time. Their chief interest seemed to be in the test match; in the polo, tennis, and golf tournaments, and in the race-course; and, indeed, some of the leading papers seemed to devote much more intelligent attention to these great subjects than to the urgent problem facing us at the present moment. Were it not for the memory of the heroic suffering, endurance, and patience of this country during the Great War, one would be inclined to say with the poet:

"You have the Pyrrhic dance as yet,
Where is the Pyrrhic phalanx gone?
Of two such lessons why forget
The nobler and the manlier one?"

It was clear that the general public was bewildered by the multiplicity and complexity of these problems, and every allowance must be made for the mental and moral exhaustion following on those fearful five or six years through which we had passed. But it meant that there were certain urgent problems in which the general public had taken no interest, problems which in old days would have filled their thoughts and minds and might have led to the fall and disappearance of ministries. It was to two of those problems he wished to direct attention—viz., those of the Turkish peace terms and of Persia.

In regard to Turkey, it was now nearly three years since an armistice was concluded with that country. In April, 1920, peace terms were offered to Turkey, and in August last peace was signed. Since then there had been further conferences and further modifications had been suggested. But despite all this there was no peace. There was a treaty which we were powerless to enforce, and the writ of the Allied Powers did not run anywhere practically within the Turkish dominions.

Lord CHELMSFORD continued: Now I frankly approach this subject as one who has had under his Government 70,000,000 Mohammedan subjects of the King-Emperor, and I should say that my remarks are made entirely from that standpoint. I have no knowledge and can have no knowledge of the considerations on the other side which have weighed on those responsible. For my part I should have liked to have said to the Turks: "You entered unprovoked into the war; indeed, we implored you and almost bribed you not to do so; your entry prolonged the war and entailed an incalculable extension of the toll of death, suffering, and expenditure which we incurred. For this you must be punished. But we will not be unmindful of our old friendship; we know you were misled by false advisers, and we will remember that we have as subjects of the King-Emperor in India some 70,000,000 of those who hold the same faith as you do. We will consider all these things in dealing with you. Therefore we propose, while punishing you, to deal as generously with you as we possibly can compatible with agreements we have made with third parties." (Cheers.) Now, I believe that in this way we should not have had, as at present, a Turkey which is thoroughly and bitterly hostile to us and a Peace Treaty whose terms cannot be enforced. It may well be thought that what I have suggested would not have been absolutely successful, but surely we could have not been worse placed than we are under the present conditions of the Treaty. I would like to suggest, further, that the policy which has been adopted has violated that very fundamental principle of statecraft that your policy must have some relation to the military force which is available to support it. Nothing could be more ignominious than the present position in which this Empire of ours and the

Allies have imposed terms upon Turkey which they are powerless to enforce.

Yesterday afternoon I had the privilege of listening to Mr. Churchill's most interesting and illuminating exposition of policy in connection with Mesopotamia and Palestine. Mr. Churchill showed his usual courage and frankness in not blinking the situation. He said that his policy would be frustrated unless there was a lasting settlement with Turkey. (Loud cheers.) I believe that if the policy I have outlined had been followed such a settlement would not be to-day an hypothesis but an actual fact. If we are not going to get that peaceful and lasting settlement with Turkey I should like to ask if Mr. Churchill has behind his policy the military force which can enforce it; because, if not, it seems to me that the chances of his policy being successful are perilously small.

Now let me turn to the subject of Persia. There was a time when Persia looked upon England as her most disinterested friend; and I think that even under the Anglo-Russian agreement Persia did not altogether despair. She felt that we were being dragged at the heels of Russia, and she knew in her heart of hearts that we were really her friends. (Cheers.) Then came that very difficult time in the war which would have been a difficult time even between nations which were absolutely trusting each other, but which was the more difficult because of the suspicion in the Persian mind. Persia was the avenue to India for the advance of German and Turkish forces, and it was necessary for us to take steps for the security of our dominions in the East which did not seem quite compatible with the neutrality of Persia. But I believe that that would have passed off quite smoothly if it had not been for that *souçon* of suspicion with regard to our designs in Persia. A golden opportunity came for us when the Czarist régime fell in Russia. It would have been possible for us then to say to Persia: "We are now free from the shackles of the Anglo-Russian agreement. We wish to do all we can to show our friendliness to you, and all we desire is to see Persia prosperous and strong, and we are ready to aid you in putting your house in order. But please understand that if we do so it must be in response to your own requests. We can undertake no measures which constitute an interference with the independence of your country." I am perfectly aware that all through these were our aims, and that we said so. But I cannot help feeling that our actions were not up to our words; that we were school-mastering in Persia all the time, and that we were not getting in touch with that portion of the Persian public which may be described as the democratic national party, and which has proved to be a very potent factor in Persian politics. (Cheers.) We allied ourselves to the most reactionary element in politics that existed in Persia, and which was regarded as hopelessly Anglophile. And when

we put up the Anglo-Persian agreement the suspicions of Persians became not doubts, but convictions, that we were out for something for ourselves, and were not out genuinely for the interests of Persia. (Cheers.)

Well, the agreement came to birth, and I cannot say that it did very much more. It came to birth though it was always stoutly opposed by the Persian people as a whole. It never obtained the approval of the Persian Mejliss; indeed, no ministry ventured even to summon the Mejliss to secure sanction for it, though there has been a succession of ministries since it was published. So the agreement practically lapsed. I cannot help feeling that it deserves the epitaph on an infant which lived only a few days: "If I were so soon to be done for, what was I ever begun for?" (Laughter.)

I am afraid it is a gloomy tale I have unfolded this evening; but can anyone say that what I have told you is not in consonance with the facts? Or can anyone say that what I have said has deviated one hair's-breadth from what has actually happened? (Hear, hear.) I have been particularly scrupulous to say nothing to-night which could not have been said by anyone of you who have followed these matters from beginning to end. Naturally anyone who has been in my position must be careful that he does not touch upon such information as comes into his possession in an official capacity. But I think I have said nothing to-night which is not known to any one of you who have followed affairs.

What is the upshot? There is a vast tract of Asiatic country where Islam prevails and where England was once a cherished neighbour and indeed a cherished friend, but is now no longer so. In Persia we are profoundly suspect. The fact is that you cannot run the Empire in watertight compartments, and as the largest Mohammedan power in the world you cannot afford to ignore Mohammedan opinion in formulating your policy in these matters. (Cheers.) If you ignore that consideration you must be prepared to see that the policy you adopt is backed by military force capable of imposing it, as the only principle on which your policy can be based. But I sincerely hope that that will not be the principle we follow, and that we shall be mindful of the consideration that our policy must have regard to the fact that we are the greatest Mohammedan power and that Mohammedan sentiment should influence though it does not govern our decisions. (Cheers.) If this is so you must go to the right place for getting your information and advice. You cannot ignore in these matters the Government of India, which has special and peculiar opportunities of being able to gauge the situation in the East. Therefore if we are going to have an Eastern policy which is to be an Eastern policy in more than name, you must keep in close touch with India the whole time. The connection must be more than a liaison for the passing on of information. It must be

one of consultation and advice, and you must be prepared to follow such advice. I believe if such a policy had been pursued in settling the peace and were to be pursued in the future you would not have the present chaos over all these vast regions and England a back number as she has in a measure become, but that you would have peace, and England maintaining the great position in the East and winning back the faith and confidence which she enjoyed for so many years in the past. (Loud cheers.)

Lord CHELMSFORD proposed the toast of the chairman, and Lord CARNOCK briefly acknowledged the toast.

REVIEW

A HISTORY OF PERSIA. By Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, K.C.I.E., C.M.G. Second Edition.

(Reprinted by kind permission from the "*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*.")

The first edition of this History appeared in 1915, and was reviewed at some length by Mr. Longworth Dames in the October number of the R.A.S. *Journal* for that year. Sir Percy Sykes has now published a second edition of his work, revising it in many particulars and adding eight chapters, which bring it up to date.

This *Journal* is not the place for the discussion of political questions, but it must be observed that the fresh period which has been added to the subject-matter of the History is one of special importance—the period of the Great War, which has changed the face not only of Persia but of the world. And it is safe to say that no man living was so well fitted for telling the story as Sir Percy Sykes. In reviewing the first edition Mr. Longworth Dames drew attention to the writer's "unrivalled experience of the country of Persia, and of its people, their customs, their art, and their archæology." This unique qualification for the work stands out with double clearness when the historian comes to deal with events *quorum pars magna fuit*. Possibly it tends here and there to detract slightly from the historical manner of the book, but it ensures the accuracy of the statements made regarding a very intricate series of military and political operations, and renders them comprehensible. If told by a writer whose knowledge had been gathered entirely in his library, the story would be very hard to follow, for the writer would himself understand but imperfectly the characters and lines of thought and action of the various races which go to make up the population of Iran. As told by Sir Percy Sykes, with his very different type of knowledge, the story becomes a lucid and consistent whole.

I have not space to comment in detail on the various points of interest which are treated in this second edition, but they are many, and as the reader goes from one to another he cannot fail to be impressed by a feeling, which is evidently the writer's feeling, of admiration for the high level of courage and practical capacity shown in difficult circumstances by unknown men and women of British race. Whether in the great adventure of the "Dunsterville mission" to Baku, or in the

operations of the force which restored order and peace to the vast tracts of Southern Persia, or in other positions of trial, those qualities seem to emerge as a matter of course ; and it is cheering at times, when we are passing through periods of apparent failure, in war, or in the organizations of peace, or in the contests of sport, to think how true to type the average Englishman shows himself to be, all over the world, when he finds himself faced with novel dangers and responsibilities.

The last chapter of Sir Percy Sykes's book, "Persia after the Great War," is perhaps the most interesting chapter of all. As one lays it down one can only feel with the writer a hope—not a certainty, but a hope—that in time to come Persia will once more play a part in the world worthy of her splendid past. Nowhere could her people find more encouragement to do so than in the pages of this History.

H. M. DURAND.

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 Davies, Rea, 127, Rue Rakovska, Sofia.
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 Director of Intelligence, Sudan Government, Khartoum.
 Drower, C. Stefana, c/o Credit Lyonnais Bank, Cockspur Street, S.W.
 Duncan, J. A. L., Rocky Close, St. Ives, Cornwall.
 Duncan, Mrs., Rocky Close, St. Ives, Cornwall.
 Farrer, Hon. C. C., 100, Palace Gardens Terrace, W. 8.
 Forbes, Dowager Lady, Ladies' Park Club, 32, Knightsbridge, S.W.
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- Horridge, J., Haverholme, Brumhall, Cheshire.
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*It has been considered advisable to publish Part IV. of the Journal
immediately. No further number will be issued this year.*

